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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The view that individuals and organisations create or enact their social worlds through 
shared frames of reference, on-going interlocking routines and patterns of action is 
increasingly underpinning academic research and offering practitioners new insights.  At 
the same time, now commonplace strategy consultancy services are rooted in the 
rhetoric, if not the practice, of rational, technical analysis.  This research explores the 
influence of management consultants in helping managers to create as well as discover 
the environment they experience and to develop and realise a strategic direction for 
their organisations. 
 
Grounded in four diverse case studies, the research offers a richer, inextricably 
contextual and essentially social conception of consultants’ strategy interventions.   
Consultants’ work is conceived as simultaneously embedded or set within, yet seeking 
to achieve a separation from, existing organisational frames of reference, 
commitments and routines.  By creating and maintaining some degree of separation, 
consultants facilitate a distinct enactment or experience of the world, and so influence 
the strategic thinking and subsequent actions of managers.  Efforts to achieve 
separation are met by pressures to conform, and the ideas generated merge into the 
wider organisational enactment.  The research points to complex processes of reciprocal 
influence, positioning and resistance between consultants and members of the 
organisation which shape the nature and course of an intervention.  It also sheds light on 
the ripple effect interventions have through an organisation, on how new strategies are 
diffused and fused within existing patterns of thought and action, and the process of 
strategic change and transformation. 
 
The theoretical framework developed, comprising the concept of embedded 
enactment and two overarching dimensions of separation and absorption, provides a 
new way of understanding and explaining consultants’ strategy interventions. The 
case studies themselves describe some subtleties and nuances of interventions and offer 
opportunities for consultants and managers to reflect on personal experiences. 
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Chapter 1 1
1. THESIS 
 
 
1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH: 
  LOGIC, DESIGN AND CONDUCT 
 
Management consultants and the assistance they offer senior managers in the 
development and realisation of strategy are now a common feature of organisational 
life.  Such consulting interventions have traditionally been grounded in the rhetoric, if 
not necessarily the practice, of a rational linear conception of strategic management. 
Perhaps ironically, the ubiquity of strategy consulting has coincided with the questioning 
of the assumptions underpinning this classical conception. 
 
In particular, the adaptive, institutional and, more recently, the enactment perspectives 
have begun to enrich theory and to offer greater insights and hope to practitioners.  The 
enactment perspective is founded on the view that an organisation’s environment, in 
terms of relationships with customers, suppliers, competitors, stakeholders and other 
entities, is socially constructed or acted out.  The organisation and its environment are 
created together by the on-going social interaction of key individuals (Smircich and 
Stubbart 1985).  Newer metaphors of organisations, based on shared frames of reference, 
assumptions, social constructs and webs of meaning and relationships are drawn upon to 
address processes of interpretation, sensemaking and action.  These create and sustain 
the taken for granted understanding and lived experience of the organisation and its 
environment.  Attention is drawn to how managers can re-conceive and re-create 
different and more appropriate patterns of thinking and acting, in essence new 
enactments (Weick 1995).  Increasingly, academics and practitioners are seeking to find 
ways of helping individuals and organisations to overcome what they see as self-
imposed constraints and limitations. 
 
The objectivity, expertise, and even the analytical and process skills described and 
promoted by consultants in relation to the value they offer sit uneasily within the 
enactment perspective.  This questions the very existence of an objective social reality 
and the idea that rational means can shed light on a constructed social world.  Such a 
paradox raises questions and suggests that research into consultants’ strategy 
intervention from an enactment perspective offers the possibility of fresh insights into 
how such interventions affect the thinking and subsequent actions of members of the 
organisation. 
 
The aim of this research is to generate greater awareness and understanding of the 
influence and effects of management consultants’ interventions in organisations, in 
particular as they help senior managers to develop strategic direction and realise strategic 
change.  The thesis explores the process of consulting and the role of management 
consultants using the conceptual lens of the enactment perspective.  Specifically, the 
research addresses the central question: 
 
How do management consultants’ interventions influence processes of strategic 
change within organisations? 
 
The case study design and research methods, which rely primarily for information on 
direct, face to face interviews and inductive, overlapping processes of data collection and 
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analysis, reflect an essentially exploratory research agenda.  The research process itself 
has been guided by diverse theoretical and empirical work in a number of management 
fields and has focused on the development of abductive theory.  Abductive theory is the 
distillation of a social scientific account or explanation from concepts and meanings used 
by social actors (Blaikie 1993).  The resulting theoretical framework is thus informed by 
and linked to extant theory, yet grounded in the interpretations, understanding and 
actions of individuals in relation to specific cases. 
 
The practical difficulties of researching the consulting process and of finding 
organisations and consulting firms prepared to participate in the research were 
recognised at the outset.  Despite clear intentions and research parameters, the actual 
research process was hesitant, staccato, stumbling and fraught with problems and 
disappointments.  Opportunities were grasped and accommodated into the overall 
research strategy and design. Such “planned opportunism” (Pettigrew 1990) played a 
part in the first two cases studied, and in how the research evolved.  One consulting 
organisation, Kepner Tregoe, and two of the firm’s clients, the Bristol and West Building 
Society and The Post Office, were the first to agree to participate in the research.  Once 
the two cases had been secured, there was a conscious decision to analyse and draw 
some tentative conclusions from these cases before attempting to secure further cases.  
The cases relating to Kepner Tregoe’s interventions in the two organisations were 
studied and tentative concepts, frameworks and inferences were derived. 
 
The first two cases researched suggested that consultants’ interventions might be 
understood in terms of a conceptual framework with separation and absorption as 
overarching dimensions.  The research indicated an interplay and tension between the 
efforts to separate the object of the intervention, the deliberate process of strategy 
formulation, from both other activities and influences, and also insidious pressures 
drawing or absorbing the intervention into the political and cultural maelstrom of 
organisational life.  Such a conceptualisation was broadly supported by the existing 
literature on strategic management, organisation theory and consultancy interventions.  
However, the research findings and analyses were grounded on two relatively similar 
and to some extent incomplete cases, and so could not be relied upon to be 
sufficiently robust and relevant in other circumstances. 
 
Two additional cases, exhibiting a reasonable diversity in terms of the context, nature 
and process of the interventions were found after much searching, and were 
researched to establish a more thoroughly grounded and comprehensive analysis.  The 
focus of this second phase of the research was to test, refine and elaborate the 
tentative concepts and framework, which had emerged from the first two cases.  
Sufficient theoretic saturation and completeness were achieved through these two 
additional cases to draw the field research to a close.  The two cases researched were 
Triangle Management Services’ strategy intervention with Carousel, and Transitions’ 
on-going support of McQuillan Young Communications. 
 
 
1.2 FINDINGS, CONTRIBUTION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The central argument of this thesis, generated primarily from the case study research, 
is that through creating and sustaining a distinct, albeit embedded, enactment, 
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management consultants influence and contribute to the strategic thinking and 
subsequent actions of their clients and senior management within the organisation. 
 
Certain consulting processes and activities can be understood as seeking to create and 
maintain some degree of separation from the prevailing organisational processes and 
conceptions.  In so doing, consultants can facilitate such a distinct enactment. The 
case study research points to this separation being created and maintained in three 
distinct, but inter-related and mutually supportive, ways.  The first way is the process 
of crystallisation/ reification, namely defining, bounding and drawing attention to an 
issue or outcome.  The second way is through the imposition of an alternative 
paradigm, in the form of an approach or methodology, fresh perspective or specific 
expertise.  The third way is through altering the existing patterns of interaction or 
discourse between members of the organisation.  Habitual roles and relationships are 
partially suspended, and non-routine subjects are discussed under the direction, 
guidance or facilitation of the consultant(s).   
 
In carrying out their work consultants do not operate in a vacuum.  Rather, their 
interventions are set within existing frames of reference, beliefs, commitments and 
action patterns of their client organisations.  Interventions can thus be conceived as 
embedded or located within organisational, and wider social, processes and 
conceptions of the world, which are mostly taken for granted, shared and lived out by 
members of the organisation and society at large. 
 
Interventions, and the enactments they create and sustain, are subject to a number of 
forces or processes of absorption.  Consultants and members of the organisation 
involved in the intervention are under pressure to conform to, or to operate within, the 
constructs of this organisational reality.  Efforts to establish separation are met with 
inertia, resistance or active attempts to influence the intervention.  These pressures 
and the need to make the conceptions about the nature of the organisation and its 
environment understandable, believable and acceptable mean that the ideas, analyses 
and views emerging from the intervention are continually being tested against, 
reviewed in the light of and related to wider constructs and assumptions. 
 
In essence, the enactment facilitated by the consultant(s) and the wider organisational 
enactment in some respects are experienced as competitive versions of social reality.  
Their advocates seek to secure a critical mass of belief and acceptance, creating tensions 
and the need to accommodate differing views as part of the process of generating shared 
constructions of the organisation and its environment. 
 
To varying extents, boundaries are permeable and the two enactments are reciprocally 
influential.  The views, desires and commitments of senior managers shape the 
intervention and constrain the freedom of consultants to assert their constructions of 
reality.  Consultants are influenced as well as influence during the course of an 
intervention.  The ways in which consultants and key members of the organisation 
address the interplay and tensions that arise determine the course of the intervention and 
its influence on on-going processes.  The more marked the separation, the greater the 
potential dislocation between the formal strategy emanating from the intervention and 
the prevailing beliefs, actions, commitments and conceptions of the environment and 
the challenges faced by the organisation. 
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The enactment created by the intervention enables members of an organisations to re-
shape, individually and collectively, their realities and go on to establish new routines 
and patterns of action.  This enactment is temporary, and is absorbed.  It gradually 
dissolves and becomes fused with the wider organisational reality; the intervention 
itself can become part of the fabric of organisational life. 
 
Grounded in the case study research and supported by existing theories, a theoretical 
framework is put forward for understanding and explaining consultants’ strategy 
interventions within organisations.  At the heart of this framework is the concept of an 
embedded enactment, shaped by the interplay and tensions between processes of 
separation and absorption.  The theoretical framework offers and underpins a richer, 
inextricably contextual and fundamentally social conception of the consulting process. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the theoretical framework developed through this research. 
 
Figure 1:  Separation and Absorption 
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In many ways the research complements and expands upon many theoretical views 
and various empirical research studies on how consultants influence processes of 
strategic thinking and change within organisations.  The research does though cast 
consultants’ activities in a new theoretical light through the concept of separation, 
and brings to the fore the ‘organisation’, highlighting the embedded nature of 
interventions and processes of reciprocal influence.  Pressures to conform, the 
interplay and tensions between enactments, and the dissolution and fusion of the 
consultant facilitated enactment are distinct conceptualisations of important aspects of 
consulting interventions, and are contributions made by the research. 
 
The research enriches prevailing views on management consulting and contributes to a 
deeper understanding of the consulting process and role of consultants. Consultants’ 
performances, claims and mystique are seen as central to their influence as they seek 
credibly to suspend one social reality to inspire another, as well as a way of 
demonstrating their value and competence.  The importance of new, substantive views of 
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the organisation and its environment in supporting and encouraging different values, 
attitudes and patterns of action is highlighted.  The repeated use of consultants by 
managers, despite the anxiety and dissatisfaction experienced, can be linked to an 
inescapable imperative to renew meaning, understanding and social order. 
 
The research also sheds some light on processes of deliberate strategic change, in 
particular how new strategies are diffused and fused within existing patterns of thought 
and action, and the importance of action in the transformation process.  In examining 
consulting interventions, the research also adds to the enactment and sensemaking 
literature in terms of theory and as an empirical study. 
  
The research also has value to and implications for practitioners. As Kurt Lewin, a 
leading light in the OD tradition within consulting, commented, there is nothing as 
practical as a good theory.  The theoretical perspective developed in this thesis provides 
a more holistic and inclusive way of thinking about, understanding and planning 
interventions.  Crucially, management consultants might appreciate more fully, and 
reconsider how they address, the stresses and tensions of creating and sustaining 
separation in the design and conduct of interventions.  They might also want to plan 
explicitly for diffusion and fusion of the ideas generated with the prevailing 
organisational paradigm.  Senior managers too might benefit from taking note of the 
potentially debilitating effects of the abuse or overuse of consultancy interventions.  The 
case studies themselves offer some insights into the subtleties and nuances of 
interventions and opportunities for consultants and managers to reflect on personal 
experiences. 
 
The theoretical framework generated by this case study research is clearly open to 
further research.  Additional, diverse cases conducted by other researchers informed by 
different literatures, theories, experiences and perspectives and using different methods 
will undoubtedly elaborate and expand our knowledge of consulting interventions.   The 
research though does provide a starting point and guide in a field of growing importance, 
though one which is still shrouded in secrecy and myths. 
 
 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
The first section of this chapter contains a summary of the reasons for researching 
consultants’ strategy interventions, the central research question and the choice of 
methodology.   It has also outlined the unfolding logic and conduct of the research 
itself.  These themes are covered in more depth in subsequent chapters, which chart 
both the research journey and the development of grounded abductive theory.  The 
journey culminates in the construction of a conceptual framework and argument, and 
an evaluation of the contribution made by the research, as summarised in the second 
section of this chapter. 
 
The quotes and illustrations, and the case write ups themselves, imbue richness, 
vitality and meaning to the argument and concepts.  Tracing the research journey 
enables the reader to discern how the arguments and concepts emerged and were 
elaborated.  The ideas and insight offered by this exploratory qualitative research, and 
their usefulness and credibility, are bound up in an appreciation of the contexts and 
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process through which they emerged.  The thesis thus attempts simultaneously to lay 
out an unfolding process and to develop a compelling argument. 
 
Chapter Two, Strategic Change, Organisations and Management Consultants, 
reviews briefly the principal conceptions of and research into strategy and change, 
especially the enactment perspective.  The nature and role of consultants within 
strategic change processes is also reviewed, and relevant conceptual and empirical 
work critiqued.  In essence, this literature review highlights key themes and issues 
that both gave rise to and shaped the research.  Finally, the research objectives are set 
out and positioned in terms of the gap in our knowledge. 
 
Chapter Three, Research Design and Methods, covers the methodology and case 
study design.  It sets out the framework and guiding principles for the conduct of the 
research, and in particular the search for cases to study.  The following two chapters 
describe the actual research process, which was undertaken in two phases. 
 
Chapter Four, Initial Research: Kepner Tregoe’s Interventions within the Bristol and 
West Building Society and The Post Office Group, describes the initial phase of the 
research including the overlapping access, fieldwork, analysis and write up of the first 
two cases.  The research process itself is opened up with the conscious intention of 
exposing the difficulties, compromises, mistakes, tentative theorising and emergent 
nature of this particular exploratory, interpretive research.  By recounting the 
experience, broadly as it unfolded, my aim is to share how the research and its 
conclusions took shape.  Chapter Four ends with a synthesis of the interim findings 
illustrated by pertinent quotations from the interview transcripts. 
 
Chapter Five, Subsequent Research: Carousel / Triangle Management Services Case 
and McQuillan Young Communications / Transitions Case, describes the second 
phase of the research, and how it was guided and informed by the emergent findings. 
The chapter draws to a close with a synthesis of how the last two cases contributed to 
the testing, refining and tightening of the theoretical framework which emerged from 
the first phase of the research. 
 
Chapter Six, Closure and Evaluation of the Field Research, argues that the research is 
adequately grounded in the four cases studied.  This type of research calls for 
judgements on the part of the researcher in terms of the number of cases studied and 
claims made, since there are no clear-cut external referents for rigour or quality.  In 
particular, the diversity of the cases is examined along five theoretically relevant 
dimensions, indicating a reasonable coverage of consulting interventions.  The 
theoretic saturation achieved, and hence completeness of and support for the 
theoretical framework, is then discussed.  In particular, a published case is analysed to 
check the robustness of the framework.  The trustworthiness of the research is 
evaluated using five criteria, both to give confidence in the concepts and framework 
discussed in the next chapter but also to acknowledge the research’s limitations. 
 
Chapter Seven, Consulting Interventions as Embedded Enactments: Concepts and 
Discussions is the heart of the thesis.  In this chapter, the principal findings and 
concepts developed through the detailed analysis are drawn together into a coherent 
theoretic framework.   The theoretical discussion builds on the tentative findings 
outlined in earlier chapters and uses quotes extensively, from the case write ups and 
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interview transcripts, to give life to, explicate and ground the concepts.   The 
framework and concepts developed are then reviewed in their relation to existing 
theory and empirical work, creating explicit linkages to current knowledge and 
building further support for the central argument of the thesis and theoretical 
framework developed. 
 
Chapter Eight, Contribution and Implications, identifies where the research has added 
to our formal knowledge of consultants’ strategy interventions, and more broadly 
strategic management and the nature of sensemaking processes within organisations.  
Possible lessons and guidance the research offers practitioners, both consultants and 
senior managers, are put forward to encourage reflection.  Finally, some ideas are 
suggested on how this work can be used as a springboard for further research.  
 
The Appendix contains the four stand-alone case write ups, which were sent to and 
checked by managers and consultants involved in the interventions. All four case 
write ups form an integral part of this thesis, and provide, in part, the grounding for 
the analysis and conceptualisations.  These case write ups add richness and context to 
the analysis and reflections contained in Chapters Four and Five, and are the backdrop 
for the overall synthesis in Chapter Seven.  
 
The thesis is succinct and tightly woven, yet intended to be accessible to academics 
and practitioners.  Each of the following Chapters has an introduction that sets out the 
main themes of the Chapter and their position within the overall research journey and 
argument.  The narrative style is direct and at the same time seeks to capture and 
convey the subtleties inherent in the subject matter. 
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2. STRATEGIC CHANGE, ORGANISATIONS AND 
MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Conceptions of strategic management as a rational process of ensuring a fit between the 
organisation and its externally determined environment have come under challenge.  
Questions are being asked regarding the appropriateness of the assumptions 
underpinning these conceptions, and alternative perspectives and research programmes 
have emerged based on different assumptions.  In particular, the view that organisational 
change is adaptive and influenced by pervasive societal norms and expectations, and 
more recently the enactment perspective, have begun to enrich theory.  They also offer 
different insights and greater hope to practitioners.  The enactment perspective is 
founded on the view that an organisation’s environment, in terms of relationships with 
customers, suppliers, competitors, stakeholders and other entities, is socially constructed 
or acted out.  The organisation and its environment are created together by the social 
interaction of individuals.  Newer metaphors of organisations, based on shared frames of 
reference and webs of meaning and relationships, are drawn upon to address processes 
of interpretation, sensemaking and action, which create organisation and environment.  
In many ways these metaphors better illuminate the interconnectedness and complexities 
of the social world and organisational life  
 
In tandem with the introduction of new perspectives, consultancy services have boomed 
and are now commonplace.  Perhaps ironically, consulting interventions have 
traditionally been grounded in the rhetoric, if not necessarily the practice, of a rational 
linear conception of strategic management.  While academic writers have put forward 
diverse conceptualisations on of consultants’ activities, the value added by consultants 
has typically been described and promoted in terms of objectivity, expertise, and 
analytical and process skills.  Yet, these concepts are at odds with the enactment 
perspective, which questions fundamentally their very existence and certainly their 
merit.  It is this apparent paradox and gap in our knowledge which both prompts and 
frames the research agenda. 
 
The remainder of this chapter reviews briefly the principal conceptions of strategy 
indicated above and the empirical research into strategy and change.  Particular 
attention is focused on the enactment perspective, which provides the theoretical lens 
and sensitivity for the research.  The various approaches to management consulting 
are outlined, and different roles of consultants within strategic change processes are 
described.  Finally, the chapter frames the research in terms of the gap in our 
knowledge and identifies the objectives of the research. 
 
 
2.2 CONCEPTIONS OF STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
 AND ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE 
 
Strategy and strategic management revolve around ensuring the survival and prosperity 
of the organisation (Hofer and Schendel 1978, Rumelt, Schendel and Teece 1991). The 
role of strategic management is to achieve and maintain a fit between the organisation 
and its external environment, and the task of senior management is to direct and shape 
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the organisation such that the environmentally given opportunities are exploited and 
threats mitigated.  As Rumelt, Schendel and Teece (1991) point out: 
 
“Firms have choices to make if they are to survive.  Those which are strategic 
include: the selection of goals, the choice of products and services to offer; the 
design and configuration of policies determining how the firm positions itself to 
compete in product-markets (e.g. competitive strategy); the choice of an 
appropriate level of scope and diversity; and the design of organization structure, 
administrative systems and policies used to define and coordinate work.” (1991: 
6, italics in original) 
 
This fundamental need to make choices has focused considerable academic effort on the 
content of the strategy (Chakravarthy and Doz 1992).  For instance, Ansoff (1968) 
contributed significantly to our understanding of product-markets by means of a simple 
matrix. Porter (1980, 1985) built on concepts from industrial economics to identify the 
forces affecting industry competition and firm profitability, and developed a value chain 
model as a way of seeing how firms create competitive advantage in the way in which 
they operate.  These and many other theories, techniques and research findings have 
been advocated to senior managers to help them analyse their environments, make the 
appropriate choices and then go on to implement them.  Enough is presumed known, or 
knowable, by strategy formulators about such things as market requirements, competitor 
activities and strengths, and macro-economic trends for senior managers to determine 
the appropriate direction and position of the organisation. 
  
2.2.1 The Rational Linear Perspective on Strategy  
 
The notion of a rational sequence involving analysis, choice and implementation reflects 
the fact that much academic work on strategy draws upon the economics literature 
(Rumelt, Schendel and Teece 1991), and is at the heart of texts on strategy and strategic 
management (Johnson and Scholes 1997, Mintzberg and Quinn 1991).  Chaffee (1985) 
describes this rational sequential approach as the linear model of strategy in which 
implementation is logically distinct and follows formulation.  Implementation is handled 
by aligning internal structures, systems and processes to the predetermined goals and 
strategy, as exemplified by Galbraith and Kazanjian (1986), Hrebiniak and Joyce (1984) 
and Judson (1990).  Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984) describe this as the “Commander 
Model”, and the model ascribes considerable power and authority to the Chief Executive 
and top management, and presumes compliant subordinates.  Amburey and Dacin (1994) 
provide evidence to support the view that structure does tend to follow strategy.  
Strategic change is thus the deliberate re-positioning of the organisation within its 
external environment. 
 
The rational linear conception of strategic management is supported by classic 
conceptions of organisations.  The classical and later modern schools of thought on 
organisation theory (Hatch 1997) take the root metaphors of systems, whether 
mechanical or organic, as their starting points for thinking about and conceptualising 
organisations.  The focus of such organisational analysis is the ways and means by 
which senior management can structure, shape and apply levers to the organisation to 
realise the objectives of the enterprise (Astley and Van de Ven 1983).   
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The rational linear conception of strategic management outlined very briefly above is 
based on four assumptions which merit closer scrutiny:  
 
• The strategic management process is, and should be, based on rational, linear logic; 
 
• Organisations or firms have choices in terms of their fit with the environment and 
their response to environmental change, and can implement those choices; 
 
• Senior managers can objectively assess the external environment in terms of the 
threats and opportunities it presents; 
 
• The organisation and its environment are distinct and independent. 
 
 
2.2.2 The Adaptive Perspective, Population Ecology and 
 Institutionalism 
 
The challenge to the assumption of linear rationality comes from what Chaffee (1985) 
describes as the adaptive model of strategy. Various arguments and growing empirical 
evidence suggest that strategic change is frequently evolutionary or incremental.  
Lindblom (1959) characterises strategic management as “muddling through”, while 
Quinn (1980) contends that strategic change is, and should be, incremental.  Quinn 
argues that change occurs through a logical and purposeful process of forming alliances, 
agreeing agendas and taking small steps or ‘side bets’, which build on existing positions 
and capabilities and which recognise uncertainties and political factors.  Mintzberg and 
Waters (1985) propose that “real-world strategies” are not purely deliberate, but are 
influenced and shaped by actions and events within and outside the organisation.   
Strategic change can be seen as a combination of deliberate and emergent strategies.  
Mintzberg (1987), building on his earlier work (1978), emphasises the importance of 
action, and the interaction of thought and deed, when he suggests that: 
 
“the crafting image better captures the process by which effective strategies 
come to be.  The planning image, long popular in the literature, distorts these 
processes and thereby misguides organizations that embrace it unreservedly.” 
(1987: 66) 
 
The notion of rational analysis and choice is further challenged by Huff, Huff and 
Thomas (1992), who suggest that strategic change is better understood as a response to 
cumulative stress and inertia.  Organisations experience stress in the form of adverse 
reactions and misalignment with their environments, but find it difficult to change 
because of the inertia caused by existing commitments, systems and working practices. 
 
The notion of inertia is central to the challenge put forward by population ecologists.  
For instance Hannan and Freeman (1977, 1984) and Aldrich (1979), question the extent 
that organisations can change.   Their contention is that standard operating procedures 
and industry entry and exit barriers restrict the degree of change possible at the 
organisation level.  Rather, strategic change needs to be analysed at the industry level.  
Strategic change occurs within populations of organisations through processes of 
variation, selection and retention as the environment changes, akin to evolution and 
natural selection in biological populations.  Radical change within an organisation, in 
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terms of a significant re-configuration of structures and processes, is the exception rather 
than the norm.  They argue that established organisations tend to be replaced by newer, 
more adept organisations as the environment changes. 
 
Another school of thought, known as institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 
Powell and DiMaggio 1991), contends that the range of effective choices available to 
senior managers is limited.  Norms, values and rules influence and underpin the ways in 
which managers think and act, reducing the variety of organisational forms and 
approaches.  This degree of conformity is greater than might be expected if context or 
environment were the primary driver of organisational strategy and structure.  To some 
extent, organisations need to conform to norms of acceptable behaviour if they are to 
secure the approval, power, co-operation and resources from entities within their 
immediate environments.  This need to conform leads to coercive, mimetic and 
normative isomorphism, in which groups of organisations, or industries, adopt similar 
forms and behave in similar ways.   Coercive pressures come from the presence of 
common legal frameworks, a perceived need to be seen to be operating in a legitimate 
way, and exhortations from other organisations to adopt a common approach to issues.  
Mimicry is a frequent and lower risk response to environmental uncertainty than 
innovation and uniqueness.  Normative isomorphism is associated with the increasing 
prevalence of professionals within organisations, who share approaches, values and 
belief systems, and live them out within their respective organisations.  Essentially, 
institutionalism focuses attention on stability and the isomorphic forces which create 
inertia.  However, more recent work within the field, such as Scott and Meyer (1994), 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996), and Barley and Tolbert (1997), recognises the need to 
account for organisational change and draw upon the role of meaning systems, 
organisational context and the role of actions of members of the organisation.  The 
deterministic tendencies of early work (Whittington 1992) have, more recently, been 
superseded by greater attention to processes of interpretation, choice and rationalisation. 
 
2.2.3 Interpretive Perspective 
 
The adaptive model of strategy and the population ecologists challenge the rational 
linear conceptions of how strategic change is conceived and realised, and how much an 
organisation can, in effect, change.   However, they imply the possibility of scanning, 
knowing and finding the appropriate way of dealing with the environment confronting 
an organisation.  Senior managers may not adopt a rational planning process nor always 
come up with the best option, but that is attributed to managers’ bounded rationality 
(Simon 1957).  Specifically, managers have limited time and capabilities with which to 
absorb, structure and analyse information when making decisions.  Moreover, this 
information is typically incomplete and not timely.  These and the rational linear 
conceptions of strategic management reflect an essentially functionalist view of the 
world (Burrell and Morgan 1979).  Predictable and stable regularities exist in the world, 
and can be discovered objectively and used by management in a rational and deliberate 
way to achieve the goals of the organisation.   The process and outcome, in practice, may 
be imperfect and restricted, but this is a shortcoming in execution and capable of 
improvement. 
 
Authors such as Pettigrew (1985a, 1985b) and Johnson (1987) reject the rational, 
analytical conceptions of strategic change in favour of a political, cultural and cognitive 
perspective.  Pettigrew’s (1985a) longitudinal research on organisational change at ICI 
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reveals how decisions are shaped by interests and commitments of individuals and 
groups.  The organisation is no longer seen as unitary but is fragmented, with multiple 
political influences and agendas which affect the way in which internal and external 
events are understood and decisions taken.  This conception of strategic management is 
underpinned by views of organisations as characterised by a politically negotiated order 
(Pettigrew 1985a, 1987).  
 
Johnson (1987, 1988) emphasises how the world which managers experience is made up 
of interpretations of events and symbols, and it is these interpretations which form the 
basis for action.  Sheldon (1980) and Pfeffer (1981) have also argued that members of 
organisations interpret signals from the environment according to their own histories and 
paradigms, or interpretive schemes (Bartunek 1984).  This perspective is described as the 
interpretive model by Chaffee (1985), which questions the notion that managers have 
access to and act on the basis of an objective and unambiguous environmental reality.  
As Barr and Huff (1997) explain: 
 
“The processes of noticing and interpreting stimuli have been linked by 
cognitive scientists to schemas the individual has already formulated… 
‘Schemas’ and other related concepts (frames, mental models) identify the 
simplified and abstracted representations individuals use to make sense of and 
act within their environments… A schema is a set of interrelated, largely 
unquestioned assumptions that highlights certain characteristics of new stimuli 
and establishes grounds for categorising them as similar to or different from 
those encountered before.” (1997: 339) 
 
This process of interpretation provides some insight into empirical observations of 
management failures to notice changes in the environment and to take timely action.  
Schemas, scripts and paradigms (Gioia 1985, Johnson 1987, 1988) create meaning and 
guide actions within organisations.  Contradictory information tends to be recast within 
the constructs of the paradigm, ignored or discredited.  Johnson (1987, 1988) describes 
sustained periods of misalignment between the organisation and its environment, as 
perceived by outsiders, as strategic drift.  Barr, Stimpert and Huff (1992) analyse the 
differing ability of organisations to undertake strategic change when faced with a 
deteriorating environment, and link it to managers’ ability to change their cognitive 
maps.  Barr and Huff (1997) suggest that environmental change needs to be linked 
explicitly to performance within an organisation before change occurs, and this, in part, 
accounts for differences in timing of responses to external change. These personal 
cognitive schemes (Bartunek 1984) and organisational paradigms (Johnson 1987, 1988) 
are reinforced by industry recipes (Grinyer and Spender 1979, Spender 1989), and 
industry influences (Huff 1982).  These patterns of beliefs and actions, or collective 
wisdom, held by industry members, influence actions and responses to changes.  
Managers tend to feel reassured that competitors are in the same difficulties and reacting 
in similar ways, and can attribute poor performance to industry dynamics rather than 
strategic or managerial shortcomings (Fiske and Taylor 1991). 
 
The need for radical shifts in strategy, and to redefine the organisation’s paradigm, can 
still be diagnosed, and are more readily seen and effected by outsiders (Johnson 1988, 
1992).  Radical change appears to need active and deliberate change agency, and 
outsiders are more sensitive to performance shortfalls and prepared to consider 
alternative strategies and to take actions (Johnson 1992, Greiner & Bhambri 1989). 
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Political manoeuvring, backstage activities, the manipulation of situations to achieve the 
desired results, interpersonal skills and judgement are identified as tactics used to 
facilitate or drive strategic change processes (Pettigrew 1985a, Pettigrew & Whipp 1991, 
Buchanan and Boddy 1992).  Leaders and senior managers are urged to create shared 
meaning through symbolic action (Pfeffer 1981) and address explicitly the culture of the 
organisation (Deal and Kennedy 1982), and overcome cultural barriers to change 
(Lorsch 1986, Beckhard and Harris 1987, Beckhard and Pritchard 1992, Hampden-
Turner 1994). 
 
2.2.4 Enactment Perspective 
 
Within the interpretive perspective, the notion of an objective environment is not 
abandoned.  Rather, the concepts such as strategic drift and differential speed of reaction 
are related to partial, imperfect and biased perceptions, compounded by inertial forces.  
Hence, outsiders are viewed as better able to appreciate the situation and the need to act.  
Another conception of strategic management exists, though, which suspends the 
realist notion (Bhaskar 1978, Outhwaite 1987) of an objective social reality, 
independent of the observer or actor – the enactment or sensemaking perspective. 
 
The enactment or sensemaking perspective is built on the ideas of Berger and 
Luckmann (1966) and Weick (1979), among others, who argue that reality is socially 
constructed; individuals construct and share meaning through the use of language and 
symbols, and these constructions are the reality that individuals see. Berger and 
Luckmann contend that social reality has no existence independent of the interpretations 
and actions of individuals, yet everyday life presents itself to, and is taken for granted by, 
individuals as a self-evident and compelling fact.  The creation of social reality can be 
understood as “an ongoing dialectic process composed of three moments of 
externalization, objectivation and internalisation… not to be thought of in a temporal 
sequence.  Rather society and each part of it are simultaneously characterized by these 
three moments” (1966: 149).  Society thus exists as both objective and subjective reality; 
individuals “realize” society, both in terms of apprehending it and in terms of generating 
or accomplishing it. 
 
Berger and Luckmann posit that individuals’ conceptions overlap but not fully, thus 
prompting and perpetuating the dialectic process.  The idea that individuals define and 
mediate meaning in social interactions is also central to symbolic interactionism (Blumer 
1966, 1967, Manis and Meltzer 1967, Burrell and Morgan 1979).  Blumer (1967) 
summarises the distinctive aspects of symbolic interactionism succinctly: 
 
“The term “symbolic interaction” refers, of course, to the peculiar and distinctive 
character of interaction as it takes place between human beings.  The peculiarity 
consists in the fact that human beings interpret or “define” each other’s actions 
instead of merely reacting to each other’s actions.  Their “response” is not made 
directly to the actions of one another but instead is based on meaning which they 
attach to such actions.  Thus, human interaction is mediated by the use of 
symbols, by interpretation, or by ascertaining the meaning of one another’s 
actions.  This mediation is equivalent to inserting a process of interpretation 
between stimulus and response in the case of human behaviour.” (1967: 139) 
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Interpretation and definition are thus central to human interaction, with individuals  
drawing upon, mostly in an unreflective manner, concepts of self and others.  Thus the 
enactment perspective builds on the concepts of schemas, scripts and paradigms central 
to the interpretive perspective, but adds that individuals do not simply interpret signals 
and cues from an external world.  In making sense of their social worlds individuals also 
construct those very signals and cues to which they appear simply to be responding.  As 
Weick (1995) points out in relation to sensemaking: 
 
“The process of sensemaking is intended to include the construction and 
bracketing of the textlike cues that are interpreted, as well as the revision of those 
interpretations based on action and its consequences.  Sensemaking is about 
authoring as well as interpretation, creation as well as discovery.” (1995: 8) 
 
The concept of action, whether in the form of a physical act or the formulation and 
articulation of an idea or perception, is fundamental to enactment and sensemaking.  As 
Weick (1988) points out: “At the heart of enactment is the idea that cognition lies in the 
path of the action.  Action precedes and focuses cognition.” (1988: 307).  Human lived 
experience is a continuous flow of events, only when part of this stream is bracketed and 
attended to can an individual make sense of the experience.  As people in organisations 
act they bring events and structures into existence and set them in motion, often 
producing constraints and opportunities that were not there before.  In acting individuals 
“realize” (Berger and Luckmann 1966) their situations. 
 
Weick (1988) argues that the concept of enactment builds on four lines of scholarship: 
social information processing (Salancik and Pfeffer 1978), self-fulfilling prophesies 
(Jones 1986), commitment (Staw 1980), and retrospective sensemaking (Weick 1979). 
In social interactions, individuals tend to behave and interpret responses in line with 
prior expectancies, to an extent inducing the expected responses and predisposing the 
individual towards confirming these expectancies. Social exchanges thus have a 
tendency of becoming self-fulfilling prophesies. Moreover, individuals develop 
rationalisations and justification for past decisions, which are shared and become forms 
of “committed interpretations” (Weick 1993), underpinning action within organisations.  
This binding social action reduces ambiguity and stabilises a potentially confusing flow 
of events.  Shared interpretations and committed social action are the seeds that enlarge 
and diffuse among organisational members to impose order on otherwise confusing or 
ambiguous situations. 
 
The argument that social reality is created and maintained through processes of 
action, interpretation and negotiation implies choice.  However, that choice has 
effective limits.  First, as with structuration theory (Giddens 1976, 1984), patterns of 
seeing, interpreting and acting are informed and conditioned by prior enactments.  At 
one level, past enactments are concretised into operating procedures, contracts and 
resources, which can take on the aura of immutable things.  At another level, past 
enactments reinforce schemas, mental models of the world and organisational 
paradigms, which make it difficult for individuals to question or re-conceptualise the 
world (Argyris 1985, Johnson 1987, 1988).  Second, enactment entails acting, not 
simply thinking.  Clearly, physical and intellectual resources limit the potential 
enactments which can be sustained, and such constraints cannot be wished away.  Third, 
enactments are in competition with each other.  Smircich & Stubbart (1985) suggest 
that: “for sizable organizational enactments to succeed, a critical mass of belief and 
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acceptance must be reached.  But reaching the critical mass depends on persuasion 
rather than objective factors.” (1985: 733).  The notion of competing enactments is 
echoed by Weick (1995) when he writes:  “Sense may be in the eye of the beholder, 
but beholders vote and the majority rules” (1995: 6). 
 
In summary, the enactment perspective is based on three core tenets: 
 
• Social reality is constructed; individuals construct, negotiate and share meaning 
through the use of language and symbols, and these constructions simultaneously 
enable and constrain action within a social setting. 
 
• Individuals create the signals and cues to which they appear simply to be responding; 
in acting individuals bring events and structures into existence and set them in 
motion, producing constraints and opportunities that were not there before. 
 
• Social order is shaped by prevailing construction, limited by available resources and 
continually negotiated, both cognitively and politically, as enactments compete. 
  
2.2.5  Strategy within the Enactment Perspective 
 
The enactment perspective conceives strategic management as a process in which 
organisational actors attend to and make sense of their situations, act on their beliefs 
and perceptions and, in acting understand what, collectively, they have created. As 
Smircich and Stubbart (1985) state, this strategic management view is based on: 
 
“the assumption that organization and environment are created together 
(enacted) through the social interaction processes of key organizational 
participants.” (1985: 726) 
 
This assumption, as Smircich and Stubbart point out, supports the work of Mason and 
Mitroff (1981), Davis (1982), Huff (1982) and Peters (1978).   Within this 
perspective, separate, objective “organisations” and “environments” are essentially 
reifications; they are labels used by managers when they make sense of patterns of 
actions and on-going events.  The enactment perspective takes as problematic 
concepts such as “the industry”, “threats” and “opportunities”, since they are 
constructions rather than givens.  Managers’ attention is directed towards the way 
common sense understanding is constructed and the limitations which arbitrary or 
taken for granted labels or classifications might impose.  The focus of attention is less 
on a static snapshot of the social world and more on the on-going process of 
sensemaking and action.  Strategists and senior managers are reminded that they 
define what constitutes “the industry”, “threats” or “opportunities”, and attention is 
focused on how their concerted actions stabilise and reproduce such definitions.  
  
So useful and widespread are labels and notions such as organisation and environment 
that the idea that they may be constructed, and therefore open to redefinition, is alien 
to many managers.  If one conceives of an organisation as a legally constituted entity, 
a conception which underpins rational linear strategic management perspectives and 
economics, then the organisation by definition is concrete and distinct from its 
environment.  However, the enactment perspective of strategic management is 
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intimately linked to a view of organisations as interpretation systems (Daft & Weick 
1984).  Westley (1990) describes organisations as: 
 
 “a series of interlocking routines, habituated action patterns that bring the 
same people together around the same activities in the same time and places” 
(1990: 339). 
 
Interlocking routines also exist which bring together individuals from different legally 
constituted entities, for instance customer-supplier relationships, alliances, industry 
associations and regulatory bodies.  Individuals interact within multiple sets of routines, 
sharing experiences and views and so creating their social world.  Through these 
processes both the organisation and the environment, that is the non-organisation, are 
inter-subjectively formed and sustained. Czarniawska-Joerges (1992) describes 
organisations as: 
 
“nets of collective action, undertaken in an effort to shape the world and 
human lives.  The contents of the action are meanings and things (artifacts).  
One net of collective action is distinguishable from another by the kind of 
meanings and products socially attributed to a given organisation ” (1992: 32) 
 
The presence of industry bodies, dialogue between commercial organisations and 
government bodies, and the more recent trend towards the use of alliances and 
networks highlight the interdependence and mutual influence of actors and entities 
within a social or economic setting.  Strategic alliances (Faulkner 1992, Hamel, Doz 
and Prahalad 1989) between different organisations are characterised by simultaneous 
collaboration and competition.  Resources, experience and know-how are shared, yet 
the aim is to learn more and faster than one’s partner.  Such arrangements 
demonstrate the permeability of boundaries between organisations and their mutual 
influence and dependence.  Network forms of organisation (Powell 1990), typified by 
reciprocal patterns of communication and exchange, represent a viable and 
increasingly common form of economic organisation.  Such forms emphasise the 
process of organising and the continual need to create and define social and economic 
ties and meaning.  Neither the organisation nor the environment has a pre-determined 
existence, but are continually created over time. As such, strategic change is not 
simply the adjustment or re-positioning of the organisation in relation to its 
environment, but the enactment of a different social reality affecting what constitutes 
both the organisation and the environment.  
 
So, the distinction between an organisation and its environment is an inter-subjective 
labelling of on-going enactments, as individuals share, negotiate and assert their 
conceptions of the social world.  Weick (1979) points out that: “as an organisation 
becomes larger it literally becomes more of its own environment” (1979: 167).  
Presumed behaviour, shared convictions and implied threats are integral parts of any 
social setting. The actions, presumed actions or even the perceived latent actions of 
any individual or organisation are, in principle, cues used by others as they make 
sense of the world they see.  Weick (1985) argues that a significant proportion of the 
organisational environment: 
 
“consists of nothing more than talk, symbols, promises, lies, interest, attention, 
threats, agreements, expectations, memories, rumours, indicators, supporters, 
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detractors, faith, suspicion, trust, appearances, loyalties and commitments.” 
(1985: 128) 
 
Social processes are not independent of the individuals, groups or organisational 
entities; all actors have a part in constituting the social world however small a part.  
Economic entities and agents will certainly favour, and want to promote, social orders 
which confirm or reinforce their relative advantages.  Even within an organisation, 
groups and individuals will tend to propose, support and act out patterns of activities 
which confer advantage, security or congruence with existing views and commitments.   
 
Knights and Morgan (1991) suggest that the concept of strategy itself is a discourse, 
namely a socially embedded “ set of ideas and practices which condition our way of 
relating to, and acting upon, a particular phenomenon” (1991:253).  They argue that the 
notion of strategy mediating the relationship between the organisation and its 
environment has been fostered by academics and consultants, and promoted by certain 
groups within organisations to obtain or defend a privileged status and to project images 
of rationality and control.   A discourse is not just a way of seeing, but also an exercise 
of power such that what is seen is the ‘truth’.   “Knowledge is always intricately bound 
up with technologies of power which reproduce particular discursive practices” 
(1991:253).   Political agendas, in the broadest sense, thus permeate not only deciding 
but seeing. 
 
2.2.6 Strategy Advice from the Enactment Perspective 
 
Smircich and Stubbart (1985) suggest that the enactment perspective implies 
rethinking three conventional wisdoms of strategic management.  First, the 
prescription that organisations should adapt to their environments should be 
abandoned.  Instead, strategists should focus on creating new interpretive frameworks 
and examining the choices which these suggest.  Second, constraints, threats and 
opportunities should be re-thought, since these are ground in implicit assumptions 
which could restrict experimentation and new patterns of actions, a view shared by 
Dutton and Jackson (1987).  Third, the role of strategic managers should be re-
conceived, and the focus shifted away from technical analysis and towards the 
creation of meaning and context, through language, metaphors, symbols and stories, 
which echoes the suggestions of Pfeffer (1981) and Johnson (1990, 1992).  Strategy, 
organisation and environment in this context have no independent existence or meaning.  
The enactment perspective implies that “the task of strategic management... is 
organization making  - to create and maintain systems of shared meaning that facilitate 
organized action” (Smircich & Stubbart 1985: 724).   Managers’ attention is directed at 
the assumptions which underscore actions, the creation of context, the fostering of 
multiple realities and continuous experimentation. 
 
More recent research within this perspective has made some significant contributions to 
the theory and understanding of strategy and strategic change.  For instance, the work of 
Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) and Gioia, Thomas, Clark and Chittipeddi (1994) identifies 
the role of sensegiving and sensemaking processes in strategic change.  They show how 
those promoting change both shape meaning and allow meaning to emerge, and are 
influenced by the emergent meaning and understanding.  Porac, Thomas and Baden-
Fuller (1989) describe how enacted cognitive models of markets and competitors shape 
and sustain strategic groups.  These shared cognitive models determine how markets are 
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scanned, competitors defined and customer needs assessed.  Individual cognitive models 
are reinforced by actions of others, who share similar models.  Isabella (1990) examines 
how evolving interpretations shape managers’ understanding of key events.  Managers 
continually reconstruct their social reality as new events arise and new questions are 
asked, and “the collective interpretations of key events move from unformed and 
tentative to well-constructed, well-processed viewpoints” (1990:33).   The research 
suggests complex processes of reciprocal influence and elaboration between meaning 
and action at the heart of strategic change. 
 
The notion of an enacted world tacitly underpins some of the more recent and popular 
approaches to strategic management.  Hamel and Prahalad (1989, 1993) advocate that 
leaders and managers in organisations should be less concerned about the rational, 
and usually limiting, analyses of opportunities and capabilities, but commit to a long 
term strategic intent, by creating stretching visions and setting ambitious goals.  They 
suggest that the notion of trimming ambitions to match available resources, namely 
maintaining a strategic fit, should be replaced by the concept of leveraging resources 
to reach seemingly unattainable goals. “Corporate Imagination” and “Expeditionary 
Marketing” (Hamel & Prahalad 1991) are concepts which advocate the creation of 
previously unimagined products and markets.  These new markets evolve as a result 
of interactions between organisations and consumers.  Normann and Ramirez (1993) 
argue that firms and customers co-produce value, and that organisations should 
develop interactive strategies where roles are reconfigured continually to create new 
forms of value. 
  
The straightjacket of rational analysis and determinism of rational linear conceptions 
of the world is abandoned in favour of advice to corporate leaders to create their own 
futures (Hamel & Prahalad 1994).  The argument is that competencies, not current 
product market offerings or positions, are better indicators of future success, and that 
these competencies can be developed and nurtured, sometimes in collaboration with 
other organisations (Hamel, Doz and Prahalad 1989).  In essence, Prahalad & Hamel 
(1990) echo the view that strategy and organising are intimately linked.  The notion of 
core competencies and the idea that interaction patterns between individuals and shared 
cognitive maps generate and store knowledge within organisations (Daft & Weick 1984) 
have much in common. 
 
Hamel and Prahalad (1989, 1991) also provide some insight into the limits of choice 
and the idea of competing enactments.  They suggest that existing resource levels are 
less of a constraint than an organisation’s strategic orthodoxy.  In their analysis of 
how Japanese companies overcame large and well-financed Western competitors over 
the previous two decades, they suggest that Japanese organisations had, in essence, 
enacted different conceptions of strategy, competition, innovation, and relative 
advantage.  Western organisations, enacting a shared reality based on the concepts of 
classical strategy, were not able, initially, to see how “loose bricks”, or peripheral 
markets, and gaps between traditional product market divisions were being 
systematically targeted to undermine competitive strength, nor how the terms of 
engagement were being changed.  In part, this is attributed to the prevailing notion of 
an objective world, knowable through a set of established analytical techniques taught 
at the leading business schools (Hamel and Prahalad 1989).  
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At another level, the Western and Japanese approaches to strategy and competition 
can be understood as competing societal enactments.  In this case, the Western world-
view was arbitraged as a new perspective conferred opportunities and points of 
leverage.  The prevailing Western world-view consequently became unsustainable.  
Clearly, any enactment is open to potential arbitrage and to the possibility of it 
becoming unsustainable. 
 
2.2.7 Critique and Reconciliation 
 
In his review of the strategic choice perspective, Child (1997) essentially up-dates and 
incorporates more recent ideas and research into the rational linear conception of 
strategic management.  The limitations of a purely rational, linear approach are 
acknowledged, as are the difficulties and complexities associated with implementing 
strategic choices.  The cognitive and political influences are given a greater 
prominence in terms of how threats and opportunities are identified and assessed.  
Child also acknowledges the interdependence between the organisation and its 
environment, but disagrees with Smircich and Stubbart (1985) on the extent to which 
actors have a choice over enactments.  At the heart of Child’s critique is a different 
view regarding underlying economic and social regularities, and the scale and nature of 
the limitations placed by material resources and existing structures.  In a sense, the 
enactment perspective is seen as encouraging wishful thinking and forlorn attempts to 
overturn entrenched practices and positions.  In part, this reflects a greater attention to 
static analysis rather than processual development, but it also reflects different views of 
the world.  Nonetheless, Child does agree on the possibility of managerial agency and 
(restricted) choice.  
 
Cognitive and symbolic processes are now also recognised by scholars of the 
institutionalism perspective (Scott and Meyer 1994, Greenwood and Hinings 1996, 
Barley and Tolbert 1997).  Institutionalists, though, would argue that the enactment 
perspective does not give due attention to the structures, values, norms and rules which 
pervade social and organisational life and so generate conformity and the reproduction of 
existing orders.  But, in his critique of institutionalists’ tendencies towards determinism, 
Whittington (1992) suggests that organisations are far from the passive, accommodating 
entities depicted by some.   Rather, managers exploit the structural tensions between 
institutional rules to gain their agency; ambiguity and plurality enable and demand 
choice.  Individuals and organisations have scope to shape the world in which they exist. 
 
In his critique of interpretive sociologies, Giddens (1976) argues that too much attention 
is paid to meaning, motivation and consensus at the expense of practical action, the 
conditions of actions and asymmetries of power and conflicts of interest.  The enactment 
perspective, while building on an interpretive world view, does emphasise the centrality 
of action in the construction of social reality, the material and symbolic legacy of prior 
enactments and competition between enactments. 
 
2.2.8 Summary 
 
Challenges to the conception of strategic management as a rational process of ensuring a 
fit between the organisation and its externally determined environment undermine the 
traditional advice to managers regarding the nature of managerial agency and their very 
roles. The enactment perspective is founded on the view that an organisation’s 
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environment, in terms of relationships with customers, suppliers, competitors, 
stakeholders and other entities, is socially constructed, negotiated and acted out.  The 
organisation and its environment are created together by the social interaction of 
individuals.  
 
The enactment perspective focuses attention on how strategic managers create and 
sustain meaning and context, how they bring into existence opportunities and constraints 
and how they seek to assert, and persuade others to accept, their version of reality.  The 
interconnectedness of organisational life, grounded in shared frames of reference and 
webs of meaning and relationships, is seen as integral to the ways in which social reality 
is created and sustained.  These conceptions remove the security offered by the existence 
of an external reality, accessible through rational scientific means, but at the same time 
offer different insights and greater hope to mangers.  The enactment perspective 
questions and explores issues other perspectives take for granted.  
 
 
2.3 MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS AND STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT 
 
The enactment view of strategy and strategic management, like the interpretive 
perspective, indicates a role for outsiders, such as management consultants, in helping 
the members of the organisation to examine their assumptions and become more self-
reflective (Smircich & Stubbart 1985).  Questioning and doubting what appears to be 
obvious helps managers to recognise personal schemas and organisational paradigms 
and to step outside their self-imposed constraints and conventional wisdom.  From the 
interpretive perspective, the value of management consultants comes from their 
ability to provide an alternative view the organisation-environment interface.  From 
the rational linear perspective, consultants may have expertise, methodologies and 
problem solving skills to create a better strategic fit between the organisation and the 
environment.  It is this rational linear view of the world that, on the whole, consultants 
have projected and clients have perceived. 
 
2.3.1 Management Consultancy: Origins and Typologies 
 
As a recent Economist survey points out (March 1997), consulting interventions 
which seek to shape an organisation’s strategy, whether through the innovative use of 
information technology, the nurturing of core competencies or the more classic 
targeting of specific product markets, are now commonplace. It is the organisation 
that does not use consultants which is now the exception rather than the rule.   
Management Consulting Magazine (July/August 1998) reported that world-wide 
revenues for the top 100 firms had in two years increased by £520million over 1996 
levels to over £2.6 billion.  This rate of growth was neither unprecedented nor 
expected to slow.  Moreover, management consultancy is a fragmented industry with 
many small or sole operators.  The overall world market was estimated to be in the 
order of  £25 billion in 1995 (Rassam 1998).  In terms of revenues at least, the 
influence of consultants appears to be valued and growing.  Reassuringly, there is also 
some evidence that management consultancy services generate benefits for clients 
(Ginsberg 1989, Burke 1994). 
  
Over the last twenty years in particular, consultancy services have expanded from 
work measurement and accountancy to most areas of organisational life.  
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Management consultancies, such as McKinsey, Booz, Allen Hamilton, Arthur D 
Little, and Hay Management Consultants, set up in the first half of the century, have 
been joined by, among others, the consulting arms of the major international 
accountancy partnerships, actuarial firms, business school professors and business 
school based consultancies (Rassam and Oates 1991, Rassam 1998).  The Institute of 
Management Consultancy (IMC), the professional association for management 
consultants in the United Kingdom, recognises that consultants and consultancy touch 
almost every aspect of management.  The IMC defines management consultancy in a 
broad and comprehensive fashion as: 
 
“The service provided by an independent and qualified person or persons in 
identifying and investigating problems concerned with policy, organisation, 
procedures and methods; recommending appropriate actions and helping to 
implement those recommendations” 
 
Mainstream management consultancy has its roots in concepts of scientific 
management pioneered by Frederick Taylor (Tisdall 1982, Rassam 1998), and their 
work, in the main, remains firmly grounded in a problem solving tradition. Phills 
(1996b) describes the work of consultants in terms of “generic analytical activities” 
comprising comparison, explanation, prediction and prescription, which are aimed at 
influencing clients’ competitive beliefs and organisational action.  In the main, 
consultants use theories, knowledge and analytical approaches developed out of 
practical experience or adapted from academic research.  The leading consulting firms 
themselves have developed frameworks and methodologies to inform and structure the 
way in which they address strategy and organisational issues. The Boston Consulting 
Group's growth/share matrix and development of the experience curve, and McKinsey's 
7S model (Payne and Lumsden 1987), and more recently business process re-
engineering (Hammer and Champy 1993) are but a few examples of models developed 
by consultants which are in the public domain.   Many other concepts, frameworks and 
methodologies are deemed proprietary and the basis of differentiation and competitive 
advantage. 
 
Mainstream management consultancies actively promote their ability to develop 
recommendations and solutions to the real problems and issues facing organisations.  
They stress the merits of their rational analytical intervention approaches and 
methodologies in their marketing literature. This is reinforced by how professional 
associations and journals describe the consulting process: 
 
“From the initial contact with the client to the post-assignment evaluation, the 
professional management consultant moves through a prescribed set of steps 
bringing objectivity, independence, and problem solving skills to the particular 
requirement of the client. Project management discipline in conducting the 
consulting assignment adds to the quality and credibility of the results.” (The 
Journal of Management Consulting, Fall, 1993: 41) 
 
This rational analytical view of consulting is codified by a number of best practice 
manuals advocating how interventions should be carried out (Block 1981, Weinberg 
1985, Margerison 1988, Kubr 1996, Markham 1997), which are largely distilled from 
practitioner experience.  For instance, Kubr (1996) lays out the consulting process in 
terms of five stages: entry; diagnosis; action planning; implementation; and 
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termination.  Entry includes preliminary problem diagnosis, agreeing terms of 
reference, diagnosis includes diagnostic frameworks, defining necessary facts, 
obtaining and analysing facts, and action planning includes developing and evaluating 
alternatives and presenting proposals to clients. Markham (1997) takes a project 
perspective on the consultancy process and defines it in terms of three sequential 
stages: mobilisation, which includes introduction, contracting and organising, 
execution, which includes data collection, data analysis, diagnosis and intervention, 
and withdrawal, which includes transfer, disengagement and completion.  These texts 
implicitly treat the process as a means to providing recommendations or effecting an 
intervention, rather than an end in itself.  The value comes from the solution, not 
necessarily from the interaction of consultant(s) and client organisation.  These best 
practice texts deal explicitly with client interface, the importance of influence and 
persuasion and cultural issues.  However, the client-consultant relation is examined 
and intervention approaches are advocated with a view to making the process more 
effective and the solution easier to implement. 
 
2.3.1.1  Process Consultation and the Organisational Development 
 
This rational analytic, even mechanistic, approach to consulting can be seen as 
representing one end of a spectrum, and is not the only school of thought on 
consulting.  Lippitt and Lippitt (1978) propose a descriptive model in which the roles 
played by consultants can be understood in terms of a continuum based on the level of 
consultant activity in problem solving, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 2:  Description of the consultant’s role on a directive 
       and nondirective continuum 
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Source: Lippitt and Lippitt (1978:31) 
 
At one end of the continuum, the consultant is nondirective, acting as an objective 
observer and process controller, while at the other end the consultant is directive, 
acting as an advocate and information expert.  The directive end reflects a greater 
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concern for the achievement of the task or correctness of the solution, while at the 
nondirective end the concern is focused more on the consulting process and 
interaction between the consultant and the client, and between members of the client 
organisation.  This conceptualisation of consulting is similar to earlier work by 
Margulies and Raia (1972), whose continuum had task and process orientations at 
opposite ends.  Schein (1987) defines process consultation as essentially a helping 
role in which the consultant and the client work together to diagnose and find 
solutions to issues and problems.   The client in this model of consulting owns the 
problem and continues to own the problem throughout the consultation process.  The 
process consultation model is compared to two other models as a way of emphasising 
its holistic and non-advocacy aspects.  In the purchase of information or expertise 
model, the consultant relieves the client of a specific, defined problem and arrives at a 
rational, analytical solution.  In the doctor-patient model, diagnosis is an essential part 
of the process but the doctor is responsible for developing the appropriate solution.  In 
process consultation the consultant facilitates the client in reaching and understanding 
a solution. 
 
Concern over process is a central theme of the organisation development (OD) tradition 
in consulting, as exemplified by Bennis (1969), Margulies and Raia (1972, 1978), Bell 
and Nadler (1979), Schein (1987), Burke (1994).  As Burke (1994) suggests, 
organisational development is a broad school that is still evolving and is based more on 
considerations on how consulting work should be done rather than specific techniques.  
Organisational development (OD) has its theoretical roots in clinical and behavioural 
psychology and group processes, and focuses attention on how individuals and groups 
interact within an organisational context.  The methodological model for OD is action 
research; data are collected and then action is taken based on what the analysis suggests.  
Argyris (1970) in proposing a theory of intervention identifies three appropriate roles for 
consultants: obtaining valid information, facilitating free choice and promoting internal 
commitment to the chosen course of action.  Argyris develops these three themes as 
central commitments to avoiding and counteracting defensive routines that hinder 
organisational change and learning (Argyris 1985, 1999). 
 
Central to an OD intervention is that the client should perceive a need for change and 
should be involved in planning and implementing the change.  Some exponents go as far 
as suggesting that an OD intervention should lead to a transformation of the 
organisation’s culture.  The target of an OD intervention is the organisation, reflecting 
the belief that significant change requires a system-wide approach and perspective, and 
the aim is to bring about lasting, cultural change.  It appears almost an article of faith 
within the OD tradition that change is, and should be, brought about through improving 
the skills and capabilities of people within the organisation, through better teamwork and 
through enlightened working practices. 
  
OD consultants use a range of intervention techniques and strategies (Covin 1992) from 
survey feedback to teambuilding, to understand and enhance the role of the individual 
within the social system.  As Burke (1994) points out, OD consultants too have 
developed models to guide the process of diagnosis and intervention.  The Burke-Litwin 
Model of Organizational Performance and Change (Burke and Litwin 1992) is a prime 
example of an OD model in that it identifies and links a wide range of factors seen as 
critical in realising change.  Transformational factors, such as mission, leadership and 
culture, are linked to transactional factors, such as procedures, systems and work 
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climate, emphasising the holistic and system approach of OD.  Using concepts and 
theories of the OD tradition, Kets de Vries and Balazs (1997) adopt a psychodynamic 
perspective of organisational change, drawing parallels between individual and 
organisational change, to propose ways of facilitating and speeding organisational 
change processes.  James and Jarrett (1997) apply theories of group psychodymanics to 
understand the interaction of the top management team and possible roles of a consultant 
when working with regressive or dysfunctional teams.  Their work also draws on 
concepts of family therapy (Minuchin 1974) as practised in an organisation context by 
Kahn (1993). 
 
2.3.1.2  Typologies 
 
The directive-nondirective continuum is not the only way of categorising consultants, 
what they do and how they do it.  Steele (1975) identifies nine roles a consultant may 
adopt when dealing with a client organisation: teacher, student, detective, barbarian, 
clock, monitor, talisman, advocate, and ritual pig.  Nees and Greiner (1985) propose a 
classification scheme of management consulting firms, shown as Table 1, based on 
professional values and cultures.  This classification, though still insightful, now 
appears somewhat dated given the efforts of most major consultancy firms to offer 
clients a full range of services (Rassam 1998).  Most major firms would claim to be 
able to operate within four of the five roles, depending on the client and the nature of 
the assignment, and to support in the implementation of strategies, processes or 
structures.  The friendly co-pilot role is typically the role adopted by the business 
school professor. 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of Management-Consulting Firms 
 
 Mental 
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Physician 
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Better CEO 
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Source: Nees and Greiner (1985: 77) 
 
Ganesh (1978) points to a strong influence of OD consultants’ style, in terms of their 
orientation towards people or task and structure, on their consulting approach.  He 
advocates more conscious awareness on the part of OD consultants of their style 
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preferences to avoid mismatches between style and approach, potentially leading to 
ineffective interventions.  
 
Blake and Mouton (1976) seek to characterise the interventions of applied behavioural 
scientists in terms of a Diagnosis/Development (D/D) matrix.  The two dimensions of 
the matrix are types of interventions and units of change.  The five types of interventions 
are: acceptant; catalytic; confrontation; prescriptive; principles models and theories.  
The five units of change are: individual; team (group, project department); intergroup 
(interdivisional, headquarters-field, union-management); organization; and society.    
Their matrix is intended to help consultants to think more explicitly about the work and 
its possible implications.  The D/D matrix highlights the breadth of activities and 
interventions that are considered within the ambit of management consultancy.  
Examples range from one-to-one mentoring (Tranfield 1995) to advising the UK 
Government on macro-economic issues such as productivity and growth of the UK 
economy (McKinsey Global Institute 1998). 
  
2.3.2 A Critique of Traditional Consultancy Practice 
 
Despite differences in orientation, methodological approaches, and the object of their 
interventions, the difference between the various consulting schools of thought is 
narrowing.  In their critique of OD, Beer and Walton (1987) suggest that OD consultants 
and the OD approach would benefit from being less purist, less programmed and less 
value-laden.  Specifically, OD consultants are being urged to acquire knowledge of 
business and analytic skills (Burke, 1994), and chapters on change management are now 
part of texts directed at consultants in the rational analytical mould (Sadler 1998).  The 
application of a structured process, based on sound social scientific principles, 
whether derived from management, economics, social psychology, and/or sociology, 
as well as independence and objectivity are cornerstones of a consultant’s offering. 
 
However, the image of consultants and the consulting process projected by the 
industry does have its critics.  Lippitt and Lippitt (1978) question whether disciplined 
problem solving or rigorous application of action research principles (Schein 1995) is a 
good or appropriate description of the consulting process.  They believe that consultants 
react to situations by a complex of trained reactions and experimental responses, some of 
which are unexplainable.  This essential element of skill or craft, as opposed to a 
structured intervention or problem solving exercise underpinned by scientific theory and 
method, is also recognised by Schon (1983, 1987).  Schon (1983) describes the process 
used by professionals in complex, ill-defined and unique situations as thinking-in-action 
and the associated learning and development as reflection-in-action.  Schein (1995) 
suggests that OD consulting is, and should be, driven by the client’s agenda and 
responsive to client needs.  Moreover, the process consulting tenet that the client should 
own the problem at all times does not preclude the consultant from making specific 
suggestions (Schein 1987).  Consultants make and seek to learn from mistakes (Reddin 
1977).  They come under a wide variety of pressures and stresses and in response often 
develop defence mechanisms to cope with their situations (Edmonstone 1980).  They 
develop personally and professionally through their careers, and continually experiment 
with new approaches and concepts as they carry out assignments (Harrison 1995b).  
 
This image of independence, objectivity and, implicitly, political neutrality also appears 
to be somewhat different from what can happen in practice.  Rather, Greiner and Schein 
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(1988) advocate that organisation development practitioners should understand, acquire 
and utilise political power and influence in order to effect change.  Greiner (1986) 
contends that organisational politics, particularly within the top management team, is a 
major reason why consulting assignments aimed at bringing about change of a “major 
organizational and strategic nature” fail.  Moore (1984) discusses specifically the politics 
of management consultancy, suggesting that consultants have their own agendas, which 
may, inadvertently, encourage them not to resolve problems in the hope of increasing the 
scale or duration of the assignment.  He finds that consultants operating in complex 
situations, with no clear-cut criteria of success or failure, can create unintended 
consequences, and can help to enhance the organisation’s image, to pacify dissenters and 
to satisfy or put off external agencies, rather than help bring about “genuine” changes.  
Argyris (1961) reports situations in which OD consultants compromise their own values 
and principles when dealing with clients.  Nees and Greiner (1985) suggest that differing 
professional values and organisational cultures have a profound influence on the way 
firms interpret clients’ problems and develop recommendations. 
 
While the actual consulting process may be more tentative, experimental and politically 
influenced than the normative texts on consulting suggest, the rational conceptualisation 
and model of consulting continues to be, in the most part, the basis on which claims to 
add value and influence organisations are made.  The research by Gattiker and Larwood 
(1985) shows that the objectivity of external consultants and their rational analytical 
approaches are valued by clients.   In their research into why organisations employ 
management, Gattiker and Larwood surveyed both clients and consultants.  They found 
that clients employ consultants for the stimulation they provide for members of the 
organisation, the expertise they bring to problem solving, the objectivity they can bring, 
and their ability to apply the consulting process within the organisation.  The use of 
consultants in cases of work overload, one of their hypotheses, does not appear to be 
strong; consultants have to bring something more to an organisation than in-house skills.  
Their role in enhancing credibility in a political context, another hypothesis, is less clear 
cut, since, in the research, the desire to enhance credibility was correlated with the desire 
for objectivity.  Gattiker and Larwood suggest that the deliberate insertion of consultants 
into organisational politics occurs, and that it is the result of a more subtle relationship 
than can be explored using the type of survey techniques employed in their research.  
The same research also indicated that management consultants felt themselves 
particularly useful in stimulating the organisation into setting about the change process.   
Gattiker and Larwood posit that this might be a self-serving bias, in which consultants 
see themselves as more capable and successful than others see them. 
 
In his research into the effectiveness of strategy consultants, Ginsberg (1989) finds that 
strategy consultants are perceived by senior managers to be better at increasing an 
organisation’s flexibility and environmental adaptability than at contributing to 
immediate profitability.  This is accounted for by the longer term horizon of competitive 
strategies compared to the more immediate impact of cost cutting and asset utilisation 
initiatives.  Ginsberg suggests that “strategy consultants who claim they can improve 
short-term profits should be treated with great skepticism” (1989: 296). 
  
Building on the interpretive perspective in the strategic management and OD literature, 
as briefly summarised above, Ginsberg and Abrahamson (1991) explore the role of two 
key change advocates in the change process: new members of the top management team 
(TMT) and management consultants.  Ginsberg and Abrahamson find that management 
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consultants are good at helping to break the conventional thinking and opening the way 
for new strategic possibilities, but are not good at helping to implement them: 
 
“To stimulate significant changes in the ways top managers think, executives 
may do well to hire management consultants who bring good problem-solving 
and coaching skills, along with a more objective view of the organization-
environment interface.  However, in general, management consultants may be 
inadequate for counteracting the inertial processes through which the 
organizational symbols, meanings, and values are created and institutionalized…  
To legitimize and facilitate extreme changes in strategic orientation, or ‘recipes’, 
organizations need to resort to strong political and symbolic actions, such as 
hiring new top executives in key leadership roles.” (1991: 186) 
 
These findings reinforce the view that consultants can have a significant impact on the 
way in which an organisation adapts to an increasingly complex environment by helping 
reshape existing perspectives and schemas.  Consultants can help senior managers by 
asking questions and doubting, and by providing an objective, expert view not 
constrained by prior commitments.  However, they challenge the view that management 
consultants add significantly to the credibility and legitimacy of making changes, and so 
help to counteract the cultural and political inertia within organisations. 
 
Management consultants are also seen to facilitate the change in frames of reference by 
acting as fashion setters and forcing managers to recognise the antiquated nature of 
previous strategic orientations.  This theme of fashion setting is explored by 
Abrahamson (1996), who identifies management consultants as key fashion setters.  He 
argues that consultants have to sense the emergence of collective preferences for new 
techniques and develop the rhetorics to define and disseminate these techniques to wary 
managers and others fashion setters.  The key to success for management consultants is 
to be perceived at the forefront of this process.  Importantly, Abrahamson contends that 
the choice of fashion being promoted is important in that it has real consequences for 
organisations and the people within them. 
 
Overall, the projection of the consulting process as being methodical, rational and 
dispassionate has numerous critics and scant empirical support. 
  
2.3.3 Management Consultancy: Alternative Perspectives 
 and Conceptualisations 
 
Implicit in the work of most consultants is the concept of a real social world, amenable 
to discovery, analysis and change through rational techniques. Within this rational 
perspective, consultants influence processes of strategic change by providing objective 
advice and structured support to facilitate action.  New, more objective views and ideas 
offered by consultants may provide a better or closer approximation to the external 
environment of the organisation and, hence, a closer strategic fit.  Fashions, fads and 
rhetorics, or concepts, methodologies and frameworks, encourage managers to think 
about, interpret and understand the world in different, presumed better, ways.  Structured 
support and guidance facilitates the translation of strategies into action. 
 
Other authors, though, adopt more subjectivist and critical (Burrell and Morgan 1979) 
stances to social science in their research and analyses of consultants and consulting.   
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Research and analysis set outside the functionalist paradigm suggest more subtle 
processes of influence and interaction between consultants and clients.  
 
The concept of rhetoric is developed by Alvesson (1993), who includes management 
consultants in his analysis of knowledge-intensive firms.  Alvesson puts forward a 
perspective on knowledge as institutionalised myth and rationality-surrogate, and 
suggests that the stressing of knowledge, science and rationality by such firms in the way 
they project themselves, internally and externally, is a strategy to deal with ambiguity.  
Alvesson’s propositions provide some insight into why consultants might continue to 
project images of rationality despite mounting disconfirming evidence based on actual 
practice. 
 
Others have conceptualised consultants in terms of creators and manipulators of image 
and impressions, rather than mere followers of a rational, scientific process.  Clark and 
Salaman (1995a, 1995b) and Clark (1995) analyse consultancy, and especially the 
work of two types of consultants: management gurus and executive recruitment 
consultants, through the lens of the dramaturgical metaphor.  They argue that 
consultancy is essentially an intangible and difficult to define service, a view shared 
by Mitchell (1994), and that clients choose consultants based, primarily, on reputation, 
a research finding in common with Dawes, Dowling and Patterson (1992). 
Consequently, consultants need to draw upon symbolic means to project competence 
and value, since they are not able to rely on a distinct, well defined and professionally 
endorsed body of knowledge and qualifications.    Executive recruitment consultants 
manage the “back-stage” aspects of a candidate’s performance, providing cues to and 
opportunities to rehearse the appropriate, socially enacted “scripts” interviewers might 
expect.   Building on the work of Huczynski (1993) and others, Clark (1995) argues 
that management gurus use theatrical techniques of energy, drama, suspense, and 
counter-point to “convert the audience to the gurus way of thinking; to restructure 
managers’ ways of thinking and in so doing to transform their consciousness” (1995: 
118).  Central to the consulting process is the concept of performance and the 
relationship it creates between the consultant and the client, not the substantive 
knowledge or techniques which underpin the conceptualisation of consultants as expert 
helpers. 
 
Sturdy (1995, 1997) proposes an interpretation of management fads and fashions as 
discourses used to promote interests and positions of power.  He takes a psychodynamic 
interpretation of management whereby the adoption and discarding of ideas is mostly 
subconscious and driven by anxieties about their careers, role and organisational 
environment.  He argues that consultants play on such anxieties when promoting new 
ideas in ways which position them, and by association, managers as being in control.  
Managers are not unaware, nor are they gullible, and resist such approaches, which in 
turn creates a sense of insecurity for consultants.  Sturdy (1997) develops and supports 
his arguments with empirical research based on selected in-depth interviews with 
consultancy purchasers, followed by a broadly targeted postal questionnaire.  The 
research findings indicate that, in their sales pitches, consultants offer reassurance while 
reinforcing uncertainty.  However, their prospective clients are both conscious and 
critical of such approaches.  Sturdy (1997) takes the view that “consultancy and the 
persistent adoption of ‘new’ ideas is an interactive and dialectic process founded on both 
consultants’ and clients’ self-defeating concerns to secure a sense of identity and control 
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which is framed within organizational structures and broader capitalist social relations 
and managerial labour process” (1997: 390).  
 
Bloomfield and Best (1992) examine the activities of IT consultants in terms of the 
way consultants seek to establish privileged positions by claiming to speak for 
“objective” information technology capabilities and the opportunities which arise 
from its application.  Central to their conceptualisation of consultancy is the use by 
consultants of symbolic processes to secure and hold positions of power in respect of 
their clients.  Bloomfield and Danieli (1995) develop these concepts of power and 
privilege and argue that technical and socio-political skills are indissoluble, and that 
the use of discursive, or rhetorical, and symbolic resources are an inherent part of the 
construction of an IT system.  They argue that the role of consultants can be 
understood “in relation to the use stratagems first for making themselves 
indispensable to clients, and second for maintaining that identity during the lifespan 
of a consultancy engagement” (1995: 24). 
 
Other, ideologically informed perspectives of the nature and practice of consulting 
exist. Baxter (1996) offers a post-modern perspective of consulting based on seven 
condensed tenets covering approach and values.  These include the view that meaning 
is endlessly deferred and that the factual is replaced by the representational.  He also 
stresses the need for continual reflexivity and warns against privileging one cultural 
view over another.  Though primarily found in academia, human inquiry is also a 
perspective which refutes the privileged position of the researcher, or consultant, and 
rejects the concept of people as mere subjects of research or an intervention.  For 
instance, Heron (1981a, 1981b) advocates the position in which researcher and 
‘subject’ work together and contribute fully to the research process.  He also 
advocates attention to, elevation and inclusion of experiential and practical 
knowledge, alongside the more conventional theory based or propositional 
knowledge, in research activity.  Reason (1994) outlines three methodological 
approaches: co-operative inquiry, participatory action research and action inquiry, the 
last of which is focused on the transformation of organisations and society.  Frost and 
Egri (1994) suggest that organisational change efforts might benefit from consultants 
adopting a shamanic perspective in which multiple realities, worlds or classes of 
experience are presumed and leveraged as part of the consulting process.  They argue 
that the ordinary world of reality and the symbolic world of reality should be 
complemented by the world of energy, in which everything is presumed to be 
connected in a “synchronous and cyclical manner”, and the world of holism which 
focuses attention on the spiritual element. 
 
2.3.4 Conceptualisations of Consultancy Compared 
 
Conceptions of consultancy are many and reflect the myriad forms that consultancy 
takes.  Among the more traditional forms, the main conceptions described above 
include: 
 
• rational analytical problem solving (e.g. Phills 1996b) 
• helping relationship (e.g. Schein 1987, 1999) 
• organisational transformation through action research (e.g. Burke 1994, Argyris 
1970) 
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The view that consultancy is essentially a process intended to solve problems through 
objective data and rational analysis (e.g. Phills 1996b) positions the consultant as a 
supplier of knowledge, expertise or resource to the organisation.  The research into 
consultancy, within this perspective, has naturally focused on the efficacy and 
outcome of the service provided (e.g. Gattiker and Larwood 1985, Ginsberg and 
Abrahamson 1991).  The OD tradition focuses on transforming the behaviour of 
individuals and the functioning of the organisation through skills transfer, improved 
group processes and organisational arrangements.  Building on concepts of organisations 
as complex systems (Hatch 1997) OD consultants draw upon theories of motivation, 
cognition and groups, and use modes of inquiry to reduce dysfunctional behaviour and 
defensive routines (Argyris 1985).  Research into OD consulting approaches has focused 
on the techniques and technologies of intervention (Covin 1992).  In many ways OD is 
conceived as a continual process of the research in which psychological theories and 
concepts are applied to, or tested and refined in, organisational contexts (Burke 1994).  
The OD tradition recognises the interaction of individuals and how such interactions 
create and shape organisations. 
 
In the traditional forms of consulting, interventions are, implicitly or explicitly, theory 
driven and aimed at bringing about some form of desirable benefit.  The research is 
similarly set within a functionalist paradigm, taking as axiomatic an objective reality 
accessible through scientific inquiry.  Practitioner oriented writers and researchers, intent 
on offering practical advice, are possibly unaware of, or avoid, philosophical debates.  
Research and critiques typically address discrepancies between the espoused 
intervention principles and theories and practice. 
 
More scholarly writers, such as Argyris (1999), acknowledge the analyses offered from 
different perspectives, and in their work greater attention and prominence is given to 
interpretive processes and the negotiation and construction of meaning.  Schein (1999) 
writes to correct the common but erroneous approach to process consultation as a 
technology for working with groups or model for non-directive counselling.  He 
specifically addresses the tacit assumptions upon which different models of 
consultancy rest and, in a notable addition to his earlier writing (1987), states that 
process consultation requires a conscious effort to decipher and experience the reality 
operating in the client-consultant relationship and situation.  Schein adopts an 
explicitly social constructionist conception of reality: 
 
“This concept of reality rests on the epistemological assumption that culture and 
thought create the external reality in which we operate and that we are, therefore, 
in a perpetual process of jointly deciphering what is going on.” (1999: 6) 
 
Schein (1999) contends that the continual process of collaboratively assessing “current 
reality” is fundamental to establishing a truly helping relationship.  He chides 
consultants, including OD professionals, for being overly keen to sell consultancy 
products and apply set intervention techniques and processes.  He suggests that once 
consultancy becomes a business, it is transformed into the sale of expert services and 
ceases to be consulting as he conceives the process. 
 
The more subjectivist and critical perspectives of consultants and consulting include: 
 
• purveyors of institutionalised myth and rationality surrogate (e.g. Alvesson 1993) 
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• manipulators of image and impressions (Clark and Salaman 1995a, 1995b, Clark 
1995) 
• palliatives and anxiety relief for managers (Sturdy 1995, 1997) 
• attainment of privileged position through rhetoric and symbolic resources 
(Bloomfield and Danieli 1995) 
• ideological pawns in a capitalist, managerial discourse (Knights and Morgan 1991) 
 
These conceptions, discussed above, share a view of the social world as socially 
negotiated and constructed in common with the enactment perspective.  Consultants and 
managers are deemed co-creators of the social world they experience, and consultants 
are an inextricable part of the ‘object’ of their interventions.  Each perspective has 
contributed insight and added to our understanding and appreciation of consulting 
interventions as social phenomena.  Others have suggested how consultancy might be 
conducted if it were guided by or set within other perspectives: 
 
• post modern (Baxter 1996) 
• human inquiry (Heron (1981a, 1981b, Reason 1994) 
• shamanic (Frost and Egri 1994) 
 
The more recent conceptions, to varying extents, use the firmly established, traditional 
view of consulting as a backdrop against which to question fundamental assumptions 
and to draw out differences.  At present, these conceptions have stimulated some 
academic debate, but appear to have gained little currency in the practitioner 
community, which seems to crave simple prescriptions and instrumental knowledge 
(e.g. “Practical Management Consultancy”; Markham 1997, “The Secrets of 
Consulting”; Weinberg 1985). 
 
 
2.4 MANAGEMENT CONSULTANCY INTERVENTIONS: 
 AN ENACTMENT PERSPECTIVE 
 
Academic research on management consultancy interventions is limited, and most of 
the existing research on its effects on processes of change is implicitly based on 
concepts of consultancy grounded in a rational, functionalist perspective. 
  
2.4.1 Limitations of Existing Research 
 
For most analytically oriented management consultants, their contribution to 
organisational change is the substantive input they make in terms of their objectivity, 
expertise, models, and structured problem solving skills and techniques.  It appears 
that, for many, their value proposition is so self evident that it requires no further 
consideration or investigation.  However, as Delaney (1995) points out, the research 
on the benefits of strategy consulting are limited and inconclusive, despite its 
prevalence.  Much of the research available is lacking in explicit theoretical 
foundations and survey based, reporting on why management consultants are 
employed by clients (Gattiker and Larwood 1985), selection criteria (Dawes, Dowling 
and Patterson 1992) and experiences of and benefits from consulting interventions 
(Ashford 1998).   This research tends to build on rather than question the prevailing 
notions on consultancy as a rational analytical process.  However, from an enactment 
perspective there is no such thing as an objective organisation-environment interface.  
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Expertise is someone else’s conventional wisdom, and methodologies are restrictive 
orthodoxies or pre-determined patterns of thought and action. 
 
Ginsberg and Abrahamason’s (1991) research showing that consultants are good at 
stimulating managers’ thinking by offering a more objective evaluation of  
opportunities available to an organisation also sits uncomfortably when viewed from 
an enactment perspective.   The concept of consultant as expert helper, able to 
perceive more clearly the “organization-environment interface” is at odds with the 
view of a socially constructed world.  One could argue that if managers within 
organisations want stimulation, they should be looking for eccentricity, ignorance and 
lateral thinking from their consultants.  The widespread use of consultants offering 
substantive expertise, industry or functional knowledge and/or rational analytical 
solutions is problematical for a conception of strategic management grounded in an 
enacted world since such consultants would appear to have little to offer.  It is far 
from clear how consultants’ rational, and invariably narrower, analyses, and their 
synthetic, and invariably simplified, action plans might facilitate richer, more 
encompassing enactments on the part of members of the organisation. 
 
Nonetheless, as Burke (1994) points out, evidence does exist of the success of OD 
interventions, though the evaluation process for specific interventions is fraught with 
difficulties.  Questions arise over the appropriate definition of organisational change, 
the independent and instrumental variables, confounding or external effects, and how 
to measure the change.  These questions hinder attempts to evaluate the effectiveness 
of interventions.  Even conceptualisations of consulting interventions grounded in 
social psychology or psychodynamic perspectives are partial in their examination of 
their influence on organisational change processes. The focal point of the evaluative 
research and conceptualisation of consultancy is the application of tools or techniques, 
not other aspects of the processes of engagement between consultants and client 
organisations. Schein (1995) writes to correct the common assumption amongst 
consultants that the initial client contact, data collection and the whole process of 
diagnosis is not an intervention.  From an enactment perspective, the very 
introduction of consultants within an organisational context disrupts on-going 
enactments by compelling individuals to make sense of the new situation.  Any 
interaction, whether direct or indirect, has the potential to influence routines, schemas, 
and paradigms, and so needs to be addressed in seeking to understand consulting 
interventions.  It is far from clear how essentially mechanistic interventions affect, or 
blend into, the more fluid habituated action patterns, which inform and constrain 
individual frames of reference and organisational paradigms. 
 
Some insightful case study based research exists which sets interventions within the 
context of the organisation.  Beer and Eisenstat (1996) describe evaluation research 
on one of their own interventions, and conclude that the history of the intervention: 
“can be understood at two levels – as the implementation of a clearly defined social 
technology…and as an on-going three-way negotiation among managers, employees 
and consultants about the meaning and use of this technology”.  Kahn (1993) 
describes his experiences as a consultant on a specific assignment and his feeling of 
being subtly manipulated and co-opted, and empathising with a particular point of 
view, shared by a group within the organisation.  Argyris (1993) describes an 
extended period of consulting support to a consulting firm to reduce organisational 
defensive routines and facilitate double loop learning.  James and Jarrett (1997) 
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describe two consulting interventions by the authors and indicate the complexity of 
the relationships that a consultant becomes part of and needs to take into account.   
Like confessions (Reddin 1977), and reflections (Harrison 1995b), such case based 
accounts and analyses of consultancy draw, to a large extent, on introspection and a 
personal perspective of events.  From an enactment perspective, this is valid and 
useful, yet incomplete.  It does not give sufficient attention to the on-going enactment 
processes between those individuals directly in contact with the consultants and those 
individuals not in contact with the consultants but likely to be affected by the 
intervention.  These processes are largely opaque to the consultant.  Even where 
clients have been asked to comment on and evaluate interventions, these issues tend 
not to be raised or commented upon.  Beer and Eisenstat’s (1996) work is a rare 
example of how different meanings are created and ascribed to an intervention by 
those involved or affected.  O’Shea and Madigan (1997) piece together case studies 
from different sources and informants, but their cases deal with generic approaches 
rather than specific details, and lack the range of perspectives to develop a rounded 
account. 
 
2.4.2 Fresh Insights from Research set in an Enactment Perspective 
 
In 1977, Frankenhuis (1977) offered managers in organisations advice on when to 
hire management consultants and whom they should hire.  Over twenty years later, 
Ashford (1998) offers very similar advice.  In the intervening period, consultancy 
services have grown at phenomenal rates and many books and articles have been 
published on consulting, its process and best practice methods, as outlined above.  
Nonetheless, in 1997, the Institute of Management Consultants published the results 
of focus group research of consultancy users on management consultancy services, 
which indicated that there was still significant room for improvement on the part of 
clients and consultants.  Again, the suggestions put forward were simple and 
straightforward, and were framed within a linear, rational, functionalist view of the 
world. 
 
Perhaps it is the view of the world that needs to be questioned and revisited.  From an 
enactment perspective the linear, rational, functionalist view of the world makes 
restrictive and unwarranted assumptions about the nature of the environment, 
organisations and their relationships, about the strategic management process and also 
about how change occurs within organisations.  These assumptions tend to constrain 
consultants’ and managers’ thinking and acting by encouraging them to regard 
socially constructed concepts as self-evident truths and to tailor their actions so they 
conform to rigid principles of organisation and accommodate presumed immutable 
external forces.  This world-view is even more problematic where it underpins efforts 
to research, understand and conceptualise consultancy interventions.  While 
practitioners are likely to abandon ill fitting theory in favour of pragmatism, 
researchers are more wedded to their ontological and epistemological assumptions, 
which guide what they see and how they account for it (Blaikie 1993, Hughes 1990). 
The assumptions are especially restrictive and binding when consultancy 
interventions attempt to address strategic issues, since these deal with the most 
fundamental of enactments: the organisation, its relationship with its environment and 
its core structures and processes.   
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Research from an enactment perspective explores how the organisation and the 
environment are created as well as discovered (Weick 1995), and how labels 
(Smircich and Stubbart 1985) or definitions (Blumer 1967) take shape and affect 
cognition and action.  The enabling and constraining influences of prior enactments 
and structures (Giddens 1976, 1984), interlocking routines (Westley 1990) and nets of 
collective action (Czarniawska-Joerges 1992) are core to an analysis of strategic 
change processes.   At the heart of the research is an attempt to understand consulting 
interventions as social processes rather than merely technical, functional processes.  
 
 
2.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
An enacted world implies that the organisation and its environment are continually 
shaped and defined through interpretive frameworks and patterns of activity.  
Attention is drawn to how senior managers within organisations create meaning and 
context, through language, metaphors, symbols and stories, rather than technical 
analysis.  Smircich and Stubbart (1985) argue that senior managers’ roles should be 
re-conceived, yet little attention has been paid to the implications for their advisers.  
Management consultants, who are increasingly used by senior managers to assist on 
practically all business issues including strategic management, appear to hinder rather 
than facilitate that role by emphasising rational analysis or humanist values.  The 
implications of an enacted world for management consultants, in terms of how they 
contribute to this creative process, is far from clear.   
 
The analysis of prevailing views on the nature of consulting interventions and their 
benefits from an enactment perspective raises a number of questions: 
 
• What benefits do consultants’ views, expertise and methodologies afford if 
objectivity is just an external bias, expertise is someone else’s conventional 
wisdom, and methodologies are restrictive orthodoxies or pre-determined patterns 
of thought and action? 
 
• How do essentially mechanistic consulting interventions affect, or blend into, the 
more fluid habituated action patterns, which inform and constrain individual 
frames of reference and organisational paradigms? 
 
• How are interventions affected by on-going enactments, which are largely opaque 
to the consultant? 
 
Some fresh insight into these issues and a different, in many ways complemetary, 
perspective into consulting interventions has the potential to contribute to the knowledge 
and discourse on management consultancy, and to strategic management and 
organisation theory.  Research also needs to speak to practitioners, both managers and 
consultants, if it is to add value outside a purely academic context (Watson 1994).  
Practical guidance should be of more than passing interest to practitioners.  When 
consultancy interventions attempt to address strategic issues, they influence and 
interfere with the fundamentals of an organisation.  The title of O’Shea and 
Madigan’s (1997) book; “Dangerous Company: Consulting Powerhouses and the 
Companies They Build and Ruin”, is a stark warning of the risks and potential 
consequences. 
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The aim of this research is to generate greater awareness and understanding of the 
influence and effects of management consultants’ interventions in organisations, in 
particular as they help senior managers in developing strategic direction and effecting 
strategic change.  Specifically, the research explores the central question: 
 
How do management consultants’ interventions influence processes of strategic 
change within organisations? 
 
The intention of the research is both to advance academic knowledge and to inform and 
sensitise consultants and managers to issues relating to consulting interventions, and so 
help them reflect on the practice of consulting and being clients (Bingham 1992).  
 
An examination of the influence of management consultants on processes of strategic 
change in organisations from an enactment perspective can offer new insights, 
concepts and understanding.   A fresh perspective is certainly called for, even if not 
easily achieved. 
 
The limitations of existing research reflect, in part, the difficulties of studying the 
consulting process.  As the literature review above suggests, the consultancy process 
tends to be far less programmed, neutral and transparent than some of the formal 
models portray.  The thinking-in-action (Schon 1983), political manoeuvring (Greiner 
1986, Moore 1984), tacit claims to and use of power (Bloomfield and Danieli 1995) 
and back-stage activities (Clark 1995, Buchanan and Boddy 1992) are not easily 
accessible to the external researcher.  The research difficulties are further complicated 
by multiple interpretations of an intervention (Beer and Eisenstat 1996) and subtle 
reciprocal influences (Kahn 1993, Argyris 1961). 
 
The difficulties in studying the consulting process are compounded by a general 
reluctance to open up interventions to rigorous examination.  Researchers and 
commentators (Gagnon 1984, Rassam and Oates 1991, O’Shea and Madigan 1997) 
have noted a reluctance to discuss specific assignments on the grounds of client 
confidentiality or desire to protect proprietary consulting approaches.  Clearly, 
allowing a researcher access to clients and staff entails a cost in terms of time and 
effort.  Perhaps of greater concern is that opening up an intervention to external 
scrutiny may risk surfacing shortfalls in competence, delicate or tense relationships 
and/or covert manipulations. An editorial in Management Consultancy magazine 
(May 1998) suggested that this “near silence” was creating a mystery around the work 
of management consultants and preventing the articulation and dissemination of best 
practices.  This secrecy has also retarded rigorous analysis and theory development, 
leaving managers and consultants alike to stumble along, sometimes in a fog of 
misunderstanding, suspicion and ignorance.  This research seeks to remove some of 
this fog. 
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The review of the literature on strategic change, organisations and management 
consultancy in the previous chapter indicates a limited amount of detailed, theory based 
research into consulting interventions.  It also suggests that research into consultants’ 
strategy interventions from an enactment perspective offers the possibility of fresh 
insights into how such interventions affect the thinking and subsequent actions of 
members of an organisation.  In particular, research attention is focused on how 
consultants influence and are influenced by the schemas, interlocking routines and 
actions which facilitate the continual negotiation of social order. 
  
The research design and methods were chosen for this research to enable the process of 
inquiry to be incisive, comprehensive and theoretically sensitive and sensitised.  The 
case study method grounds the research firmly within specific and defined contexts, 
allows an examination of how thinking and actions evolve and unfold over time, 
provides data from different perspectives and from a range of informants, and enables 
analysis at different levels: individual, group, organisation and environment.  Direct, face 
to face interviews, as the primary source of information, allow those involved to express 
themselves freely and to give their constructions and interpretation of events.  The 
overlap of field research and analysis within individual cases, and the phased approach 
to the research overall, facilitates the development, testing and elaboration of concepts.  
The drafting and circulation of a case study to those involved provides feedback on the 
reasonableness and resonance of the account with their own experiences. 
 
The design and methods reflect an essentially exploratory research agenda, aimed at the 
development of abductive theory and conceptual frameworks, informed by and linked to 
existing theory, yet grounded in the data from specific cases.  Importantly, the chosen 
design and conduct of the research are consistent with the philosophical assumptions of 
the enactment perspective itself. 
 
The remainder of this chapter elaborates on the research methodology and justifies the 
choice of research design.  The conduct of the actual fieldwork and analysis is described 
in later chapters. 
 
 
3.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The research is intended to generate some insight into a particular aspect of the world of 
management.  It is informed by and builds on three different literatures or bodies of 
knowledge: strategic management and change, organisation theory and management 
consultancy interventions, as outlined in the previous chapter.  The research 
methodology and design has to enable the questions raised, or the gap in the body of 
knowledge, to be addressed incisively and rigorously.  The choice of research design 
and methods also has to be compatible with, or more accurately derived from, the 
underlying philosophical assumptions. 
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As Hughes (1990) points out: 
 
“Every research tool or procedure is inextricably embedded in commitments to  
particular versions of the world and to knowing that world… it’s very status as 
a research instrument making the world tractable to investigation is, from a 
philosophical point of view, ultimately dependent on epistemological 
justifications.” (1990: 11) 
 
3.2.1 Epistemological Commitments 
 
Central to the research is the enactment perspective, which is based on the view that 
organisations and the environment are, in essence, social constructions, and that social 
order and social reality is continually negotiated through interlocking routines, 
sensemaking processes and patterns of action.  Research within such interpretive 
(Blaikie 1993) or symbolic-interpretative (Hatch 1997) conceptions of the world seeks to 
discover and describe the meanings and interpretations, intentions and motives, 
experiences and actions of individuals as social actors.  There is no presumption that 
external forces somehow operate thorough individuals, unobserved and unknown to 
them; the human act is self-directed, however imperfectly or inconsistently (Blumer 
1966).  The meanings and interpretations, intentions and motives, experiences and 
actions of individuals as social actors are the basic building blocks for understanding and 
providing accounts of social reality.  The task of the researcher is summarised succinctly 
by Blaikie (1993): 
 
“To discover why people do what they do by uncovering the largely tacit, mutual 
knowledge, the symbolic meanings, intentions and rules, which provide the 
orientations for their actions.  It is the everyday beliefs and practices, the 
mundane and taken for granted, which have to be grasped and articulated in 
order to provide an understanding of these actions.” (1993: 176) 
 
Any comparison and attempt to build or test concepts or theories to account for social 
action requires the researcher to start with actors’ understanding and concepts of their 
situation and their rationales for action (Shutz 1963a).  The process of inquiry does not 
start with a well-defined theoretical framework, which either implicitly or explicitly is 
imposed on the views and experiences of individuals, and/or is used to guide the 
research and explain the findings.  Rather, the researcher is required to empathise with 
the participants of the phenomenon being investigated and their experiences, and to 
obtain a deep and rich comprehension of their reasoning, behaviours or beliefs (Evered 
and Louis 1981).  As Blumer (1966) comments: 
 
 “ In short, one would have to take the role of the actor and see his world from his 
standpoint.  This methodological approach stands in contrast to the so-called 
objective approach so dominant today, namely that of viewing the actor and his 
actions from the perspective of an outside, detached observer... the actor acts 
towards his world on the basis of how he sees it and not on the basis of how that 
world appears to the outside observer.”  (1966: 542) 
 
This need to see the world from the actors’ standpoint and empathise with their 
reasoning, beliefs and conceptions suggests and favours interviews as the way of 
soliciting accounts from those involved.  It also favours a relatively open and 
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unstructured format, which allows participants to express themselves in their terms and 
using their concepts, to elaborate on the subtleties and complexities of their beliefs and 
motivations, and to raise and explain issues important to them.  A semi-structured 
interview process also allows the researcher to explore a wide range of subjects, to check 
and probe on certain issues and to gain immediate and direct feedback that some shared 
understanding of the very personal perceptions exists between informant and researcher.  
The researcher has to understand the accounts of those involved, and more specifically to 
gain as deep and empathetic an understanding as possible, before trying to synthesise 
these accounts and then begin to interpret these into social scientific constructs and 
theories (Shutz 1963b).  As Pettigrew (1990) points out, in practice this means accepting 
and exploring a plurality of accounts of the same event, before attempting, as a 
researcher, to analyse and make sense of potentially conflicting versions of reality. 
 
3.2.2 Abductive Research Strategy 
 
From an enactment perspective, all research is to some extent exploratory, since the way 
in which people make sense, personally and inter-subjectively, of their situations 
depends on innumerable specific factors and interactions.  Deetz (1996) describes such 
research as having emergent or local origins in terms of the concepts and problems being 
addressed and investigated.  Moreover, the development and dissemination of 
knowledge and even research processes change enactments to some extent.  As Giddens 
(1984) points out, the concepts and theories derived by social researchers about 
managerial behaviour are studied and appropriated by managers.  This process of 
learning and becoming aware of one’s own and others’ behaviour risks changing the 
very behaviour studied in the first place.  As suggested in the literature review, 
management consultants both reflect on experience and are prone to pick up and 
promote the latest fad or theory.  
 
The commitment to the primacy of actors’ conceptions places an onus on the researcher 
to develop, as well as test, social scientific concepts, theories and frameworks.   Unlike 
the hypothetical-deductive method of science promoted by rational or positivist schools, 
the researcher cannot simply take an extant theory or causal mechanism, translate it into 
testable hypotheses and then expose those hypotheses to the severest tests indicated by 
the posited theory itself.  This would mean imposing some form of external framework 
on a social setting and the way in which individuals make sense of their world.  Rather, 
the researcher has to draw out or induce the tacit and taken for granted, to surface the 
unreflective attitudes and practices and to assemble the fragments of meaning.  From 
these articulated insiders’ insights and stories the researcher builds social scientific 
description, concepts and theories.  This is the abductive research strategy (Blaikie 
1993).  An example of an abductive strategy is Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) grounded 
theory method, which they developed to enable generation of theory from data in an 
emergent yet rigorous fashion.  Their concepts of categories are the intermediaries or 
bridges between participants’ ideas, language and concepts and researcher derived 
theoretical constructs.  They both anchor or ground the theory in the data and allow 
abstraction and generalisation.  The categories also provide the means of identifying 
analogous situations where the theory might be expected to hold and thus define, in part, 
the transferability or analytical generalisability of the theory. 
 
Exploratory, abductive research does not mean naïve research based on the presumption 
of theory neutrality of observation.  There is a formal recognition that the researcher is 
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also an actor seeing and understanding the world from a particular perspective. The 
enactment perspective provides the theoretical lens which guides and directs the process 
of inquiry.  The extant theory, academic literature and knowledge of the subject in 
general sensitise the researcher to areas of possible interest, and the development of 
analytical concepts.  This existing theory can subsequently provide both additional 
support for emergent concepts and a backdrop for evaluating the contribution of the 
research.  The perspective and the literature, though, are aids not straightjackets, making 
explicit the frame of reference for the research and analysis (Eisenhardt 1989).  The role 
of the researcher as the primary research instrument (Berg and Smith 1988) is also 
acknowledged.  The researcher’s presence and the very act of inquiry in part inevitably 
shape the way people structure and articulate their experiences and intentions.  It is then 
the researcher who analyses and integrates the diverse accounts and narratives.  
Academic rigour in exploratory, abductive research is provided through informed 
empathetic inquiry, and the structured coding and the synthesis of categories and 
dimensions grounded in the data.  The fusion of different accounts into single, researcher 
compiled narratives or case write ups, accessible to and commented on by informants, 
provides further means of ensuring that the research has captured, in a rounded, 
reasonable and empathetic way, participants’ experiences and understanding.  In keeping 
with this intention, the narrative style (Van Maanen 1995) used to communicate 
emergent concepts and understanding seeks to meet the integrity and rigours of 
academic scrutiny while engaging practitioners with empathy and in a way in which they 
can easily follow and understand. 
 
In summary, an abductive research strategy has been adopted for this research.  The 
process of inquiry is informed by a defined theoretical lens and prior research, and the 
theoretic concepts are developed through rigorous analytical induction and supplemented 
by a process of feedback with participants. 
 
3.2.3 Knowledge Sought 
 
How knowledge and theory are advanced, namely the contribution of the research, is 
inherently linked to the researcher’s epistemological commitments and research strategy.  
While functionalist and realist philosophies of science focus on explanatory power, 
interpretive schools of thought, of which the enactment perspective is one, focus on 
understanding. 
 
The positivist philosophy of science contends that theories are derived inductively from 
repeated observations of a phenomenon, and explanatory power is primarily in the form 
of a constant conjunction of events.  For critical rationalism explanatory power comes 
from the causal relationships explicit in the theory, which are deemed to hold until 
demonstrated to be false by subsequent tests (Popper 1959).  Realism contends that the 
object of science is to create, and subsequently test, models, which if they were to exist 
would explain the observed phenomenon (Bhaskar 1978).  The explanatory power is 
derived from a model of the underlying, but essentially unobservable, processes, which 
give rise to observable events.  Critical realism posits that these models are hypotheses, 
subject to later revision (Outhwaite 1987). 
 
An interpretive view is that the concept of understanding, developed in relation to 
specific instances of the subject or setting, is more appropriate for a social phenomenon 
than the notion of explanatory power.  Such understanding is not devoid of theory.  
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Theory, as conceived and summarised by Bacharach (1989) as “a statement of 
relationships among concepts within a set of boundary assumptions and constraints”, 
reflects a realist philosophy.  Rather, an abductive theory, described by Gioia and Pitre 
(1990) as “any coherent description or explanation of observed or experienced 
phenomena”, is the goal of the research.  This entails going beyond the level of 
description, analysing carefully and critically the views of the participants, and linking 
emergent ideas to extant theories.   It does mean not imposing the researcher’s order on 
the world, but being creative in exploring, divining and testing potential relationships.   
Such theory can be used to investigate and make sense of phenomena or situations 
outside the unique context in which it is derived.  It can thus improve understanding 
within the academic and practitioner communities and so sensitise actors to their 
behaviour and its potential interpretation and implications. 
 
In summary, the research’s methodology and strategy, and the type of knowledge sought 
are coherent and based on defined epistemological commitments.  
 
 
3.3 CASE STUDY RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The case study research methodology was chosen as an appropriate means of exploring 
interventions within the context and processes of an organisation, and drawing upon 
multiple perspectives.  As Schon (1983) points out, an intervention takes place within 
the context of changes occurring within the organisation itself and its wider 
environment, both of which give it meaning and shape.  In terms of Layder’s (1993) 
research map, the research focus is on situated activity, namely the consulting 
intervention, but embedded in and actively seeking to influence the social setting or 
enactment within an organisation.   The ability to address the social, contextual nature of 
interventions is fundamental to establishing a rounded, cogent and relevant 
understanding and theoretical framework. 
 
As Yin (1994) suggests, case study design is particularly suitable in cases where the 
context is highly pertinent to the phenomenon of study.  Yin (1994) describes a case 
study as: 
 
 “ an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident.” (1994: 13) 
 
Pettigrew (1990) argues that “context is not just a stimulus environment but a nested 
arrangement of structures and processes where the subjective interpretations of actors 
perceiving, comprehending, learning, and remembering help shape process” (1990: 270).  
From an enactment perspective, the boundaries between a consulting intervention and 
the on-going processes of action and interaction within an organisation are constructs. 
Such constructs, like many others including the organisation, environment or concept of 
strategy, are essential in providing focus and scope to any research.  The research though 
needs to treat these boundaries as permeable and fluid.  As suggested by the literature, an 
intervention is likely to influence and be influenced by conceptions, routines and events 
happening within the organisation or its environment.  
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Insight into sensemaking processes and competing enactments requires multiple 
perspectives, which are facilitated by the case design.  The views, understanding, 
expectations, hopes, fears, actions and reactions of multiple informants can be sought in 
relation to a specific case, a specific consulting intervention.  An understanding of the 
dynamic interaction of consultants and managers is fundamental to the research and 
favours the choice of the case study design.  The case study design can also enable the 
exploration and analysis of the intervention process and its effects at multiple levels: the 
interaction of managers and consultants involved in the intervention, and between 
members of the organisation. 
 
Yin (1994) also states that the case study strategy has a distinct advantage where “a how 
or why question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over which the 
investigator has little or no control” (1994: 9).  The central question being asked by this 
research is how management consultants influence processes of strategic change, with a 
view to developing coherent accounts and a theoretical framework.  Importantly, case 
study research is suitable for exploratory research, but is more than the first phase of a 
predominantly survey based research strategy.  As Stoecker (1991) puts it, the case study 
design “is a comprehensive research strategy”.  The case study can accommodate both 
the development and testing of theory, essential given the exploratory and theory 
development nature of the research. 
 
The case study is also an established and understood research strategy. Allison (1971) 
used a case study approach to provide explanations of the Cuban Missile Crisis from 
three theoretical perspectives.  Johnson’s (1987) study of changes at Foster Brothers 
Retailers and Pettigrew’s (1985a) study of strategic change within ICI are examples of 
the case study approach.  In these cases, the research was informed by significant prior 
knowledge and a defined theoretical perspective, and went on to contribute to the 
theoretical perspective and substantive theory. 
  
The chosen research design reflects an emphasis on theory development and the relative 
absence of rigorous academic research on consulting interventions.  Moreover, the 
subject itself has not been analysed from an enactment perspective, which itself is still on 
the periphery of mainstream strategic management research.  Rather than focus on a 
single case study, the research design is one of studying multiple cases.  Multiple, 
diverse case studies provide greater coverage of the phenomenon and allow a greater 
amount of testing, elaboration of concepts and comparative analysis between cases 
(Pettigrew 1990, Yin 1994).  The multiple instances help to reveal underlying patterns 
and thus enable more complete understanding and explanation.  The importance of 
factors will tend to emerge more clearly, as a factor or relationship, which appears 
relatively unimportant in one case, can be amplified and its role clarified as more cases 
are analysed.  Pettigrew and Whipp (1991) studied multiple, matched cases to explore 
how organisations respond to competitive forces and possible sources of competitive 
advantage within a meta-framework of process, content and context. 
 
The cases studied by Johnson (1987), Pettigrew (1985a) and Pettigrew and Whipp 
(1991) were longitudinal, though these combined some elements of retrospective 
analysis.  Longitudinal case studies have the advantage of enabling the researcher to 
track all the key events, access the views and observe the behaviours of participants as 
they occur.  The longitudinal cases allow the researcher personally to experience, follow 
and appreciate the multiple connections, loops and emergent aspect of events as they 
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unfold.  However, they are difficult to gain access to, and, from a practical point of view, 
there is no guarantee that the researcher will be allowed to follow the intervention 
through to the end, particularly if difficulties emerge.  Neither can the researcher be sure 
of witnessing or being given intimate details of informal chats or private meetings that 
might have a profound effect on the course of an intervention. 
 
Practical considerations favoured multiple retrospective cases.  The retrospective cases 
are more certain and time efficient to research, since the data collection on the case can 
be completed within a manageable period and is not drawn out over a possibly indefinite 
period as the case unfolds.  The use of multiple case studies enables the researcher to 
phase or overlap the research process between cases.  The phasing of the research 
enables tentative concepts and theoretical frameworks developed from one case to be 
tested, amended and/or elaborated through research on subsequent cases.  This phasing 
at the case level complements the overlap of data collection and reflection and analysis, 
theory development and testing (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Strauss 1987, Strauss and 
Corbin 1990) within individual cases.  The passage of time can also reduce sensitivities 
surrounding client confidentiality (Rassam and Oates 1991) or delicate interpersonal 
relationships (Argyris 1961,1985, Kahn 1993), and so improve the chances of gaining 
access and the degree of openness with which informants discuss issues.   
 
The disadvantage normally cited in respect of retrospective studies is that accounts are 
distorted and biased as a result of the passage of time.  Participants present the researcher 
with a constructed series of events, intentions and interpretations from memory or 
limited documentary information.  These constructions will be based on participants’ 
present frame of reference, and some of the emotions, rationales and subtleties 
experienced at the time of the intervention may be lost.  As Weick (1995) contends, all 
sensemaking is retrospective and best characterised as a continuous, social process; 
accounts at different points in time are inevitably different, but should not be regarded as 
distortions of some form of objective reality. 
 
With retrospective case studies, the researcher is practically limited to a single snapshot, 
or at best a couple of snapshots covered by a relatively short interval of time. Unlike 
with longitudinal cases, the researcher cannot directly follow, through a series of 
interviews, or possibly direct observations, how a consultant’s or a manager’s 
interpretation and understanding of an intervention changes over time.  Events, 
comments and emotions may increase or decrease in prominence.  By asking informants 
to describe their views at an earlier date, how they have changed and why, an insight, 
though incomplete, can be gleaned into the sensemaking processes.  
 
Research into multiple cases enables the researcher to vary the proximity of the field 
research to the events relating to the different cases.  This variation across cases provides 
other suggestions and insight, again limited and incomplete, into how the interpretations 
and understandings of managers evolve over time, and hence into the influence of the 
intervention on on-going processes of strategic change. 
 
In retrospective cases, though, the views of participants are likely to reflect their 
considered thoughts, theories and insights.  Informants can become co-theorists, sharing 
their personal, intimate experiences and reflections on the social phenomenon.  Such 
reflections offer firm grounding for the elaboration of social scientific constructs and 
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theories.  Retrospective cases thus have certain advantages from a theoretical perspective 
as well as from a pragmatic one. 
 
3.3.1 Cases 
 
As with all research, the theoretical lens and methodology have to be operationalised 
(Rose 1982) at a detailed and practical level.  In exploratory, case study based research 
the decisions on how best to conduct the study go hand in hand with the fieldwork, 
reflecting a need to operate within the parameters of the research strategy and the 
opportunities afforded by any specific case.  In particular, cases are less selected than 
they are found, though the process of search is guided by emergent theoretical 
considerations (Glaser and Strauss 1967). 
 
The starting point for seeking cases is predicated on the core research interest, namely 
the intervention of a consulting firm or single consultant within the process of change 
occurring in a client organisation.  The focus is, therefore, on finding purposeful 
interactions of management consultants and individuals within the client organisation 
responsible for, or tasked with, bringing about strategic change, within the context of the 
wider organisational enactment.  The fieldwork, in essence, involves obtaining, 
comparing and analysing the multiple accounts of the intervention, and exploring the 
motivations, reasoning and interpretation of the various actors. 
 
In line with the epistemological commitments, managers’ and consultants’ definitions 
and understanding of what constitutes a strategy intervention are primary considerations 
in deciding to research a case.  The agreement to include the case in the research is 
reached through discussion and mutual clarification of concepts.  The period that the 
consultancy is retained for the assignment provide the focus and approximate temporal 
boundaries for the case.  This eliminates the need to impose arbitrary time boundaries, as 
in some cases of research into organisational change (Miller and Friesen 1980, Pettigrew 
1990, Romanelli and Tushman 1994).  However, the intervention needs to be studied in 
terms of its history and consequences, not a discrete set of interactions abstracted from 
on-going routines, actions and conceptions which characterise organisations.  The 
reasons for and overall process of engaging consultants are expected to be key to setting 
expectations (Gattiker and Larwood 1985), and in shaping the scope, content and 
‘modus operandi’ of the intervention.  The subsequent changes to structures, systems, 
actions and understanding, facilitated or inspired by the intervention, are also key 
elements of the research. 
 
The following two chapters provide a detailed and candid account of the fieldwork and 
analysis of the four cases researched.  In essence the research process sought to apply the 
methodology and principles set out above. 
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4. CONDUCTING THE INITIAL RESEARCH: 
 
KEPNER TREGOE’S INTERVENTIONS WITHIN 
THE BRISTOL AND WEST BUILDING SOCIETY 
AND 
THE POST OFFICE GROUP 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The practical difficulties of finding organisations and consulting firms prepared to 
participate in the research were recognised at the outset.  Researchers and commentators 
(Gagnon 1984, Rassam and Oates 1991) identified the reluctance of consultants and 
their clients to divulge details of specific assignments, and the authors of most published 
case studies have been consultants in the interventions described and analysed.  
Moreover, the wise, if not totally heeded, advice from Cranfield School of Management 
faculty warned of the effort and perseverance required to carry out the research.  
 
While clear intentions and research design elements, as summarised in the previous 
chapter, were set out in PhD Review papers, the actual research process was hesitant, 
staccato, stumbling and fraught with problems and disappointments.  Opportunities were 
grasped and accommodated into the overall research strategy and design.  Pettigrew 
(1990) describes his and this research experience aptly: 
 
“…the practicalities of the process are best characterised by the phrase “planned 
opportunism”… a judicious mixture of forethought and intentions, chance, 
opportunism, and environmental preparedness” (1990: 274). 
  
Such “planned opportunism” played a part in the first two cases studied, and how the 
research evolved.  One consulting organisation, Kepner Tregoe, and two of the firm’s 
clients, the Bristol and West Building Society and The Post Office, agreed to participate 
in the research.  The cases relating to Kepner Tregoe’s interventions in the two 
organisations were studied and tentative concepts, frameworks and inferences were 
derived.  Once the two cases had been secured, there was a conscious decision to analyse 
and draw some tentative conclusions from these cases before attempting to secure 
further cases.  The initial phase of the research thus revolved around the investigation 
and analysis of the two cases above. 
 
The chapter provides a detailed description of the conduct of the research, with a view to 
sharing my experiences, decisions and the process through which I reached my tentative 
conclusions.   The next section recounts how access was secured to the first two case 
studies, and this is followed by a review of the instruments and protocols used to study, 
analyse and synthesise the cases.  The stand-alone case write ups or narratives, as 
reviewed by the research sponsors in the participating organisations, are located in the 
Appendix.  These write ups are important elements of the thesis and research process 
itself.  The case write ups can be read prior to section 4.3.2 on analysis, thereby 
providing the story and contextual backdrop the research process used, in particular the 
fieldwork and analysis.  The final sections in the chapter describe the interim findings 
from the initial research and reflection, which are illustrated by quotations taken from 
the interview transcripts. 
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4.2 ACCESS 
 
Once the research objectives, methodology and design had been more clearly defined, 
the process of securing access to empirical cases began.  The initial access strategy was 
to approach the major management consultancy firms, since many had strategy practices 
and offered strategy consulting services.  Since only a small number of cases were to be 
researched in depth, a relatively focused and small scale mailshot was deemed 
appropriate. 
  
In September 1994, 13 firms were approached.  Ten firms were members of the 
Management Consultancies Association (MCA), which is a voluntary body established 
to enhance the standing of the management consultancy profession and to promote the 
interest of its members.  The MCA’s members are the larger, well established 
consultancies.  Of the total membership, the ten approached were selected on the basis of 
personal knowledge regarding their large size and wide scope of work.  Additionally, the 
London offices of three major international consultancies, not members of the MCA, 
were also selected: McKinsey and Company, Bain, and Booz Allen Hamilton 
International.  All the firms approached carried out strategy assignments for numerous 
clients, and the expectation was that some would be interested in the research subject 
and willing to participate.  A standard letter was sent to each firm, personally addressed 
to the Managing Partner or Managing Director. 
 
The letter outlined the research objectives and methods, and stressed the participation 
and open access sought of both the organisation and the consulting firm as a pre-
requisite of inclusion in the research.  The letter also emphasised that all participants 
would be assured that their comments and views would be dealt with discretion and 
confidentiality, since the information sought was expected to be sensitive and generally 
regarded as highly confidential.  An offer was made to reciprocate (Pettigrew 1990) by 
offering consulting firms and client organisations feedback on the results of the research, 
once completed.  The knowledge and insight likely to emerge from the research was 
expected to be of interest to consulting firms in particular, since it held out the possibility 
of improving their services to clients in an area which is highly complex and 
professionally demanding. 
 
In some cases the firms replied promptly, but in most cases the letters were followed by 
telephone calls around a week later.  Four appointments were arranged with partners or 
managers from: Andersen Consulting, Ernst & Young, Touche Ross Management 
Consultants, and Oasis Group Plc.  At these meetings, I outlined the objectives of the 
research and the research design and then invited questions.  The anticipated concerns 
regarding confidentiality and sensitivity were raised during the various meetings, but 
these concerns were not regarded as insurmountable.   However, after some months and 
numerous telephone calls, all four of the above firms decided not to participate, despite 
some having expressed an interest in the research at the meetings.  The reasons for 
declining to participate were phrased in terms of inadequate or inappropriate resources or 
just a lack of interest.  I sensed that I may have persuaded the individuals with whom I 
spoke of the potential merits of the research, but that they must have found it difficult to 
overcome the internal reservations and concerns.  As has been noted earlier, there is a 
general reluctance on the part of consultants to discuss their work. 
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From a conventional mailshot approach, the emphasis switched to asking Cranfield 
School of Management faculty, fellow researchers and contacts within the consulting 
profession personally if they knew or could put me in touch with consultancy firms or 
client organisations that might be willing to participate in the research.  In the Summer 
of 1995, a Professor at Cranfield School of Management sent a single page summary of 
the research proposal to an acquaintance at Kepner Tregoe, a relatively small firm of 
management consultants which specialised in process consultation, who agreed to see 
me.  I arranged a meeting in September 1995 with Mike Freedman, the Executive Vice 
President, at which I outlined the objectives of the research and the research design.  
Mike Freedman described briefly the Kepner Tregoe approach and intervention 
philosophy and said that he was interested in the research.  He also identified two client 
organisations with which Kepner Tregoe had worked recently to help them to develop 
their corporate strategies.  Both these organisations had subsequently undergone and 
were still undergoing significant strategic change. 
 
Mike Freedman approached senior managers within these organisations, the Bristol and 
West Building Society and The Post Office Group, who agreed to discuss their 
organisation’s participation in the research.  In October 1995, meetings were arranged 
with Kevin Flanagan, Group Services Director at the Bristol and West, and with John 
Roberts CBE, Managing Director Personnel at The Post Office.  Following a number of 
meetings, both organisations agreed to participate in the research. 
 
In both cases the consulting intervention was made up of a series of interactive 
workshops designed to help the senior management of two organisations develop their 
own business strategies.  The workshops each lasted two days, with approximately a 
month between each, and followed a conventional flow of identifying the factors in 
the environment, understanding the organisation’s relative strengths, choosing and 
then developing the exact details of the strategy (Tregoe, Zimmerman, Smith and 
Tobia 1989).  Kepner Tregoe provided the analytical framework, introduced and 
explained a range of decision making and analytical techniques and acted as 
facilitators during the discussions.  Kepner Tregoe did not claim any industry 
expertise and based its approach on a belief that senior managers should carry out the 
analyses themselves since this generates greater understanding of the issues and 
ownership of the chosen strategy.  Participation in the workshops was restricted to the 
Chief Executive and top management team. 
 
These interventions clearly fitted the research agenda. Given the difficulties 
experienced, the decision was taken to follow up both cases promptly, as quickly as 
the managers within the organisations could fit the proposed interviews in their 
diaries. 
 
 
4.3 STUDYING THE CASES: INSTRUMENTS AND PROTOCOLS 
 
The case data came from the review and analysis of secondary data and in-depth 
interviews with key members of the organisation and the consulting firm. 
 
Following the initial meetings with both the Bristol and West and The Post Office, 
documentary material was requested and provided by both organisations.  Specifically, 
the binders, which had been compiled and circulated by Kepner Tregoe, containing the 
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deliberations and decisions made by the respective strategy formulation groups were sent 
to me.  These binders documented the chronology of the strategy process and final 
strategy agreed as a result of the intervention.  The binders supplemented some 
promotional material supplied by Mike Freedman on Kepner Tregoe’s approach and an 
article referring to previous work.  This information was reviewed and provided a basic 
understanding of the process, nature and context of the intervention. 
 
4.3.1 Fieldwork 
 
The fieldwork was designed to solicit the accounts and perspectives of consultants and 
members of the organisation either directly involved in the consulting intervention or to 
some extent affected by it.  The in-depth interviews with informants lasted around one 
hour.  The fieldwork in the two cases overlapped very slightly, but the analysis of the 
first case of the Bristol and West influenced the later fieldwork for The Post Office case. 
  
4.3.1.1  Bristol and West Building Society 
 
The initial briefing for the Bristol and West took place on 23 November 1995 when I 
met Kevin Flanagan in Bristol, following a short meeting with him in London in 
September.  The formal interviews started in January 1996 and finished in March 1996, 
and most were held at the Bristol and West offices.  Kevin Flanagan suggested that I 
should speak to Jennie Barton, one of his direct reports, and some of his colleagues on 
the Executive Team (in effect the operating Board), and mutually convenient times were 
arranged.  The interviewees/ informants for the Bristol and West case study were: 
 
23/1/96 Jennie Barton, Head of Strategy Management and Implementation 
12/2/96 Jeff Warren, Deputy Chief Executive and Finance Director 
21/2/96 Ian Kennedy, Group Operations Director 
4/3/96  Kevin Flanagan, Group Services Director 
 
21/3/96 Mike Freedman, Executive Vice President, Kepner Tregoe 
 
A meeting was scheduled with John Burke, Chief Executive, but was subsequently 
cancelled.  Since John Burke was the ‘client’ or ‘sponsor’ for the consulting intervention, 
specifically the person with ultimate responsibility for employing, directing and 
evaluating the work of the consultants, it was disappointing that he personally declined 
to participate in the research.  The stated reason was that he felt I had got the necessary 
information on the strategy formulation process from other members of the Executive 
Team, namely Jeff Warren, Ian Kennedy and Kevin Flanagan. 
 
Mike Freedman was the lead consultant, responsible for facilitating and co-ordinating 
the work of Kepner Tregoe.  Unfortunately, both the other two consultants involved in 
the Kepner Tregoe intervention, Ann Orton and Nick Mobley, were working in the USA 
and could not be included in the research.  Ann Orton supported Mike Freedman in the 
formulation process and Nick Mobley led the subsequent implementation planning on 
behalf of Kepner Tregoe. 
 
4.3.1.2  The Post Office 
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Before I could arrange the first interviews, Bill Cockburn CBE, the Chief Executive of 
The Post Office, resigned and was succeeded by John Roberts CBE.  The research was 
delayed while the new organisational arrangements were being sorted.  John Roberts 
transferred the responsibility for sponsoring and liaising with me to Richard Osmond, 
The Secretary.  A meeting was arranged in January 1996 with Richard Osmond and the 
research agenda and methods were vetted and approved.  The Post Office interviewees/ 
informants were: 
 
20/3/96 Jean Irvine, Group Information Technology Director* 
28/3/96 Jerry Cope, Managing Director, Strategy and Personnel 
16/4/96 Kevin Williams, Managing Director, Parcel Force 
3/5/96  Richard Dykes, Managing Director, Post Office Counters 
16/5/96 David Tailor, Business Strategy Director, Post Office Counters 
3/6/96  John Roberts, Managing Director Personnel* 
17/6/96 Bill Cockburn, Chief Executive* 
 
19/6/96 Mike Freedman, Executive Vice President, Kepner Tregoe 
 
(* at the time of the Kepner Tregoe intervention, but not when the interview was 
conducted) 
 
Bill Cockburn agreed to participate personally in the research, even though he had left 
and was at the time Group Chief Executive of WH Smith.  He was aware of the research 
and had sanctioned The Post Office’s participation initially.  His account of events and 
perspective was invaluable given his role as sponsor of the intervention and his influence 
within the organisation and on the consulting process.  David Tailor was interviewed at 
the suggestion of Jean Irvine who perceived that he had strong views on the Kepner 
Tregoe intervention. 
 
Again, Mike Freedman was the lead consultant, supported by Ann Orton.  As with the 
Bristol and West case, Ann Orton was in the USA and could not be included in the 
research. 
 
In both cases, the choice of interviewees combined initial suggestions by my sponsor 
within the organisation, based on my description of the nature and purpose of the 
research, and subsequent suggestions by interviewees themselves (snowball sampling; 
Burgess 1984).  The order of the interviews largely reflected the openings available in 
respective diaries, though there was a conscious effort to interview Mike Freedman last 
in both cases.  I had already spoken to Mike Freedman, who had talked about his firm’s 
approach in general, and I felt that the limited interview time could best be used 
addressing specific points which emerged from the other interviews and my reflections.   
The interview with Bill Cockburn came towards the end of the fieldwork in The Post 
Office case, because I contacted him only after I had started the fieldwork.  I was 
encouraged to contact Bill Cockburn by senior managers at The Post Office when I 
interviewed them, which helped to overcome a slight hesitancy on my part.  I was 
unaware of the circumstances relating to Bill Cockburn’s departure and did not want to 
raise possible issues or concerns within The Post Office.  I was also keen not to make his 
agreement to participate in any way conditional on my being able to research the case. 
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The option of going back to ask more detailed questions at a subsequent date was 
sought, in principle.  However, there was a tacit, mutual acceptance that this was going 
to be difficult in practice, given the work pressure faced by all the interviewees. 
 
4.3.1.3  Topic Guides 
 
The research objectives of understanding how management consultants’ interventions 
influence processes of strategic change within organisations, and earlier literature review 
were the starting point for developing topic guides and provided the framework and key 
lines of inquiry, as suggested by Eisenhardt (1989).  Specific questions were also 
prompted by the review of the documentary material.  Personal experience as a 
management consultant and of having carried out or been involved in similar strategy 
formulation assignments provided another source of questions.  This combination of 
theoretical and practical sensitivity is a distinct advantage when doing exploratory, 
grounded research (Glaser and Strauss 1967).  Given that consulting relies heavily on 
tacit, experiential knowledge (Schon 1983, 1987), this blend of theory and practice 
helped both to identify, focus on and probe issues, and to provide a backdrop for making 
sense of answers and directing questions, especially in the early stages of the research.  
 
The intention was to give primacy to actors’ understanding and interpretation of events 
and to be as open as possible to their accounts, recognising that observation and 
comprehension cannot be theoretically neutral.  Topic guides were developed to focus 
the research efforts in line with emerging areas of interest.  A separate topic guide was 
developed for each interview.  The initial topic guides included questions designed to 
establish a basic chronology of events, as perceived and recollected by interviewees, and 
‘factual’ information on timings of the intervention and participants in the strategy 
formulation process.  Subsequent topic guides picked up on issues and events which 
previous interviewees considered important or appeared important to the researcher once 
the interview transcripts had been reviewed, or analysis undertaken.  There was a 
deliberate overlap between the data collection, reflection and the formal analysis.  The 
later topic guides for The Post Office case reflected and incorporated questions relating 
to the themes and issues that were emerging from the initial analysis of the Bristol and 
West case. 
 
An example of a topic guide developed for the third interview in the Bristol and West 
case is included as Exhibit 1.  This guide built on the initial briefing provided by Kevin 
Flanagan, the research sponsor within the Bristol and West, and a formal interview with 
Jennie Barton, who was responsible for the implementation of the strategy, though she 
had not been party to the formulation process.  The interview with Jeff Warren, Deputy 
Chief Executive and Finance Director, was the first opportunity to explore in detail the 
mechanics and interpretations of the Kepner Tregoe strategy formulation process from 
the perspective of an insider. 
 
The topic guides were intended to act as a prompt list or a reminder of issues previously 
raised, and prior and emergent theoretical considerations, and so supported rather than 
constricted the interview process.  The order and articulation of the questions asked 
reflected the flow and language used by informants.  As with the literature review, these 
guides were sensitising issues designed to help the process of inquiry and exploration.  
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Exhibit 1 
 
 TOPIC GUIDE 
 
Interviewee: Jeff Warren, Deputy Chief Executive and Finance Director 
 
 
* First indications that B&W might use KT - impressions reactions, reservations (if 
any) 
 
* Describe the presentation Mike Freedman made to the Exec.  What attracted you 
to the approach or KT?  What reservations? 
 
* How did the Exec come to a decision on KT? 
 
* How long after did the workshops start?  What preparation did you or KT do? 
 
* Describe the process adopted by KT.  How was it adding value to your strategic 
debate?  Were the gaps between workshops useful?  How? 
 
* Was the shortlist of Driving Forces easily arrived at? 
 
* What contribution did the KT consultants make to your deliberations - process/ 
content?  Were there any off-line meetings? 
 
* What was Mike Freedman's style.  Did it flex, adapt or change during the course 
of the review?  Was this appropriate, helpful? 
 
* The process took over 6 months; how did other events and activities influence 
the formulation process?  What internal processes were also at work? 
 
* How happy were you with the results, the strategy selected - rigorous, 
exhaustive, best possible? 
 
* Why were KT asked to support the implementation? 
 
* Why was Jennie Barton asked to head up the strategy implementation group? 
 
* On reflection, what could KT have done to make the formulation process better? 
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4.3.1.4  Interviews 
 
In carrying out the research, there was a deliberate attempt to establish rapport with the 
interviewees, and to solicit their accounts and interpretations. As the researcher, I 
recognised and accepted that my presence and my line of questioning in some way 
influenced the process of reconstructing events and impressions.  The interviews were 
loosely structured and were essentially a conversation with a purpose (Burgess 1984), a 
mutually constructed dialogue.  Informants were given a brief overview of the topics of 
interest and allowed to express themselves as they wished, with the topic guides acting 
as a prompt to ensure that the areas of interest were covered.  The discussion around 
individual topics varied from single sentences to multiple pages of transcribed narrative.  
The questioning sought to probe issues and build upon previous comments to understand 
as fully as possible and to empathise with the meaning that the intervention had for them.  
The interviewees held firm opinions and were prepared to express them, which was not 
surprising given their seniority within their respective organisations and experience.  It 
was reassuring that, when interviewees thought I was going off at a tangent or had not 
understood what they were trying to say, they corrected me and emphasised their point 
of view. 
 
For most of the informants the intervention seemed vivid.  Inevitably, retrospective case 
studies require individuals to reconstruct the series of events from memory or limited 
documentary information.  This meant that the interviewees were uncertain regarding the 
exact dates and timings of the intervention, and could not describe with any confidence 
the precise analytical tools or frameworks.  However, in most cases, the ‘factual’ details 
could be checked using the documentary material, and sometimes at the interviewee’s 
request certain details relating to the intervention were shared, if known.  This 
uncertainty served to highlight those aspects of the intervention that apparently had the 
least impact or salience to those involved.  Their impressions and feelings in respect of 
the intervention seemed to be still fresh and were expressed clearly.   Questions and 
probing were also directed towards getting them to remember their original views, 
emotions and rationales, and this suggested how their interpretations and understandings 
had changed over time.  Some interviewees were very conscious of these changes, and 
could provide specific examples of changes in perspective and explanations of why the 
changes had occurred. 
 
In asking informants to recollect an intervention, the researcher is presented with a 
personal series of snapshots, with the chance that key events essential for developing an 
adequate understanding and depiction of the intervention are missed out.  However, the 
iterative process of data collection and analysis meant that as rounded and 
comprehensive as practical an account was developed as the interviewing progressed.  
Reading the transcripts in detail, reflecting upon them, and trying to understand what the 
interviewees were saying threw up issues and areas which warranted further 
investigation and so were incorporated into subsequent topic guides. 
  
Somewhat unexpected but most welcome were the carefully considered thoughts and 
insights offered by most interviewees.  It appeared, and was sometimes confirmed, that 
they had reflected at length on the intervention.  They had formed and were able to 
communicate their theories, understandings and explanations of the intervention and 
consulting interventions in general.  Most of the interviewees had participated in or 
directed other such interventions.  The views expressed tended to be synthetic and 
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analytic, rather than a more descriptive account of the events as they unfolded.  This 
provided me with valuable insights and clues in the search for more theory-based 
appreciation and conceptualisation of strategy consulting interventions.  In essence, the 
interviewees were my co-theorists, sharing the way they had made sense of the 
intervention, simultaneously giving rise to and grounding the emergent concepts in their 
experiences and perceptions. 
 
4.3.1.5  Transcriptions 
 
Almost all of the interviews were tape recorded, with the agreement of the participants, 
and so enabled me to take a complete and verbatim record of what was said.  The initial 
briefings were not recorded, though extensive notes were taken.  The tapes were 
transcribed by a specialist transcription service.  I personally verified the transcriptions 
by comparing them with the tape recordings of the interviews, inserting punctuation in 
line with my understanding of the dialogue and points being made.  This process of 
verification and punctuation served two purposes.  It created an intimacy and empathy 
with the accounts of the interviewees and the points they were making.  It also was the 
first stage of the analysis, in which issues emerged and were noted for subsequent 
interviews; these included apparent discrepancies in the timing or accounts of specific 
events or significantly different opinions.  These pre-theoretical issues and insights 
played a major part in shaping and directing the inquiry.  These verified transcripts were 
used in the later, more systematic analyses. 
 
4.3.2 Analysis 
 
Analytical procedures were designed to provide the rigour fundamental to good research.  
The choice of an interpretive epistemology, abductive research strategy and case study 
design, reliant on multiple accounts, places a considerable burden on any researcher to 
lay out and explain how concepts and conclusions are derived.  There is simultaneously 
the task of capturing and making sense of the complexities, subtleties and nuances of the 
divergent accounts, and of structuring and clarifying the data collected.  There is also a 
“requirement for inductive conceptualization” (Pettigrew 1990: 281) or a need to apply 
“disciplined imagination” (Weick 1989) to generate theory from data.  This latter 
requirement entails an inherently creative process of moving from purely actors’ or 
participants’ accounts to a more general, social scientific level of explanation, while 
remaining true to their conceptions (Shutz 1963b).  The results of this process of 
conceptualisation should be recognisable to and understandable by participants. 
 
In keeping with the abductive research strategy, a grounded analytical approach was 
used to meet the needs of the research objectives.  The approach was informed by the 
original work of Glaser and Strauss (1967) on grounded theory method, which stresses 
researchers’ creativity, insight and sensitivity rather than a general procedure.  The 
grounded method was later refined by Strauss (1987) and given a more structured 
procedural form by Strauss and Corbin (1990).  Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) and Gioia, 
Thomas, Clark and Chittipeddi (1994) applied a grounded method in their research and 
developed empirically grounded, overarching dimensions from “in vivo” codes, 
analytical codes, and categories.  Gioia, Thomas, Clark and Chittipeddi (1994) set out, in 
graphical form, the link between the “in vivo” codes, analytical codes and categories, 
both grounding the analysis in the words and concepts of the informants and defining the 
connections between the analytical codes and categories.  This analytical process and 
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representational form facilitated the marshalling of subtle and diverse concepts emerging 
from the transcripts. 
 
In essence, the analysis sought to make sense of and conceptualise from the experiences, 
understanding and meaning attributed by those involved in or affected by the Kepner 
Tregoe interventions.  As the analysis proceeded it provided the conceptual and practical 
framework for the subsequent data collection, and the on-going, iterative analysis and 
organisation of the themes and ideas that emerged.  The process of inquiry iterated 
between data collection and analysis, and the analysis itself started within a single case, 
then across cases, which in turn prompted more investigation within an individual case.  
This iteration and review was the basis for rigorous conceptual development, firmly 
grounded in the data. 
 
4.3.2.1  Open Coding 
 
The analysis and fieldwork overlapped significantly, with each element of the research 
process informing the other.  All the transcripts were read individually once they had 
been verified, and interesting passages were highlighted.  The process of highlighting 
text was tentative, intuitive and unstructured, and picked up on themes which ran 
through the available literature and echoed personal experience.  In the margins, notes 
were made commenting on or raising issues which appeared to warrant further 
investigation. 
 
These passages provided the main source of ideas and issues to incorporate in the topic 
guides.  As part of the process of maintaining an open mind to discovery, more formal 
analysis was deferred until the interviews with the individuals involved in the Bristol and 
West case study had been completed.  The aim was not to code too soon, and potentially 
close off avenues of inquiry or reduce the receptivity to the constructs and meanings of 
those who participated in the interventions.  
 
Once all the transcripts from the Bristol and West case study had been verified, these 
were read through as a group to gain a holistic impression of the intervention and to 
begin comparing the accounts as a way of identifying differences in perspectives.  This 
led to more passages in the text to be highlighted, as comments, views and events which 
had been previously skipped over appeared to have greater significance.  The detailed 
coding of the transcripts then began.   
 
The objective of this ‘first pass’ was to label or code the highlighted extracts of the texts, 
using as far as possible the concepts and expressions used by the interviewees/ 
informants themselves.  These “in vivo” codes helped to ground the analysis, since they 
were a constant reminder of how those involved understood what happened and had 
powerful associative effects, bringing to mind the speaker and the context of the 
extracted text.  Some of the interviewees’ descriptions were also very evocative; for 
instance “prisoners of the process”, was used to describe the structured facilitation.  
There was no attempt at this stage to develop and impose a structured coding framework 
written in the margin of the text, and an element of duplication and lack of precision was 
accepted at this stage. 
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4.3.2.2  Categories and Dimensions 
 
The codes were written on ‘post it’ notes and stuck on a wall.  They were then arranged 
and re-arranged as possible connections between the codes suggested themselves, as 
advocated by Miles and Huberman (1994).  This holistic, visual manifestation of the 
codes and their potential connections stimulated further thoughts, ideas and possible 
connections.  The notes remained on the wall for several days, as the transcripts were re-
read and the contexts giving rise to particular codes re-examined.  This slow, iterative 
process of analysis allowed time for reflection and evaluation.  Gradually, codes that 
appeared to have few connections were marginalised in terms of their location on the 
wall. 
 
Groupings of codes were tentatively made around the strategy formulation process and 
the facilitation style and process.  In addition, a looser grouping was made which 
brought together ideas and issues relating to the clarity of, commitment to and the degree 
of consensus relating to the strategy developed.  Two groupings, namely context and 
politics, which were expected to be quite prominent, based on the literature (e.g. Greiner 
1986, Greiner and Schein 1987, Pettigrew 1985a, Quinn 1980), appeared to be relatively 
unimportant in the Bristol and West case.  However, the strong political and contextual 
themes which were emerging from the interviews with Directors at The Post Office, 
which were being carried out at the same time, indicated that these groupings were worth 
keeping for the moment.  These interviews with informants from The Post Office 
influenced the process of analysis on the Bristol and West case. 
  
On re-reading the transcripts, the observations and reflections of one Bristol and West 
Director on the intervention itself, and how he perceived that the Executive Team’s 
approach in relation to strategy formulation had moved on, struck me as interesting.  I 
was particularly struck by the dualism in his discourse.  Exhibit 2 is an extract of the 
transcribed interview with the Director. 
 
Words and expressions such as “out here somewhere”, “separate process”, “outside”, 
“meet quite separately”, “externalised”, and “step out” suggested a notion of separation.  
Words and expressions such as “mature”, “standard parts of our normal management 
practice”, “internalised”, “only bringing back”, and “through integrating” suggested a 
notion of absorption.  The two concepts were distinct yet inter-related and provided a 
way of understanding the specific Kepner Tregoe intervention. 
 
More fundamentally, these concepts seemed to offer an emergent framework for 
answering the central research question: How do management consultants’ interventions 
influence processes of strategic change within organisations? 
 
The notion of separation, in the form of independence, objectivity, defining a scope, 
applying a methodology and managing the consulting process, was inherent in the good 
consulting practices advocated by writers such as Block (1981), Weinberg (1985), and 
Margerison (1988).  The notion of absorption echoed themes and ideas in the 
sensemaking (e.g. Weick 1979, 1995), learning (e.g. Argyris 1977) and strategic 
change (e.g. Bartunek and Moch 1987, Johnson 1987) literatures.  The tentative 
concepts became the core dimensions of the emergent theoretical framework.  The 
groupings of the codes could be understood as elements or manifestations of these core 
concepts or dimensions. 
Chapter 4 55
Exhibit 2 
 
EXTRACT OF THE INTERVIEW WITH A DIRECTOR OF 
THE BRISTOL AND WEST BUILDING SOCIETY 
 
 
SP How much content discussion went on at your regular board meeting or 
Executive team meetings? 
 
Dir About the strategy? 
 
SP Yes 
 
Dir Not very much to be honest.  We tended to leave the discussions of strategy 
and its stuff to when we were meeting with KT.  There would be some discussion, but 
it would be mainly on the lines of where are you up to on your homework, or… 
(Director) would say - look I have done some work but I need to talk to 
with…(Director), or I need to talk with… (Director) to close out on this particular 
issue or to move this issue forward.  But they were mainly in the nature of this is 
where I am up to, rather than I would like to discuss this.  And that didn’t seem to 
have any negative effects. My memory of it at the time was that it seemed only 
natural that this stuff was being developed out here somewhere, it was being 
developed in a separate process.  It was almost like the only place where you can talk 
strategy is over in Queens Square, you know that is the strategy room, like the only 
place you could study is the library.  You know, as we moved on, we have become a 
touch more mature about things, not much, but we have become a bit more mature.  
We are actually talking about them as standard parts of our normal management 
process to the extent, Sergio, that as a rule of thumb we try to have something about 
strategy on every Executive agenda.  Sometimes it is a very full discussion.  For 
example at the last Executive meeting, and at the next one which is this Wednesday, 
we had a very full discussion, in fact involving others on STEP analysis, and on 
Wednesday we are going to finish off STEP analysis and move into SWOT analysis.  
Now when we first started the process we would only do this outside, so to speak, but 
it is now becoming internalised within the organisation and we actually have a 
timetable now of full Executive meetings where, a lot will depend on the subject, we 
will actually be able to initiate and close out the discussion within the time confines of 
the normal Executive meeting.  But there may well be one or two other subjects where 
we will just need to just meet quite separately for that, in a sense the only bringing 
back into the normal management process will be noting that X, Y Z was agreed, 
frankly from a minuting purposes.  So I think, where we have moved from is, if you 
like, the process being externalised towards the process being internalised, but 
without in a sense being a prisoner of that.  We try to do most of this through 
integrating it with our normal management process, but if and when a particular issue 
requires us to take a step out if you like, then we will do that. 
 
 
Notes: Passages in italics are those highlighted as part of the process of analysis and 
 reflection 
 Names removed for confidentiality 
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The case suggested that the Kepner Tregoe intervention sought to separate out a set of 
decisions, decision processes and decision makers from their organisational context: 
 
“... this was a very unusual case of strategy because there were in effect two 
levels of decision being taken... whatever happened... they still needed to sort 
out the range of products... targeted customers, what competencies they 
needed... I think they also recognised that the charge towards discussing the 
higher level issue (of ownership) was one which was not necessarily going to 
involve them all, so the separation, I thought, was well handled by John 
(Burke).” 
Kepner Tregoe consultant 
 
“Frankly, it occurred to me at the time that it was necessary (to be prisoners of 
the process), but looking back it was absolutely necessary...we were, a slightly 
indelicate term but nevertheless an accurate one, we were strategy virgins... 
we were like the five year old - golly talking about strategy... if we hadn’t had 
a tightly defined process, we could have gone walk about. ” 
Bristol and West Executive Team member 
 
“We didn’t set out to make it a secret thing, equally we didn’t go publicising 
it, simply because we actually wanted to have something of substance to say... 
We thought it better to get through something so we had material that we 
could then bounce off some people and then go firm.” 
Bristol and West Executive Team member 
 
The formulation process provided a new analytical framework.  Its application, directed 
by consultants with different experiences and views to the Executive Team members, 
provided a distinct perspective on the organisation and its strategy, separate from the 
existing, tacit perspective: 
 
“I am not sure it matters what the process is.  I am not sure it matters who it is 
so long as they have a decent process... they had a framework and probably 
one of the main things about KT is that they had a view that there are eight 
key drivers in any business and you had to pick the one which is appropriate 
for you.  It may or may not be rubbish, but I found the process was useful and 
actually brought out quite a bit and therefore they developed a framework 
around which you can have discussions...” 
Bristol and West Executive Team member 
 
The external facilitation created different group dynamics, introduced non-routine 
subjects and interaction processes and encouraged the participants to take an 
organisation-wide rather than a functional focus: 
 
“In the initial stages of the intervention Mike Freedman had to get strident and 
unpleasant from time to time when individuals were being too functional and 
had to remind people fairly publicly that they were there as executives of the 
whole organisation as opposed to head of this or head of that.” 
Bristol and West Executive Team member 
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The codes and texts that made up the looser grouping of clarity, commitment and 
consensus were reviewed in detail.  They included the identification of strategy as an 
issue to be addressed formally, securing commitment to external support, defining the 
scope and relevant questions for a strategy review, articulating the strategy.  The 
underlying theme was one of crystallisation or reification, essentially creating boundaries 
between routine management processes and strategy formulation, and making explicit 
and tangible the chosen strategy. 
 
Maturity as an element of absorption made sense of some of the marginal codes, relating 
to issue of “comfort” with the consultants, of “internalisation” and of “evolution”: 
 
“They were very, very uncomfortable with it at the outset, some more than 
others…  But actually as results began to emerge and we began to see some 
real progress, and I repeat, committed progress, everybody pretty much saw 
whilst it might have been a bit tiresome, a bit pedantic, a bit pedestrian, they 
could actually see the value of the process.  And in fact what was quite 
interesting was when they came back a year to eighteen months after the first 
intervention we were all making jokes about the way the typical Freedman day 
would go, you know sort of thing, and it had reached that sort of fond humour 
level.  So people were accepting and I would suggest relatively supportive, 
that, if this is what was necessary to gain a committed consensus, they were 
prepared to enter into the spirit of the thing.” 
Bristol and West Executive Team member 
 
“So I think, initially, it (a tightly defined strategy process) was, for this 
particular group of people, given the particular history of this organisation and 
its, we now realise, very limited view of strategy formulation, a very necessary 
part of the task that we had to get done.  I would go as far as to say that it 
probably remains true today, less true that it was because we have added this 
wider perspective, rather than function, we have recognised that talking about 
strategy does require a lot of talking, a lot of explanation and a lot of 
consensus building.  You can have the greatest strategy you like, but if it 
doesn’t have consensus it just ain’t gonna work.  But I suspect as we move 
forward we will probably actually be able to, if I can use this term, abuse the 
KT process merrily, but nevertheless pretty much staying true to the major 
part of the process.” 
Bristol and West Executive Team member 
 
Political and contextual factors appeared to have played a relatively small role in the 
intervention.  However, John Burke, the Chief Executive of the Bristol and West 
Building Society and client for the assignment, had not been interviewed and only one 
person from outside the Executive Team had contributed to the research. 
 
The concept of absorption created a new perspective and seemed to offer some insight 
into two aspects of the Bristol and West case that did not sit easily with the general 
impression of success associated with the strategy formulation. 
 
First, the implementation planning which was facilitated by Kepner Tregoe and carried 
out by a group of senior managers of the Bristol and West, including two Executive 
Team members, was perceived internally to have been a failure.  The reasons put 
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forward were varied, and included a “not invented here syndrome”, indicating a form of 
rejection or non-absorption by the senior managers not involved in the formulation 
process. 
 
The second was a lack of interest on the part of some senior managers invited to 
participate in the strategy review process, which the Executive Team launched at the 
beginning of 1996, over 18 months after the intervention.  The Director who recounted 
this state of affairs expressed puzzlement as to why this should have happened.  These 
issues were not probed at the time and I later recognised that the contextual influence on 
the intervention had not been explored fully in this case. 
  
With this tentative, loosely defined conceptual framework in mind, all the Bristol and 
West transcripts were re-read to make sure that the ideas and emergent concepts lined up 
with what the interviewees/ informants actually said, and where appropriate new 
passages were highlighted and coded. 
 
The transcripts from The Post Office interviews were verified, read, coded in the same 
open, tentative way and analysed.  The Post Office case interviews echoed the themes in 
the Bristol and West case on decisions being framed with set boundaries and decision 
makers being segregated: 
 
“We had this issue: Are we going to be privatised? What degree of 
commercial freedom are we going to get?, and a lot of externalising the 
problem, it’s all Government’s fault.  Now actually, KT tried very hard to say 
no, it’s not Government’s fault, everybody has these sort of problems and your 
job is to manage Government, which is absolutely right.” 
POEC member 
 
“And of course during it all we had the privatisation debate.  But my position 
was very strong, and they accepted that, and that was - you need a strategy 
regardless of who owns you, and privatisation will have an impact in terms of 
affordability and how adventurous you can be and the scope of things, but 
fundamentally you need to do this work anyway, and that was accepted.” 
Kepner Tregoe consultant 
 
“Well I tried to protect them (Divisional Board members) from it mostly... I 
wanted to play my part of the POEC discussions, but in a way that didn’t 
disrupt them or make them too anxious.  And I really kept them apart from it.  
I mean I had to ask them for information and I kept them broadly in touch with 
what was happening, but without giving them a blow by blow account of how 
this was all going.” 
POEC member and Divisional Managing Director 
 
The processes of absorption, where individuals internalise and develop the concepts and 
ideas first discussed during the strategy intervention, were also evident in The Post 
Office case: 
 
“I think that you could say that KT is sort of down here, as a foundation on 
which all this is built, but you can’t.... It’s like a house, once the house is built 
you know there are foundations there, but you can’t see them any more, so it’s 
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hard to say what influence they are having.  They are probably supporting it 
all, but you couldn’t be sure... it could have fostered new ideas.” 
POEC member 
 
“It has probably influenced us more than perhaps we give it credit for.  We 
quite often go back to (Kepner Tregoe intervention), amongst the Board group 
somebody will remember something that we did in that exercise and will use it 
as a piece of learning, it may be a positive piece, it may be negative... It 
stimulated the thoughts that are now on-going; we no longer think of ourselves 
as a niche UK player or a UK-centric player...” 
POEC member 
 
The Post Office case also highlighted how managers outside the strategy formulation 
process might seek to find out about it, understand its likely outcomes and to influence it.   
The interviews indicated a strong desire on the part of some senior managers to bring the 
consulting intervention within the orbit of the prevailing political and cultural norms and 
controls: 
 
PO Int: …our managing director was off in a room somewhere working up something 
with some consultants who were called Kepner Tregoe.  But it wasn’t clear 
who they were because Kepner Tregoe were known to one or two of us as Mr 
Kepner and Mr Tregoe who wrote books on the subject, but it was called 
Kepner Tregoe.  (Managing Director) communicated some of the stuff as to 
what we would be doing, and he wasn’t entirely sure what they were doing 
because I got the sense that the whole picture had not been revealed, as to 
what was going on.  But what emerged from that was that some analysis was 
going on to try and place the Post Office Group into one of the KT drivers… 
Obviously, it emerged that it was just a technique… And we went out of our 
way to try and find out a bit more about it… although this wasn’t pressed upon 
us and indeed the communication was a bit haphazard.  We invited a 
consultant from KT to come and brief out top team on what this methodology 
was and what the thinking was…The emotion around it was that, first of all, 
that we observed here, that they seemed to be trying to force fit the business 
into a distribution business… Bunch of consultants turn up and talk to the 
important people in the business, who then say your Managing Director 
disappears for a while. He is not very clear why he is being dragged down, 
certainly he hasn’t got a big picture and in The Post Office he is probably told 
not to communicate for a bit, so you get this kind of silence when people start 
speculating as to what is going on. 
 
SP Did that leave you with certain concerns… I mean, how did you react to the 
 situation? 
 
PO Int: Well, what I did was to go and get the book and read it, and to force the issue of  
being communicated to by consultants, because the only way we were going to 
understand what the bloody hell was going on was to talk to the consultants.  We 
could work out ourselves what the politics of it were, because it was privatisation 
going on.  We know that, but the issue was to try and find what it was they were 
doing, to find out what the likely outcome was going to be, and of course to 
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influence it, thereby influence the outcome… once we understood what was 
going on we could brief (Managing Director) accordingly.” 
 
While the Bristol and West case only alluded to potential tensions or adverse effects of a 
highly segregated, formulaic strategy formulation process, The Post Office case pointed 
to a very apparent tension: 
 
“It wasn’t very good for the next level of most senior managers, who hadn’t 
been involved.  They felt terribly cut off by this process, and, because it was a 
fairly concentrated process, you know there was something funny going on 
inside a magic box as far as the rest of the organisation was concerned.” 
POEC member 
 
 “You got a lot of not invented here, you got a lot of clashes, and this comes 
back to the tunnel point, you got a lot of clashes with existing models and 
systems, being used by very big managers within the organisation, which we 
weren’t able to integrate into the process.” 
POEC member 
 
This tension between separation and absorption suggested complex and subtle processes 
linking consultants’ activities and how they affected on-going organisational processes.  
In particular, the political processes (e.g. Pettigrew 1985a) and conscious defensive 
routines (e.g. Argyris 1985) appeared prominent.  These tentative, emergent concepts 
suggested passages of text in the transcripts, which were highlighted.  Research memos 
were written which documented some of the messy, piecemeal thinking and helped to 
articulate and explicate the concepts and their potential relationships. 
 
A coding framework was then developed linking the in vivo codes to analytic codes and 
to the core categories or dimensions, and applied to all the transcripts from the Bristol 
and West and The Post Office cases.  The text references were collated and reviewed.  
The relationships between the codes were then examined, as part of the process of 
developing a more complete, integrated understanding of the interventions and their 
effects within the two organisations.  This framework was gradually refined as the 
research proceeded and is shown as Exhibit 3. 
 
A similar analytical approach was used by Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) and Gioia, 
Thomas, Clark and Chittipeddi (1994) in their study of strategic change in a large, public 
university, in which they developed two key explanatory concepts, sensemaking and 
sensegiving, from the grounded theory analysis of the longitudinal case.  Gioia, Thomas, 
Clark and Chittipeddi use a similar conceptual framework of clearly specified links 
between informant codes, analytical codes, and aggregated second-order categories 
which supported the two overarching dimensions of sensemaking and sensegiving.  
They were thus able to relate their conclusions to the interview and documentary data, 
enabling them to demonstrate the robustness of their analyses.  Gersick (1994) also used 
a similar method in her longitudinal study of a venture capital-backed start-up company 
in which she explored whether temporal pacing could regulate momentum and change in 
an organisation’s strategy.  
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Exhibit 3 
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EMERGENT ANALYTICAL CODES, CATEGORIES AND DIMENSIONS 
 
 
“In Vivo” Codes 
 
 
Analytical Codes 
Second Order 
Categories 
Overarching 
Dimension 
 
pent up desire 
marshall commitment 
forced to confront 
catalyst 
jolt/ shake  the system 
 
 
 
focus 
  
independence 
ignored wider issues 
say no 
need to do regardless 
 
 
boundaries, scope 
 
Crystallisation/ 
Reification 
 
 
something we could 
  say/ call our strategy 
face validity 
circle around business 
cobbled/ “blue tac” 
clear strategy, not 
woolly 
  (importance thereof) 
consensus 
 
 
 
 
output tangibility, 
synthesis 
 
  
 
 
 
SEPARATION 
models, methodology 
systematic, structure 
unfolding process 
framework for 
discussion 
helpful way to see 
credibility, viability 
marshall thoughts 
rigour 
 
 
 
 
methodology, 
concepts, 
framework/ approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Alternate Paradigm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
experience 
personal credibility 
challenge, critique 
have opinions 
devils advocate 
external stimulus 
test for intellectual or 
  intuitive source 
 
 
 
 
external perspective, 
challenge 
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Emergent Analytical Codes, Categories and Dimensions 
 
 
“In Vivo” Codes 
 
 
Analytical Codes 
Second Order 
Categories 
Overarching 
Dimensions 
 
discipline 
prisoners of the process 
tunnel, rigid 
working with terrorists 
keep us on track, bring 
  us back  
enable, facilitate 
poultice, draw out issues 
shaft of light to break  
 out of circle 
referee 
 
 
 
 
 
external management 
  
outside, cut off 
out there somewhere, 
  off in a room 
behind closed doors 
not invented here 
hermetically sealed 
in secret 
low involvement by 
  design 
no consensus at next tier 
  of management 
 
 
 
 
 
 
physical detachment 
 
 
 
 
 
Altered Discourse 
 and Interaction 
 
 
 
 
 
SEPARATION 
 
less functional 
more peer, but boss still 
  present 
lower level of politics 
  more constructive 
top executive together 
  for long periods of 
time 
Nth challenge not 
  welcomed 
 
 
 
hierarchical influence 
  reduced, 
interactions 
  changed 
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Emergent Analytical Codes, Categories and Dimensions 
 
 
“In Vivo” Codes 
 
 
Analytical Codes 
Second Order 
Categories 
Overarching 
Dimension 
 
(CEO) leads the process 
private discussions, fireside 
  chats 
manipulation 
collusion, accomplices 
steer, not entirely democratic 
close down the debate 
 
 
 
 
CEO agenda and 
direction setting 
  
force issue of being 
  communicated to 
adequately brief MD 
influence the outcome 
minimise the damage 
competition 
divide and conquer 
forage around 
 
 
 
 
 
influencing 
 
 
 
 
Politicisation 
 
inevitable resistance 
legitimise resentment 
how dare 
poke fun at 
constructive cynicism, 
  creative tension 
non buy-in, raspberry 
not invented here 
little things happen and 
  don’t happen 
 
 
 
 
resentment/ 
resistance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSORPTION 
overarching questions 
other work impinges 
duplication 
inconsistency, dissonance 
force fit 
external element of 
  change too powerful 
added complexity 
 
 
 
relatedness 
 
 
 
Contextualisation 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 64
Exhibit 3 
Page 4 of 4  
 
Emergent Analytical Codes, Categories and Dimensions 
 
 
“In Vivo” Codes 
 
 
Analytical Codes 
Second Order 
Categories 
Overarching 
Dimensions 
 
cultural fit 
used KT before, familiar 
explain organisation, educate 
draw into own porridge 
 
 
culture/ 
assumptions  
assimilation 
  
biases, strong internal  
beliefs 
juxtaposed, competing,  
clash 
foreign invaders 
essentially a strategic 
  planning methodology 
poo-pooed it 
irrelevance, not coming 
  to anything 
less than expected 
not compelling 
strategy - a turd 
 
 
 
 
 
 
positioning 
 
 
Contextualisation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSORPTION 
 
part of the wallpaper 
comfort, relaxed with 
chemistry, personal fit 
 
 
familiarity, comfort 
  
skills transfer 
ownership 
in psyche and mentality 
part of management 
internalised, institutionalised 
connection, anchor, embed 
  underpin 
refine and hone 
beyond prisoners 
 
 
 
 
 
internalisation 
 
 
 
 
Maturity 
 
re-framing 
changed the way people 
think 
orients the mind 
provided the seeds 
stimulated on-going 
thoughts 
more influence than credited 
raise awareness, move us on 
 
 
 
re-framing/ 
evolution 
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4.3.3 Case Write Ups 
 
The individual case studies were written up and sent to the research sponsors within the 
Bristol and West, The Post Office and Kepner Tregoe, as advocated by Yin (1994).  The 
aim was to create an account, based on a number of individual accounts, which would 
resonate with the experiences of the individuals involved.  The emergent concepts and 
understanding were used to structure and determine the content of the two cases, but no 
attempt was made to link the accounts to other theory or concepts or to go beyond the 
individual case. The preface acknowledged that the case study was a distillation and 
partial analysis of selected interviews and documentary material and therefore 
incomplete and influenced by the research agenda.  The decision on whether to include 
or exclude comments, views or aspects of the intervention or its wider context were 
ultimately mine. The considerations and judgements exercised were about remaining as 
true to the accounts of those involved as possible while seeking to present a composite, 
holistic account which went beyond any individual account.  I also tried to respect the 
interviewees’ desire for confidentiality and for their relationships with colleagues, 
former colleagues and between consultants and clients not to be put at risk.  This meant 
in practice toning down certain comments or making their source less transparent, but 
did not materially affect the integrity of the case write up. Conceptual relevance and the 
desire to present a coherent, non-judgmental narrative were also factors which 
influenced the writing, in terms of style and content, of the cases (Van Maanen 1988, 
1995).   
 
The case write ups were reviewed by the research sponsors.  One sponsor kindly replied 
in writing clarifying certain points and adding others so that the case write up could be, 
in his words, “a more accurate reflection of what happened”.  In the other case, there was 
a formal meeting and discussion on some points and how they might be expressed.  No 
substantive changes were made to the case write ups. 
 
This writing up of the individual cases and their review by the research sponsors was an 
integral part of the analysis and served a number of purposes.  Weick (1979, 1995) 
expresses the value and revelatory quality of writing very succinctly; “how can I know 
what I think until I see what I say”.  It forced me, as the researcher, to pull together and 
analyse the accounts into a single case and synthesise what I perceived had happened 
from the personal accounts and documents available (Simmons 1988), then to test this 
understanding by sharing it with the individuals involved.  The case write up gave me 
confidence in that the initial concepts and constructs were understood and to some extent 
shared and validated by those involved, and so could be built on.  This initial validation 
was important since it provided surer foundations for the more elaborate 
conceptualisation carried out later, reducing the chances of a dislocation between the 
experiential knowing of participants and the researcher's conceptual development.  The 
write up though is distinct from the individual accounts that provide the bedrock data 
(Silverman 1995).  The case was not intended to be theoretically comprehensive, since 
there was an expectation that the thinking and conceptual development would evolve 
and aspects of the case or the interviews would become more prominent or meaningful.   
As such it was described as a “first order” analysis, in that the account represented more 
than a “first-order narrative” based on informants codes and concepts  (Gioia, Thomas, 
Clark and Chittipeddi 1994).  The account sought in a limited way to fuse actors’ 
accounts with emergent social scientific descriptions and emergent perspectives (Blaikie 
1993, Shutz 1963b). 
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In addition, a case write up was promised, as part of the access negotiation, as a way of 
allaying any concerns over the publication of potentially sensitive and confidential 
issues.  On reading the case, the Bristol and West research sponsors did not raise any 
reservations regarding its content and agreed that it could be circulated to other 
researchers and interested parties within Cranfield School of Management and the wider 
academic community.  The Post Office sponsor was happy for the case to be used intact 
as part of the PhD research, but given some of the comments contained in the case 
preferred that it were not published or circulated widely.  The case write up was an 
instance, albeit small, of reciprocation for their participation in the research.  The 
sponsors found the case write ups interesting, and contributed to some extent to their 
knowledge and understanding of the specific intervention, and possibly interventions in 
general. 
 
These two revised case write ups which are included in the Appendix form an important 
part of this thesis.  They provide the history and context of the two interventions and 
core data on which the concepts and theoretical framework are grounded.  The concepts 
are described and supported by the data, primarily in the form of direct quotes.   The 
accounts themselves are acknowledged by those involved in the interventions.   The case 
write ups though are not the only source of data and substantiation for the thesis.  
Additional material from the field interviews of these two cases is drawn upon to 
illustrate, discuss and elaborate concepts from the research process as a whole. 
 
 
4.4 INTERIM FINDINGS 
 
Research into Kepner Tregoe’s work with the Bristol and West Building Society and 
The Post Office indicated that consultants seek to draw or separate out the object of the 
intervention from other activities and influences.  In the cases studied, the object of 
the intervention was the deliberate process of strategy formulation.   This attempt to 
separate a set of decisions and the decision makers from the on-going organisational 
life appeared not to be easily achievable.  Insidious pressures, commitments and 
understandings seemed to draw or absorb the intervention into the political and 
cultural maelstrom of the organisation. 
 
The initial research suggested a tentative answer to the central research question: How 
do management consultants’ interventions influence processes of strategic 
change within organisations?  Through creating and maintaining some degree of 
separation consultants can influence and contribute to the thinking and subsequent 
actions of their clients and senior management within the organisation.  The case study 
research pointed to this separation being created and maintained in three distinct, but 
inter-related, ways: crystallisation/ reification, the imposition of an alternative 
paradigm, and the altering of existing patterns of interaction or discourse.  This was 
congruent with the emphasis and advice in practitioner texts (e.g. Block 1981, 
Weinberg 1985, Margerison 1988, Kubr 1996) that consultants do and should define a 
scope, apply a coherent methodology and manage the process. 
 
However, the case study research, particularly The Post Office case, indicated that 
interventions are not impervious to the history, politics, culture and business 
environment of organisations.  These factors act almost like a gravitational force, 
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creating a resistance against the attempt to take the object of the intervention outside 
the prevailing frame of reference and field of influence.  Specifically, these factors 
shape the understanding and influence the reactions of managers directly involved in 
the intervention, and those who expect to be subject to the outcome of the 
intervention, but who are not directly involved.  These factors were broadly 
understood and conceptualised as politicisation and contextualisation of the 
intervention.  These factors echoed research by Westley (1990) on how middle 
managers react to being excluded from strategy deliberations.  The tensions between 
the consultant created views and perspective and the prevailing consensus was 
broadly analogous to the concept of competing enactments (Smircich and Stubbart 
1985). 
  
It seemed from the initial research that consultants and their clients intuitively 
appreciate and address the interplay and tensions between separation and absorption 
(though not in these terms).  Consultants recognise they have to bring something 
distinctive to the organisation, to have some expertise, insights or approach that is 
different and can add value.  Equally, they have to position their interventions so they 
are acceptable.  There has to be some “cultural fit” and political alignment with the 
organisation and its dominant coalitions.  The relationship between the consultant and 
the client for the assignment appeared crucial to managing the intervention, and 
specifically the interplay and tensions between separation and absorption.  This very 
closely reflected early research by Argyris (1961) who observes that consultants 
compromised their own stated values in client situations, as they were subtly co-opted 
or intimidated.  McGivern (1983) finds that “interdependent” relationships between 
consultants and clients are perceived by both parties as most effective in the conduct 
of assignments.  McKinney Kellogg’s (1984) research shows that effective feedback 
process and frequent exchange of information are two characteristics of successful 
consultations. 
 
Separation seemed necessary to facilitate a shift in the frame of reference of those 
directly involved in an intervention, at an individual and group level, and to facilitate 
a re-conception of the organisation and its environment.  This need to step outside the 
prevailing paradigm is supported by Johnson (1987, 1988), and Berger and Luckmann 
(1966) suggest that an enclave needs to form where new concepts can gain support 
and take root.  Separation creates a shared view in respect of the strategy, ownership 
and clarity and provides new paradigms and “conceptual gems”. The separation 
benefits the “formulation” of the outcome of an intervention, but in the cases studied 
hindered its “implementation” or absorption. Those not directly involved in the 
intervention had not been through the (different) thinking process and, to the extent 
that the outcome is distinct from the prevailing assumptions and conceptions, found 
the outcome alien.  The dislocation appeared greater where the separation had been 
achieved by overcoming strong forces for absorption. 
 
However, to the extent that an intervention enabled managers to conceive of a new 
reality and new possibilities, it can stimulate “thoughts that are on-going”.  The cases 
suggested that work done during the intervention may “go into the sand” and that “the 
words are no longer spoken”.  But some of the ideas begin to permeate through the 
organisation.  The intervention can become a “foundation”, unseen but supporting 
future developments and fostering new ideas.  The processes of reification (Smircich 
and Stubbart 1985) instigated and supported by consultants are reversed, and concepts 
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and ideas slowly internalised and fused with existing models, changing both text and 
context in subtle and unforeseeable ways.  This very much supports the conception of 
organisations as networks, interlocking routines and habituated action (Czarniawska-
Joerges 1992, Weick 1995). 
 
 
4.5 REFLECTIONS AND SYNTHESIS 
 
As part of the PhD review process and to help in the process of reflection and synthesis, 
a paper was drafted, covering the research objectives, methodology and process, the 
cases studied and the emergent findings.  The process of drafting this paper helped to 
clarify my thinking and to draw together and synthesise the ideas, themes and emergent 
concepts in the research memos.  The documentation of the interim findings also forced 
me to check the logic, accuracy and rigour of what I was putting forward, and 
highlighted some of the strengths and weaknesses of the initial research.  In the absence 
of co-researchers, the reflection prompted by the need to produce a formal paper 
heightened my awareness of my role in conducting the research.  This process of 
reflection made me stand back from the research and become more critical and self- 
conscious. 
 
This paper was submitted to and reviewed by the faculty members my PhD Review 
Panel.  The subsequent discussion and the Panel members’ helpful comments guided the 
next phase of the research. 
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5. CONDUCTING SUBSEQUENT RESEARCH: 
 
CAROUSEL / TRIANGLE MANAGEMENT SERVICES CASE 
AND 
McQUILLAN YOUNG COMMUNICATIONS / TRANSITIONS CASE 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The two cases researched suggested that consultants’ influence on processes of strategic 
change within organisations might be conceptualised and understood within a 
theoretical framework with separation and absorption as overarching dimensions.  
The research indicated an interplay and tension between the efforts to isolate the 
object of the intervention, the deliberate process of strategy formulation, from other 
activities and influences, and insidious pressures drawing or absorbing the 
intervention into on-going organisational processes. 
 
Such a conceptualisation was consistent with themes in the existing literature on 
strategic management, organisation theory and consultancy interventions.  However, 
the research findings and analyses were grounded on two relatively similar and to 
some extent incomplete cases.  Additional cases, exhibiting a reasonable diversity in 
terms of the context, nature and process of the interventions were required to establish 
a well-grounded and comprehensive analysis.  In line with Eisenhardt (1989), two 
additional cases were sought given the exploratory and theory development nature of 
the research.  Anything less than four cases risked generating concepts and theoretical 
frameworks lacking compelling empirical grounding and sufficient complexity, 
inclusiveness and richness. 
 
Consequently, the focus of this second phase of the research was to test, refine and 
elaborate the concepts and framework which had emerged, by seeking and studying 
other, diverse cases.  As with earlier attempts to secure access, the efforts were 
fraught with difficulties and disappointments, and best characterised as planned 
opportunism.  Two cases were researched: Triangle Management Services’ strategy 
day with Carousel, and Transitions’ on-going support of McQuillan Young 
Communications.  These cases were significantly different from the earlier cases on a 
number of theoretically relevant dimensions, yet supported and helped to hone the 
concepts developed. 
 
The diversity, combined with a strong degree of convergence with the synthesis from 
the earlier cases, indicated that a thorough coverage and analysis of the subject had 
been achieved.  Thus the McQuillan Young Communications / Transitions case 
became the last one to be researched as part of this PhD. 
 
The next section of this chapter details the commonality between the first two cases and 
the rationale for seeking diverse cases.  The following sections discuss in turn the two 
subsequent cases studied, in terms of access, fieldwork, analysis and case write ups.  The 
stand-alone case write ups themselves are set within the Appendix. 
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5.2 DIVERSITY AND FURTHER CASES 
 
The interim research findings and analyses were grounded on two relatively similar 
and to some extent incomplete cases.  As such, additional cases were called for to 
explore more fully the influence of strategy consulting interventions, and to ground 
the emergent concepts and framework in a wider number and range of instances. 
 
Both initial cases related to Kepner Tregoe interventions. The two interventions were 
described by Mike Freedman as typical of the strategy formulation assignments carried 
out by Kepner Tregoe, and regarded as reasonably successful.  The consulting approach 
was based on a rational linear view of strategy formulation and organisational change, 
and the methodology itself was modelled on a sequential process of analysis, choice and 
implementation.  Mike Freedman and Ann Orton were the two principal consultants for 
both cases.  The strategy formulation framework, methodology and consulting process 
was essentially the same, though it was applied to the unique circumstances of the two 
organisations. 
 
Commonality between the cases created some advantages, making the process of inquiry 
more efficient and allowing greater focus on emergent issues and differential factors, 
especially in the light of limited interviewing time and restricted access to senior 
managers and consultants.  The basic structure and application of the process were 
explored in detail from a number of perspectives in the first case study and this learning 
process did not have to be repeated in the second case.  Rather, this knowledge was used 
to direct the line of inquiry and to ask more probing questions of interviewees from The 
Post Office.  Nonetheless, the interview process for The Post Office case did seek to 
explore, test and elaborate issues and perceptions previously examined in detail across a 
number of interviewees.  These included the importance of and stated high quality of the 
facilitation, and the central role of the Driving Forces within Kepner Tregoe’s analytical 
framework. 
 
The perceived success of both interventions appeared less of a common factor as the 
interviews proceeded.   It became evident that members of the client organisations had 
very mixed, and in some cases unflattering, comments in respect of Kepner Tregoe.  
Some even deemed the intervention a failure or incomplete.  Furthermore, interviewees 
appeared to be very frank and forthcoming in their opinions, which permitted a detailed 
and extensive exploration of the intervention.  The access strategy of approaching 
consultants first did not appear to be an issue since both organisations had to agree to 
participate and the consultants had little to gain from promoting participation beyond a 
quick inquiry.  However, the other common factors raised questions about the extent to 
which the concepts developed from the two cases alone, even if corroborated by other 
related theories and research, could be applied to other instances or contexts. 
 
Moreover, the inability to interview the Chief Executive of the Bristol and West 
Building Society and the reliance on a single informant from outside the Executive Team 
meant that the case was built on a rather limited number of individual accounts and 
perspectives.  Certain issues, which emerged from The Post Office case and/or are 
touched upon in the literature, were not explored fully.  The nature and importance of the 
relationship between the client and consultant was not clear.  Nor was there a rounded 
exploration of the views, understanding, positioning, and the possible resistance, 
resentment and attempts to influence the process on the part of senior managers excluded 
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from the strategy formulation.  The credibility (Lincoln and Guba 1985) of the concepts 
and framework relied heavily, for a number of points, on The Post Office case.  This in 
itself relied on a larger, but still relatively small number of informants, and both cases   
relied on two interviews with a single consultant, Mike Freedman.  
 
The issue of credibility, which is approximately comparable to the more functionalist 
notions of construct validity and internal validity, called for more cases to generate more 
substantial and compelling empirical grounding for the concepts and theoretical 
framework emerging from the research.  This issue of transferability (Lincoln and Guba 
1985), again analogous to a more functionalist notion of external validity (Yin 1994), 
called for diverse cases to enable the complexity, inclusiveness and richness of 
consulting interventions to be captured and synthesised. 
 
The concept of diversity implies seeking cases which exhibit different aspects of the 
social phenomenon, enabling its fuller exploration and study.  Pettigrew (1990) 
advocates looking for extreme situations, critical incidents and social dramas, which 
make the processes transparently observable, and for polar types which can 
disconfirm patterns from earlier case studies.  Strauss (1987) and Strauss and Corbin 
(1990) emphasise the need for selective or theoretical sampling based on emerging 
findings.  The advice offered by Strauss and Corbin (1990) is to choose cases which 
permit categories to be dimensioned, elaborated and linked as part of the continual 
process of developing grounded theory.  However, they recognise the need to retain 
some flexibility, and include open sampling as another strategy. 
 
The concept of diversity is distinct from the notion of ‘representativeness’, which is 
important within functionalist research where the aim is to generalise the findings and 
theory across a population or class of phenomena.   In such research, the concerns relate 
to having too narrow or unrepresentative a sample and the potential bias this might 
introduce.  However, the objectives of this research, and its epistemological 
underpinnings, are to produce coherent description and explanation and, through that, 
some degree of transferability or analytical generalisation.  The concept of diversity is 
also distinct from concerns which might arise had either a literal or a theoretical 
replication strategy (Yin 1994) been chosen as the research design.  There was no 
intention to adopt a literal replication strategy, where a case is chosen to support or 
corroborate a predetermined theory.  Literal replication, like theoretical replication, 
where a case is chosen to refute previous finding for theoretically predicted reasons (Yin 
1994), relies fundamentally on theoretically predefined dimensions which underpin the 
case selection and research questions.  Neither replication strategy was appropriate as a 
starting point, given the determination not to impose a researcher’s construction on 
participants’ experiences and the absence of a well formulated theory or set of concepts 
as reliable guides at the start of the research or from the first two cases. 
 
In line with Eisenhardt (1989), who suggests that between four and ten cases are 
required to provide the necessary empirical grounding and richness in 
conceptualisation, at least another two additional cases were sought.  While guided by 
the advice to look for extreme situations and theoretical sampling, the likely difficulty 
in securing access suggested making the best of whatever cases became available.  
 
In mid-February 1997 around 70 letters were sent to Cranfield Management 
Association members who attended either the Senior Management Programme or the 
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Directors as Strategic Leaders course.  Former Cranfield faculty and students, who 
were or had been consultants, were also approached, as were personal contacts from 
my MBA programme.  Additionally letters were sent to some of the Partners in the 
major consultancy firms who had expressed an interest in the research when they 
were contacted initially.  The objective of the letter was to inquire whether their 
circumstances had changed and whether they were now in a position to participate in 
the research.  The fact that two cases studied had been completed and “interesting” 
findings had emerged was used as an incentive.  While a number of organisations and 
people expressed an interest, no further case access was secured from those routes. 
Cranfield contacts and PhD candidates then became the primary sources of leads for 
potential case studies. 
 
 
5.3 CAROUSEL / TRIANGLE MANAGEMENT SERVICES 
 
In July 1997 I contacted Triangle Management Services, a firm of management 
consultants offering specialist services to the freight, express, postal and logistics 
industries. 
 
Paul Jackson, Triangle Management Services’ Chief Executive and owner, agreed to 
see me and a meeting was arranged for 19 August.  At the meeting Paul Jackson 
explained that Triangle operated in a niche market and relied on its reputation, its 
depth of knowledge of the industries served and the expertise of its professional staff 
to secure assignments and to advise clients.  Apart from management consultancy 
services, Triangle offered support in undertaking mergers and acquisitions, training, 
project and interim management, marketing and recruitment services.  He also talked 
about his views on consulting and the principles that guided him in his work with 
clients. 
 
Paul Jackson suggested that his larger, international clients, such as DHL, might be 
reluctant to participate in the research, but that I might be able to study a recent 
intervention with a small family-owned business called Carousel.  He explained that 
Carousel was a transport broker based in Sittingbourne, Kent, which had approached 
him to review the company’s strategy.  He thought I would find the case interesting, 
even though the intervention itself had been very brief; essentially a one day 
workshop.  I indicated that I would be interested in the research opportunity, so Paul 
Jackson contacted the Directors of Carousel.  The Carousel Directors were sent some 
information, prepared by me, on the research design and agenda, and subsequently 
agreed to participate. 
 
I telephoned Michael Martin, the Joint Managing Director of Carousel, my contact 
within the company, and arranged a date for the first interviews.  Prior to the first 
interviews, Michael Martin sent me the Triangle Management Services report which 
summarised the workshop deliberations, the pre-workshop questionnaire completed 
by the Directors, and a Carousel document describing the recommended strategic and 
organisational changes, many of which were introduced on 1 November 1997. 
 
In all, I interviewed the four Directors who made up the management team and two 
staff members suggested by the Directors.  I also interviewed Paul Jackson who had 
led the workshop, and Jason Whiteley a consultant with Triangle, who had developed 
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and analysed a pre-workshop questionnaire sent to Carousel.  Jason Whiteley had also 
assisted Paul Jackson at the workshop itself.  The interviewee or informants used to 
develop the case history were: 
 
14/11/97 Michael Martin, Joint Managing Director 
14/11/97 Maureen Martin, Chief Executive Officer 
14/11/97 Graham Martin, Joint Managing Director 
14/11/97 Mark Chittenden, Customer Services Consultant 
 9/12/97 Andrew Ovenden, Logistics Director 
 9/12/97 Helen Pilcher, Team Leader, European Division 
 
20/1/98 Paul Jackson, Chief Executive, Triangle Management Services 
20/1/98 Jason Whiteley, Consultant, Triangle Management Services 
 
5.3.1 Fieldwork, Analysis and Case Write Up 
 
As with the first two cases, the data came from the review and analysis of secondary 
data, followed by in-depth, confidential interviews with key members of the organisation 
and the consulting firm. 
 
Topic guides for the initial interviews were developed from the secondary data, and from 
the concepts and provisional theoretical constructs emanating from the first phase of the 
research. Subsequent topic guides picked up on issues and events that previous 
interviewees considered important or that appeared important once the interview 
transcripts had been reviewed.  These later topic guides also highlighted issues to be 
probed which seemed to disconfirm or not corroborate findings from the first phase of 
the research.  There was a deliberate overlap between the data collection and the 
analysis. 
 
As before, the interviews were semi-structured and were essentially a conversation with 
a purpose.  Interviews were tape recorded, with the agreement of all the participants, and 
the tapes were transcribed and personally checked against the tape recordings of the 
interviews.  Once all the transcripts from each case study had been checked, these were 
read through as a group to gain a holistic impression of the intervention and to begin to 
compare the accounts as a way of identifying differences in perspectives. The detailed 
coding of the transcripts then began.  The texts were coded using the codes which had 
emerged from the first phase of the research and also new codes suggested by the data. 
  
Every attempt was made to retain an open mind to contradictory views, opinions and 
interpretations and to issues given prominence by the informants but not identified in the 
first phase of the research.   The concepts and expressions used by the interviewees/ 
informants themselves were retained as far as possible and added to the coding 
framework.  New concepts or ideas were also noted and their relationship with the 
existing analytical constructs examined.  Where appropriate these concepts were 
incorporated into an analytical category or dimension, amplifying and elaborating its 
definition or significance.  The case histories and in some cases the transcripts of 
interviews relating to the first two cases were reviewed briefly in the light of new 
concepts and possible constructs.  Some issues in the earlier cases previously ignored 
were brought into relief by this later work. 
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The case study was written up and sent to Michael Martin of Carousel and Paul Jackson 
of Triangle Management Services for their review and comments.  As with the earlier 
cases, the aim was to create an account, based on a number of individual accounts, 
which would resonate with the experiences of the individuals involved.  Some minor 
amendments suggested by the Directors of Carousel and by Triangle Management 
Services were incorporated into the final draft of the case write up.  Both organisations 
agreed that the case could be used for the PhD.  The final case write up is included in the 
Appendix. 
 
The Directors of Carousel mentioned that they had found the process interesting. Jason 
Whiteley found the whole process stimulating, and Paul Jackson appreciated the 
feedback on the assignment.  Triangle Management Services formally asked permission 
to use the final case write up to explain the type of services the firm could offer to small 
businesses.  Both Carousel and I agreed.   I was particularly pleased since this 
represented a tangible benefit and form of reciprocation for the time and effort Triangle 
Management Services had put into the research.  
 
An interim paper, covering the background to the case research, the case write up and 
tentative theoretical reflections, was drafted and reviewed with my supervisor.  This 
paper built on and synthesised my thinking and research memos. 
 
 
5.4 McQUILLAN YOUNG COMMUNICATIONS / TRANSITIONS 
 
In March 1998, I was discussing my research with a former PhD student at Cranfield.  
At the time, he was working for a consulting firm called Transitions which focused on 
providing advice and support to small companies which were trying to grow rapidly 
and so make the transition from small to medium sized enterprises.  He suggested that 
his organisation might be willing to participate in the PhD research.  He explained 
that the two founding partners of Transitions, Shai Vyakarnam and Robin Jacobs, had 
gained their PhDs from Cranfield and were generally sympathetic towards academic 
research. 
 
A few weeks later, I arranged to meet Simon Pratten, a partner of Transitions, who 
might be able to help.  I met him on 19 June 1998, and explained the nature of the 
research and the type and level of involvement required.  He agreed to contact a few 
of his clients to see if any would be willing to participate.  About a month later, 
Simon Pratten provided me with the names of Directors of two client companies, and 
suggested that I telephone them personally.  One of the companies declined to 
participate, while the other agreed to see me to discuss the research.  
 
I met Linda McQuillan, the Director and co-founder of McQuillan Young 
Communications, a specialist communications, publishing and public relations 
company, on 18 August 1998.  I talked through the nature of the research and the 
research methodology.  Initially she was not sure how she could help until I suggested 
that the work undertaken by Transitions with McQuillan Young Communications 
might be a suitable case study.  She agreed to speak to her business partner and 
members of staff to get their reactions.  A few days later I called and was told that 
they were happy to participate. 
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In all, I interviewed five individuals from McQuillan Young Communications, which 
represented almost all the professional staff, as well as Simon Pratten.  Specifically, 
the informants for the case were: 
 
28/8/98 Linda McQuillan, Director 
28/8/98 Tricia Young, Director 
28/8/98 Joanne Kuriyan, Events Manager  
18/9/98 Briony Martin, Assistant Editor 
18/9/98 Wayne Theisinger, Design Manager 
 
12/10/98 Simon Pratten, Transitions 
 
5.4.1 Fieldwork, Analysis and Case Write Ups 
 
Overall, the fieldwork followed the same pattern as the research conducted on the 
previous cases.  The analysis was focused on testing and elaborating or modifying the 
concepts and theoretical framework developed earlier, while retaining an open mind 
to discomfirming evidence and the nuances of the specific case. 
 
The case study was written up and sent to Linda McQuillan of McQuillan Young 
Communications and Simon Pratten of Transitions for their review and comments.  
As with the earlier cases, the aim was to create an account, based on a number of 
individual accounts, which would be congruent with the experiences of the 
individuals involved.  A minor amendment relating to the description of Transitions was 
suggested by Simon Pratten.  He appreciated the feedback on aspects of the assignment, 
particularly his influence on the relationship between the two McQuillan Young 
Directors, which he was unaware of and would not normally have been discussed in a 
review of the assignment.  Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young were pleased with the 
way in which the development of McQuillan Young Communications was conveyed in 
the case and found the analysis interesting.  They expressed some surprise regarding the 
comments on the Transitions models, which they could not remember being used in any 
formal way.  Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young intended to discuss some of the points 
raised in the case write up with Simon Pratten at one of their meetings.  The final case 
write up is included in the Appendix. 
 
An interim paper, covering the background to the case research, the case write up and 
some theoretical reflections, was drafted and reviewed with my supervisor.  This paper 
built on and synthesised my thinking and research memos. 
 
 
5.5 REFLECTIONS AND SYNTHESIS 
 
The two cases studied as part of the second phase of the research enabled a testing and 
elaboration of the interim findings and concepts, and a richer and deeper appreciation of 
how management consultants’ interventions influence processes of strategic change 
within organisations.  The cases suggested that tensions could be eased and the 
intervention shaped to accommodate differences in perspectives and paradigms, and so 
alleviate some of the potentially adversarial aspects of the prevailing enactment. 
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As part of the analysis the coding framework was up-dated to reflect the emergent 
findings, reflections and conceptualisations.  The overarching dimension of separation 
was largely elaborated through the second phase of the research.  In particular, expertise 
and knowledge was a prominent feature of Paul Jackson’s work with the Carousel 
Directors.  He used his industry knowledge to make suggestions and created options for 
Carousel, unimagined or perceived as infeasible by the Directors: 
 
“There were quite a few things that sort of came out, that were quite, you 
know, quite sort of radical for us, which totally affects our thinking.  We 
always saw ourselves as a very, very small company, but marketed ourselves 
as a very large company to attract the business.  And to a great extent we, 
yeah, we actually did over-market Carousel as a company.  It really came out 
looking at our U.S.P.s as a company, that we actually did have a lot more to 
offer than we thought we had.  One of the things was airfreight.  It’s a service 
we’d always offered in our brochure, but never really sold it, because we 
didn’t have the tools to sell it.  And the reason… the reason that Paul got quite 
excited about it is because obviously every single airfreight agent operates out 
of Heathrow and no-one nobody actually has the sort of client base or the 
location that we do.  And we’ve had discussions with (Major Freight 
Forwarder), as a company.  And we had their Directors round the table last 
week, and might see them next week.  And it looks as if we can do a 
reciprocal deal with them.  Now, we never even thought that we could do that.  
You know, they have a 60 billion dollar, pound turnover, what ever it is, 
company and we’ve got something in common with them.  So we can work 
with big boys.” 
Carousel Director 
 
To a lesser extent, Simon Pratten drew upon specific experience and expertise in his 
work with McQuillan Young Communications, especially the need for greater structure 
and control as a business grows: 
 
“What Simon has brought to it and what was very badly needed though we 
probably didn’t realised it at the time was the straight business side of it, 
which is the structure of the business, the control of the business, setting the 
direction actually focusing on McQuillan Young as a business.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
This explicit use of perceived expertise and knowledge made the challenges to 
prevailing assumptions and perceptions more telling, more credible and more pointed.  It 
also provided input for analyses and, implicitly, gave confidence in the outcomes.  
Triangle Management Service’s intervention highlighted how the application of a 
relatively simple analytical framework in the form of a SWOT analysis (Strengths, 
Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats), industry knowledge and forceful challenges 
and views can combine to create and impose a radically different paradigm: 
 
“When we got the questionnaire through it really started to bring to light that 
22% of our business in turnover was with UK parcel work, but in real terms it 
was probably taking up 40% of our time…” 
Carousel Director 
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“When we did an analysis that showed them that the small amount of work 
they did on the Continent was actually 20 times more profitable than the work 
they did for domestic parcels, it just became very clear, but they’d never done 
that…we did a matrix of what contributed what and how the overheads were 
allocated…they’d never looked at it that way.” 
Triangle Consultant 
 
“It does make you wonder that the suggestions that were given, you think – 
‘why didn’t we think of that’, you always do.  But it’s such a complete change 
in some ways, getting rid of certain Divisions.  I think it may have been too 
large a step for them to contemplate.” 
Carousel staff 
 
The ideas relating to and concept of absorption expanded significantly through the 
second phase of the research and new core categories were derived to address the diverse 
aspects of absorption.  The major conceptual advance was the realisation that separation 
is never achieved completely.  The intervention cannot be self-contained or sealed off, 
but remains embedded within the wider organisational enactment.  The accounts of the 
Carousel Directors described the emotions and tensions they felt during the workshop: 
 
“There were a couple of questions that made me… I felt came a little close.  
And I had to think about it, and think: well, OK, fine, I can understand the 
reasons for the questions, if I’m not totally honest about it… I’ve got to face 
up to the fact that as a person myself, and I can only speak for myself, I tend to 
let people come so far and then there’s a bit of a distance you see.  And I 
thought: hold on a minute Paul you’ve just stepped inside that little arena that 
very few people ever get into. Then I addressed, mentally, again myself, and 
thought he’s doing it for a reason.  I mean why am I here, why have we asked 
him to come?  It is for a reason, and yes who else is going to tell you.” 
Carousel Director 
 
“In fact at one stage during the day, he made me feel quite insecure by talking 
about; ‘well, let’s get Maureen out of the scenario because, you know, she’s 
not going to be there for ever, and she’s coming up to retirement age’, or 
however it was phrased, beautifully done, ‘and it’s up to you boys’.  And I 
thought God, I’ve been put on the scrap heap. In fact my comment to him was, 
you know, ‘well I’ve just been retired off’, which he glossed over.  And 
looking back on it that was for a reason, because what he actually did was 
retire me out of the position I was in to develop, and said: ‘Maureen you 
should be out there networking more, you should be out there talking to more 
clients, you should be out there doing you know A, B or C, and start where 
you feel comfortable, and develop it, and you should join, you know, the 
Institute of Directors etc’.  And I must admit there was one stage when I 
thought I haven’t got time for all that rubbish, to be quite blunt.  Who’s going 
to run the shop? … I can now see that he extracted me, if you like, from the 
bowels of the ship and put me up in the crow’s nest.  You can still steer the 
ship but you’re in a different position to do it.  But I’m only feeling that now 
by putting it into practice.  I actually had to do it… it’s very well somebody 
telling you all these wonderful things that could happen or may not happen, 
depending on how much you are prepared to put into that... If you’re going to 
Chapter 5 78
make it successful you’ve got to do it, and the first step was physically 
changing the people in places.” 
Maureen Martin 
 
Despite the near crisis situation they were experiencing and their determination to listen, 
their commitment to the world as they saw it was constantly present, putting up 
“physical or mental barriers”.  Relating the events of the day to the missing Director 
almost immediately suggested a need to affirm emotional commitments towards him and 
to seek a reconciliation of new and old ideas and perceptions: 
 
“Well the way we actually operate there’s (Martin family members) who are 
basically on the Board, Directors, and who also basically own the company, 
and there’s a chap here called Andrew Ovenden, who’s Director of Logistics.  
And the four of us sat down.  We... He’s a very crucial part of our team, but 
we didn’t involve him with Triangle, because he wasn’t part of the family.  
And we weren’t too sure what they would say.  Yeah?  So… But once we 
knew for a fact that it was all quite, quite positive stuff, we brought him in, 
sold him the concept of what we were doing, and then looked at all the 
recommendations in relation to the staff.  We then... I produced a sort of a 
presentation package to all the staff and actually had them in individually, 
because obviously they knew that we had Triangle in.  We up-sold it to the 
staff.” 
Carousel Director 
 
The notion of interventions as embedded processes was further reinforced by Simon 
Pratten’s work with McQuillan Young Communications.  Some of his suggestions were 
met by deeply felt, but not previously articulated, emotional reactions from the 
Directors: 
 
Dir: “There have been times where he’s said well I think you’ve got to consider, I 
think you should consider this and we’ve both said no we’re not going to do 
that.  It’s sort of instinctively and immediately and he’s said oh well okay and 
he’ll back off and come round again and then he’ll think about it. 
 
SP: When you say back off and come round, you mean two months down the track 
he may raise it? 
 
Dir: I think so, there is one issue that I can think of when we were recruiting the 
publications manager at the end of last year, and we needed to look at 
someone with a higher salary than we were paying anybody else and it was 
important to get the right person and this would free us up and so on.  He said 
- I think you have to start looking at the idea of offering the share of the 
equity, what do you call it… 
 
SP: Equity participation 
 
Dir: Yes, something like that, and we were not keen at all and that’s probably just 
another instinct of … you know … but if they are getting a good salary, we’ll 
give them profit share, we’ll give them, but they are not having X % of the 
company.  And we were very adamant about that and he felt that this was 
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unreasonable of us and he still feels, I’m absolutely sure and it would be worth 
checking with him, he still feels I think that this is a real impediment to our 
growth.  And that’s an issue that he comes back to time and time again.” 
 
The monthly meetings with the two Directors had become a routine for the organisation, 
and Simon Pratten began to feel more like an insider than outsider, taking vicarious pride 
in the achievements of McQuillan Young Communications: 
 
SPe: Do you still see yourself as an outsider? 
 
SPr: Less so funnily enough.  No, I don’t I feel.  Now you come to ask me, no, I 
don’t, I feel myself much less as an… even more so now I’ve actually been to 
their new office because when we used to meet at the IOD, you were remote 
from it and I used to feel very remote, and not so sure.  But even after that one 
meeting last week, it’s… I’ve… my feeling has changed, because I was there 
for all day, so I was able to have quick chats with the others, and was around 
and they saw me around.  And little things like Linda and Tricia, I just 
happened to note, they didn’t shut the door.  OK, it was a glass door I think, so 
they could… or was there a window from the meeting room, I can’t 
remember, but even so the door was open.  So even if we were talking 
something that was a bit sensitive we just dropped our voice, but there was no 
shutting the door away.  So I feel, no I feel less and less an outsider.  I feel 
quite proud of it actually, not proud from my point of view, but proud of the 
business that I’m part of what they’ve been doing.  Not proud, really not proud 
in my end, but proud of being part… I thoroughly enjoy it, I enjoy it hugely 
being part of it.  It’s exciting, it’s stimulating, it’s challenging because as I say 
they are a bright pair.” 
 
These ideas then provided the basis for re-framing and re-casting the various aspects of 
absorption broadly into the ways in which the organisational enactment encroaches on 
and subsumes an intervention.  This prompted another review of all the cases and more 
revisions of the coding framework.   This review highlighted the interplay and tensions 
between nascent reality being created by the intervention and the wider organisational 
enactment.  
 
While the Kepner Tregoe interventions were marked by a fairly rigid application of a 
prescribed process, the Triangle Management Services and Transitions interventions 
exhibited far more flexibility, interaction and accommodation.  Paul Jackson consciously 
watched the body language to see how far he could go.  Simon Pratten proposed options, 
had them rejected, but then raised these issues later, acknowledging sensitivities and 
reservations.  In essence, the latter two cases suggested that consultants are either overtly 
or subtly restricted in their ability to act out, and get members of the organisation to act 
out, their social reality.  Comments and views expressed by Directors of the Bristol and 
West Building Society and The Post Office took on new meaning.  Certain topics and 
concerns may have been off the formal agenda or never voiced, but they played a part in 
the deliberations and how the intervention was understood.  They followed the strategy 
formulation process, but at times were disengaged if not overtly resistant or sceptical: 
 
“I think they are too religious and straight with themselves, because on 
numbers of occasions we would say - look Mike you know the answer to this, 
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I actually don’t emotionally feel the need to work this out for myself, if you 
tell me I am quite happy to accept it.  But they- no, we are not going to do that, 
you must work it out for yourself, sort of thing, and we will go through a 
series of questions and we will score stuff and we will spend another four 
hours on it.  And you sit there, thinking - look you have done this 20 times 
before, you know what the answer is going to be, tell us, it is OK, its all right 
really.  But almost under no circumstances I think did that happen…. 
Mike in particular had the experience and was not prepared to short-circuit the 
process because of his experience.  And, hey, I know how this is going to end 
up and so we talk about it, get a bit irritated and then lets bloody well get on 
with it, if we have got to do it, and then off we go… 
It was painful for us but we got through it sort of thing we got out and we 
liked the end point.  One can imagine you get to a point in that process and 
you have lost someone because they are just so pissed off with the whole thing 
that they... And it happened with us, individuals would step out for the 
afternoon, they would be there but they wouldn’t be there, and I think 
everybody without exception that happened to at some point or another, they 
were just totally so fed up with the whole thing at that point that they cease to 
contribute.” 
Bristol and West Director 
 
“I was very keen to see how some external help could contribute to the 
development of strategy.  Of course there was a great deal else going on at the 
time, both subliminally and subconsciously and all sorts of other ways, and I 
think one of the issues for me was: Was this a serious exercise, were we going 
into this with an open mind, was it a genuine attempt to bring the experience 
and expertise and brain power of the Executive Committee to bear on the 
strategic issues facing the Corporation on the one hand, or was it on the other 
hand a means by which Bill intended to have his way?… 
I have got to say that the process, provided you do take an open line, has some 
interesting features.  But like most processes once you are on the track it is 
ineluctable; no matter where you think the destination ought to be the process 
drives you towards the destination.  And that is the point of it; there is no point 
in having a process if it is just going to get second guessed, you know, by your 
own view.  My view of it oscillated a little bit, and of course I had in mind the 
interests of the (Division) before that of the Corporation as a whole.  Because 
you have to remember the context of all this was of course privatisation, 
nobody knew how that was going to work.” 
POEC member and Divisional Director 
 
Flexibility, interaction and accommodation imply mutual influence, which was only 
hinted at in the first two cases.  In The Post Office case, the Chief Executive was seen, 
by other Directors, as having a strong influence on the process.  However, the content 
and outcome of the discussions (“fireside chats”) between Bill Cockburn, the Chief 
Executive and Mike Freedman of Kepner Tregoe were not explored in detail.  Simon 
Pratten recognised and acknowledged how his work and his advice had been influenced 
by how Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young saw things.  The processes through which 
the scope, content, and conduct of an intervention are shaped and how consultants are 
influenced by their clients’ reality were highlighted in the second phase of the research.   
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The McQuillan Young Communications / Transitions case also highlighted how ideas 
generated by the intervention are absorbed and transform managers’ conceptions even as 
the intervention itself unfolds: 
 
“And I think one thing that Simon did make us think; earlier on in the year, we 
said; why do we need to be big, we can enjoy ourselves and neither Linda nor 
I are empire builders nor are we people who want to spend all our time 
managing people, and we both decided that for absolutely sure, that’s what we 
don’t want to be doing all the time.  So that limits how big the company can 
ever get, but we think that probably twelve to fifteen people or twenty people 
is perhaps where we can see ourselves getting to.  And I think Simon has 
helped in that process because he kept saying why don’t you want to be 
bigger, and we resisted it quite a lot… I think he kept questioning, he kept 
challenging us on that point about why we didn’t want to be bigger.  And he 
was always talking about recruiting for growth and all this sort of thing.  And I 
think perhaps he… you know we listened, because Linda and I both are quite 
good listeners and so we take on board what he says.  And I think both of us 
probably then thought about it, either consciously or sub-consciously I don’t 
know, and then thought; well, yes maybe we do want to be a bit bigger 
because I think we have seen some projects come through this year where size 
has mattered.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
The two last two cases, though, exhibited a distinct lack of political activity.   The 
attempts to influence, position and contextualise interventions, prominent in The Post 
Office, were almost absent.  The Directors of both client organisations perceived little 
efforts to lobby them, and staff resentment or resistance was practically non-existent. 
 
“They saw it as a problem solving exercise…I think they saw it as being that 
we’d come back and we’d wave a magic wand and all of a sudden everything 
would be 9 to 5 and wonderful…we hadn’t said specifically what we were 
going for, but they assumed it was for their benefit.” 
Carousel Director 
 
 “I think they were deeply suspicious at first.  I’m not sure they’re completely 
comfortable.  They’ve got used to it…  I think (one member of staff) was 
probably quite resentful, certainly in the beginning, partly because we were 
small and she wasn’t part of the meetings, and partly because there was an 
external influence having an impact on her life without her say so.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
“We haven’t been invited to share it, except in very specific circumstances… 
so, no, I don’t think we would presume to say before they went off that we 
think this.” 
McQuillan Young Staff Member 
 
The iterative and continual process of analysis, reflections and synthesis throughout the 
period of the research led to a richer, deeper and more inclusive understanding.  The last 
two cases helped to break down the sharp divide between separation and absorption, 
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and drew attention to subtle processes of mutual influence and the way in which the 
tensions between the different ways of seeing and acting are mediated and managed. 
   
The overarching dimension of absorption was recast around two categories: pressure to 
conform and dissolution and fusion, which subsumed and redefined the earlier categories 
of politicisation, contextualisation and maturity.  In addition, a core category of interplay 
and tensions was created, comprising processes of embedding the intervention and 
managing the interplay between the competing enactments, and a third ‘second order 
category’ of inherent tensions.  This process of elaboration, refinement and recasting 
involved a restructuring of the coding framework, shown in its final form in Exhibit 4.  
This final coding framework comprises new “in vivo” codes and analytical codes from 
the second phase of the research as well as supplementary codes from the first two case 
studies.  Specifically, these supplementary codes are “in vivo” codes not identified at the 
end of the first phase and included in Exhibit 3.  The additional and re-allocated “in 
vivo” codes from the first two cases are indicated. 
 
In essence, the drafting of the thesis was the final stage of an on-going process of 
reflection and synthesis.   The concepts and conclusions of the research are described 
and explained following a review and evaluation of the field research. 
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CONSOLIDATED ANALYTICAL CODES, CATEGORIES AND DIMENSIONS 
 
 
 
“In Vivo” Codes 
 
 
Analytical Codes 
Second Order 
Categories 
Overarching 
Dimension 
 
marshal commitment 
forced to confront 
catalyst 
made us 
driving force 
priority 
single minded 
channel, focus 
not minutiae 
 
 
 
 
 
focus 
  
independence 
ignored wider issues 
say no 
need to do regardless 
get things on the agenda 
list of things to cover 
 
 
 
boundaries, scope 
 
 
Crystallisation/ 
Reification 
 
 
 
SEPARATION 
something we could 
  say/ call our strategy 
face validity 
circle around business 
cobbled/ “blue tac” 
clear strategy, not 
 woolly 
  (importance thereof) 
consensus 
paid money for 
document 
affirmation 
articulate thinking 
crystallise ideas 
 
 
 
 
 
 
output tangibility, 
synthesis 
 
  
 
Key to In Vivo Codes: 
 
Normal text: Bristol and West Building Society / Kepner Tregoe and/or 
  The Post Office / Kepner Tregoe codes (original) 
Normal text*:  From above cases, re-allocated as a result of second phase of the research 
Normal text(+): From above cases, supplementary as a result of second phase of research 
Bold text: Additional codes from Carousel/ Triangle Management Services case 
Italics:  Additional codes from McQuillan Young Comm. / Transitions case 
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CONSOLIDATED ANALYTICAL CODES, CATEGORIES AND DIMENSIONS 
 
 
“In Vivo” Codes 
 
 
Analytical Codes 
Second Order 
Categories 
Overarching 
Dimensions 
 
models, methodology 
systematic, structure 
unfolding process 
framework for 
discussion 
helpful way to see 
credibility, viability 
marshall thoughts 
rigour 
tools 
formal analysis 
 
 
 
 
methodology, 
concepts, 
framework/ approach 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
experience 
challenge, critique 
have opinions 
devils advocate 
external stimulus 
test; from intellectual or 
  intuitive source 
questions, criticism 
objectivity 
lateral thinking 
stark contrast 
bigger perspective 
demystify 
prodding and poking 
impress importance of 
 
 
 
 
 
external perspective, 
challenge 
 
 
 
 
Alternate Paradigm 
 
 
 
 
SEPARATION 
industry knowledge 
never thought we 
 could 
why is or how could be 
 
 
expertise, 
knowledge 
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CONSOLIDATED ANALYTICAL CODES, CATEGORIES AND DIMENSIONS 
 
 
“In Vivo” Codes 
 
 
Analytical Codes 
Second Order 
Categories 
Overarching 
Dimensions 
 
discipline 
prisoners of the process 
tunnel, rigid 
working with terrorists 
keep us on track, bring 
  us back  
enable, facilitate 
poultice, draw out issues 
shaft of light to break out 
 of circle 
referee 
face up to, total 
 honesty 
move in a convoy 
drag us back 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
external management 
  
outside, cut off 
out there somewhere, 
  off in a room 
behind closed doors 
hermetically sealed 
in secret 
low involvement by 
  design 
no consensus at next tier 
  of management 
open door, but lowered 
 voices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
physical detachment 
 
 
 
 
 
Altered Discourse 
 and Interaction 
 
 
 
 
 
SEPARATION 
 
less functional 
more peer, but boss still 
  present 
lower level of politics 
  more constructive 
top executive together 
  for long time 
 
 
hierarchical/ status 
influence reduced, 
interactions 
  changed 
  
more emotional(+) 
sentiments not 
  expressed otherwise 
take out of scenario 
take on more, delicate 
 issue 
not minutiae 
 
 
subjects discussed 
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CONSOLIDATED ANALYTICAL CODES, CATEGORIES AND DIMENSIONS 
 
 
 
“In Vivo” Codes 
 
 
Analytical 
Codes 
Second 
Order 
Categories 
Core 
Categories 
Overarching 
Dimension 
 
(CEO) leads the process 
jolt/ shake  the system 
keen to get hands on 
  business 
different agendas 
 
 
 
agendas 
 
 
 
 
  
force issue of being 
  communicated to 
adequately brief MD 
influence the outcome 
minimise the damage 
competition 
divide and conquer 
forage around 
more visits 
not presume 
 
 
 
 
 
influenc-
ing 
 
 
 
 
political 
activity 
 
 
 
 
Pressure to 
Conform 
 
 
 
 
ABSORP-
TION 
inevitable resistance 
legitimise resentment 
how dare 
poke fun at 
constructive cynicism, 
  creative tension 
natural fears 
apprehensions 
not invited to share 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
resenting/ 
 resisting 
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CONSOLIDATED ANALYTICAL CODES, CATEGORIES AND DIMENSIONS 
 
 
“In Vivo” Codes 
 
 
Analytical 
Codes 
Second 
Order 
Categories 
Core 
Categories 
Overarching 
Dimension 
 
 
overarching questions 
other work impinges 
duplication 
external element of 
  change too powerful 
added complexity 
 
 
 
 
relatedness 
 
 
 
 
 
  
biases, strong internal beliefs 
juxtaposed, competing, 
foreign invaders 
essentially a strategic 
  planning methodology 
poo-pooed it 
irrelevance, not coming 
  to anything 
problem solving exercise 
someone to blame 
snippets so fear worst 
up to them to take decisions 
couldn’t have done without 
shadowy figure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
positioning 
 
 
 
 
contextualise/ 
positioning 
 
 
Pressure to 
Conform 
 
 
ABSORP-
TION 
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CONSOLIDATED ANALYTICAL CODES, CATEGORIES AND DIMENSIONS 
 
 
“In Vivo” Codes 
 
 
Analytical 
Codes 
Second 
Order 
Categories 
Core 
Categories 
Overarching 
Dimension 
 
 
draw into own porridge* 
terrorists, become free of(+) 
less of an outsider 
proud 
part of fabric (but in a 
 detached way) 
 
  
 
 
dissolution 
 
  
skills transfer 
ownership 
in psyche and mentality 
part of management 
internalised, institutionalised 
connection, anchor, embed 
  underpin 
refine and hone 
beyond prisoners 
pulled apart and affirmed 
more aware 
followed like lambs 
mind set change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
internalis-
ation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
fusion/ 
maturity 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissolution 
and Fusion 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSORP-
TION 
re-framing 
changed the way people 
 think 
orients the mind 
provided the seeds 
stimulated on-going 
 thoughts 
more influence than credited 
raise awareness, move us on 
transmogrify(+) 
worked its way into the 
  culture(+) 
one stage further 
thinking evolved 
pulled back 
our version 
force 10 gale to ripple 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
re-framing/
evolution 
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CONSOLIDATED ANALYTICAL CODES, CATEGORIES AND DIMENSIONS 
 
 
“In Vivo” Codes 
 
 
Analytical 
Codes 
Second 
Order 
Categories 
Core 
Categories 
Overarching 
Dimension 
 
 
pent up desire* 
not ready for(+) 
come to a head 
couldn’t do it, too close 
open to suggestions, 
 exhausted 
struggle with identity 
 
 
 
 
 
readiness 
 
 
 
 
  
personal credibility(+) 
cultural fit(+) 
used KT before, familiar(+) 
part of the wallpaper 
comfort, relaxed with 
chemistry, personal fit 
common ground, 
affiliation our background 
relate to (age) 
success, tangible benefits 
respect 
 
 
 
 
 
familiarity, 
comfort, fit
 
 
 
 
embedding 
 
 
 
 
Interplay 
and 
Tensions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
explain organisation, 
   educate* 
ease off(+) 
accommodated(+) 
reflection, not just shoot 
  from hip 
back off, come round again 
 
 
accommod
-ation 
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CONSOLIDATED ANALYTICAL CODES, CATEGORIES AND DIMENSIONS 
 
 
“In Vivo” Codes 
 
 
Analytical 
Codes 
Second 
Order 
Categories 
Core 
Categories 
Overarching 
Dimension 
 
 
private discussions, fireside 
  chats* 
steer, not entirely 
  democratic* 
close down the debate* 
Nth challenge not 
  welcomed* 
 
 
 
interven-
tion 
direction 
setting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
managing the 
interplay 
  
manipulation* 
collusion, accomplices* 
not empathise with agenda 
father confessor role 
neutral 
 
 
 
stance 
 
  
 
 
Interplay 
and 
Tensions 
 
clash, inconsistency* 
dissonance* 
force fit* 
less than expected* 
not compelling* 
strategy – a turd* 
non buy-in, raspberry* 
not invented here* 
little things happen and 
  don’t happen* 
 
  
 
 
 
inherent 
tensions 
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6. CLOSURE AND EVALUATION OF THE FIELD RESEARCH 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This PhD is essentially exploratory research, grounded in an enactment perspective, 
into a relatively little studied subject area of how management consultants influence 
processes of strategic change in organisations.  Its aim is to develop, as well as test, 
social scientific concepts, theories and frameworks. 
 
As the field research and analysis progressed over the last two cases, the findings 
were integrated into the previous phase of the research, enabling the concepts and 
theoretical framework to be checked, refined and elaborated.  The richness, 
inclusiveness and credibility of the concepts and framework were continually reviewed 
and assessed. Once the last case had been analysed and written up, the diversity 
exhibited by the four cases, and the extent to which theoretic saturation had been 
achieved, was evaluated with a view to drawing the field research to a close.  This 
evaluation was an integral part of honing and consolidating the emergent theoretical 
framework.  The last two cases researched showed considerable diversity in terms of the 
intervention methodology and approach, and the involvement of different consultants, 
which were primary concerns at the end of the first phase of the research.  Yet, the 
concepts emerging from the first two cases were corroborated in many ways and 
extended in others.  The last case, though adding to the study, tended to corroborate 
rather than extend significantly the emergent theoretical framework, as indicated by the 
small number of new in vivo codes and no additional analytical codes.  An analysis of a 
reported case was also undertaken to explore the robustness of the emergent framework. 
 
An evaluation of the research was then carried out using criteria suggested by Lincoln 
and Guba (1985) and Wallendorf and Belk (1989): credibility, transferability, 
dependability, confirmability and integrity.    This evaluation suggested that the research 
was reasonably credible and of wider relevance, though not without some shortcomings 
and limitations. 
 
The next section analyses the diversity in the cases and the grounds for drawing the 
research to a close, and is followed by a section evaluating the research. 
 
 
6.2 DRAWING THE FIELD RESEARCH TO A CLOSE 
 
Three principal factors or criteria were used to determine the appropriateness of drawing 
the field research to a close: diversity of the cases studied, the extent to which theoretic 
saturation was achieved, and pragmatism. 
 
6.2.1 Diversity 
 
The latter two cases when compared to the Kepner Tregoe interventions at the Bristol 
and West Building Society and The Post Office suggest five principal differences: 
 
• Methodologies and Approaches 
• Consultants 
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• Duration of Intervention 
• Proximity of Intervention to Field Research 
• Client Organisation Size and Stakeholders 
 
There are also important differences between the case of Transitions’ work with 
McQuillan Young Communications and Triangle Management Services’ work with 
Carousel.  Specifically, there are significantly differences in relation to the first four 
factors or dimensions listed above, though the cases share some similarities in respect 
of the last factor. 
 
The nature of the differences and their theoretical relevance in relation to the 
emergent findings from the research are discussed in turn below.  
 
6.2.1.1  Methodologies and Approaches 
 
The rigid application of the strategy formulation process, yet a reliance on the 
managers themselves to provide the substantive inputs were important features of the 
Kepner Tregoe interventions.   The consulting process, which separated the senior 
managers and their deliberations from the conventional routines, was central in 
developing the concept of separation.   A review of the ‘best practice’ texts on 
management consulting (e.g. Block 1981, Margerison 1988, Kubr 1996) suggests that 
an explicit or covert imposition of a framework or methodology is intrinsic to 
consulting interventions.  The importance of the specific analytical framework and 
process in creating or bringing about the actual degree of separation, though, 
remained a relevant question.  Also, the extent to which the specific process adopted 
created the tension in respect of existing routines, patterns of interactions and 
paradigms, at the group level and in relation to others in the organisation, warranted 
further investigation. 
 
Kepner Tregoe based its approach on a strongly held belief within the firm that senior 
managers should carry out the analyses themselves since this generates greater 
understanding of the issues surrounding strategy formulation and greater ownership of 
the chosen strategy.  Kepner Tregoe had developed and provided the selected groups 
of managers with an elaborate and rigorous analytical framework to develop a 
strategy; in essence the specific questions which needed to be answered and the 
logical sequence for answering those questions.  They introduced and explained a 
range of decision making and analytical techniques to support the answering of those 
questions and the consultants acted as facilitators during the discussions.  An 
objective of the intervention, from Kepner Tregoe’s perspective, was to educate 
senior managers in the processes involved in formulating a business strategy.  Mike 
Freedman and Ann Orton of Kepner Tregoe did not claim to have any particular view 
on or insight into retail financial services, logistics nor distribution.  The firm’s stated 
core expertise was in facilitating the process through which an organisation would 
determine its own strategy. 
 
Triangle Management Services did not have a detailed, documented methodology for 
taking a client through a strategy formulation process.  Rather, Paul Jackson 
structured the main part of the intervention around a basic analytical framework, the 
SWOT analysis, and used his experience and judgement in applying it and getting the 
Carousel Directors to apply it during the workshop.  The process and method of 
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analysis were far less rigid, with issues being parked and new issues introduced to the 
discussions, and did not draw upon well defined decision making techniques.  While 
Paul Jackson recognised the importance of process and facilitation skills, Triangle 
prided itself on the industry knowledge and expertise of its consultants, and used that 
expertise to make substantive recommendations.  Implicit in the firm’s approach is a 
belief that Triangle typically has a fuller and more objective understanding of the 
client’s business context, and hence the opportunities available to the client 
organisation.   Paul Jackson certainly imposed his industry knowledge and expertise 
on the debates and used it to help shape the conclusions. 
 
The Transitions intervention was marked by a lack of defined scope, approach and 
deliverables at the outset.  The intervention and consulting support evolved over the 
period in line with the needs of the business as perceived by Simon Pratten, Linda 
McQuillan and TriciaYoung.  The intervention was characterised by a general 
absence of any formal analytical methodologies or techniques for addressing issues.  
Simon Pratten focused on asking questions that drew out the implications of options 
under consideration or possible changes; he was “not always drawing boxes and 
trying to put things in boxes”.  The process of deliberation and analysis was more 
flexible than the Kepner Tregoe approach, and did not revolve around a basic model 
like Triangle’s work.  Simon Pratten, like Paul Jackson, drew on his experience, 
though this was related to the broad sector of professional services rather than specific 
industry knowledge offered by Paul Jackson.  Transitions’ implicit value judgements 
regarding the desirability of growth did permeate, subtly, through into the agenda for 
the meetings and in setting the direction for McQuillan Young Communications.  
 
6.2.1.2  Consultants 
 
The trust and off-line discussions between the consultant and the Chief Executive 
were fundamental to an understanding of the way tensions are managed between the 
formal strategy process and the wider political and organisational agendas.   
Consequently, the importance of the interpersonal factors, highlighted by other 
researchers such as Argyris (1961), McGivern (1983), McKinney Kellogg (1984) and 
Bingham (1992), and the nature and effects of a particular relationship between a 
consultant and his/her clients needed to be addressed. 
 
In the cases of the Bristol and West Building Society and The Post Office, the senior 
consultants were the same: Mike Freedman and Ann Orton.  Together they managed 
the strategy review process and facilitated the discussions of the senior management 
teams from the two organisations.  Their management of the process, and their 
challenges and interventions during the discussions, were described by those 
managers involved as important in helping them to achieve a new perspective and 
understanding.  In the case of the Bristol and West Building Society, Kepner Tregoe 
had done work for the Society before and Mike Freedman had presented to the 
Executive Team and had extensive discussions with the Chief Executive before being 
commissioned.  In the case of The Post Office, Mike Freedman was personally known 
and respected by the Chief Executive, Bill Cockburn.  These relationships were used 
extensively by Mike Freedman, particularly in the case of The Post Office, to manage 
the strategy formulation process and the tensions between the ‘objective’ strategic 
analyses and the desire to incorporate or promote wider corporate and political 
agendas.  The trust and off-line discussions between Mike Freedman and Bill 
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Cockburn were fundamental to managing the tensions between the formal strategy 
process and the wider political and organisational agendas. 
 
The Directors of Carousel commissioned Triangle on the basis of a few brief 
telephone conversations with Paul Jackson and a referral from a trade association.  
They had not heard of Carousel before, nor had they met Paul Jackson prior to the 
evening before the workshop.  Paul Jackson was given a very loose brief:  “a three 
sentence e-mail” (Carousel Director) on which to develop Triangle’s proposal.  He 
saw Carousel, as a company, as his client rather than any one or more of the 
individual Directors, and did not have off-line discussions or briefings with any single 
Director. 
 
Tricia Young of McQuillan Young Communications met Simon Pratten at a 
conference, and the first assignment was conducted by Robin Jacobs, another partner 
of Transitions.  Before agreeing to the initial period of six months’ free consulting, the 
Directors of McQuillan Young Communications had only met Simon Pratten a few 
times and had attended, along with the staff, a workshop he ran on marketing plans.  
While Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young had some basis for being comfortable with 
Simon Pratten, the familiarity, trust and respect grew through the intervention.  
Initially, Simon Pratten saw the two Directors as his clients, and was equally 
comfortable dealing with either of them.  As the intervention moved forward he 
started to see McQuillan Young Communications, the business, as his client since it 
had become in his view a “proper business”.  Simon Pratten began to identify with the 
business and have a certain amount of vicarious pride in its achievements.  
 
6.2.1.3  Duration of Intervention 
 
Time was a key factor in defining the nature and process of absorption at the 
individual, group and wider organisational level.  Time is a central theme in the 
strategic management and sensemaking literature (e.g. Pettigrew 1985b, 1988, 1990, 
Barr and Huff 1997, Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991).  A greater understanding of the 
effect of the duration of the intervention on how ideas and perspectives are positioned, 
accepted, internalised and acted upon, or positioned, rejected, subverted and/or 
subjected to political influences was desirable. 
 
In the two Kepner Tregoe cases, the interventions were made up of 6 workshops, each 
lasting two days, with approximately a month between each workshop.  A summary 
of the deliberations and conclusions was circulated to the participants by Kepner 
Tregoe a few days after each workshop.  The managers involved in the workshops 
were tasked with activities to undertake between the workshops and had time to 
reflect on what had been discussed.  The timing in Kepner Tregoe’s approach was 
designed to allow the managers to mull over the issues and internalise the strategy 
formulation process, the decisions taken and the final outcome.  The other managers 
in the two organisations were aware of the intervention and had ample opportunity to 
find out about what was happening, make sense of it and try to influence it. 
 
In the case of Carousel and Triangle, the intervention was made up of a preparatory 
questionnaire, a single one day workshop, and subsequent dispatch of a brief report a 
few weeks later.  The intervention was kept low key and its brevity did not present 
many opportunities for those not directly involved to discuss it or seek to influence it. 
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The Transitions intervention had been running for over a year at the time of the 
research and expected to continue for some months. Linda McQuillan and Tricia 
Young had the time to think about, shape, implement and experience the results of 
ideas discussed during the monthly meetings while the intervention was on-going, 
unlike the Carousel Directors.  Unlike the Kepner Tregoe interventions, the design 
and duration of Transitions’ involvement enabled the focus of interest and agenda to 
evolve throughout the course of the intervention, incorporating initiatives and keeping 
the intervention relevant to the changing circumstances of the business.  This time 
horizon also meant that when Simon Pratten did “back off” on certain sensitive or 
emotional issues, he could come back to them later, not “letting them lie”. The scope 
for managing any tensions or disagreements was therefore much greater than in the 
other cases; there were no immediate ‘make or break’ situations confronting the 
consultant.  The staff of McQuillan Young Communications were aware of the 
intervention and had ample opportunity to find out about what was happening, make 
sense of it and try to influence it, but showed little inclination to do so. 
 
6.2.1.4  Proximity of Intervention to Field Research 
 
A central feature of the analysis and conceptualisation of absorption were the 
cognitive and mediating processes used to make sense of, and come to terms with the 
intervention.  The literature on sensemaking (Weick 1995, Gioia 1985) suggests that 
events are continually reinterpreted and made sense of through time as the flow of 
experience is bracketed or chunked in different ways.  Time was expected to influence 
how the participants both described and explained the intervention, and to allow some 
insight and examination of how that understanding evolved. 
 
The fieldwork for the Bristol and West Building Society and The Post Office was 
conducted about two years after the intervention itself, and participants’ understanding 
of the influence of the respective interventions had been shaped by subsequent 
experience.  Informants had formed synthetic and analytic views of the events and their 
consequences.  They could remember how they felt about and appreciated the 
interventions at the time, and could explain how strategic change had been affected 
within their organisations, and how their understanding of the nature of strategy, of 
formal strategy formulation processes and the role of consultants had changed. 
 
Triangle’s intervention at Carousel was only a few months old at the time of the 
fieldwork.  The first interviews took place only two weeks after the changes were 
introduced.  Interviewees’ impressions and feelings in respect of the intervention 
seemed to be still fresh, the accounts were more descriptive, and the judgements were 
more tentative and hedged.  The interviewees were aware that neither the longer term 
effects nor the full ramifications of the changes had unfolded; they were still in the 
“honeymoon period” (Carousel Director).  As such, they were in the middle of the 
process of integration or “transmogrification” (Bristol and West Director) described 
by earlier interviewees. 
 
Transitions’ intervention at McQuillan Young Communications, when the fieldwork 
was conducted, was at the same time over a year old and very proximate. Linda 
McQuillan and Tricia Young recognised that the business had changed and that their 
thinking and aspirations had also changed.  They recognised that Transitions’ 
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interventions had “been a major instrument of change”, and that this had “happened 
very subtly”.   At the same time the intervention was still unfolding, and with it their 
understanding of how Transitions’ involvement was shaping the development of their 
company.  Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young appeared to be drawing tentative, 
interim conclusions, which were both considered but also recognised as subject to 
possible re-evaluation and amendment. 
 
6.2.1.5  Client Organisation Size and Stakeholders 
 
The contextualisation of and attempts to influence the intervention, particularly in the 
case of The Post Office, and reaction to the outcome were central in defining and 
understanding the processes and forces of absorption.  The conceptualisation of 
organisations as nets of collective action, habituated patterns of interaction and shared 
cognitive schemas, maps and paradigms focuses attention on the very nature and 
composition of an organisation (Westley 1990, Fiske and Taylor 1991, Czarniawska-
Joerges 1992, Weick 1995).  Specifically, the influence of possible strength, 
complexity and interconnectedness of cognitive processes and action routines on an 
intervention warranted closer investigations. 
 
The Bristol and West Building Society and The Post Office were both large 
organisations, with long histories and employing many thousands of people.  They 
had numerous levels of management, geographically dispersed activities and defined 
management processes, structures and hierarchies. The management teams were 
subject to external pressures from stakeholders.  The Post Office was the subject of 
political debate over whether it should be partially or full privatised, and was under 
pressure from the HM Treasury to limit investment and debt funding and to deliver 
agreed levels of annual surplus.  The Chairman of the Bristol and West Building 
Society was examining whether the Society was large enough to prosper as an 
independent entity in a consolidating financial services market.  Both organisations 
had long histories and had experienced a reasonable degree of success prior to the 
interventions.  The Directors did not supervise the activities of ‘front line staff’, nor 
middle managers, but relied primarily on their direct reports to communicate strategic 
direction to managers and staff lower in the organisation.   Senior managers within the 
Bristol and West Building Society and The Post Office were generally experienced, 
talented and strong minded individuals with significant responsibilities and authority. 
 
Carousel was family-owned; the Martin family members were owner-managers with 
vested interests in the success of the company.  Carousel was a small company with 
around 30 Directors and staff, which had been in existence about 12 years and had 
few major external stakeholders.  The Directors spent most of their time running the 
day to day operations and between them managed most of the company’s staff.  
Communication between Directors and staff was therefore direct and frequent.  Other 
than the Directors, only one Sales Manager had managerial responsibilities. 
 
McQuillan Young Communications was formed, as a “loose partnership”, about two 
years before the intervention started and had at the time two Directors and two 
members of staff.  As in the Carousel case, the Directors were deeply involved in day 
to day activities.  They were the main fee earners with responsibility for the provision 
of client services, as well as having managerial responsibilities.  Few processes or 
procedure had been established.  There was little history or previous experience of 
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what was required in “building up a business”.  Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young 
had few conceptions of what were appropriate or relevant subject matters to be 
discussed as part of a review of strategy and organisation structure. 
 
Table 2 summarises the principal differences discussed above. 
 
Table 2: Summary of Differences among Cases Researched 
 
 Bristol and 
West / Kepner 
Tregoe 
The Post 
Office / 
Kepner 
Tregoe 
Carousel / 
Triangle 
Management 
Services 
McQuillan 
Young / 
Transitions 
Methodology / 
Approaches 
 
Rigid 
methodology, 
process 
expertise and 
approach 
Rigid 
methodology, 
process 
expertise and 
approach 
SWOT, 
industry 
experience 
No explicit 
methodology, 
experience of 
similar 
business 
Consultants 
 
Mike 
Freedman and 
Ann Orton, 
little prior 
contact 
Mike 
Freedman and 
Ann Orton, 
prior 
intervention 
with CEO 
Paul Jackson 
and Jason 
Whiteley, 
negligible prior 
contact 
Simon Pratten, 
some prior 
contact and 
work  
Duration of 
Intervention 
 
6 Workshops, 
5 months 
elapsed time 
6 Workshops, 
5 months 
elapsed time 
1 Workshop, 
1 day, 
follow up 
report 
Monthly 
meetings,18 
months 
Proximity of 
Intervention 
to Field 
Research 
 
2 years 2 years 3 to 6 months On-going 
Client 
Organisation 
Size and 
Stakeholders 
 
Large, 
mutual, long 
history 
Very large, 
public sector, 
very long 
tradition 
Small, family 
owned 
business, 12 
years old 
Fledgling 
partnership 
 
 
6.2.2 Theoretic Saturation 
 
As indicated above, the four cases represent markedly different interventions, in terms 
of process and context.  Yet the last two cases broadly supported and elaborated the 
concepts and theoretical framework that emerged from the first phase of the research. 
 
In particular, the dimension of separation was reinforced and a new analytical code 
relating to the use of expertise or knowledge was added by the Carousel / Triangle 
Management Services case.  The last two cases also helped to draw apart the way in 
which interactions were changed into issues to do with reducing hierarchical or 
relational positions or postures and issues to do with the subjects discussed.   In terms 
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of absorption, the last two cases expanded upon the way that learning, adoption of 
ideas and change occurs as part of and following an intervention.  The pervasive 
presence of organisational commitments was a consistent theme, especially how ideas 
and themes proposed by consultants are either immediately or later evaluated in terms 
of prevailing norms and routines.  The notion of the consultant being co-opted and the 
intervention itself absorbed was suggested by the McQuillan Young Communications 
/ Transitions case.  The political activity, which is marked in The Post Office case, did 
not appear very strong in the last two cases. 
 
The final coding framework, shown as Exhibit 4, reflects how the last two cases 
contributed to the amendment and elaboration of the concepts and understanding.  As 
can be seen from comparing Exhibits 3 and 4, the coding framework was recast 
following the second phase of the research, though the two core dimensions remained.  
The Carousel / Triangle Management Services case provided an additional analytical 
code and some in vivo codes. McQuillan Young Communications/ Transitions case 
contributed some new in vivo codes, but no additional analytical codes. 
 
In a pure grounded theory approach, the signal to stop investigating new cases or 
instances of the phenomenon comes when theoretical saturation occurs, namely that 
the new cases add practically nothing to the theory development (Glaser and Strauss 
1967, Strauss 1987, Strauss and Corbin 1990).  Clearly, the McQuillan Young 
Communications / Transitions case added to some concepts and aspects of the 
theoretical framework.  But the case also showed a strong degree of convergence 
towards the synthesis achieved from the earlier cases, despite the notable differences 
discussed above.  Research and analysis of additional cases might enable more testing 
and elaboration, and bring out more subtleties and nuances.  The view taken was that 
additional data would add relatively little to the development of the core concepts and 
overall insight into consulting interventions. 
 
As a check on the robustness of the theoretical framework, an analysis of a reported 
consulting intervention was undertaken.  The case relates to consulting work 
undertaken by Professor Chris Argyris of Harvard University, which he describes in 
detail in his 1993 book; “Knowledge for Action” (Jossey-Bass).  The case offers the 
opportunity to explore whether elements of the conceptual framework developed 
through the research can be identified in an account and data generated outside the 
research itself.  
 
“Knowledge for Action” is laced with extended transcripts of actual, tape-recorded 
conversations and intervention, as well as Argyris’ thoughts at the time and 
subsequent reflections and analyses.  This abundant use of first hand data is 
deliberately intended “to provide readers with the information to make up their own 
minds about the validity of my (Argyris’) inferences and analyses.” (1993:67).  
Especially valuable in elaborating and testing the framework put forward by the PhD 
research is the conscious effort by Argyris “to provide the reader with a window into 
my mind by commenting on the conversations and also provide relatively observable 
data showing how I acted and how others responded.” (1993:68) 
 
The nature of the intervention studied, the process of extracting data and creating an 
account of the intervention, and the stated purpose of the book are different from this 
research.  The intervention in question was designed to change the undesired, but 
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apparently entrenched, defensive behaviour patterns of Directors of a consulting firm.  
Thus the focus of the intervention was not the firm’s strategy as defined in Chapter 
Two of the thesis.  Also the account of the intervention was developed by the 
interventionist himself, with only a partial insight into and partial attention on how the 
intervention itself was being construed by the Directors and within the firm.  Finally, 
the text examines the processes of creating effective and sustained double loop 
learning in an organisation, and Argyris’ primary audience includes field researchers 
in organisational learning, OD professionals, planners and implementers of 
management education.  Argyris’ primary theoretical focus is not consulting 
interventions per se. 
 
The detailed account of the intervention was read thoroughly, including some of the 
later sessions or incidents, then coded using the coding framework developed (Exhibit 
4 in Chapter Five).  Clearly, the coding was far more tentative and speculative than in 
the cases studied personally, where I had the opportunity to explore the interpretations 
and understanding of those involved directly.  Argyris (1993) though is deliberately 
explicit and highly articulate, reducing the scope for gross misunderstanding.  Despite 
some missing elements, examples of most of the analytical codes could be readily 
identified.  The analysis is summarised in Exhibit 5, which contains quotations and 
illustrations from the text with associated page references to Argyris’ text.  Processes 
of separation were evident, while the interplay and tensions and absorption, though 
identifiable were less prominent.  This research suggests that these latter processes are 
not always at the fore and somewhat opaque, even to the more sensitive and 
experienced consultants.  In this case, the consultant is also the author and narrator, 
and these elements might reasonably have been expected to be under-stated.  Overall, 
the analysis pointed to the usefulness and robustness of the framework for examining 
consulting interventions. 
 
In addition, the research, though aimed at theory development, is not a pure form of 
grounded theory method.  It is directed and informed by prior research, theory and a 
theoretical perspective.  The links to and underpinning by extant theory and empirical 
research, reviewed in the next chapter suggest that the research is well grounded.  In 
particular, the case studies exhibit most of the characteristics or properties of 
sensemaking as set out by Weick (1995): grounded in identity construction, 
retrospective, enactive of sensible environments, social, ongoing, focused on and by 
extracted cues and driven by plausibility rather than accuracy.  As such, the cases are 
not islands of research without any underpinning other than their own data for the 
emergent concepts and theories. 
 
Moreover, the research should be taken and judged as an intentionally exploratory 
study in a relatively under-researched and difficult to research, though increasingly 
important, area of management. 
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Exhibit 5 
Page 1 of 3 
 
ANALYSIS OF REPORTED CONSULTING INTERVENTION 
(AGRYRIS C (1993); “KNOWLEDGE FOR ACTION”; JOSSEY-BASS) 
USING RESEARCH DERIVED ANALYTICAL CODES 
 
Research Code 
  
Quotation or illustration from text; page reference in brackets  
Focus 
 
Publication of results (73) 
Directors not to have freedom to veto publication (74) 
Joint commitment following meeting (74) 
 
Boundaries, 
Scope 
 
Letter describing the major conditions (74) 
Action strategies were defensive, anti-learning and 
overprotective… working with individuals dedicated to integrity 
and honesty… to learn how to stop such hypocritical actions (89) 
 
Output, 
Synthesis 
 
Development of Directors’ Action Map (92, 94, 98) 
Methodology 
Concepts, 
Approach 
 
Collation of causal explanations; translation and mapping; 
feedback and validation; connection to actions; change seminar; 
support and intervention as requested (69, 70) 
Model 1 and Model 2 (49-66) 
Top down intervention (74,75) 
 
External 
perspective, 
Challenge 
 
Four features of effective feedback (91) 
Make views known and model the reasoning and skills (111) 
Normative position (113) 
Case examples (112, chapters 7 – 11, especially chapter 11) 
 
Expertise, 
Knowledge 
 
Knew that… came prepared… expected… not troubled by… 
concerned if… responses would give me some clues (75- 77) 
External 
management 
 
Feedback session managed by an intervener (131) 
My presence was crucial… prevent the situation from escalating 
counter-productively (152) 
 
Physical 
detachment 
 
Resist interviewing subordinates (75) 
Directors only at Feedback session and Change Seminar (90, 135) 
Hierarchy 
reduced, 
Interactions 
changed 
 
CEO’s candid reflections (at Feedback session)… led other 
Directors to explore their feelings about the CEO (118) 
Subjects 
discussed 
 
Undiscussables and cover-ups blew the cover-up and violated the 
norm of undiscussability (70) 
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ANALYSIS OF REPORTED CONSULTING INTERVENTION 
(AGRYRIS C (1993); “KNOWLEDGE FOR ACTION”; JOSSEY-BASS) 
USING RESEARCH DERIVED ANALYTICAL CODES 
 
Research Code 
  
Quotation or illustration from text; page reference in brackets  
Agenda 
 
Live case… typically focused on an episode that had actually 
occurred and that was frustrating and embarrassing or threatening 
(135) 
CEO has responsibility for allocating consultants to cases… he has 
an inadequate understanding… created a process which 
undermines effective marketing and encourages unilateral resource 
grabbing and “black market” deals (136) 
 
Influencing 
 
 
Resenting/ 
resisting 
 
Genuine confrontation (117) 
Relatedness 
 
“Right” opportunity (151) 
Positioning 
 
 
Dissolution 
 
Others pitched in to help them produce new actions (152) 
Intervener no longer invited for sessions (153) 
Directors and others chose to continue tape recording some 
sessions (153) 
 
Internal-
isation 
 
Directors began to realise… also learned… The (Feedback) session 
taught the Directors (70) 
The Change Seminar began the learning process (71) 
Signs of learning (146) 
 
Re-framing 
Evolution 
In the eyes of the participants, the experiments were trails of using 
a new set of skills to produce new consequences.  They were not 
experiments to test a theory… (153) 
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ANALYSIS OF REPORTED CONSULTING INTERVENTION 
(AGRYRIS C (1993); “KNOWLEDGE FOR ACTION”; JOSSEY-BASS) 
USING RESEARCH DERIVED ANALYTICAL CODES 
 
Research Code 
  
Quotation or illustration from text; page reference in brackets  
Readiness 
 
Saw a problem (73) 
A meeting to assess the commitment of all the Directors (73) 
  
Familiarity, 
Comfort 
 
Second, and private, opportunity to question me and the proposed 
program and to express doubts that they might not have expressed 
during the group meeting (74) 
My presence was crucial, even if I did not speak (152) 
 
Accommod-
ation 
 
The decision on how much of this or that should be in your system 
is your decision (114) 
You may even wish to own up that you do not want to change 
certain actions (114) 
 
Direction 
setting 
 
Directors framed the problem (68) 
Stance 
 
Two major tasks… causal explanations… and generalisations (69) 
They felt that I respected each of them and that I was going to 
protect the process as best I could (241) 
 
Inherent 
tensions 
Validity of subordinates’ diagnoses of superiors’ performances 
before they themselves have gone through the process of 
developing a personal commitment to change and continuous 
improvement….   more evenhanded when they know their 
evaluations will become part of a joint dialogue… don’t realise the 
subtleties of the ways in which they bash their superiors (75) 
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6.2.3 Pragmatism 
 
Closure also has a pragmatic element.  There is merit in documenting and publishing 
findings before the research is overtaken by events, loses its momentum or the 
researcher simply runs out of time.  Access to other cases would neither be easy nor 
achieved in a short space of time.  The general reluctance of consultants and their 
clients to talk openly about specific assignments was evident from the extensive 
efforts required to secure the four cases researched.  Personal connections, 
perseverance and luck were required to gain entry to all four cases.  Both Kepner 
Tregoe and The Post Office declined to participate when approached via a mailshot, 
while many other organisations expressed initial interest only to withdraw later.  The 
lack of research has retarded analysis and theory development, leaving managers and 
consultants alike to stumble along on the basis of prejudices and consulting lore.  Any 
rigorous research, even subject to later review and modification, benefits  
practitioners and provides another point of reference for the academic community. 
 
 
6.3 EVALUATION 
 
Evaluating research is vital, both to ensure that the foundations on which subsequent 
research may be built are solid and to give confidence to practitioners who may act upon 
the implied advice or concepts. 
 
An abductive research strategy has been used to generate theory, in the form of a 
“coherent description or explanation of observed or experienced phenomena” (Gioia and 
Pitre 1990), primarily from interview data.  The proposed concepts and theoretical 
framework come from coding and synthesis of multiple accounts, and the fusion of these 
accounts into case specific, researcher-compiled narratives, accessible to and commented 
on by informants.  The role of the researcher as the primary research instrument (Berg 
and Smith 1988, Smith 1988) is also acknowledged. 
 
As Yin (1994) points out, a qualitative, emergent process of data collection, analysis and 
synthesis inevitably requires the researcher to make judgements and to steer a course 
based on a personal understanding and evaluation.  Case investigators are, accordingly, 
alleged to be particularly prone to bias. 
 
6.3.1 Evaluation Criteria 
 
To assess the trustworthiness of the research, Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest four 
questions to be addressed: 
 
• How do we know whether to have confidence in the findings? 
 
• How do we know the degree to which the findings apply in other contexts? 
 
• How do we know the degree to which the findings emerge from the context and the 
respondents and not solely from the researcher? 
 
• How do we know the degree to which the findings would be repeated if the study 
could be repeated in essentially the same way? 
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These questions reflect a more subjectivist or social constructionist stance and are more 
appropriate than the functionalist tests for establishing the quality of empirical social 
research commonly used, and cited by Yin (1994), of construct validity, internal validity, 
external validity and reliability.  Importantly, the cases are deemed unique sets of events 
and subjective experiences.  The research process itself is seen as an inter-subjective 
process in which informants or social actors create and communicate meaning.  As such, 
the questions reflect a concern for quality rather than verifiable validity, and are phrased 
in terms of degree. 
 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest four specific criteria for evaluating research, which 
better reflect the issues and consideration in subjectivist research: credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability.  Wallendorf and Belk (1989) add a 
fifth criterion: integrity.  These five criteria are described in Wallendorf and Belk (1989): 
 
• Credibility: adequate and believable representations of the constructions 
of reality studied 
 
• Transferability the extent to which working hypotheses can also be employed 
in other contexts, based on an assessment of similarity 
between the two contexts 
 
• Dependability  the extent to which interpretation was constructed in a way 
which avoids instability, other than the inherent instability of 
a social phenomenon 
 
• Confirmability the ability to trace a researcher’s construction of an 
interpretation by following the data and other records kept 
 
• Integrity the extent to which the interpretation was unimpaired by lies, 
evasions, misinformation, or misrepresentations by 
informants 
 
In evaluating the research against these criteria, the following sections draw upon the 
description of the research process and methods in previous chapters.  
 
6.3.2 Credibility 
 
For the research to be credible the concepts and theory should be adequately grounded in 
and be empathetic to actors’ meaning and interpretations.  The process of analysis and 
synthesis should at the same time meet the requirements of rigorous social theory, yet 
remain faithful to actors’ constructions.  A number of techniques suggested by Lincoln 
and Guba (1985), Wallendorf and Belk (1989) and others (Burgess 1984, Yin 1994) 
were employed. 
 
Prolonged engagement is suggested to acquire deep understanding of the social 
phenomenon and to enable an assessment of the quality of the data.  While the 
research methods did not include direct observation of interactions between managers 
and consultants, most of the data collected cam from in-depth interviews.  The semi-
structured interview format allowed informants to express themselves freely and in 
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their terms.  The topic guides, which built on the literature, previous interviews and 
findings from earlier cases, enabled apparently interesting or theoretically relevant 
subjects to be probed and investigated thoroughly.  Both the data collection and 
analysis built upon significant personal experience as a management consultant.  This 
made the process of inquiry efficient and practitioner informed.  This literature based 
and experiential sensitivity combined with the evolutionary research process provided 
a backdrop against which issues, comments and tensions could be thrown into relief 
and then explored fully.   
 
The data upon which the concepts and theoretical framework are grounded came from 
multiple perspectives and sources within a case, and from multiple cases.  
Documentary data in most cases was supplemented by in-depth interviews with a 
range of managers within the client organisation and the consultancy.  This enabled 
comments, opinions, interpretations, and explanations to be compared, and the 
nuances and subtleties to be explored and distilled.  Concepts from the earlier cases 
were tested and elaborated in later cases, as part of an integrative process of theory 
development.  The diversity in the cases provided the opportunity to identify and 
analyse potentially negative cases. 
 
In each case, a theoretically informed account of the interventions was sent to the 
sponsors within the consulting and client organisations for their comments.  This 
provided a check of my understanding and articulation, albeit in the form of a 
composite account, of their experiences and interpretations.  Their expressed comfort 
and understanding with the concepts and analysis provided another check that the 
theoretical framework was accessible to them and resonated with their constructions 
of reality. 
 
There was also a continuous dialogue with my supervisor regarding the emergent 
findings and concepts, which provided a check for reasonableness and credibility.   
Interim papers were drafted and reviewed by the PhD Review Panel and other 
members of faculty at Cranfield School of Management as a deliberate strategy of 
peer review.  In addition, a paper documenting the findings and concepts from the 
first phase of the research was drafted and submitted for the British Academy of 
Management Conference in 1997.  The paper was reviewed and accepted as part of 
the regular stream, and subsequently presented at the Conference in September 
(Pellegrinelli 1997). 
 
The credibility is though limited, as in most PhDs, by the fact that the research relies 
fundamentally on the skills, rigour and creativity of a single researcher, operating to a 
large extent alone.  Empathy, intuition and prejudice tend to merge, and it is 
impossible to know how much influence the individual researcher has on informants’ 
accounts of their experiences.  The credibility of the research, ultimately, can only be 
judged by its insight and endurance in the face of other, similar research. 
 
6.3.3 Transferability 
 
For the research to be transferable the concepts and theoretical framework should be 
applicable in other, similar circumstances. While the findings are grounded in a set of 
unique cases, they should prove useful hypotheses, perspective or frame of reference for 
examining and understanding other instances of consulting intervention or social 
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interactions more broadly.  As such, the framework should identify and articulate 
processes and forces so that relevant assessments of similarity between contexts can be 
made. 
  
The research is framed within the enactment perspective, which provides a meta-
theory of how individuals, groups and organisations make sense of and construct their 
social reality.  In a very small part, this research elaborates this meta-theory and 
illustrates the enactment process.  As such, the research represents a sensitising 
mechanism for future researchers and practitioners who wish to explore and 
understand social reality within the enactment perspective.  Moreover, the concepts 
and theoretical framework spell out the processes of reciprocal influence between the 
intervention and the on-going enactments within the organisation.  This facilitates the 
process of analytic generalisation to other instances, in terms of where the concepts 
and framework might be relevant in understanding or studying the cases in question. 
 
More specifically, the diversity of the cases studied indicates that the findings and 
concepts have a direct, transituational relevance in cases where management 
consultants intervene to help senior managers to develop strategies.  The cases studied 
displayed significant differences along five theoretically relevant dimensions, as 
described and analysed above: 
 
• Methodologies and Approaches 
• Consultants 
• Duration of Intervention 
• Proximity of Intervention to Field Research 
• Client Organisation Size and Stakeholders 
 
This diversity provides confidence in the concepts and a priori expectations that they 
might be applicable in many circumstances.  The analysis of the intervention by 
Argyris (1993) provided further confidence in the wider applicability of the concepts 
and theoretical framework.  The complexity and range of possible interventions, 
though, means that the concepts and framework can only represent starting 
hypotheses.  In essence, the transferability or boundaries can only be determined by 
further research and more cases.  The concepts are open to continual refinements and 
modifications (Glaser and Strauss 1967), which is a fundamental characteristic of 
emergent, exploratory research within a social constructionist stance. 
 
6.3.4 Dependability 
 
For the research to be dependable the concepts and theoretical framework should be 
grounded in relatively enduring features of the social world, not fleeting constructions 
based on particular circumstances.  Dependability is a central concern for practitioners, 
as well as academics, if they are to base their actions on the concepts and frameworks 
developed from the research. 
 
The diversity of the cases, again, provides some confidence in terms of the empirical 
grounding of the concepts.  The links to and underpinning by the existing theory and 
research indicated above suggest that the processes investigated are built on enduring 
features of social reality.  The limitation inherent in retrospective case of not being 
able to follow unfolding processes is only partly remedied through the differing time 
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gaps between the field research and the various interventions and through deliberate 
probing, during the interviews, for how views had changed.  
 
The theoretical framework, though, is not conceived as a set of causal relationships 
which consistently operate within a set of boundary assumptions and constraints 
(Bacharach, 1989), but as a coherent description and explanation of an experienced 
social phenomenon (Gioia and Pitre, 1990).  The theoretical framework should not be 
used prescriptively, but rather as a way of seeking to understand, approach and influence 
a consulting intervention.  It is an addition to managers’ and consultants’ knowledge, 
sensitivity, tool kit or repertoire.  
 
6.3.5 Confirmability 
 
For the research to be confirmable the researcher should be able to demonstrate that the 
findings and concepts are grounded in the actors’ constructions, and that the researcher 
has been open to actors’ conceptions.  As Wallendorf and Beck (1989) state:  
 
“The term neutrality is an inappropriate term for this concern because post-
positive research recognizes that there can be no absolute objectivity; at best the 
researcher can become conscious of and hopefully reduce his or her 
ethnocentrism, semantic accents, and biases.” (1989: 78) 
 
The research methods employed provided an explicit link between the data and the 
concepts and theoretical framework.  The coding framework is a prime, but not the only 
manifestation of the logic and rigour of the analysis.  It shows how actors’ concepts, 
captured in the form of in vivo codes, are grouped into and made sense of through 
analytical codes, categories and dimensions, which were derived through a process of 
analytic induction.  Its development over the course of the research is shown in the form 
of two snap-shots as Exhibits 3 and 4.  Memos and reflections in the form of rough notes 
were written throughout the process and synthesised as formal PhD Review papers, 
submitted to the PhD Review Panel, and Interim Review papers, submitted to my 
supervisor.  This process established chronological points of reference on the 
development of my thinking, and the feedback served to highlight ambiguities, biases 
and shortcomings in the research as it proceeded.  Clearly, though, the process was 
messy, iterative, and intuitive and called for the occasional creative leap (Weick 1989), 
to be supported or discarded as a result of further research or analysis (Glaser and 
Strauss 1967). 
 
Importantly, the case studies are supported extensively with quotes from the verbatim 
transcripts, which sought to capture both the informants’ ideas and the subtleties in the 
way in which they were expressed.  As described above, the case study write ups were 
sent to the sponsors within the consulting and client organisations for their comments.  
While the write ups are researcher-compiled narratives, the comments from sponsors 
indicate that they are resonant with the views and experiences of those involved. 
 
6.3.6 Integrity 
 
For the research to have a high degree of integrity, there should be evidence that 
interviewees were encouraged to share their views, and did so willingly and 
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unreservedly.  This can be particularly important if informants hold back for fear of 
recrimination or a desire not to breach confidences. 
 
There was no evidence of prior briefing or any form of collusion in relation to the 
research, either between clients and consultant, or among company members in any of 
the cases studied. The interviewees were asked if they would be willing to participate, 
either directly by me, by the sponsor for the research or by their Directors.  The 
interviews themselves were conducted in private, and the other people interviewed, or to 
be interviewed, were disclosed before the formal interview as part of a brief explanation 
of the background to and nature of the research.  The research was firmly positioned as 
academic, and therefore, implicitly, only remotely relevant to their organisations.  I made 
it clear, where there was any doubt, that the research was not part of an audit and that it 
was unlikely to have direct consequences for the individuals interviewed. 
 
Interviewees were made aware that comments and quotes would be used.  Anything  
designated by informants as “off the record” remained strictly confidential.  In general, 
interviewees held firm opinions and were prepared to express them.  If they thought I 
was going off at a tangent or had not understood what they were trying to say, they 
corrected me and emphasised their point of view.  Except for the McQuillan Young 
Communications / Transitions case, the cases were exclusively retrospective and there 
was no on-going relationship between client and consultants which could be jeopardised 
or compromised by the research.  In the McQuillan Young Communications / 
Transitions case, the relationship was seen as successful and strong by everyone 
interviewed.  The case of Kepner Tregoe’s intervention with The Post Office was the 
only one regarded by some members of the client organisation as a failure, and then the 
informants talked in a frank and open way about their views and reflections.  In part, this 
may have been facilitated by the earlier departure of the Chief Executive, Bill Cockburn, 
who was clearly seen as Kepner Tregoe’s sponsor. 
 
The willingness of informants to answer questions on and discuss a wide range of 
delicate issues suggested that there were few if any attempts to avoid an issue.  The use 
of retrospective case studies meant that I personally could not observe interactions, nor 
follow how ideas emanating from the intervention or the appreciation of the intervention 
itself.  The comparison of multiple accounts did not suggest that there were any attempts 
to deliberately misinform me.  Clearly, it is not possible to know whether certain topics 
were not mentioned, or personal positions or perspectives were misrepresented, nor is it 
possible to evaluate their potential significance.  I did gain a very personal, intuitive and 
highly subjective impression that one company informant in each of the last two cases 
may have down-played, though not denied, an element of resentment or discontent in 
relation to the intervention.  
 
6.3.7 Evaluation Summary 
 
In summary, the research offers a reasonable degree of assurance that the findings are 
believable and credible, and that they can offer guidance and insight, with confidence, on 
other instances of strategy consultancy interventions.  Inevitably, this research has some 
shortcomings and limitations (Shipman 1988) touched upon above, which relate to a 
single researcher studying a relatively small number of retrospective cases.  There are 
reasons for presuming, though, that there is enough of a path for others to follow and 
build upon. 
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7. CONSULTING INTERVENTIONS AS EMBEDDED ENACTMENTS: 
CONCEPTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The case study research provides insight into and a theoretical framework for 
understanding and explaining how consultants’ strategy interventions influence 
processes of strategic change within organisations.  Interventions are conceived as 
embedded enactments within the theoretical framework characterised by two 
overarching dimensions.  These two dimensions are separation and absorption. 
 
Certain consulting processes and activities can be understood as seeking to create and 
sustain a distinct enactment. The case study research points to this separation being 
created and maintained in three distinct, but inter-related, ways: crystallisation/ 
reification, the imposition of an alternative paradigm, and the altering of existing 
patterns of interaction or discourse.  It is through creating and maintaining some 
degree of separation that consultants can influence and contribute to the strategic 
thinking and subsequent actions of their clients and senior management within the 
organisation. 
 
This enactment, which is created and sustained by the consultant(s), is embedded 
within the prevailing organisational enactment, and subject to a number of forces or 
processes of absorption.  Consultants and members of the organisation involved in the 
intervention are under pressure to conform to, or to operate within, the constructs of 
the wider organisational enactment.  Efforts to establish separation are met with 
inertia, resistance or active attempts to influence the intervention.  These pressures 
and the need to make the intervention understandable, believable and acceptable mean 
that the ideas, analyses and views emerging from the intervention are continually 
being tested against, reviewed in the light of and related to wider constructs and 
assumptions. 
 
The temporary enactment created by the intervention enables individuals to re-shape 
their realities and go on to establish new routines and patterns of action, which in turn 
permeate and diffuse through the organisation.  The enactment facilitated by the 
intervention gradually dissolves and is fused within the wider organisational 
enactment, and the intervention itself can become part of the fabric of organisational 
life. 
 
The interplay between separation and absorption shapes the nature and course of an 
intervention and the influence consultants have on members of the organisation 
experience and live out their social world.  Through processes of separation 
consultants seek to carve out a separate enactment while members of the organisation 
seek to understand, frame and deal with the intervention within the wider, taken-for-
granted enactment.  To varying extents, boundaries are permeable and the enactments 
are reciprocally influential. The views, desires and commitments of senior managers 
shape the nature of the intervention and constrain the freedom of consultants to assert 
their constructions of reality.  Consultants are influenced as well as influence during 
the course of an intervention.  The interplay between separation and absorption is a 
manifestation of the abstract notion of competing enactments (Smircich and Stubbart 
Chapter 7 110
1985).  Advocates of the two enactments seek to secure a critical mass of belief and 
acceptance.   The resulting tensions promote sensemaking and mediating activity to 
accommodate differing views as individuals attempt to generate or renew shared 
constructions of the organisation and its environment.  The stronger the separation, the 
greater the potential dislocation between the formal strategy, or outcome of the 
intervention, and the prevailing organisational enactment. 
 
Figure 1, as shown in Chapter 1, is an illustration of the theoretical framework. 
 
Figure 1:  Separation and Absorption 
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In a number of ways the research is supported by and expands upon many theoretical 
views and various empirical research studies on how consultants seek to influence 
strategic thinking and change within organisations.  The research also provides a 
deeper and richer conceptualisation and insight into how context, and more 
specifically the organisational enactment, affects a consulting intervention and 
processes of reciprocal influence.  Pressures to conform, the dissolution and fusion of 
the consultant facilitated enactment, and the interplay and tensions between 
enactments are distinct conceptualisations of important aspects of consulting 
interventions, and are contributions made by the research. 
 
The remainder of this chapter expands upon the key findings and concepts and 
discusses their relation to existing theory and other research.  In particular, the chapter 
uses the second order categories and analytical codes and their relationships to 
explore and understand consulting interventions.  Extracts and illustrations from the 
cases are drawn upon both to ground the concepts and to add richness and vitality. 
 
 
7.2 PROCESSES OF SEPARATION  
 
By creating and maintaining some degree of separation consultants influence and 
contribute to the strategic thinking and subsequent actions of their clients and senior 
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management within the organisation.  Separation is created and maintained in three 
distinct, but inter-related, ways: crystallisation/ reification, the imposition of an 
alternative paradigm, and the altering of existing patterns of interaction or discourse. 
 
7.2.1 Crystallisation/ Reification 
 
A consultant’s intervention qualitatively changes the way in which strategic issues are 
discussed and decisions are made within an organisation, creating greater focus, 
definition and tangibility in respect of issues or direction.  The act of bringing a 
consultant into the organisation begins to break down the almost seamless connection 
between different issues, agendas and activities, and the indefinite time horizon over 
which decisions and progress can be made. 
  
The hiring of a consultant can be an act of recognition that an issue, or set of related 
issues, is important and worthy of special and prompt attention.  Once a consultant is 
hired, senior managers are aware that they are no longer completely at liberty to 
address these issues “at a time when perhaps it fits with the wider issues”, nor “keep 
at this until we have got it right” (POEC member), as might be the case in the absence 
of an external intervention.  The “firefighting, and I mean constant firefighting”, as in 
the case of the Carousel Directors, becomes less of a priority and time is allocated to 
addressing strategic questions and issues.  As such, the intervention generates focus 
and a degree of commitment to going to meetings and tackling these issues; “we are 
going to do it” (McQuillan Young Director).  In a sense, the intervention forces 
management to confront a number of key issues; “makes us face some issues 
that…you might just sweep under the carpet” (McQuillan Young Director).  It can 
also be an impetus and discipline for action, whether it is as straightforward as filling 
in a questionnaire (Carousel), or embarking on radical change.  The intervention can 
be “a major instrument of change” (McQuillan Young Director).  
 
An intervention also formally creates the object or thing of interest, in the cases 
researched this was the business strategy of the respective organisations.  The act of 
reification, namely generating an object of interest, implicitly defines what is not of 
interest, or at least what is less prominent and relevant.  Strategy formulation is thus 
disconnected from other issues with which it may have been linked explicitly or 
unconsciously in the minds of senior managers.  This act of bounding or scoping the 
object of the intervention is designed to limit and, in the process, clarify the issues 
that need to be addressed.  It focuses effort on a more tightly defined set of 
relationships and/or interdependencies, making them more analytically tractable or 
conceptually manageable. In the Kepner Tregoe interventions the assertion or 
working hypothesis of independence between business strategy and the ownership of 
the respective organisations is invoked as a way of justifying the bounding of the 
interventions.  In the case of The Post Office, it helped to get around management’s 
habit of “externalising the problem” of being ultimately controlled by the 
Government, and therefore not addressing longer term, strategic questions.  In the 
Triangle Management Services case, the Carousel Directors identified a number of 
issues for discussion, which Paul Jackson added to his ideas of what issues constituted 
business strategy.  During the workshop though, Paul Jackson sensed or responded to 
an indirectly expressed need to open up the discussions to issues of leadership and 
management structure. The scope of the intervention was deliberately widened to 
address a set of related issues which Paul Jackson, explicitly, and the Directors, 
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implicitly, recognised as necessary for the successful definition and implementation 
of a way forward.  In the Transitions intervention, the boundaries were agreed at each 
meeting and captured in the form of an agenda.  Even with such apparently permeable 
and arbitrary scoping, the agenda items were disconnected from on-going discussions 
and concerns; “we don’t chat about the minutiae of what’s going on” (McQuillan 
Young Director). 
 
Kepner Tregoe, in common with most consultants, capture as far as practical the logic 
leading to, and thinking underpinning, the outcome of the intervention.  The act of 
justifying recommendations or professional opinions is fundamental to most 
consulting practices.  Even if the management teams in the cases worked through the 
“A to B to C to D to E” in terms of the steps and analyses required of them to develop 
their respective strategies, Kepner Tregoe consultants documented their work. The 
required synthesis of the strategy in the form of a clearly articulated set of statements 
done by the managers themselves reinforces its coherence and integrity.  The object of 
the intervention, and its distinctiveness are in part legitimised by the creation of an 
internally consistent outcome.  Triangle Management Services also produced a report, 
while Transitions on occasions summarised the points agreed at the meetings. The 
Directors of McQuillan Young found that the discussions helped them to articulate 
what they had probably been thinking and to crystallise their ideas.  
  
This process of documentation helps to crystallise what otherwise might have been 
more “woolly”, vague and fleeting in the memories of those involved.  Creating a 
‘hard copy’ helps to retain coherence and to put a “circle around the business”.  As a 
physical record of deliberations and resolutions, a report or strategy document can 
help to ward off the incursions of other issues and thought processes.  It also provides 
a tangible expression and symbol of the consensus achieved.  In the case of the Bristol 
and West, the strategy document was used as a symbol within the organisation that a 
new strategy existed and that things would change.  In the case of Carousel, it meant 
having something “more concrete”; the Directors could say they had paid for it, and 
“therefore it puts a value on it”. 
  
7.2.2 Alternate Paradigm 
 
Consultants bring with them a different way of addressing the object of the 
intervention, and a new perspective and insight.  The consultants’ conceptual 
frameworks, views, expertise and questioning challenge managers’ taken-for-granted 
assumptions and beliefs.  This challenge is both supported and reinforced by the 
application of an analytical discipline and rigour which would not otherwise have 
been achieved by the managers, as exemplified particularly in the cases of The Post 
Office and the Bristol and West.  Rigour can come from the consultant simply asking 
questions and insisting on addressing the implications of certain actions or ideas, as 
exemplified in the case of McQuillan Young Communications.  Consultants tend to 
be more focused, in terms of the specific object of the intervention, and tend to be 
proficient in the use of their preferred methodology.  Their discipline and confidence 
help to overcome difficulties or reservations and to carry through the analyses to 
reach a conclusion or synthesis, and thereby generate the sorts of insights managers 
might not achieve unaided.  As one of the Triangle Management Services consultants 
remarked, “we started to uncover things they hadn’t considered before”, as he and his 
colleague analysed things in ways that the Carousel Directors had not done before. 
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The absolute validity of conceptual frameworks and techniques used during an 
intervention is less important than their plausibility and ability to show or help 
managers to see the organisation and its environment in new ways.  Some members of 
the Bristol and West Executive Team saw the process creating a framework for 
discussion and debate enabling new perspectives to emerge and be shared.  The 
process or methodology has to have face validity for experienced managers to have 
confidence in the process and to be willing to apply it or believe the conclusions.  The 
Directors of McQuillan Young were pleased that the structure and order imposed by 
Simon Pratten was not too restrictive; “he’s structured in that sense, but he’s not 
always drawing boxes and trying to put things in boxes”(McQuillan Young Director). 
 
Consultants also bring their experience to bear in their interventions, either through 
their own application of their preferred approach or their facilitation of managers’ 
work, particularly in their ability to challenge, comment upon, draw out and 
synthesise issues. The preferred Kepner Tregoe role is one of catalyst for the debates 
and devil’s advocate, forcing managers to challenge their own pre-conceptions and 
expectations, and ensuring that due consideration has been given to specific issues 
before moving on.  The external perspective and experience come through directly in 
the form of recommendations or expressed opinions, or in Kepner Tregoe’s case, 
indirectly in the questions asked and challenges made.  The value of this process 
oriented experience is in knowing which issues needed to be covered and which 
analyses and debates are particularly important and require more thought and effort, 
and in developing or pressing managers to develop a deeper understanding.  In the 
case of Triangle Management Services specific knowledge and industry expertise was 
sought by Carousel, and was provided by Paul Jackson in the form of substantive 
suggestions.  Ideas and opportunities were put forward which the Carousel Directors 
had “never even thought (they) could do”, even though some of these ideas seemed, 
once they had been expressed, relatively obvious.  Simon Pratten was seen to have a 
much broader perspective on growing and managing a business, and so able to 
“demystify” some of the issues involved for Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young. 
 
The intervention presents managers with an alternative set of conceptual lenses for 
looking at aspects of the organisation or its environment and what is or may be 
possible, in part, from an outsider’s perspective.  These images may be new, yet at the 
same time familiar: 
 
“It reaffirmed what we probably already knew, but we needed somebody to 
stand there, because we’re inside the goldfish bowl, if you like, and he was 
outside, and he actually took us outside of that to make us look back in” 
Carousel Director 
 
Managers are thus better able to re-conceive the organisation and its environment, to 
some extent separating themselves from the shared conceptions and assumptions 
within the organisation.  To the extent that managers accept these new insights as 
valid, real or useful, they begin to redefine their individual schemas and frames of 
reference.  The experiencing of “very real and tangible benefits” by the McQuillan 
Young Directors reinforced the process of shifting “mind sets”. 
 
7.2.3 Altered Discourse and Interaction 
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The presence of consultants generates different patterns of interactions between the 
members of the organisation, in some cases allowing members to step outside, at least 
partially, their customary roles, relationships and routine discussions. 
 
External consultants help maintain focus and momentum, by endeavouring as far as 
they can to prevent managers from being distracted or going off at a tangent.  
Consultants, bolstered by their formal remit and their confidence in the process and 
analytical techniques, seek to carry the process through to its conclusion, even though 
it may be frustrating or difficult for the participants at the time.  The Kepner Tregoe 
intervention approach and philosophy emphasises the facilitation of a fixed and pre-
determined set of steps and deliberations in order to formulate a business strategy.  
The rigidity and discipline imposed was seen by participants as vital in achieving the 
depth and clarity of thought at the Bristol and West, and was a selling point in the 
case of The Post Office.  Transitions’ facilitation and management reflected a more 
“flexible”, yet “channelled” approach, and Paul Jackson of Triangle Management 
Services set out an agenda and paced the day and made sure that no-one in the 
“convoy” was left behind. 
 
The presence of the consultants, in their role of directing and facilitating, can also 
alter to some extent the interpersonal dynamics of the situation.  With the consultants 
in charge the hierarchical power, while ever present, is tempered and played down, as 
a new, albeit temporary, authority structure is put in place.  This allows a more open 
and honest debate and sharing of views, since the consultant can take the role of 
neutral “referee”, perceived by most managers as able to take a more holistic view 
and having no (or few) vested interests or axes to grind.  Most consultants, like 
Kepner Tregoe, stress their neutrality and objectivity.  As a result the political 
undertones are reduced and the contributions made tend to be less functionally biased 
and more constructive.  Moreover, consultants, because of their stated independence 
and status as outsiders, are able to say things and make certain challenges which 
managers do not feel comfortable making and so would very rarely make.  They can 
also, as in the cases of Triangle Management Services and Transitions, raise 
“emotional”, “delicate” or “personal” subjects, and issues which “come a little close” 
or which make the individuals concerned “feel quite insecure”.   The facilitation can 
have direct bearing on the personal and professional relationship between the 
individuals involved.   In the case of Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young, Simon 
Pratten helped to strengthen their relationship, and in the case of the Martin family, 
Paul Jackson helped to surface and open up to discussion a simmering mix of 
professional and family tensions. 
 
A physical detachment of the senior managers from the business helps to cut them off 
from external influences and other pressures, and so make them more focused and 
receptive to the ideas and concepts developed as part of the intervention.  In all the 
cases studied, the interventions were designed so that the senior managers and the 
consultants have relatively little contact with other managers in respect of the strategy 
formulation, and the interventions were kept low key. 
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7.2.4 Separation Through Mutually Supportive Processes 
 
These three processes of separation are mutually supportive.  The initial reification of 
the object of the intervention is necessary for and reinforced by the application of the 
conceptual or analytical framework.  Without an object and scope there is no 
compelling rationale for the primacy of the alternate framework or paradigm; it is one 
of many possible, competing perspectives.  As the framework is applied, and the 
unfolding process generates new insights, the choice of issue, or set of issues, and its 
disconnection from other concerns appears self evidently correct.  The central role of 
the consultant in linking the issue to the analytical methodology and/or style of 
facilitation fades into the background.  The boundaries and hence definition of the 
question at hand vest prominence and validity to the concepts and experience of the 
consultants.  In turn, the validity of the analytical process gives the consultant the 
power and authority to facilitate the deliberations.  As the process unfolds managers 
gain confidence in the consultant(s) and insights generated by the intervention.  The 
rigorous or disciplined application of the consulting process maintains the boundaries 
and implicitly sets new ground rules for how the managers should think and interact. 
The physical detachment has a practical advantage of reducing distractions and is a 
strong symbol of separation. 
 
Figure 3 illustrates how the processes of separation combine into a mutually 
supportive and coherent whole. 
 
Figure 3:  Processes of Separation 
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Internal coherence of the processes of separation is crucial since it makes the 
consulting intervention and outcome believable and defensible, both to those involved 
and others.  Taken together, these processes combine in an attempt to suspend the 
messiness, complications, pressures and ‘baggage’ of the rest of the organisation and 
so address the object of the intervention in isolation and on its own terms.  In essence, 
consultants seek to create a distinct enactment where they can deploy most effectively 
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their competencies and skills.  Typically, and in the cases studied, this entails the 
creation of a more ‘rational’ and more structured world which is more amenable to 
analysis. 
 
Separation is necessary to facilitate a shift in the understanding and frame of 
reference of those directly involved in an intervention, at an individual and group 
level, and a re-conception of the organisation and its environment.  Thus the distinct 
enactment, facilitated through separation, provides new schemas, paradigms and 
“conceptual gems”. 
 
 
7.3 ABSORPTION 
 
The enactment created and sustained by a consulting intervention is subject to 
pressures to conform and fit in with the prevailing organisational enactment.  Efforts 
to establish separation are met with inertia, resistance or active attempts to influence 
the intervention.  These pressures and the need to make the intervention 
understandable, believable and acceptable mean that the ideas, analyses and views 
emerging from the intervention are continually being tested against, reviewed in the 
light of and related to wider constructs and assumptions. 
 
The temporary enactment created by the intervention enables individuals and 
organisations to re-shape their realities and go on to establish new routines and patterns 
of action. The reification facilitated by the intervention gradually dissolves and ideas 
and recommendations transmogrify and are fused within the wider organisational 
enactment.  The intervention itself can become part of the fabric of organisational life. 
 
7.3.1 Absorption as Pressure to Conform 
 
The case study research, particularly The Post Office case, indicates that interventions 
are not impervious to the history, politics, culture and business environment of 
organisations.  These factors can act like a gravitational force, creating a resistance 
against the attempt to take the object of the intervention outside the prevailing frame 
of reference and field of influence.  Active pressure or resistance is motivated by 
anxiety, concerns and vested interests, and can manifest itself in the form of political 
and contextualising activity.  Passive pressure to conform or resistance to separation 
exists in the form of the existing schemas, paradigms and habituated patterns of 
interactions, which condition managers’ responses and the way in which they 
conceive the organisation and its environment.  The prevailing enactment shapes the 
understanding and influences the reactions both of managers directly involved in the 
intervention, and those who expect to be subject to the outcome of the intervention, 
but who are not directly involved. 
  
Specifically, individuals interpret, and to some extent act upon, the purpose and 
content of the intervention in terms of their interests and goals.  This can extend to the 
interests and goals of the organisational groups of which managers feel that they are 
members, that they are responsible for, or that they are representing.   Thus, the 
prevailing hierarchy and power structures provide a backdrop for evaluating ideas and 
suggestions and so exert an influence on the direction and decision making processes 
of an intervention. This can constrain the scope, discussions and hence the final 
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outcome within bounds of the prevailing enactment, which provides security and 
control to the current holders of power. 
 
The presumption of a hidden agenda, as in the case of The Post Office, led to the 
intervention being viewed with a “constructive bit of cynicism”, and generated 
“creative tension”.  The consulting intervention was then no longer taken at face 
value.  The perceived overly strong influence of the Chief Executive tended to 
undermine the intervention’s purported neutrality and objectivity, especially where 
those involved saw it being covertly steered.  Once this perception or even suspicion 
was formed, personal and Divisional interests became legitimate bases for supporting 
or otherwise the strategic direction emerging from the process.  Thus the intervention 
becomes a pawn in the wider political games and processes, and commitment to the 
outcome, tacitly, becomes even more conditional on its political acceptability to those 
involved and those affected. 
 
Comfort in the process, a sense of control and personal security tend to reduce the 
degree to which individuals promote their own interests.  Ownership and control of 
their company, trust in Simon Pratten and strong relationship between them, made it 
easier for Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young to consider an issue such as equity 
participation for a new member of staff, which neither individual was prepared to 
contemplate initially.   In the case of the Carousel Directors, their strong family ties, 
equity participation and mutual respect gave them the sense of security to put aside 
personal interests and be prepared to dismantle personal empires for the sake of the 
company.  
 
Managers not directly involved in the intervention, in terms of participating in it or 
influencing it in other ways, also represent a political force. The extent to which 
Directors and senior managers can, in the views of other in the organisation, 
legitimately take decisions or exercise power without consultation depends on the 
organisation.  In the case of The Post Office, this appeared to violate norms or values 
of decentralised responsibility, autonomy and consensus.  Kepner Tregoe’s emphasis 
on detachment in the case of The Post Office appeared to foster significant 
indignation and resentment, since it appeared to go against cultural norms, and 
heighten the sense of anxiety and uncertainty; “something funny going on inside a 
magic box”.  In the case of McQuillan Young Communications, the longer serving 
staff were suspicious and felt some resentment over being excluded, while the more 
recently recruited staff took the intervention for granted. 
 
The political activity is generated by the uncertainty surrounding interventions and 
concerns over their potential outcomes.  Managers and staff can experience anxiety 
from not being sure how the intervention is going to affect them.  Consultants 
represent an unknown quantity.   While managers and staff might have a reasonable 
feel for the way their colleagues and senior managers might address and resolve an 
issue, the introduction of consultants threatens to disrupt this relatively stable pattern 
of deliberations and actions.  The uncertainty forces managers and staff to make sense 
of the intervention and create expectations of its outcome. The intervention may raise 
hopes, as in the case of Parcel Force managers who saw the strategy review as an 
opportunity to create a demarcation between their business and Royal Mail and hence 
reduce the cannibalisation of their markets.  The intervention may stir grave concerns, 
as in the case of Post Office Counters, whose managers worried that their business 
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would be starved of new investment and sacrificed in order to enable Royal Mail to be 
privatised.  Rumours and speculation spread at Carousel and staff were concerned that 
consultants might mean redundancies.  At the same time they hoped that the 
intervention might reduce the overwhelming operational pressures. 
 
This uncertainty can trigger a number of defensive reactions, such as “foraging 
around” for information on the intervention methodology and approach, demanding 
more communication from senior managers, and trying to get the consultants to tell 
them what is happening directly.  This process is exacerbated where members of the 
organisation share negative preconceptions and rumours of what consultants do.  The 
uncertainty and tension can also set in motion greater and concerted efforts to 
influence the intervention and so “minimise the (potential) damage”.  The attempts to 
influence the intervention can take the form of questioning, thereby implicitly raising 
issues and manifesting reservations, briefing those involved, and attempts to introduce 
other concepts, frameworks or organisational ‘facts’ into the deliberations.  Thus, the 
interpretations and activity of those not involved reinforce the political tendencies of 
those directly involved.  These processes were highly evident in The Post Office case, 
while at Carousel they were weak and comprised of a few extra visits from staff 
reminding the Directors of issues and problems.  Within McQuillan Young 
Communications, however, there was an acceptance that Linda McQuillan and Tricia 
Young were entitled to take whatever decisions they wished, since they owned the 
company, were the primary fee earners and it was their reputation that was on the line.  
Staff did not “presume to say before they went off that we think this”. 
 
Managers involved in an intervention also understand and react to the ideas and 
concepts put forward by the consultants in relation to other issues, initiatives, 
concerns and events.   While consultants may wish to focus managers away from the 
“minutiae” of day-to-day activities or from the factors outside the organisation and 
their immediate control, they still remain to a greater or lesser extent part of 
managers’ pressing organisational reality, reinforcing the existing pattern of thinking 
and acting.  The privatisation issue was a major factor that encroached significantly 
on the scope of the strategy discussions at The Post Office, while the ownership 
strategy was an overarching issue for the Bristol and West.   The organisational 
implications attributed to external events or potential developments, insinuated 
themselves into and clouded the business strategy deliberations. 
 
Managers and staff actively position the intervention in relation to their understanding 
of what is happening and why, both signalling and setting expectations. The Kepner 
Tregoe analytical framework and intervention process was positioned by managers in 
The Post Office as “just a technique” and “a strategic planning methodology from the 
70’s”, and was “completely poo-pooed”, and dismissed as irrelevant by some.  In the 
case of the Bristol and West, the methodology was seen as a framework for promoting 
discussion not necessarily as the best way to derive a strategy, and the implementation 
planning framework introduced by Kepner Tregoe was dismissed by some as 
inappropriate.   The Carousel Directors went to the workshop to “listen to somebody 
who knows”, rather than for any specific consulting approach or insight.  The 
McQuillan Young Communications Directors saw the meetings away from the office 
as opportunities to address longer term business issues. 
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7.3.2 Absorption as Dissolution and Fusion of the Embedded Enactment 
 
Consultants cannot sustain an indefinite nor impermeable separation, rather the 
distinct enactment they facilitate is continually being eroded.  Managers involved in 
the intervention promote and impose the constructs of their schemas and paradigms 
on the consultants to a greater or lesser extent.  They respond to the challenges and 
alternative views expressed by consultants by “educating them about what we 
(managers) would see as the reality of life”, thus “drawing them into our (managers’) 
porridge” (POEC member).  Thus sharing of apparently objective information 
represents an almost imperceptible encroachment of the prevailing enactment on the 
course and content of an intervention. 
 
Moreover, at some point the managers want to integrate and take ownership of the 
outcome: 
 
“... there is actually a limited shelf life (to working with consultants)... you go 
through the phases, like working with terrorists, of hating them, tolerating 
them, loving them, but at a certain point you want to be free of them.” 
POEC member 
 
To the extent that an intervention enables managers to conceive of a new reality and 
new possibilities, it can stimulate “thoughts that are on-going”.  The work done 
during the intervention may “go into the sand” and “the words are no longer spoken”, 
but they begin to permeate through the organisation.  The intervention can become a 
“foundation”, unseen but supporting future developments and fostering new ideas.  
The Kepner Tregoe intervention reframed the way the Bristol and West’s Executive 
Team thought about strategy.  The POEC members still perceived a lingering trace of 
the thinking and ideas from their intervention.  In both cases, the processes of 
reification instigated and supported by Kepner Tregoe were reversed and some of the 
concepts and ideas slowly internalised and fused with existing models.  The outcome 
of the intervention appears to “work its way into the culture” (Bristol and West 
Director) but at the same time it is “transmogrified” (Bristol and West Director) as it 
is absorbed, changing both text and context in subtle and unforeseeable ways. 
 
At Carousel, the fusion of the new vision and concepts, and the existing enactment 
was rapid.   Andrew Ovenden was briefed a few days after the workshop and took 
part in the subsequent deliberations on the specific actions to be taken.  The concepts 
and ideas were quickly internalised, at an individual level by the Directors and 
importantly as the Carousel management team.  The Transitions recommendations 
were soon turned into a Carousel version of what should happen: 
  
“We went from the initial recommendations saying – ‘yes, going to do all of 
that, no problem, we’re not going to question it’…we started to put it into 
some sort of order of priority, and then we started knocking things off and 
thinking – ‘no, actually, no, we don’t want to do that, and we don’t want to do 
that, or we want to do that slightly differently’.” 
Carousel Director 
 
Although the Directors offered little resistance to Paul Jackson’s ideas during the 
workshop, they certainly questioned the ideas and the recommendations when they 
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were back in their customary environment and interacting in their normal ways, as a 
full management team and with their staff.  This process of internalisation, which 
fused new and old, was aided by the small size and proximity, both personal and 
professional, of the Carousel management team. Only a few months after the 
workshop and a few weeks after the key changes were implemented, the Directors 
were talking about taking the ideas and recommendations from the workshop a stage 
further.  Clearly, the intervention was supporting future developments and fostering 
new ideas. 
 
In the case of McQuillan Young Communications / Transitions the intervention itself 
was subtly absorbed within the fabric of organisational life of the company.  The 
meetings were a regular fixture in the diary and the way in which the Directors 
addressed issues of a strategic nature, and the staff took Simon Pratten’s involvement 
for granted.  Simon Pratten himself was drawn into and felt part of the business and 
what it had achieved, and began to see his role more as a non-executive Director 
rather than as a consultant.  Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young saw how the 
intervention had subtly brought about change and how it was continuing to shape their 
thinking and actions. 
 
Figure 4 illustrates aspects of absorption. 
 
Figure 4:  Absorption 
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7.4 INTERPLAY AND TENSIONS BETWEEN ENACTMENTS 
 
The interplay and tension between enactments, manifested as simultaneous on-going 
separation and absorption, are at the heart of consulting interventions, and determine 
the influence the intervention has on processes of strategic change.  The intervention 
has to be framed or embedded within the organisation’s context, expectations and 
political agendas, making the choice and maintenance of boundaries a crucial aspect 
of the consulting process.  The embedding is on-going process throughout the 
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intervention, characterised by reciprocal influence and accommodation. The 
intervention creates tensions as views diverge and competition to ensure that a particular 
view prevails ensues.  This tension needs to be managed and eased in generating a new 
view of the organisation, its environment and the strategic options available.  The 
relationship between the client and the consultant is central to this process.  The more 
marked or politically influenced the separation, the greater the potential dislocation 
between the outcome of the intervention and the prevailing enactment.  Consultants 
and their clients intuitively appreciate and address as best they can the interplay and 
tensions between the new and the familiar, and between the external and internal 
perspective. 
 
7.4.1 Embedding Interventions 
 
The tacit, intuitive strains and “pent up desires” of senior managers within an 
organisation create the entry point for consultants.  Consultants, with the help of their 
internal advocates, crystallise these felt needs and coalesce issues, problems or 
concerns into an object for their intervention.  The Executive Team at the Bristol and 
West wanted a formal strategy in the face of increasing industry turbulence.  The 
Chief Executive of The Post Office felt the need to define the business rationale for 
being a group. The Carousel Directors experienced a form of crisis, and the Directors 
of McQuillan Young Communications were struggling to define the identity of their 
organisation.   At the same time the prevailing enactment can limit the scope of the 
intervention.  The issue of ownership was not adequately or formally addressed by 
Kepner Tregoe, neither in the intervention with the Bristol and West nor with The 
Post Office, even though some senior managers raised it as an important subject in 
both cases. 
 
The instigation of a consulting assignment is both a powerful symbolic and political 
act.  It signals an internal deficiency, “limited experience” or “weakness”, in essence a 
partial failure of the prevailing enactment, and a perceived need and will to rectify 
this shortcoming.  It also signals the possibility of radical change, depending on 
individuals’ previous experience or perceptions of outcomes of management 
consulting interventions, and their interpretation of the situation and political forces at 
work.  The announcement of a consulting intervention, in itself, promotes 
sensemaking activity, and surfaces some taken for granted assumptions or concerns. 
 
Consultants recognise they have to bring something distinctive to the organisation in 
order to add value.  Kepner Tregoe brought a tried and tested methodology, Triangle 
Management Services knew the freight forwarding business and Transitions’ Simon 
Pratten had extensive experience in running professional services firms.  Equally, they 
have to position their interventions so they are understandable, believable and 
acceptable.  There has to be some “cultural fit” with the organisation, and the 
individuals involved need to feel “comfortable” with the consultant and the process.   
The Kepner Tregoe methodology matched the rational analytical approach used 
within the Bristol and West Building Society.  Mike Freeman and Ann Orton were 
“personally credible” and “self evidently good facilitators”.  Paul Jackson of Triangle 
knew the stresses of managing a family business and had the age and experience to 
relate easily to Maureen Martin.  Simon Pratten of Transitions had a structured but not 
dogmatic or mechanistic approach which suited the way in which Linda McQuillan 
and Tricia Young liked to work. 
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In two of the cases researched, Kepner Tregoe stressed the rigour of the process, in 
terms of its conceptual framework and the method of facilitation, but insisted that the 
content should be developed by the managers themselves.  The intervention had a 
rigid structure, but was designed so that the managers would become “comfortable” 
and “relaxed” with the process and the presence of consultants.  The consultants 
enforced discipline, but worked hard on the interpersonal “chemistry” and becoming 
“part of the wallpaper”.  The format and specification for the final strategy statements 
were determined by the consultants, but the wording was composed by the managers. 
 
In the Carousel / Triangle Management Services case, Paul Jackson was keen to 
secure consensus: “moving a convoy”, and was trying to get them to buy into the 
outcome.  Paul Jackson also wanted to mull over the report and recommendations 
before sending it to Carousel: “you shouldn’t always shoot from the hip, so I wanted 
that sort of reflection period”.  This desire to reflect and be sure that the 
recommendations were sound may, in part, have been provoked by the lack of 
challenge from the Directors during the day: “we followed like lambs really” 
(Carousel Director), or a sense that the report would have to withstand a close 
scrutiny. 
 
The McQuillan Young Communications / Transitions case supports the mutuality of 
separation and absorption. The agenda for each of the monthly meetings was 
negotiated; items suggested by Simon Pratten, from an outside perspective, were 
meshed with internally generated issues and concerns.  If an item raised created an 
emotional or instinctive negative reaction Simon Pratten would “back off”.  However, 
the effort to raise and retain a subject for discussion, was not abandoned, since he 
would “come round again”, and would not let certain issues “lie”.  The interplay and 
tensions are succinctly captured by one of the McQuillan Young Directors: 
 
“And that’s where he keeps coming back, and now he prefaces it with – ‘I 
know you’re not very keen on the idea, but one of the things you might 
consider’.” 
 
Time is a factor affecting the way interventions become embedded.  The Kepner 
Tregoe strategy formulation interventions are characterised by a set of discrete 
workshops with time designated between them.  The time was intended to allow the 
senior managers involved to think about and resolve issues and concerns in their own 
minds.  Since others in the organisation are normally aware of the intervention, the 
senior managers are metaphorically in a “goldfish bowl” (POEC member).  The 
longer the duration the more uncertainty and anxiety that can build and with it 
potential resistance or the likelihood of taking de facto strategy decisions.   
Alternatively, the duration may facilitate an acceptance of the intervention as part of 
the fabric of organisational life, if it is understood and positioned as a positive or 
benign influence. 
 
7.4.2 Managing the Interplay between Enactments 
 
The relationship between the consultant and the client(s) for the assignment is crucial 
to managing the intervention, and specifically the interplay and tensions between 
separation and absorption.  Tensions, impasses and disagreements need to be 
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resolved.  This relationship, though, can undermine the ability of the consultants to 
support the processes of separation, since the perceived objectivity, neutrality and 
integrity of the consultants may be compromised. 
 
The Chief Executive of The Post Office hired Kepner Tregoe to conduct an objective, 
rational strategy formulation process.  But he did believe that radical change was 
needed, had firm views on its general direction, and had a strong influence on the 
process and content of the strategy.  He also discussed with Mike Freedman, the lead 
consultant for Kepner Tregoe, how and when certain issues might be introduced. This 
dialogue between the client and the lead consultant was a common practice for 
Kepner Tregoe.  In creating a means for raising issues neither party wanted to discuss 
in public, a degree of implicit collusion was created; the consultant became absorbed 
into and instrument of the client’s agenda.  The Chief Executive, though, recognised 
that “having a sycophantic consultant in charge destroys the challenge... (the) 
credibility”.  Others in the organisation have to believe that the consultant is immune 
from the power of hierarchies and structures within the organisation if the intervention 
is to ‘reveal’ an objective external reality and the opportunities it offers, rather than 
the whims or aspirations of a powerful manager. 
  
The tendency to collude is strong.  A Chief Executive, or other individual within the 
organisation, may be seen to have legitimate authority to influence the intervention 
and the direction of the organisation, and to be critical to the implementation of the 
outcome, let alone to the continuation and success of the intervention itself.  
Nonetheless, collusion is not inevitable.  In the Carousel / Triangle Management 
Services case, Paul Jackson “quickly sensed that it (empathising with any one 
Director’s agenda) would be self-destruct”.  At the time of the intervention, the 
leadership of the company appeared a sensitive issue, with Maureen Martin having 
relinquished a lot of the power and influence in the company to her sons, who still 
believed that they ought to have more control.  Paul Jackson observed the Director’s 
body language to gauge reactions and how far to push an issue.  In the McQuillan 
Young Communications / Transitions case, Simon Pratten attempted to be, and was 
perceived by the Directors to be, neutral at all times.  That neutrality was noted, and 
Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young recognised that he was in a position to manipulate 
and influence the relationship between them. Simon Pratten did though appreciate that 
the different personal situations and professional aspirations of Linda McQuillan and 
Tricia Young created different agendas and minor tensions between the two.   Trust in 
Simon Pratten and their respect of his professionalism and integrity were crucial in 
getting them to open up their business, themselves and their relationship. 
 
The four cases suggest that a consultant needs to be able to understand and empathise 
with the various personal concerns, ingrained beliefs and political agendas, even if 
they are not raised formally nor fully articulated.  The two later cases suggest that the 
political, collusive approach adopted by Mike Freedman of Kepner Tregoe is only one 
possible approach to dealing with tensions and unwelcome attempts to influence the 
intervention.  Explicit or implied collusion with one or more of the parties involved 
may neither be necessary nor advisable, especially given the case of The Post Office, 
and should certainly not be visible.  The last two cases indicate that numerous aspects 
of the intervention can be flexed to reduce tensions.  Specifically, scope boundaries 
can be expanded or reduced, ideas and visions can be more or less crystallised.  
Analytical tools or methodological approaches can be more or less rigidly applied.  
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Deliberations, debates, or other forms of interactions between managers can be more 
or less actively and intrusively facilitated. 
 
Embedding the intervention and managing the interplay and tensions are mutually 
supportive and dependent processes, since the more the intervention runs against the 
grain of the organisational enactment the more tensions it may generate.  Kepner 
Tregoe’s conviction in the correctness of the concepts and approach, and the 
methodical application of the process seemed to limit the consultants’ ability to 
accommodate clients’ lived organisational reality. 
 
7.4.3 Inherent Tensions 
 
The Kepner Tregoe intervention created for the Bristol and West’s Executive Team 
clarity and a shared view in respect of the strategy.  The consensus, ownership and 
clarity achieved as a result of the intervention was in marked contrast to the Executive 
Team’s experience of “woolly” statements and a lack of thinking underpinning the 
strategies of other organisations.  The Carousel Directors emerged from the workshop 
with a clear sense of what they should do. 
 
However, the detachment of the strategy formulation process from on-going processes 
and paradigms can hinder the implementation of the outcome: 
 
“we didn’t really embed it in the business... you had a sort of strategy floating 
around somewhere, not anchored down to the ground.... you have to embed it 
in the activities of the organisation, because if you don’t it won’t be delivered.  
So pinning it into the five year plan, underpinning it by specific actions that 
have got to take place is the only way you will generate the achievement of the 
strategy.” 
POEC member 
 
Separation creates a dislocation that can be difficult to overcome. The intervention 
changes the way those involved think about and see the organisation, in some cases 
more that than the managers themselves “give it credit for”.  They have moved on and 
conceive a different organisation and environment.  Those not directly involved in the 
intervention have not been through the (different) thinking process and, to the extent 
that the outcome is distinct from the prevailing assumptions and conceptions, find the 
outcome alien.  They may not understand what is intended, nor see how it forms a 
coherent whole, nor how it might be realised. 
 
The Bristol and West’s attempts at implementation planning and in involving the next 
tier of management in the strategy review process faced initial difficulties.  The 
dislocation appears greater where the separation has been achieved by overcoming 
strong resistance and active pressures to conform as in the case of The Post Office.  
The marginalisation of the intervention by disaffected parties appears aimed at  
reducing its influence, and the potential viability and impact of the outcome.  This 
positioning can accentuate feelings of “force fit”, “not invented here” and highlight 
“clashes with existing models and systems” once the outcome “bursts forth” on an 
“unsuspecting” world.  Ridicule, resistance and inertia may follow, and “little things 
happen and don’t happen”.  Not only may the momentum be lost, but, as in the case of 
The Post Office, the formal strategy may in practice be abandoned or discreetly set 
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aside.  The gradual nature of change at McQuillan Young Communications and the 
rapid integration of recommendations from the workshop into every day life at 
Carousel reduced any potential dislocation. 
 
In summary, processes of separation and the pressure to conform and the dissolution 
and fusion of the embedded enactment are concurrent.  The interaction of separation 
and absorption shapes the embedded enactment, and it turn the influence the 
intervention has on processes of strategic change.  The interplay and tensions between 
separation and absorption are illustrated in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5:  Interplay and Tensions 
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7.5 DISCUSSION 
 
The PhD research has sought to generate greater awareness and understanding of the 
influence and effects of management consultants’ interventions in organisations, in 
particular as they help senior managers in developing strategic direction and effecting 
strategic change.  Specifically, the central question of the research is: 
 
How do management consultants’ interventions influence processes of strategic 
change within organisations? 
 
The research suggests that management consultants seek to create a distinct 
enactment, through various processes of crystallisation/ reification, the imposition of 
an alternative paradigm, and the altering of existing patterns of interaction or 
discourse.  Separation is necessary to facilitate a shift in the understanding and frame 
of reference of those directly involved in an intervention, at an individual and group 
level, and a re-conception of the organisation and its environment, and so provide new 
paradigms.  These new conceptions, promoted and reinforced by specific changes, 
actions and new routines, permeate and diffuse through the organisation.  This 
enactment, though, is embedded within the wider organisational enactment and 
subject to insidious pressures drawing or absorbing the intervention into the political 
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and cultural maelstrom of organisational life.  The extent and nature of the influence 
that consultants have is dependent on: 
 
• how the intervention is embedded; 
• how the interplay and tensions between the enactments are managed by 
consultants and key organisational actors; and 
• how the ideas, concepts and insights dissolve and fuse with on-going patterns of 
thought and action, changing or transforming the organisational enactment. 
 
The concept of an embedded enactment providing the catalyst and vehicle for change is 
echoed by other research and theoretical perspectives.  Barr, Stimpert and Huff (1992),  
Barr and Huff (1997), Poole, Gioia and Gray (1989), and Louis and Sutton (1991) stress 
the link between cognitive changes and changes in strategic action leading to 
organisational transformation.  Consulting interventions can be seen as an example of 
what Gioia (1985) describes as prospective sensemaking, in which a set of expectations, 
images or simulated experiences are created of what might be an alternative, desired 
social reality.  A separation of, or tension between, concepts and experience of reality is 
emphasised by other writers.  Cameron and Quinn (1988) focus on paradox as a motive 
force behind organisational change, and Westenholz (1993) describes how the 
experiencing of a paradoxical situation can enable individuals to pursue new ways of 
understanding the environment and to act accordingly.  Sewell (1992) building on 
Giddens (1976, 1984) among others, shows how a juxtaposition of structures, as defined 
by a combination of schemas and resources, fosters agency and change.  Berger and 
Luckmann (1966) suggest that for new conceptions of reality to form, past socialisation 
needs to be dismantled and the plausibility of the new conceptions sustained and made 
real through social interaction.  The existence of an enclave or segregated community is 
critically important in the early stages of conversion, if the individual is not to lapse.   
Argyris (1993) makes this point in describing his best strategy for interventions 
designed to transform behaviour patterns: 
 
 “always to begin with the top organisational level…  Moving from Model 1 to 
Model 2… leads to significant changes in the ways individuals deal with each 
other.  It is important, therefore, that the people at the top develop the internal 
commitment that will support the program for change, sustain them through 
the reeducation experiences necessary for the changes to succeed and to 
persist…” (1993:74) 
 
 
7.5.0.1  On Objectivity, Expertise and Methodologies 
 
The research also provides some insights into the benefits afforded by consultants’ 
objectivity, expertise and methodologies within an enacted world.  Management 
consultants provide plausible, alternative views that trigger reflection, sensemaking 
and experimentation.  The technical, rational world strategy consultants typically 
present their clients simultaneously reduces and accentuates complexity.  The social, 
political and emotional elements are suspended to focus attention on the rational 
analytical elements.  Consultants can bring some form of relative rather than absolute 
objectivity and expertise by offering a novel insight into prevailing, potentially 
competing, social constructions that affect the organisation.  They reveal how others 
might, or do, see the world, and the potential consequences in terms of threats and 
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opportunities for the organisation.  As Abrahamson (1996) points out, the latest 
offerings of consultants may be regarded as fads but their adoption or otherwise has 
consequences for organisations and the people in them.  Methodologies might be 
better seen and used, less as restrictive orthodoxies or pre-determined patterns of 
thought and action, and more as temporary pedagogical aids to be applied flexibly and 
intuitively once mastered.  In a sense, methodologies and approaches can add to the 
repertoire of schemas and scripts available to senior managers when facing novelty, 
anomalies or discontinuities and seeking to make sense of them.  Recommendations 
and analyses might better be seen as reasonable conjectures rather than definitive 
expositions of an external reality.  In line with the concepts of sensemaking (Weick 
1990, 1995, Gioia 1985), only a plausible map or a script is needed to start the process 
of acting, and therein, of transforming social reality.  Once the process has started the 
map becomes redundant. 
 
7.5.0.2  On Habituated Thought and Action Patterns  
 
The research adds to best practice texts on consulting grounded in the rational 
analytical school of consulting (Block 1981, Weinberg 1985, Margerison 1988, Kubr 
1996, Markham 1997) or the OD school (Margulies and Raia 1978, Burke 1994), by 
locating and exploring interventions firmly within the context of the organisation.  The 
case study research sheds some new and interesting light on how interventions are set 
within, and create tensions with, the patterns of thought and action, which inform and 
constrain individual frames of reference and organisational paradigms.  In particular, 
the research design complements consultant reported cases and experiences (e.g. 
Reddin 1977, Kahn 1993, Argyris 1993, Harrison 1995b, Beer and Eisenstat 1996, 
James and Jarrett 1997) by adding other perspectives and insights.  The research has 
explored how interventions are affected by on-going attempts to participate in, 
position and influence, through the lobbying and briefing of key managers, the 
intervention.  These processes are largely opaque to the consultant, though the need to 
obtain wider commitment to desired changes has long been recognised (e.g. Argyris 
1970).  
 
The processes of separation distilled from the research: crystallisation/ reification, the 
imposition of an alternative paradigm, and the altering of existing patterns of 
interaction or discourse, are to a greater or lesser extent common practices among 
management consultants.   The definition and scoping of a client’s problem, the 
application of a set methodology and tools and the management of the process are at 
the heart of consulting and are described in various ways by almost all texts on 
consulting. 
 
Moreover, the ways in which the various processes affect individuals and 
organisations have theoretical and empirical support and underpinning from a number 
of sources.  The symbolism associated with the introduction of a consultancy as a 
signal for need and desire to change has parallels in the analysis of strategic change  
by authors such as Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991), Johnson (1987, 1990), and Pfeffer 
(1981).  The bounding of certain issues at the organisation level is akin to the 
bracketing of a stream of consciousness or events at the individual cognitive level, as 
described by Weick (1979, 1995), and the basis for sensemaking cues for re-
examining the situation (Weick 1979, 1995).   The symbolic importance and latent 
motive force of a consultancy report have direct parallels with the concept of a map 
Chapter 7 128
(Weick 1990, Barr and Huff 1997), which gives individuals the courage and comfort 
to embark on new ventures or patterns of action.  The imposition of an alternative 
paradigm has been given an epistemological basis by Phills (1996b) in terms of 
“generic analytical activities”.  The management and facilitation of the interaction 
between managers and the active direction and involvement of the consultant is 
central to interventions grounded in process consultation (Schein 1999), 
psychodynamic (James and Jarrett 1997) and family therapy perspectives (Minuchin 
1974).  The role of the consultant in creating a “holding environment” which helps to 
create a sense of security and to break down group barriers and feelings of having to 
represent and promote the interests of a group (Alderfer and Smith 1982) is described 
in detail by Kahn (1993).  Minuchin (1974) describes how consultants, by becoming 
actively involved and seeking to alter routine dialogues and interactions within family 
groups, can help to change and promote new, more desirable interpersonal relations.  
Harrison (1985a) talks about depth of organisational interventions to capture the 
emotional ability and readiness to address deep-rooted beliefs and ways of working. 
 
What is given less explicit attention in most conceptualisations of consultancy is the 
complementarity and mutual dependence of these processes.  The research suggests 
that the creation of an embedded enactment, given the pervasiveness and power of the 
organisational enactment, is difficult.  The more inclusive the intervention, 
comprising processes aimed at changing schemas, frames of reference, patterns of 
interaction and actions, the greater the latent potential for transforming the lived 
reality of those involved, and subsequently, through diffusion, the reality experienced 
more widely through the organisation.  In the case of McQuillan Young 
Communications / Transitions, the concurrent implementation of decisions emanating 
from the strategy meetings provided a powerful feedback mechanism which sustained 
the process of transformation.   The research suggests that management consultants 
who ignore or under-utilise processes of separation may limit their influence on 
strategic change within organisations.  OD consultants who focus on process, in terms 
of the research’s conceptual framework on altering of existing patterns of interaction 
or discourse, may fail to provide an alternative view on the external world.  In 
essence, individuals are encouraged to address their organisational world in a different 
way, though its substance and implicit limitations remain constant.  As a force for 
change, a new conception of the organisation and its environment may be untapped, 
unless it already resides, unexpressed, within one or more individuals in the 
organisation.  Past and current patterns of interactions or positioning in respect of 
entities in the environment may be deemed suitable for the future.  Analytical 
consultants who operate at arms-length from the members of the organisation may 
find that the discussion and interpretation of their recommendations are set within the 
prevailing political and hierarchical structures.   The opportunity to transcend, or at 
least reduce the prominence of, vested interests, pre-defined patterns of debate and 
decision-making, and past commitment may be lost.  The potential pitfalls, similar to 
the ones suggested above, of strategy workshop processes have also been analysed 
and documented by Bowman (1995).  Bowman (1995) describes the situation where 
the quality of the strategy is low but has high management team commitment as a 
“blinkered strategy”, and where the outcome of the workshop process is of high 
quality but has low management team commitment as the “consultant’s strategy”.   
Neither situation is desirable or likely to lead to significant change.  The research 
suggests that such shortcomings may reflect a relative lack of attention to certain 
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processes of separation; in the former case inadequate separation and in the latter 
case excessive separation. 
 
7.5.0.3  On the Influence of the ‘Organisation’ on Interventions  
 
The aspects of absorption in terms of the pressure to conform to, or to operate within, 
the constructs of the organisational enactment and the dissolution and fusion of the 
intervention-facilitated enactment, are only partially discussed in texts on consulting.  
The client – consultant relationship has received formal practitioner and academic 
attention, and has to some extent provided a label for examining the interplay and 
tensions between enactments and other aspects of absorption specifically identified by 
this research.  The research provides a deeper and richer conceptualisation and insight 
into how context affects a consulting intervention and processes of reciprocal 
influence.  
 
The importance of organisational paradigms in conditioning how managers think and 
the political processes of influence have been acknowledged by many writers in the 
field of strategic management (e.g. Johnson 1987, 1990, Pettigrew 1985a, 1985b, 
Quinn 1980).  Argyris (1977, 1985, 1999) describes defensive routines designed to 
avoid threat or embarrassment and implicit assumptions become out of bounds for 
discussion. Bartunek (1993) shows how change agents’ attempts to alter 
organisational members’ shared schemata provide the stage for the development of 
multiple schemata as well as for conflict among holders of the different schemata.   
However, the potential personal conflict or tension felt by an individual seeking to 
operate simultaneously within two enactments is not widely recognised and explored 
by current conceptualisations of consulting interventions.  As Weick (1995) 
comments, sensemaking is essentially a social process grounded in identity 
construction, and is therefore influenced by affinities, loyalties and commitments as 
well as data and rational analyses.  Interventions may strain personal identity by 
questioning competencies and beliefs, and expose tacit loyalties and presumed 
congruence of interests. 
 
The research also throws into relief the tensions and interplay between the 
intervention-facilitated enactment and the organisational enactment.  Bartunek (1993) 
suggests that conflict resolution or synthesis of competing schemata requires powerful 
organisational members and/or consultants to hold both sides of the conflict.  In 
particular, this research describes a subtle process of mutual accommodation and 
influence, involving partial alignment, negotiations, the moving of boundaries, the 
sharing of frames of reference and the delicate but insistent raising of issues.  Most 
views and texts on consultancy stress how consultants offer distinctive competencies, 
not the way in which, intuitively, they align themselves to the culture and views of the 
organisation, appearing additional or complementary, rather than detached or 
oppositional.  Consultants’ approach to and entry into an organisation are dealt in 
classical marketing terms, and project definition and scoping are treated as technical 
or subject specific issues, not a negotiation or even a courtship.  The amount a 
consultant assimilates of the client organisation’s enactment is rarely discussed 
formally.  Ironically, consultants sell and clients buy experience gained on previous 
assignments, yet such a process of learning and assimilation is not an explicit part of 
the consulting process.  Assimilation tends to be discussed informally and pejoratively 
in terms of the consultant ‘going native’ or losing objectivity.  Argyris’ (1961) 
Chapter 7 130
exposition and analysis of the process of tacit compromise of their principles by 
consultants is a notable exception.   Most experienced consultants have learnt mainly 
through intuition and trial and error when to press home an issue, when to let go and 
when to re-introduce it (Schon 1983).   The consulting methodologies, though, 
provide little effective guidance to the novice, focusing rather on a generic model of 
the consulting process or the mechanics of setting up a consulting business (Elvy 
1993). 
 
The client – consultant relationship is explored and discussed by various authors in 
terms of trust and credibility (Phills 1996a), anxiety (Sturdy 1995, 1997), the use of 
political levers (Greiner and Schein 1987, Moore 1984), influencing strategies and 
defensive routines (Argyris 1961, 1977, 1985, Phills 1997), persuasion (Clarke 1995, 
Clark and Salaman 1995a, 1995b) and on-going dialogue (Beer and Eisenstat 1996).  
The research, though, does suggest that the consultant’s consistent projection of 
objectivity, and more specifically of their neutrality, or unimpeachable humanist 
values play an important part in sustaining the embedded enactment.  As others have 
pointed out, covert (Phills 1997) or collusive (Argyris 1961, 1985) forms of influence 
tend to reinforce prevailing patterns of behaviour rather than allow a more 
fundamental examination of how behaviour might be changed. 
 
The research also highlights the potential dislocation in terms of perception, views 
and concepts as the intervention unfolds and eventually dissolves.  The link between 
cognitive sensemaking activity and political activity designed to promote personal and 
group views is described by Schwenk (1989).  The process of fusing or merging 
enactments is also insightfully explored by Balogun (1998), who describes how 
middle managers relate new strategic initiatives, ideas and ways of working, passed 
down to them from senior management, to their existing frames of reference and 
scripts.  The familiar aspects of the formal strategy and organisational changes are 
accepted and incorporated into existing schemas and routines easily, while the 
unfamiliar change requirements have to be consciously and socially mediated, 
through stories, symbols, vicarious learning and dialogue.  Such mediation transforms 
the change process and eventual outcomes in unforeseeable ways. 
  
This research suggests that radical re-conceptualisations of the organisation and its 
environment requires a significant degree of separation. The inevitable exclusion of 
some managers can lead to efforts to counteract any significant separation and to 
resistance towards the outcome of the intervention in parts of the organisation.  
Westley (1990) also finds that the exclusion of middle managers, although to some 
extent inevitable, creates dissatisfaction and can de-energise them.  This research 
suggests that, beyond passive dissatisfaction and resentment, middle managers can 
become proactive in their attempts to participate in and influence the strategy 
deliberations, especially where some element of threat is perceived. 
 
The on-going, retrospective nature of sensemaking, in which individuals act and make 
sense of those actions (Weick 1995), is a key feature of the research.  The way in 
which the understanding of managers in respect of the intervention changes over time 
is evident in all the case studies.  Isabella (1990) also describes how managers’ 
interpretations evolve as change unfolds and key events are re-interpreted from 
different perspectives.  Interestingly, the understanding of the specific intervention 
typically does not evolve for consultants: they may learn from the experience in a 
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generic sense, but its role and significance in the development of the organisation 
seem frozen.  Only through his prolonged engagement did Simon Pratten feel a 
change in how his intervention was affecting and influencing McQuillan Young 
Communications.  The research suggests that consulting interventions may have 
unseen yet profound influence, unrelated to whether the recommendations are 
implemented or the way in which individuals relate to one another becomes markedly 
different.  To some extent those involved in an intervention experience and act out a 
slightly different organisational world, which can bring about a slow but nonetheless 
substantial change. 
 
The research also highlights the enveloping nature of organisational enactments, and 
how individuals can adapt to, internalise and take for granted what might initially be 
seen as external intrusions.  To the extent that interventions become routine they no 
longer generate surprise, novelty, ambiguity or attention and may then not trigger 
active sensemaking activity (Louis 1980, Louis and Sutton 1991).   As such, this 
would suggest that frequency and duration tend to reduce the effects of interventions 
on processes of strategic change within organisations.  The consultancy overload 
hinted at by O’Shea and Madigan (1997) in one of their case examples fits well within 
the theoretical framework developed. 
 
7.5.0.4  Summary 
 
Overall, the research suggests that consulting interventions are inextricably bound up 
in the organisational enactments they seek to alter, and not a set of self contained 
management processes.  The concepts of embedded enactment and separation and 
absorption provide a distinctive and rounded way of understanding, approaching and 
explaining strategic consulting interventions. 
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8. CONTRIBUTION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The research builds on and makes contributions to three areas of academic interest.  
The research primarily adds to our understanding of management consulting, and to a 
lesser extent to strategic management and the enactment perspective.  The research 
also provides thoughts and suggestions for practitioners, both management 
consultants and senior managers within organisations. 
 
The concept of embedded enactment and two overarching dimensions of separation 
and absorption provide a theoretical framework for understanding and explaining 
consultants’ strategy interventions within organisations.  This theoretical framework 
adds to the existing conceptualisations of the consulting process, focusing attention on 
complex, reciprocal influences between consultants and their clients that characterise 
strategy interventions.  The implicit view of an organisation as unitary in purpose, 
rational and essentially passive, which underpins most formal consulting approaches, is 
replaced by a more socially grounded conception.  Active attempts to influence, make 
sense of, position and/or politically steer interventions are seen as intrinsic to the 
interaction between consultants and members of an organisation.  The importance of 
new views of the organisation and its environment in supporting and encouraging 
different values, attitudes and patterns of interaction are highlighted.   Consultants’ 
performances appear central to the creation of new frames of reference and perspectives, 
as well as the demonstration of value.   The repeated use of consultants by managers, 
despite the anxiety and dissatisfaction experienced, is seen as reflecting the need to 
continually take on board new ideas and concepts to reduce the risk exposing the 
organisation to competitive arbitrage as their world is re-ordered. 
 
The research also sheds some light on processes of deliberate strategic change, in 
particular how new strategies are diffused and fused within existing patterns of thought 
and action, and the importance of action in the transformation process.  In examining 
consulting interventions, the research adds to the enactment and sensemaking literature 
in terms of substantive theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967) and as an empirical study. 
  
There is also some value to and implications for practitioners.  The theoretical 
perspective developed provides a more holistic and inclusive way of thinking about, 
understanding and planning interventions. The case studies themselves offer insights into 
the subtleties and nuances of interventions, and opportunities for consultants and 
managers to reflect on personal experiences. 
 
The theoretical framework generated by this case study research is shaped, and at the 
same time limited, by the perspective and the methods adopted.  Additional research into 
other interventions will undoubtedly elaborate and amplify our knowledge of consulting 
interventions and their influence on strategic change within organisations.   The research 
though does provide a springboard for advancing knowledge in a field of growing 
importance. 
 
The remainder of this chapter highlights the contributions of the research and the 
implications for consultants, senior managers and future researchers. 
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8.2 CONTRIBUTION 
 
The research is located at the intersection of two substantive fields of academic interest: 
strategic management and organisational change, and consulting interventions, and is 
guided and framed by the fundamental idea that we live in an enacted social world.  This 
has shaped the research and determined the contribution made. 
  
The research has reviewed and drawn upon differing conceptions of strategic 
management and their underpinning assumptions, and a number of disparate schools 
of thought on consulting.  The empirical case study research itself has generated some 
insights into and understanding of how management consultants’ interventions influence 
organisational processes as they help senior managers to develop strategic direction and 
realise strategic change.  It has added to the body of knowledge on consulting 
interventions.  In particular the research has increased our understanding of the pressures 
and forces shaping the nature and conduct of the intervention.  It has also added to our 
knowledge of strategic management and organisational change and the sensemaking 
literature. 
 
8.2.1 Contribution to Conceptions of Strategy Consulting  
 
The theoretical framework based on the concept of embedded enactment and two 
overarching dimensions of separation and absorption provides a rich and inclusive 
insight into and analysis of strategy consulting intervention.  It both adds to the 
prevailing conceptions of consulting and suggests how they might be extended. 
 
An important contribution of the research is a framework placing consulting within an 
organisational setting, which sheds light on how interventions influence and are 
influenced by on-going enactment processes.  The research highlights how consulting 
interventions are, in part, circumscribed and shaped by subtle pressures to conform to 
prevailing norms and paradigms.  The research has given us an insight into the ripple 
effect interventions can have through an organisation, both immediately and long after 
they have ended.  Other research and theoretical positions allude to pressures to 
conform (e.g. Argyris 1961, 1985), the dissolution and fusion (e.g. Weick 1990, Barr 
and Huff 1997) of the consultant-facilitated enactment, and the interplay and tensions 
between enactments (e.g. Bartunek 1993).  This research has sought to bring them 
together into a coherent, integrated framework, addressing explicitly the relationship 
between the consulting activity and social setting of the organisation (Layder 1993).  
As such it gives an insight into the considerations, deliberations and lobbying 
experienced by managers but usually unobserved by consultants.  The research dispels 
the common but implicit notion that consultancy interventions can be regarded as a 
set of self-contained management processes.  Consultants should no longer be 
completely baffled by the apparent irrationality and unreasonableness of managers, 
nor have any excuse for merely paying lip service to the need to understand and adapt 
to organisational stresses. 
  
Through the concept of separation, the research synthesises the core of the consulting 
process in relation to the organisational context in which it occurs.  The view that 
consulting assignments facilitate the crystallisation/ reification of issues and the 
application of an alternative paradigm is shared by the rational analytical conceptions 
of consulting, whether captured by best practice texts (Block 1981, Weinberg 1985, 
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Margerison 1988, Kubr 1996, Markham 1997, Sadler 1998) or the notion of generic 
analytical activities (Phills1996b).  However, the way in which the context, and more 
specifically the organisational enactment, affects a consulting intervention and 
processes of reciprocal influence are relatively under-emphasised.  The research 
draws formal attention to patterns of social interaction which are fundamental to the 
creation and maintenance of a social reality comprising the organisation and its 
environment.  The research shows that these social processes affect not only the 
content of the strategy intervention, but also in a fundamental way the process of 
changing following the intervention, especially how ideas are absorbed and undergo a 
metamorphosis within the organisation.  As Balogun (1998) points out, 
implementation is not a rational linear process and is therefore not completely 
programmable. 
  
The research describes how the processes of separation are mutually supportive.  
Most consultants within the OD tradition, as exemplified by Bennis (1969), Margulies 
and Raia (1972, 1978), Bell and Nadler (1979), Schein (1987), Burke (1994), focus on 
altering the social relationships within the organisation and pattern of discourse.  They 
recognise and address explicitly the cognitive and symbolic aspects of change, and 
conceive organisational transformation as a process requiring change at the individual 
level before it can occur at the organisational level.  They tend not to challenge 
actively the existing constructions of the external world, which are presumed given, 
even if subject to perceptual filtration.  Even Schein (1999) advises consultants to “go 
with the flow” and only confront clients at opportune moments.  The research 
suggests that the absence of compelling new images, maps and scripts may limit a 
consultant’s ability both to trigger and to sustain a change in routines.  In accepting 
prevailing constructs of what constitutes the organisation and its environment, OD 
consultants may miss out on a powerful driver for change, as perceived environmental 
stability tends to entrench the existing paradigm (Johnson 1987, 1988, Barr and Huff 
1997).  Analytically oriented consultants tend to regard the consulting process and 
relationship with members of the organisation as necessary in reaching a solution or 
set of recommendations.  The discourse or patterns of interaction, which enable or 
sustain conceptions of the social world, are relatively neglected, making it more 
difficult for past socialisation needs to be dismantled and the plausibility of the new 
conceptions sustained and made real.  As Berger and Luckmann (1966) suggest the 
existence of an enclave or segregated community is critically important in the early 
stages of conversion, if the individual is not to lapse. 
 
The research shows how theatre, positioning and claims to knowledge are central in 
creating and sustaining the credibility and confidence required for managers to 
believe and to act.  The research also gives new meaning and importance to the drama 
or performance inherent in consulting interventions.  Supporting the work of Clark 
and Salaman (1995a, 1995b) and Clark (1995) that performance is important in 
demonstrating value, the research points to performance also being central to the 
delivery of value.  Just as good theatre facilitates a temporary journey into another 
world, the consultants carrying out the intervention need to suspend the prevailing 
schemas, frames and paradigms to achieve some degree of separation.   Drama, or 
stage management of events, in terms of settings, energy, revelations and suspense is 
vital in maintaining attention and putting things into stark relief or contrast.   The 
consultants have to emphasise differences, create new images and capture the 
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imagination if they are to facilitate a distinct enactment.  It is this very forming and 
filling of a conceptual void which makes re-conceptions of social reality possible.   
 
As Kakabadse (1986) argues, the external consultant has an aura of credibility and 
mystique compared to the internal consultant.  Clark and Salaman (1996) claim that 
the success of management gurus depends upon the magic and mystery of the 
performance, and not on the substance of their message.  Credibility of the consultant 
emerges from the research as an essential factor for the suspension, even if only 
partial and temporary, of the prevailing enactment.  The mystique may be short lived, 
but it provides the initial belief, curiosity and willingness to listen.  As Barr and Huff 
(1997) suggest, managers need to know something and to have confidence in that 
knowledge before they act, in effect before they take a leap of faith.  Consultants 
through their rhetoric of knowledge, methods and processes, their stance of 
objectivity and neutrality, and their asserted proximity to the market may provide the 
necessary confidence. 
 
The research draws out subtle process of mutual influence between consultants and 
members of their client organisations, and suggests that the relationship between 
consultants and their clients is a double-edged sword.  The consulting literature (Block 
1981, Weinberg 1985, Margerison 1988, Kubr 1996, Markham 1997, Sadler 1998) 
tends to describe processes of tailoring assignments, managing client relationships and 
learning from clients and interventions in a neutral or consultant-centred way.  The 
processes through which the scope, content, and conduct of an intervention are shaped, 
both before and during its course, by organisational pressures and forces are rarely 
touched upon.  Little formal attention is paid to how a consultant’s own conception of 
reality is subtly influenced.  The research builds on the notion of a consultant being 
subtly manipulated and co-opted by factions within an organisation, described in detail 
by Kahn (1993) and by Schein (1987, 1999). 
  
The research also adds a new dimension to our understanding of the nature of the 
relationship between consultants and their clients, specifically the individuals 
commissioning and sponsoring the assignment.  The “Commander Model” (Bourgeois 
and Brodwin 1984), in which the Chief Executive has significant and undisputed 
power, is implicitly used by many consultants as the basis for establishing a client 
relationship.  The benefits of active client involvement, on-going communications, 
and the development of a good rapport between the consultant(s) and client in 
effecting successful interventions is stressed by authors such as McGivern (1983) and 
McKinney Kellogg (1984).  This proximity though can be counterproductive.  It 
represents a pressure to conform, and to some extent co-opts the consultant.  It can 
also, ostensibly, make the intervention less objective or neutral. 
 
8.2.2 Contribution to Conceptions of Strategic Management 
 and Organisational Change  
 
Three case studies represent deliberate attempts to formulate and subsequently 
implement a strategy, while the last case studied is more akin to an evolutionary, 
incremental (Quinn 1980) approach to strategic change.  As such, the research 
provides some new insights into the roles management consultants might play in 
helping to bring about deliberate strategic change. 
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The research points to consultants acting as “instruments of change”.  The research 
supports existing findings that management consultants are good at helping to break the 
conventional thinking and opening the way for new strategic possibilities (Ginsberg and 
Abrahamson 1991).  It also suggests that the recourse to consultants, the conduct of the 
assignment and the tangible output from a consulting intervention assignment can have 
a strong symbolic impact within the organisation.  Moreover, consultants’ continued 
presence post formulation of a strategy and beyond implementation planning allows 
action to feed back into the deliberation process and tangible results to sustain the 
nascent enactment.  Consequently, the intervention can become “a major instrument 
of change” (McQuillan Young Director), providing the momentum and discipline for 
carrying out actions.  Organisations may increasingly be insisting that consultants 
assist with implementation as well as formulation not just to focus consultants’ minds 
on the feasibility of the strategy they are developing but to create as seamless a 
transition as possible between thinking and acting, between apprehending and 
achieving.   
 
The research points to strategy consultants being ‘map makers’.  The cartographic 
metaphor used by Weick (1990, 1995) and Huff (1990) is an apt way of examining 
the work of consultants.  The consulting process, to some extent, transforms the 
organisational world for those directly involved and creates expectations in respect of 
possible future actions.  Consultants can be seen as producing maps of the 
organisation’s world and the organisation’s position within it, which are encapsulated 
in reports or in the form of consensual understanding through syntheses and 
summaries.  Without actions, these maps remain symbolic representations.  As 
members of the organisation take actions, in particular different actions, and interpret 
the feedback from modified schemas and frames of reference, they begin to transform 
their organisational world.  Where consultants support the process of implementing 
the chosen strategy, they also contribute to the development of new scripts and daily 
routines.  In a sense, ‘implementation’ is the process of turning the map into the 
territory, through sharing, negotiating and, most fundamentally, acting within and 
outside the organisation. 
 
The research suggests that consultants might act as ‘weather-cocks’, ‘endorsers’ and 
‘security blankets’.  The enactment perspective, and particularly the notion of 
competing enactments, suggests that organisations are perpetually open to arbitrage as 
wider social constructions change and new ideas, methods or concepts provide some 
form of relative advantage.  Consultants in their role as fashion carriers and fashion 
creators (Abrahamson 1996) are weather-cocks or early warning systems, which 
should be valued by managers. The continual recourse to consultants may be fruitless 
and ultimately self-defeating, as suggested by Sturdy (1995, 1997), if managers are in 
search of ultimate truths.  However, if managers seek ideas and employ consultants in 
continual process of scanning and renewal, there may be benefits. Strategy 
consultants may be more useful to managers in gauging what others think and how 
they might act, rather than in exposing an objective picture of the external world or in 
prescribing definitive action for the organisation. The lack of knowledge and insight 
into the organisation, compared to insiders (Kakabadse 1986), or the different value 
sets they bring to bear (Case, Vandenberg and Meredith 1990), are therefore distinct 
advantages. 
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The opinions and recommendations of consultants, generally assumed to be or 
claimed to be informed by numerous consulting experiences, may act as a surrogate 
for an objective reality in a socially constructed world.  In their efforts to offer 
something novel and distinctive consultants tend to operate at the boundaries of 
prevailing social enactments.  In their efforts to confer advantage on their clients, 
consultants create a more level playing field. With relativism comes anxiety (Sturdy 
1995, 1997), since managers cannot be sure that the latest fad is an improvement 
rather than a distraction.  Failure by senior managers to take on board new ideas and 
concepts may risk exposing the organisation to competitive arbitrage as their world is 
re-shaped around the organisation.  But the tensions and stresses from introducing 
new concepts and ideas, which inevitably disrupt the prevailing routines and 
commitments, are almost certain.  The tension between consultants and their clients 
described by Sturdy (1995, 1997) is seen as a fundamental aspect of interventions 
within the theoretical framework proposed by this research. 
 
The research adds to the discourse on strategy formulation and implementation.  The 
research also suggests that radical or second order change (Bartunek and Moch 1987), 
outside the bounds of the organisation’s paradigm, requires some degree of separation 
which forms the conceptual space within which new visions and ideas can take shape.  
This development of ideas and direction need not, though, be in the form of a major or 
single strategy formulation exercise, as shown by the McQuillan Young 
Communications / Transitions case.  One could easily describe the work done by 
Simon Pratten and the McQuillan Young Directors as crafting a strategy and the 
communications with staff and the introduction of new systems and processes as 
sensegiving (Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991).  Equally, formulation is not independent of 
implementation.   The map, to continue the metaphor above, is a representation of a 
possible, future, inter-subjectively negotiated social order.  It should be a great 
surprise if it were to match exactly the world experienced by managers.  Action, 
through some form of implementation, is fundamental to shaping the organisation’s 
reality and direction. 
  
Perhaps a conception of formulation as prospective expectation setting and 
retrospective sensemaking interlaced with action (or implementation), might be more 
appropriate and helpful to managers.  Formulation and implementation may be better 
conceived as distinct, reciprocal and concurrent, and so neither sequential, as 
understood within the rational linear model of strategy (Chaffee 1985), nor 
simultaneous, as understood with an adaptive perspective (Quinn 1980, Mintzberg 
1978, 1987).  Such a conception also characterises strategic change as simultaneously 
deliberate and emergent, challenging the notion of a continuum between deliberate 
and emergent strategies (Mintzberg and Waters 1985).  Implied criticisms of 
managers who either fail to realise some formal strategies, or aspects of a strategy, or 
who appear to exercise little or no control on emergent strategies, are misguided. 
  
The notion of competing enactments in a socially negotiated world casts 
implementation in a new light.  The implementation is not simply the alignment of 
internal structures, systems and processes (Galbraith and Kazanjian 1986, Hrebiniak and 
Joyce 1984, Judson 1990) but includes the diffusion of ideas and fusion of enactments. 
The role of symbolism (Johnson 1987, 1988), politics (Pettigrew 1985a, 1985b) and 
mediation (Balogun 1998) are shown to be fundamental to the realisation of strategic 
change.  It also does away with the negativity and recalcitrance implied by terms such 
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as resistance to change (Kotter and Schlesinger 1979) or to innovation (Kanter 1983), 
and with the unethical manipulation sometimes associated with back-stage activity 
(Buchanan and Boddy 1992).  As touched upon above, the fundamental premise of an 
objective world accessible and knowable through rational means seems 
simultaneously to enable and to hamper strategic development. 
 
8.2.3 Contribution to Enactment and Sensemaking 
 
With everyday life presenting itself as a self-evident and compelling fact (Berger and 
Luckmann 1966), individuals’ roles and centrality in its enactment are obscured.   It is 
where this taken for granted continuity breaks down that enactment processes can 
most easily be studied.  Weick (1988) describes enacted sensemaking in crisis 
situations, where individuals in taking action to understand a crisis often intensify it.  
In many ways consulting interventions can be seen as both responding to and creating 
crises, discontinuities and the questioning of taken for granted assumptions.  The 
study of strategy consulting interventions from an enactment perspective has 
generated a theoretical framework and insights discussed in this and preceding 
chapters.  While not an objective nor a central contribution of the research, it also 
enriches our thinking and understanding of enactment and sensemaking. 
 
An intervention reflects a “committed interpretation” (Weick 1993) that something is 
wrong, and the complexity and ambivalence facing individuals and organisations 
provides ample opportunities for new insights and action routines.  Thus the search 
for a solution becomes a self fulfilling prophesy (Jones 1986).  The new insights and 
actions create new possibilities, which on reflection are seen as having existed all 
along.  The Carousel Directors came to appreciate that their firm had something to 
offer a major international freight forwarder, a fact confirmed at their first meeting.  
The McQuillan Young Directors came to appreciate their potential and desire to grow 
as they introduced new systems and processes.  The consulting process itself can be 
similarly characterised.  The initial commitment to an objective and scope of the 
intervention and reinforced by a specific conceptual or analytical framework shapes 
what is seen and how it is seen.  As the framework is applied and the consulting 
process unfolds, the new insights generated justify (Shaw 1980) the scope of the 
assignment and the consulting methodology.  In turn, these ‘discoveries’, as they are 
reflected upon, promote greater confidence and use of the framework or consulting 
advice.  Use and familiarity bring new discoveries, creating a self-sustaining and self-
propelling process or “deviation amplifying causal structure” (Weick 1979:157).  The 
insights generated justify the intervention itself and the initial commitment to address 
the organisation’s strategy 
 
The Post Office case, though, shows how precarious newly forming committed 
interpretations can be.  The espoused view that The Post Office needed a group 
strategy competed with the tacit view that the Kepner Tregoe intervention was 
motivated by a political agenda on the part of the Chief Executive.  Thus some POEC 
members appeared to be looking for signs of collusion or manipulation, and found 
some.  This brings us back to fundamental notions of indeterminacy and retrospect.  
Individuals see and act on the basis of expectations, and in acting realise (i.e. 
construct and appreciate) their lived social world.  In acting, through words and deeds, 
they share their constructions, forming committed interpretations and binding actions, 
which further reinforce these constructions.  These constructions compete, and which 
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constructions take hold and flourish can only be known retrospectively.  As The Post 
Office case shows, while power may confer advantages in the creation or imposition 
of social reality, it does not guarantee dominance.  
 
Consulting interventions tend not only create a discontinuity in the relatively 
predictable and taken for granted routine of organisational life, they also tend to create 
or accentuate a rift between those involved and those excluded.  The seamless fabric 
of organisational life is torn, triggering active sensemaking primarily from those 
excluded to repair the tear.  The discontinuity may be seen as artificial and imposed, 
but the potential consequences of an intervention are seen as real.  Those involved 
seem to experience this discontinuity more slowly and subtly as the intervention 
shapes new schemata and scripts, and where they are confronted with the 
contradictory of conflicting interpretations of those excluded in the form of lobbying, 
expressed concerns, resentment, resistance and disinterest. 
 
The research, and in particular the concept of embedded enactment where 
discontinuity and tension is deliberately sustained, is a distinct contribution to the 
thinking in the field.  Unlike other conceptualisations in which alternative well- 
formed schemata compete and the conflict is resolved by in the imposition of a 
dominant schemata or a dialectic synthesis (Bartunek 1993), the research explores and 
describes the subtle processes in which new schemata and scripts form.  These 
emergent schemata and scripts are simultaneously protected from and shaped by the 
prevailing enactment.  The research also indicates how difficult it is for managers to 
live out simultaneously two social realities, one familiar and the other emergent, 
tentative and partial.  The permeability of enactments suggests that reconciliation is 
on-going, through thinking and acting, involves some degree of fusion or synthesis 
and is never complete. 
 
In his work on sensemaking, Weick (1995) says that: 
 
“sensemaking, as a focus of inquiry, is only as significant and useful as are its 
most recent exemplar.  The way those exemplars are framed, discussed, and 
investigated is what sensemaking is about and can contribute” (1995: 64-65). 
 
This research overall, and the individual case studies are examples of organisational 
sensemaking, which illustrates the seven properties of sensemaking described by 
Weick (1995).  The importance of personal identity construction in understanding and 
reacting to an intervention emerges clearly from the research.  In The Post Office, 
some of the POEC members’ affinity and felt sense of responsibility for the operating 
Divisions made them more guarded and suspicious.  For the Carousel Directors, the 
security afforded by family bonds made them more open and receptive to ideas and 
criticism.  The presence of consultants, their analyses, reports and various props, 
creates a sensible environment for sensemaking.  The views, insights and ideas 
exchanged during interventions act as cues.  The segregation and selection of 
participants, the off-site meetings and workshops and the new modes of conduct form 
the defined social context for sharing and sustaining the new enactment.  The 
intervention itself is a prompt for sensemaking within the organisation on the part of 
those involved, using previous experience, reputation, and concepts advocated by the 
consultants as cues.  The on-going and retrospective characteristics of sensemaking in 
organisations is illustrated well by the McQuillan Young / Transitions case.  
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Appreciation of the actions taken and the role of the intervention changed over time, 
and that appreciation was still changing subtly at the time of the research.  For 
Directors of the Bristol and West Building Society the Kepner Tregoe methodology 
was deemed a plausible way of structuring a discussion rather than the best way of 
formulating a strategy in some objective sense. 
 
Exemplars of sensemaking describe the establishment of a social order, for instance 
the case of Scottish Knitwear Manufacturers (Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fuller 1989), 
as a slow process facilitated by proximity and shared points of reference.  Others 
describing the recognition and appreciation of a social phenomenon, for instance 
Battered Child Syndrome (Weick 1995), suggest it is a gradual process, triggered by 
anomalies and dissonant cues.  In contrast, consulting interventions appears to be 
characterised by greater abruptness, tension, imposition and artificiality. 
 
The case studies themselves embellish the theoretical constructs with texture and 
colour, and hint at the subtleties and nuances of interventions.  Given the reluctance to 
discuss specific assignments on the grounds of client confidentiality or desire to 
protect proprietary consulting approaches noted by researchers and commentators 
(Rassam and Oates 1991, O’Shea and Madigan 1997), the case studies are valuable 
empirical narratives.  For academics the case studies are points of reference, both to 
sensitise researchers entering the field and against which to examine their findings.  For 
many consultants and managers, such case studies are opportunities to reflect on 
personal experiences and to draw their own conclusions.  It is they who will be called 
upon to make fine judgements on the conduct of interventions. 
 
 
8.3 IMPLICATIONS 
 
Schon (1983, 1987) describes the process used by professionals in complex, ill-defined 
and unique situations as thinking-in-action and the associated learning and development 
as reflection-in-action. Dunphy and Stace (1988, 1993) challenge the empirical 
validity and universal applicability of the OD model founded on participation and 
incremental change and argue for a contingency based approach.  Helping senior 
managers to develop a strategic direction and to realise strategic change is a clear 
example of a complex, ill-defined and unique situation, a point amply illustrated by the 
diversity of the cases studies as part of this research.  
 
Unlike many texts or manuals on consulting practices, the theoretical framework 
developed through this research does not, and is not intended to, prescribe a specific 
consulting process or actions.  Rather, the research offers a way of thinking about and 
understanding interventions.  As such, the comments which follow are designed to 
stimulate thought, reflection and debate on the assumptions and behaviour of both 
consultants and managers.  The activities of management consultants are only one part 
of an intervention, and no amount of good intentions and wisdom can unilaterally 
guarantee success.  As Bingham (1992) eloquently points out, it takes two to tango. 
 
8.3.1 Intervention Design and Conduct 
 
A central finding of the research is that consultants and managers need to balance 
separation and absorption through the course of an intervention.  Intervention design 
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tends to focus on familiar aspects of separation, over which consultants have the most 
control.  Consultants may need to step out of their comfort zones if they are to 
influence and contribute to the strategic thinking and subsequent actions of their 
clients.  This imbalance needs to be redressed, but the research suggests that there is 
no Aristotlean “golden mean” (Russell 1961) independent of the situation or course of 
the intervention itself.  Insufficient separation risks simply confirming the status quo, 
while too strong a separation risks rejection or dislocation. 
 
In principle, consultants should push for separation, while being very attentive to the 
strains and tensions that their actions might be creating.  The notion of “depth of 
organizational intervention” (Harrison 1995a) set within the OD school of consulting 
has a direct parallel in the idea of a maximum tolerable separation.  Both ideas are 
intimately linked to organisational setting and rely on subtle, qualitative judgements 
on the part of consultants. 
  
As a starting point, consultants might wish to take a fresh look at how to create and 
sustain separation, as indicated by the theoretical framework.  Solving a problem or 
addressing interpersonal relations are a constituent part of this process, but are likely to 
have a limited effect if other aspects of an intervention are not at least considered.  If 
practical, assignments might be extended to include facilitating or supporting new 
patterns of action in the form of pilots or experiments, detached from the rest of the 
organisation, a practice advocated by Beer, Eisenstat and Spector (1990).  Thus, 
consultants could help managers to initiate tangible action and to master unfamiliar 
scripts.  As Donnellon, Gray and Bougon (1986) point out, organised action can occur in 
the absence of shared meaning as long as there is agreement on a desired outcome.  It is 
the feedback from action that begins to reshape schemas and paradigms (Weick 1995).  
As a way of promoting new actions, consultants might also consider the use of a series 
of brief, action-oriented interventions instead of the grand, all encompassing analytical 
strategy project, which heightens tensions and delays action. 
 
The development of detailed methodologies by management consultancies is driven by 
the need to stand out in a competitive market and to capture intellectual capital.  The 
disciplined application of methodologies also enables consultancies to employ relatively 
inexperienced consultants, thereby leveraging the time and expertise of senior staff 
(Maister 1993).  From being a store of knowledge and a guide to action, a methodology 
can become an indispensable crutch or rigid format.  Methodologies can thus inhibit 
thought and creativity, and can even take on the aura of an unassailable panacea.  
Although uncomfortable or disconcerting, consultants might try to make the scope, 
approach and execution of their work more malleable, open to question, and permeable.  
Malleability relates to carving out and bounding the enactment they wish to sustain, and 
to responding to pressure to conform and make the intervention understandable, 
believable and acceptable.  An adequate strategy, which stimulates action and 
experimentation, is better than an excellent strategy which is so alien that it is ignored.  
Openness to question can ease tensions and help to accommodate differing views as 
part of the process of generating inter-subjective constructions of the organisation and its 
environment.  Permeability can help the processes of dissolution and fusion of the 
consultant facilitated enactment within the wider organisational enactment and fabric 
of organisational life. 
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As Phills (1996b, 1997) suggests, analytically oriented consultants have no formal 
mechanism for surfacing deeply held beliefs, covert political agendas or differing 
values or assessments of the environment.  They tend to deal with resistance or 
disagreement with more data and more analyses.  Strategy consultants who presume 
the superiority of their paradigm and then insist on proving that they are right are at 
best winning Phyrric victories.  Consultants might benefit from focusing more 
attention on how their ideas are being made sense of by listening to managers’ 
articulations of the situation and their views on the appropriate course of action.  
Consultants might also try to be more attentive to and adept at diagnosing the tensions 
their presence provokes.  Feedback on the intervention should not only help 
consultants to check whether the members of the organisation are satisfied and 
understand the process and what is being put forward, but also how the intervention is 
being interpreted.   Nuances of articulation, expression and action are vital clues in 
piecing together schemas, paradigms and processes, which are otherwise obscure. 
Approaches advocated by proponents of human inquiry (Heron 1981a, 1981b, Reason 
1994) offer useful insights and ideas.  In particular, they suggest ways to create active 
collaboration and to share ideas and methods of inquiry. 
 
A centre-piece of the intervention, namely the relationship with the client, warrants 
critical scrutiny.  Burke (1994) discusses the issue of the client or beneficiary of the 
intervention, and indicates that there is no straightforward answer and that the 
consultant must make a choice.  Schein (1987,1999) suggests that consultants have 
different types of clients, and that they must know whom they are helping at any point 
in time.  The research adds a layer of complexity to the choice of client in that the 
nature of the relationship with key senior managers needs to be gauged in the context 
of the organisation’s norms and culture, pressures and politics.  A close relationship is 
not necessarily a good relationship, unless satisfying the requirements and aims of the 
individual(s) are the consultants’ primary goal. 
 
Despite the potential loss of follow-on business, consultants might be more proactive in 
looking for the appropriate moment to exit.  As the research shows, an intervention is 
absorbed into the fabric of organisational life and strategy consultants can lose their 
ability to create new schemas and shift frames of reference.  Consultants can become 
part of ‘the problem’ rather than ‘the solution’, as shown by O’Shea and Madigan 
(1997).   Perhaps consultants should be more willing to redefine the nature of the 
relationship, from consultant to interim manager (Golzen 1992) or seconded resources, if 
their on-going involvement is beneficial. 
 
As the research overall and the comments above indicate, strategy consultants are 
faced by a huge personal challenge.  If they are to influence members of an 
organisation they need to project an aura of credibility, distinctive expertise, 
confidence and mystique, while having the humility to listen, be criticised and 
influenced, and then fade into the background.  Yet there are few sources of support 
for these latter virtues. The felt need to perform, to assert and to demonstrate 
competence and control of the situation, something expected and valued by clients, 
diminishes consultants’ sensitivity.  The lavish attention and starting salaries paid to 
new recruits to the major consulting firms tend to foster a sense of superiority rather 
than humility.  The drive for commercial success encourages the development of 
unique knowledge, methods and insight, which tend to be packaged in the form of 
consulting offerings emphasising distinctiveness and exclusivity.  Attention and value 
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are inevitably reduced in respect of the mostly tacit knowledge and understanding of 
members of an organisation.  Schein (1999) similarly laments that as consultancy 
becomes a business it de-emphasises “relationship-building that would permit clients 
to own their problems and make sensible decisions about”(1999:248) specific 
interventions. 
 
Perhaps a fundamental review of what being a strategy consultant entails, and how 
that is promoted to clients and the public, might be in order.  The image of consultants 
is important to an intervention, and the current, popular views of consultants as witch-
doctors (Economist 1988), or dangerous company (O’Shea and Madigan 1997) are 
likely to predispose or condition individuals in organisations against consultants.  The 
repositioning of the industry as a whole might enable a better delivery of value not 
just additional business.  The current attempts by the Institute for Management 
Consultancy in the UK to establish professional qualifications may not be as 
important as a clear basis and conceptual underpinning for the profession.  The 
current dominant bases, namely rational analytical problem solving or the application 
of (social) psychological concepts to interpersonal and group relationships within 
organisations, are partial and cannot adequately cope with the complexity of 
organisations.  These very bases are challenged.  Clark (1995) suggests that we should 
think of management consultants as performers rather than helpers.  Sturdy (1995, 
1997) implies that consultants offer palliatives not lasting solutions.  Bloomfield and 
Best (1992) and Bloomfield and Danieli (1995) suggest that consultants act as both 
advocates and judges.  Knights and Morgan (1991) suggest that consultants are 
exponents of a strategy discourse that defends the privilege, power, status and control 
of senior managers over others in an organisation. 
 
The theoretical framework developed through this research offers a more holistic way 
of thinking about, carrying out and explaining consulting interventions.  Strategy 
consultants, though notionally focused on the external environment, operate within 
and influence change of an organisation’s enactment. Perhaps the dominant yet 
implicit metaphor of strategy consultant as surgeon might give way to the metaphor of 
consultant as anti-biotic, which appears much richer and more insightful.  
 
8.3.2 Senior Managers and Consulting Interventions 
 
An important feature of the research is the concept of interplay and tension between 
the enactment facilitated by an intervention and the wider organisational paradigm 
and routines.  Managing interplay and dealing with inherent tensions shapes the 
intervention and its potential influence, and falls upon both consultants and managers.   
Senior managers might consider the nature and significance of their own roles in an 
intervention, both in terms of its commissioning and their involvement in its 
execution. 
 
Ashford (1998) furnishes a long list of bad reasons for using management consultants 
and a much shorter one for using them.  Using consultants as scapegoats, political 
footballs or ferrets, among other covert roles, is ultimately self-defeating for the 
organisation.  Managers will increasingly be unable to draw upon and utilise 
effectively the alternative perspectives, skills and expertise of external parties, since 
they, as a group, become tainted with political intrigue.  As shown by the research, 
once collusion or political manipulation is perceived or even suspected the embedded 
Chapter 8 144
enactment collapses and the prevailing enactment is reinforced.  Phills (1997) makes a 
similar point when discussing covert versus overt modes of influence. 
 
Even without covert intentions, management consultants’ influence on processes of 
strategic change diminishes with frequency of use and/or duration of interventions.  
Once the novelty and mystique wears off, interventions may have the same influence 
as reading the latest management book or attending a lecture by a management guru.  
Consultants become taken for granted, their ideas and projects compete for attention 
with daily routines and emergencies, and they begin to be treated and to take on the 
aura of managers within the organisation.  The research by Gattiker and Larwood 
(1985) indicates that the simple substitution of consultants for in-house management is 
not a desirable situation. 
 
Bingham (1992) describes incompetent clients as closed and protective, intolerant of 
questioning, unwilling to give feedback, apt to change objectives and to treat a 
consultant as a tool or object of control.  The existence of such clients usually results 
in sterile, unsatisfactory and unproductive assignments.  The pivotal role of living out 
both enactments and mediating between them, described by Bartunek (1993) and 
brought out by the research, suggests that a subtle, active involvement is called for.  In 
many respects the work of senior managers starts when the formal intervention is 
over.  They have a huge influence over how the new ideas and concepts fuse with the 
prevailing organisational reality.  
 
8.3.3 Further Research 
 
This PhD is essentially exploratory research into a relatively little studied subject 
area.  The theoretical framework generated by this grounded case study research is 
clearly open to question and further research to refine and elaborate the key concepts 
and constructs.  The influence of the organisational context on interventions, and 
particularly the concept and aspects of absorption, warrants further investigation.   
 
Additional cases conducted by other researchers with different perspectives should 
increase the credibility, robustness and definition of the theoretical framework.  
Further research should aim to clarify the extent of transferability of the concepts and 
make the framework more dependable and helpful to practitioners.  For example, 
research into strategy consulting interventions that are characterised by significant 
research and analysis, a large consulting team and that culminate in a set of highly 
prescriptive recommendations might also help to elaborate and refine the theoretical 
framework.   Consulting interventions that support the systematic implementation of 
an already formulated strategy also warrant study.  Does the theoretical framework 
provide a good way of understanding such change management exercises? 
 
Beyond a deeper study of strategy interventions by consultants, the research prompts 
investigation of other types of interventions.  For instance, the relevance and 
usefulness of the concepts in examining consultants’ interventions in respect of non-
strategic issues warrants study.  Are separation and absorption present and/or as 
important in understanding consultants’ work on non-strategic issues?  Does the 
organisational enactment, informed and constrained by wider social enactments, 
generate the regularities exploited by consultants and observed by other researchers?  
If organisational boundaries and outputs are agreed, issues are rendered more tractable 
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and capable of rational analysis and proof.  Are functionalist (Burrell and Morgan 
1979) perspectives and theories better at explaining consultants’ activities in relation 
to functional strategies or the alignment of processes towards an agreed goal or 
market positioning?  
 
Hartley, Nenington and Binns (1997) imply in their accounts of organisational and 
cultural change in a UK local authority that the internal change agent is subject to and 
has to work within the political context.  How does the role and status of the 
consultant affect the intervention and ability of the consultant to realise some degree 
of separation?  The internal consultant or change agent appears to lack the objectivity, 
credibility and aura of an external consultant and the power of a senior manager.  
How do internal consultants influence strategic change? 
 
The concept of embedded enactment appears to be a useful starting point for research 
into related fields of management.  Formal, off-site training, which provides managers 
with ideas and concepts and seeks to influence their behaviour, can be seen as a form 
of consulting intervention.   Could such training be conceived as an embedded 
enactment?  If so how does the concept of absorption help to explore and explain how 
participants on training programme react to new ideas, take them on board and make 
them part of their working practices?  Does this research point to ways of designing 
and executing training programmes to facilitate acceptance, diffusion and fusion of 
ideas within prevailing organisational enactments? 
 
The appointment of new senior managers helps to “legitimize and facilitate extreme 
changes in strategic orientation” (Ginsberg and Abrahamson 1991).  To what extent do 
they represent an embodiment of an embedded enactment?   Are new senior managers 
under similar pressure as consultants to conform and become part of the prevailing 
enactment?  Should new senior managers actively create some degree of separation, or 
should they rely on their positions of power and authority to transform the organisation 
‘from within’? 
 
As with any research, this PhD thesis is but a stepping stone to asking and answering 
other questions.  The research process has given me a better understanding of what is 
meant by rigorous research and a contribution to knowledge, and provided the 
opportunity for me to reflect on my own work as a management consultant.  I now 
have a far greater appreciation of the stresses and strains experienced by managers as 
they grapple to reconcile the cool logic of my recommendations with the reality of 
their organisations.  The research is intended to speak to practitioners and to help 
them reflect on their work and experiences.  There are some positive signs.  On 
reviewing an earlier draft of the thesis a couple of the sponsors specifically 
commented that “it made fascinating reading, particularly the insights into other 
companies’ experiences”, and that it was “very interesting”.  My hope is that the 
research should also inspire and inform other researchers in their own quests for 
knowledge, and stimulate practitioners to reflect on their experiences.  As the ideas 
and concepts contained in this thesis are considered, reflected upon, developed, 
expanded upon and diffused, the research makes its contribution to the academic and 
practitioner communities. 
References 
 
214
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
References 
 
215
 
 
References 
 
216
References{PRIVATE } 
 
Abrahamson E (1996); “Management Fashion”, Academy of Management Review, Vol 21, 
No 1, 254 -285 
 
Alderfer C P & Smith K K (1982); “Studying Intergroup Relations Embedded in 
Organizations”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 27: 35 - 65 
 
Aldrich H (1979); “Organizations and Environments”, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall 
 
Allison G T (1971); “Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis”, Little, 
Brown and Company, Boston 
 
Alvesson M (1993); “Organizations as Rhetoric: Knowledge-Intensive Firms and the 
Struggle with Ambiguity”, Journal of Management Studies, 30, 6, 997 - 1015 
 
Amburey T L & Dacin T (1994); “As The Left Foot Follows The Right? The Dynamics Of 
Strategic And Structural Change”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol 37, No 6, 1427 - 
1452 
 
Ansoff H I (1968); “Corporate Strategy”, Penguin 
 
Argyris C (1961); “Explorations in Consulting-Client Relationships”, Human Organization, 
20, 121 - 133 
 
Argyris C (1970); “Intervention Theory And Method: A Behavioural Science View”, 
Addison-Wesley 
 
Argyris C (1977); “Double loop learning in organizations”, Harvard Business Review, 
September – October, 115 - 125 
 
Argyris C (1985); “Strategy, Change and Defensive Routines”, Pitman 
 
Argyris C (1993); “Knowledge for Action: A Guide to Overcoming Barriers to 
Organizational Change”, Jossey-Bass 
 
Argyris C (1999); “On Organizational Learning” (Second Edition), Blackwell 
 
Ashford M (1998); “Con Tricks: The Shadowy World of Management Consultancy and How 
to Make it Work For You”, Simon & Schuster Business Books 
 
Astley W G & Van de Ven A (1983); “Central Perspectives and Debates in Organization 
Theory”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 28, 2, 245 - 273 
 
Bacharach S B (1989); “Organizational Theories: Some Criteria for Evaluation”, Academy of 
Management Review, Vol 14, No 4, 496 - 515 
References 
 
217
Balogun J (1998); “The Role of Obstructing and Facilitating Processes in Change”, PhD 
Thesis, Cranfield School of Management 
 
Barley R B & Tolbert P S (1997); “Institutionalization and Structuration: Studying the Links 
between Action and Institution”, Organization Science, Vol 18, No 1, 93 - 117 
 
Bartunek J M (1984); “Changing Interpretive Schemes and Organisational Restructuring: The 
Example of a Religious Order”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 29: 355 - 372 
 
Bartunek J M (1993); “The Multiple Cognitions and Conflicts Associated with Second Order 
Organizational Change”, in Murnighan J K (ed); “Social Psychology in Organizations: 
Advances in Theory and Research”, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall  
 
Bartunek J M & Moch M K (1987); “First-Order, Second-Order, and Third Order Change 
and Organization Development Interventions”, The Journal of Applied Behavioural Science, 
Vol 23, No 4, 483 – 500 
 
Barr P S & Huff A S (1997); “Seeing Isn’t Believing: Understanding Diversity In The 
Timing Of Strategic Response”, Journal of Management Studies, 34:3, 337 - 370 
 
Barr P S, Stimpert J L & Huff A S (1992); “Cognitive Change, Strategic Action and 
Organizational Renewal”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol 13, 15 - 36 
 
Baxter B (1996); “Consultancy expertise: a post-modern perspective”, in Scarbrough H (ed); 
The Management of Expertise; Macmillan Business 
 
Beckhard R & Harris R T (1987); “Organizational Transitions”, (Second Edition), 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company 
 
Beckhard R & Pritchard W (1992); “Changing the Essence: The Art of Creating and Leading 
Fundamental Change in Organizations”, Jossey-Bass, San Francisco 
 
Beer M & Eisenstat R A (1996); “Developing an Organization Capable of Implementing 
Strategy and Learning”, Human Relations Vol 49, No 5, 597 - 619 
 
Beer M, Eisenstat R A & Spector B (1990); “Why Change Programs Don’t Produce 
Change”, Harvard Business Review, November – December, 158 - 166 
 
Beer M & Walton A E (1987); “Organization Change and Development”, Annual Review of 
Psychology, 38, 339 - 367 
 
Bell C R & Nadler L  (Eds) (1979); “The Client – Consultant Handbook”, Gulf Publishing 
 
Bennis W (1969); “Organization Development: Its Nature, Origins and Prospects”, Addison-
Wesley 
 
Berg D N & Smith K K (1988); “The Self in Social Inquiry”, Sage 
References 
 
218
Berger P L & Luckmann T (1966); “The Social Construction of Reality”; Garden City, New 
York 
 
Bhaskar R (1978); “A realist theory of science”, Harvester Press 
 
Bingham E (1992); “It Takes Two To Tango”, Management Consultancy, April 
 
Blaikie N (1993); “Approaches to Social Enquiry”, Polity Press 
 
Blake R R & Mouton J S (1976); “Consultation”, Addison-Westley 
 
Block P (1981); “Flawless Consulting”, Pfeffer & Company 
 
Bloomfield B P & Best A (1992); “Management consultants: systems development, power 
and the translation of problems”, The Sociological Review, 40:3, 533 - 560 
 
Bloomfield B P & Danieli A (1995); “The Role of Management Consultants in the 
Development of Information Technology: The Indissoluble Nature of Socio-Political and 
Technical Skills”, Journal Of Management Studies, 32:1, 23 - 45 
 
Blumer H (1966); “Sociological implications of the thought of George Herbert Mead”, 
American Journal of Sociology, Vol 71, No 5, 535 - 544 
 
Blumer H (1967); “Society as Symbolic Interaction”, in Manis J G & Meltzer B N (eds); 
“Symbolic Interaction: A Reader in Social Psychology”, Allyn and Bacon 
 
Bourgeois L J & Brodwin D R (1984); “Strategic Implementation: Five Approaches to an 
Elusive Phenomenon”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol 5, 241 - 264 
 
Bowman C (1995); “Strategy workshops and top-team commitment to strategic change”, 
Journal of Managerial Psychology, Vol 10, No 8, 4 - 12 
 
Buchanan D & Boddy D (1992); “The Expertise of the Change Agent: Public Performance 
and Backstage Activity”, Prentice Hall 
 
Burgess R G (1984); “In the Field: An Introduction to Field Research”, Unwin Hymans Ltd 
 
Burke W W (1994); “Organization Development: A Process of Learning and Changing”, 
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, (Second Edition) 
 
Burke W W & Litwin G H (1992); “A Causal Model of Oganizational Performance and 
Change”, Journal of Management, Vol 18, No 3, 523 - 545 
 
Burrell G & Morgan G (1979); “Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis”, 
Ashgate 
 
References 
 
219
Cameron K S & Quinn R E (1988); “ Organizational Paradox and Transformation”, in Quinn 
R E & Cameron K S (eds), “ Paradox and Transformation: Towards a Theory of Change in 
Organization and Management”, Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge Massachusetts 
 
Case T L, Vandenberg RJ & Meredith P H (1990); “Internal and External Change Agents”, 
Leadership and Organizational Development Journal, 11, 1, 4 - 15 
 
Chaffee E E (1985); “Three Models of Strategy”, Academy of Management Review, Vol 10, 
No 1, 89 - 98 
 
Chakravarthy B S & Doz Y (1992); “Strategy Process Research: Focusing On Corporate 
Self-Renewal”, Startegic Management Journal, Vol 13, 5 - 14 
 
Child J (1997); “Strategic Choice in the Analysis of Action, Structure, Organization and 
Environment: Retrospect and Prospect”, Organization Studies, 18/1, 43 - 76 
 
Clark T (1995); “Managing Consultants: Consultancy as the Management of Impression”, 
Open University Press 
 
Clark T & Salaman G (1995a); “Creating the "Right" Impression: Management Consultancy 
as a Dramatic Event”, Conference Paper, British Academy of Management, Sheffield 
 
Clark T & Salaman G (1995b);  “Understanding Consultancy as Performance: The 
Dramaturgical Metaphor”, in Glover I & Hughes (eds), Professions at Bay, Aldershot, 
Avebury 
 
Clark T & Salaman G (1996);  “The Management Guru as Organizational Witchdoctor”, 
Organization, Vol 3, 85 - 107 
 
Covin T J (1992); “Common Intervention Strategies for Large-scale Change”, Leadership & 
Organization Development Journal, Vol 13, No 4, 27 - 32 
 
Czarniawska-Joerges B (1992); “Exploring Complex Organisations: A Cultural Perspective”, 
Newbury Park 
 
Daft R L & Weick K E (1984); “Towards a Model of Organizations as Interpretation 
Systems”, Academy of Management Review, Vol 9, No 2, 284 - 295 
 
Davis S M (1982); “Transforming Organizations: The key to strategy is context”, 
Organization Dynamics, 3, 10, 64 - 80 
 
Dawes P L, Dowling G R & Patterson P G (1992); “Criteria Used to Select Management 
Consultants”; Industrial Marketing Management, 21, 187 - 193 
 
Deal T E & Kennedy A A (1982); “Corporate Cultures: The Rites and Rituals of Corporate 
Life”, Addison-Westley 
References 
 
220
Deetz S (1996); “Describing Differences in Approach to Organization Science: Rethinking 
Burrell and Morgan and Their Legacy”, Organization Science, Vol 7, No 2, 191 - 207 
 
Delaney  E (1995); “Strategy Consultants - Do They Add Value ?”, Long Range Planning, 
Vol 28, No 6, 99 -106 
 
DiMaggio P J & Powell W W (1983); “The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism 
and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields”, American Sociological Review, Vol 48, 
April, 147-160 
 
Donnellon A, Gray B & Bougon M G (1986); “Communication, Meaning, and Organized 
Action”, Administrative Science Quarterly, 31, 43 - 55 
 
Dunphy D & Stace D (1988); “Transformational and Coercive Strategies for Planned 
Organizational Change: Beyond the O.D. Model”, Organization Studies,  9/3, 317 – 334 
 
Dunphy D & Stace D (1993); “The Strategic Management of Corporate Change”, Human 
Relations, Vol 46, No 8, 905 - 920 
 
Dutton J E & Jackson S E (1987); “Categorizing Strategic Issues: Links to Organizational 
Action”, Academy of Management Review, Vol 12, No 1, 76 - 90 
 
Economist Survey (1988); “Management Consultancy”, February 13  
 
Economist Survey (1997); “Management Consultancy”, March 22 
 
Edmonstone J (1980); “The Realities of Organizational Consultancy”, Leadership and 
Organizational Development Journal, 1, 2, 20 - 24 
 
Eisenhardt K M (1989); “Building Theory from Case Study Research”, Academy of 
Management Review, Vol 14, No 4, 532 - 550 
 
Elvy B H (1993); “How to Become a Consultant”, The Macmillan Press Ltd 
 
Evered R & Louis M R (1981); “Alternative Perspectives in the Organizational Sciences: 
“Inquiry from the Inside” and “Inquiry from the Outside””, Academy of Management 
Review, Vol 6, No 3, 385 - 395 
 
Faulkner D (1992); “Strategic Alliances: Cooperation for Competition”, in Faulkner D & 
Johnson G (eds) “The Challenge of Strategic Management”, Kogan Page 
 
Fiske S T & Taylor S E (1991); “ Social Cognition”, (Second Edition), McGraw-Hill 
 
Frankenhuis J P (1977); “How to get a good consultant”, Harvard Business Review, 
November – December, 133 – 139 
 
References 
 
221
Frost P J & Egri C P (1994); “The Shamanic Perspective on Organizational Change and 
Development”, Journal of Organizational Change Management, Vol 7 No 1, 7 – 23 
 
Gagnon R J (1984); “An Integrated Strategy for Increasing Management Consulting 
Research”; Academy of Management Proceedings, Boston, 152 - 184 
 
Galbraith & Kazanjian (1986); “Strategy Implementation: Structure, Systems and Processes”, 
2nd Edition, West Publishing Company 
 
Ganesh S R (1978); “Organizational Consultants: A Comparison of Styles”, Human 
Relations, Vol 31, No 1, 1 - 28 
 
Gattiker U E & Larwood L (1985); “Why do clients employ management consultants ?”, 
Consultation, 4, 1, 119 - 129 
 
Gersick C J G (1994); “Pacing Strategic Change: The Case Of A New Venture”, Academy of 
Management Review, Vol 37, No 1, 9 - 45 
 
Giddens A (1976); “New Rules of Sociological Method”, London, Hutchison  
 
Giddens A (1984); “The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration”, 
Polity Press 
 
Gill J & Johnson P (1991); “Research Methods for Managers”, Paul Chapman Publishing 
 
Ginsberg A (1989); “Assessing the Effectiveness of Strategy Consultants”, Group & 
Organization Studies, Vol 14, No 3, 281 - 298 
 
Ginsberg A & Abrahamson E (1991); “Champions of Change and Strategic Shifts: The Role 
of Internal and External Change Advocates”, Journal of Management Studies, 28:2, 173 - 190 
 
Gioia D A (1985); “Symbols, Scripts and Sensemaking”, in Sims H P Jr & Gioia D A (eds), 
“The Thinking Organization”, Jossey-Bass 
 
Gioia D A & Chittipeddi K (1991); “Sensemaking and Sensegiving in Strategic Change 
Initiation”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol 12, 433 - 448 
  
Gioia D A & Pitre E (1990); “Multiparadigm Perspectives on Theory Building”; Academy of 
Management Review, Vol 15, No 4, 584 - 602 
 
Gioia D A, Thomas J B, Clark S M & Chittipeddi K (1994); “Symbolism and Strategic 
Change in Academia: The Dynamics of Sensemaking and Influence”, Organization Science, 
Vol 5, 363 - 383 
 
Glaser B G & Strauss A L (1967); “The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research” Aldine, Chicago 
References 
 
222
Golzen G (1992); “Interim Management: A New Dimension in Corporate Performance”, 
Kogan Page  
 
Greenwood R & Hinings C R (1996); “Understanding Radical Organizational Change: 
Bringing Together the Old and the New Institutionalism”, Academy of Management Review, 
Vol 21, No 4, 1022 - 1054 
 
Greiner L E (1986); “Top Management Politics and Organizational Change”, in Srivastava M 
I (ed), “Executive Power: How Executives Influence People and Organizations”, Jossey Bass, 
San Francisco 
 
Greiner L E & Bhambri A (1989); “New CEO Intervention and Dynamics of Deliberate 
Strategic Change”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol 10, 67 - 86 
 
Greiner L E & Schein V E (1988); “Power and Organization Development”, Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company 
 
Grinyer P H & Spender J C (1979); “Recipes, Crises and Adaptation in Mature Businesses”, 
International Studies of Management, 9, 113 -123 
 
Hamel G, Doz Y L & Prahalad C K (1989): “Collaborate with Your Competitors and Win”, 
Harvard Business Review, January - February, 133 - 139 
 
Hamel G & Prahalad C K (1989); “Strategic Intent”, Harvard Business Review, May - June, 
63 - 76 
 
Hamel G & Prahalad C K (1991); “Corporate Imagination and Expeditionary Marketing”, 
Harvard Business Review, July - August, 81 - 92 
 
Hamel G & Prahalad C K (1993); “Strategy as Stretch and Leverage”, Harvard Business 
Review, March - April, 75 - 84 
 
Hamel G & Prahalad C K (1994); “Competing for the Future”, Harvard Business School 
Press 
 
Hammer M & Champy J (1993); “Re-Engineering the Corporation”, Nicholas Brealey, 
London 
 
Hampden-Turner C (1994); “Corporate Culture: How To Generate Organisational Strength 
And Lasting Advantage”, Piatkus 
 
Hannan M T & Freeman J (1977); “The Population Ecology of Organizations”, American 
Journal of Sociology, 82, 5, 929 – 964 
 
Hannan M T & Freeman J (1984); “Structural Inertia and Organizational Change”, American 
Sociological Review, 49, 149 - 164 
 
References 
 
223
Harrison R (1995a); “The Collected Papers of Roger Harrison”, McGraw-Hill 
References 
 
224
Harrison R (1995b); “A Consultant’s Journey; A Personal and Professional Odyssey”, 
McGraw-Hill 
 
Hartley J, Benington J & Binns P (1997); “Researching the Roles of Internal-change Agents 
in the Management of Organizational Change”, British Journal of Management, Vol 8, 61 - 
73 
 
Hatch M J (1997); “Organization Theory: Modern, Symbolic-Interpretive and Postmodern 
Perspectives”; Oxford University Press 
 
Heron (1981a); “Experiential research methodology”, in Reason P & Rowan J (eds), “Human 
Inquiry”, John Wiley & Sons Ltd  
 
Heron (1981b); “Philosophical basis for a new paradigm”, in Reason P & Rowan J (eds), 
“Human Inquiry”, John Wiley & Sons Ltd  
 
Hofer C & Schendel D E (1978); “Strategy Formulation: Analytical Concepts”, St Paul, 
Minnesota 
 
Hrebiniak & Joyce (1984); “Implementing Strategy”, Collier Macmillan 
 
Huczynski A A (1993); “Management Gurus: What makes them and how to become one”, 
Routledge, London and New York 
 
Huff A S (1982); “Industry Influences On Strategy Formulation”, Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol 3, 119 - 131 
 
Huff A S (1990); “Mapping Strategic Thought”, in Huff A S (ed), “Mapping Strategic 
Thought”, John Wiley and Sons 
 
Huff J O, Huff A S & Thomas H (1992); “Strategic Renewal And The Interaction Of 
Cumulative Stress And Inertia”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol 13, 55 - 75 
 
Hughes J (1990); “The Philosophy of Social Research”, Longman, (Second Edition) 
 
Institute of Management Consultants (1997); “IMC Report on the views of Consultancy 
Users”, IMC, 32-33 Hatton Garden, London EC1N 8DL 
 
Isabella (1990); “Evolving interpretations as change unfolds: How managers construe key 
organizational events”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol 33, No 1, 7 - 41 
 
James K & Jarrett M (1997); “Group Regression and Team Development: Implications for 
the Top Team Consultant”, The Cranfield School of Management Working Papers Series 
 
Johnson G (1987); “Strategic Change and the Management Process”, Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford 
 
References 
 
225
Johnson G (1988); “Rethinking Incrementalism”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol 9, 75 – 
91 
References 
 
226
Johnson G (1990); “Managing Strategic Change: The Role of Symbolic Action”, British 
Journal of Management, Vol 1, 183 - 200 
 
Johnson G (1992); “Managing Strategic Change - Strategy, Culture and Action”, Long Range 
Planning, Vol 25, No 1, 28 - 36 
 
Johnson G & Scholes K (1997); “Exploring Corporate Strategy”, (Fourth Edition), Prentice 
Hall International 
 
Jones E E (1986); “Interpreting Interpersonal Behavior: The Effects of Expectancies”, 
Science, Vol 234, 41 – 46 
 
The Journal of Management Consulting (1993); “International Report: Uniform Body of 
Knowledge”, Fall, 41 
 
Judson (1990); “Making Strategy Happen: Transforming Plans into Reality”, Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford 
 
Kahn W A (1993); “Facilitating and Undermining Organizational Change: A Case Study”, 
The Journal of Applied Behavioural Science, Vol 29, No 1, 32 - 55 
 
Kakabadse A P (1986); “Consultants and the Consulting Process”, Journal of Managerial 
Psychology, Vol 1, No 1, 28 - 36 
 
Kanter R M (1983); “The Change Masters: Corporate Entrepreneurs at Work”, Unwin 
Hymans 
 
Kets de Vries M F R & Balazs K (1997); “Beyond the Quick Fix: The Psychodynamics of 
Organizational Transformation and Change”, INSEAD working papers series 
 
Kotter J P & Schlesinger L A (1979); “Choosing Strategies for Change”, Harvard Business 
Review, March – April, 106 - 114 
 
Knights D & Morgan G (1991); “Corporate Strategy, Organizations, and Subjectivity: A 
Critique”, Organisation Studies, 12/2, 251 - 273 
 
Kubr M (ed) (1996); “Management Consulting: A Guide to the Profession”, International 
Labour Office, Geneva 
 
Layder D (1993); “New Strategies in Social Research”; Polity Press 
 
Lincoln Y S & Guba E (1985); “Naturalistic Inquiry”, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications 
 
Lindblom C E (1959); “The Science of Muddling Through”, Public Administration Review 
 
Lippitt G & Lippitt R (1978); “The Consulting Process In Action”, University Associates, La 
Jolla, California 
References 
 
227
Lorsch J W (1986); “Managing Culture: The Invisible Barrier to Strategic Change”, 
California Management Review, No 2, Winter, 95 – 109 
 
Louis M R & Sutton R I (1991); “Switching Cognitive Gears: From Habits of Mind to Active 
Thinking”, Human Relations, Vol 44, No 1, 55 - 76 
 
Louis M R (1980); “Surprise and Sense Making: What Newcomers Experience in Unfamiliar 
Organizational Settings”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol 25, 226 – 251 
 
Maister D H (1993); “Managing the Professional Service Firm”, The Free Press 
 
Management Consultancy (1998); “Winners and Losers: The 1998 Consultancy League 
Tables”, July/August, VNU Business Publications 
 
Management Consultancy (1998); “It’s time to start talking shop ”, Leader, May  
 
Manis J G & Meltzer B N (eds) (1967); “Symbolic Interaction: A Reader in Social 
Psychology”, Allyn and Bacon 
 
Markham C (1997); “Practical Management Consultancy”, Accountancy Books 
 
Margerison C J (1988); “Managerial Consulting Skills”, Gower 
 
Mason R O & Mitroff I I (1981); “Challenging strategic planning assumptions: Theory, cases 
and techniques”, New York, Wiley Inter-science 
 
Margulies N & Raia A P (1972); “Organization Development: Values, Processes and 
Technologies”, McGraw Hill 
 
Margulies N & Raia A P (1978); “Conceptual Foundations of Organizational Development”, 
McGraw-Hill 
 
McGivern C (1983); “Some Facets of the Relationship Between Consultants and Clients in 
Organizations”, Journal of Management Studies, 20, 3, 367 - 386 
 
McKinney Kellogg D (1984); “Contrasting Successful and Unsuccessful OD Consultation 
Relationships”, Group & Organization Studies, Vol 9, No 2, 151 - 176 
 
McKinsey Global Institute (1998); “Driving Productivity and Growth in the UK Economy”, 
McKinsey and Company Inc. 
 
Miles M B & Huberman A M (1994); “Qualitative Data Analysis”, Sage 
 
Miller D & Friesen P H (1984); “Momentum and Revolution in Organizational Adaptation”, 
Academy of Management Review, Vol 23, No 4, 591 – 614 
 
References 
 
228
Mintzberg H (1978); “Patterns In Strategy Formation”, Management Science, Vol 24, No 9, 
934 - 948 
 
Mintzberg H (1987); “Crafting Strategy”, Harvard Business Review, July-August, 66 - 75 
 
Mintzberg H & Quinn J B (1991); “The Strategy Process: Concepts, Contexts, Cases”, 
(Second Edition), Prentice Hall International 
 
Mintzberg H & Waters J A (1985); “Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent”, Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol 6, 257 - 272 
 
Minuchin S (1974); “Families & Family Therapy”, Harvard University Press 
 
Mitchell V W (1994); “Problems and Risks in the Purchasing of Consultancy Services”, The 
Service Industry Journal, Vol 14, No 3, 315 - 339 
 
Moore G L (1984); “The Politics of Management Consulting”, Praeger 
 
Nees D B & Greiner L E (1985); “Seeing Behind The Look-Alike Management Consultants”, 
Organizational Dynamics, Winter, 68 - 79 
 
Normann R & Ramirez R (1993); “From Value Chain to Value Constellation: Designing 
Interactive Strategy”, Harvard Business Review, July – August, 65 - 77 
 
O’Shea J & Madigan C M (1997); “Dangerous Company: Consulting Powerhouses and the 
Companies they Build and Ruin”, Penguin 
 
Outhwaite W (1987); “New Philosophies of Social Science: Realism, Hermeneutics and 
Critical Theory”; MacMillan Press 
 
Payne A & Lumsden C (1987); “Strategy Consulting - A Shooting Star ?”, Long Range 
Planning, Vol 20, No 3, 53 - 64 
 
Pellegrinelli S (1997); “Management Consultants’ Strategic Change Interventions Within 
Organisations: An Enactment Perspective”, Conference Paper, British Academy of 
Management, September 
 
Peters T J (1978); “Symbols, patterns and settings: An optimistic case for getting things 
done”, Organizational Dynamics, 2, 7, 3 - 23 
 
Pettigrew A (1985a); “The Awakening Giant”, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 
 
Pettigrew A (1985b); “Examining Change in the Long-Term Context of Culture and 
Politics”, in Penning J M (ed), “Organizational Strategy and Change”, Jossey Bass, San 
Francisco 
 
Pettigrew A (1987); “Context And Action In The Transformation Of The Firm”, Journal of 
References 
 
229
Management Studies, 24:6, November, 649 – 670 
References 
 
230
Pettigrew A (1988); “Researching Strategic Change” in Pettigrew (ed), “The Management of 
Strategic Change”, Basil Blackwell, Oxford 
 
Pettigrew A (1990); “Longitudinal Field Research On Change: Theory and Practice”, 
Organization Science, Vol 1, No 3, August, 267 - 292 
 
Pettigrew A & Whipp R (1991); “Managing Change for Competitive Success”, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell 
 
Pfeffer J (1981); “Management as Symbolic Action: The Creation and Maintenance of 
Organisational Paradigms” in Cummins L L & Shaw B M (eds), “Research in Organisational 
Behaviour”, Vol 3, Greenwich, Conn, JAI Press 
 
Phills J A (1996a); “Tensions in the client-consultant relationship: The dynamics of trust and 
credibility”, Conference Paper, Academy of Management Annual Meetings, Cincinnati, OH 
 
Phills J A (1996b); “The Epistemology of Strategic Consulting: Generic Analytical Activities 
and Organizational Learning”, in Moingeon B & Edmondson A (eds), “Organizational 
Learning and Competitive Advantage”, Sage Publications 
 
Phills J A (1997); “Consequences of covert versus overt influence approaches in strategy 
consultation”, Conference Paper, Academy of Management Annual Meetings, Boston, MA 
 
Poole P P, Gioia D A & Gray B (1989); “Influence Modes, Schema Change, and 
Organizational Transformation”, The Journal of Applied Behavioural Science, Vol 25, No 3, 
271 - 289 
 
Popper K R (1959); “The Logic of Scientific Discovery”, Unwin Hyman 
 
Porac J F, Thomas H & Baden-Fuller C (1989); “Competitive Groups as Cognitive 
Communities: The case of Scottish Knitwear Manufacturers”, Journal of Management 
Studies, 26:4, July, 397 - 417 
 
Porter M E (1980); “Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and 
Competitors”, The Free Press 
 
Porter M E (1985); “Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior 
Performance”, The Free Press 
 
Powell W (1990); “Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization”, 
Research in Organizational Behavior, Vol 12, 295 - 336 
 
Powell W & DiMaggio P (1991); “The New Institutionalism in Organization Analysis”, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press 
 
Prahalad C K & Hamel G (1990); “The Core Competence of the Corporation”, Harvard 
Business Review, May-June, 79 – 91 
References 
 
231
Quinn J B (1980); “Strategies for Change: Logical Incrementalism”, Irwin 
 
Rassam C (1998); “The management consultancy industry”, in Sadler P (ed), “Management  
Consultancy: a handbook for best practice”, Kogan Page 
 
Rassam C & Oates D (1991); “Management Consultancy: The Inside Story”, Mercury 
 
Reason P (1994); “Human inquiry as discipline and practice”, in Reason P (ed), 
“Participation in Human Inquiry”, Sage Publications 
 
Reddin W J (1977); “Confessions of an Organizational Change Agent”, Group & 
Organization Studies, March, 33 - 41 
 
Romanelli E & Tushman M L (1994); “Organizational Transformations As Punctuated 
Equilibrium: An Empirical Test”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol 37, No 5, 1141 - 
1166 
 
Rose G (1982); “Deciphering Sociological Research”, London: MacMillan 
 
Rumelt R P, Schendel D & Teece D J (1991); “Strategic Management and Economics”, 
Strategic Management Journal, (special issue) V12, 5 - 29 
 
Russell B (1961); “History of Western Philosophy”, Routledge 
 
Salancik G R & Pfeffer J (1978); “ A Social Information Processing Approach to Job 
Attitudes and Task Design”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol 23, June, 224 – 253 
 
Sadler P (Ed) (1998); “Management Consultancy: a handbook for best practice”, Kogan Page 
 
Schein E (1987); “Process Consultation”, Addison-Westley 
 
Schein E (1995); “Process consultation, action research and clinical inquiry: are they the 
same?”, Journal of Managerial Psychology, Vol 10, No 6, 14 - 19 
 
Schein E (1999); “Process Consultation Revisited: building the helping relationship” 
Addison- Westley 
 
Schon D A (1983); “The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think In Action”, Basic 
Books, Harper Collins 
 
Schon D A (1987); “Towards a New Design for Teaching and Learning in the Professions”, 
Jossey Bass Inc, San Francisco 
 
Schwenk C R (1989); “Linking Cognitive, Organisational and Political Factors in Explaining 
Stratgeic Change”, Journal of Management Studies, 26:2, 177 – 187 
References 
 
232
Scott W R & Meyer J W (1994); “Institutional Environments and Organizations”, Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications 
 
Sewell W H (1992); “A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency and Transformation”, 
American Journal of Sociology, Vol 9, No 1, 1 - 29 
 
Sheldon A (1980); “Organizational Paradigms: A Theory of Organisational Change”, 
Organizational Dynamics, Winter 1980, 61 - 79 
 
Shipman M (1988); “The Limitations of Social Research”, (Third Edition), Longman 
 
Shutz A (1963a); “Common-sense and Scientific Interpretations of Human Action”, in 
Natanson M A (ed), “Philosophy of the Social Sciences”, New York, Random House 
 
Shutz A (1963b); “Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences”, in Natanson M A 
(ed), “Philosophy of the Social Sciences”, New York, Random House 
 
Silverman D (1995); “Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and 
Interaction”, Sage 
 
Simon H A (1957); “Administrative Behaviour”, Macmillan, New York 
 
Simmons V M (1988); “Reconstructing an Organization's History: Systematic Distortions in 
Retrospective Data” in Berg D N & Smith K K (eds), “The Self in Social Inquiry”, Sage 
 
Smircich L & Stubbart C (1985); “Strategic Management in an Enacted World”, Academy of 
Management Review, Vol 10, No 4, 724 - 736 
 
Smith K K (1988); “Epistemological Problems in Researching Human Relationships”, in 
Berg D N & Smith K K (eds), “The Self in Social Inquiry”, Sage 
 
Spender J C (1989); “Industry Recipes: An Inquiry into the Nature and Sources of 
Managerial Change”, Cambridge MA, Basil-Blackwood 
 
Staw B M (1980); “Rationality and justification in organizational life”, in Cummings L & 
Staw B M (eds), “ Research in Organizational Behavior”, Vol 2, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press 
 
Steele F (1975); “Consulting for Organizational Change”, Amhurst, MA: University of 
Massachusetts 
 
Stoecker R (1991); “Evaluating and rethinking the case study”, The Sociological Review, 39, 
88 - 112 
 
Strauss A L (1987); “Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists”, Cambridge University Press 
 
Strauss A L & Corbin J (1990); “Basics of Qualitative Research: Grounded Theory 
Procedures and Techniques”, Sage Publications  
References 
 
233
Sturdy A (1995); “An Insecure Business – IT Strategy Consulting in UK Financial Services”, 
Conference Paper, British Academy of Management, September  
 
Sturdy A (1997); “The Consultancy Process - An Insecure Business?” Journal of 
Management Studies, 34:3, 389 – 413 
 
Tisdall P (1982); “Agents of Change”, Institute of Management Consultants 
 
Tranfield D (1995); “Salesman, dreamer and son-of-a-bitch: quality executive development 
for managing directors”, Management Decision Vol 33, No 4, 22 - 26 
 
Tregoe B B, Zimmerman J W, Smith R A & Tobia P M (1989); “Vision in Action: Putting a 
Winning Strategy to Work”, Simon & Schuster 
 
Turner A N (1982); “Consulting is More Than Giving Advice”; Harvard Business Review, 
September – October, 120 - 129 
 
Van Maanen J (1988); “Tales of the Field: On Writing Ethnography”, The University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago and London 
 
Van Maanen J (1995); “Style as Theory”; Organization Science, Vol 6, No 1, 133 - 143 
 
Wallendorf M & Belk R W (1989); “Assessing Trustworthiness in Naturalistic Consumer 
Research”, Interpretive Consumer Research, Association for Consumer Research, 69 - 83 
 
Watson T (1994); “In Search of Management: Culture, Chaos and Control in Managerial 
Work”; Routledge 
 
Weick K E (1979); “The Social Psychology of Organizing”; Reading Massachusetts, (Second 
Edition) Addison-Wesley 
 
Weick K E (1985); “Sources of order in underorganized systems: Themes in recent 
organizational theory”, in Lincoln Y S (ed), “Organizational Theory and Inquiry”, Beverly 
Hills, CA, Sage 
 
Weick K E (1988); “Enacted Sensemaking in Crisis Situations”, Journal of Management 
Studies, 25:4, 305 – 317 
  
Weick K E (1989); “Theory Construction as Disciplined Imagination”, Academy of 
Management Review, Vol 14, No 4, 515 – 531 
 
Weick K E (1990); “Cartographic Myths in Organizations”, in Huff A S (ed), “Mapping 
Strategic Thought”, John Wiley and Sons 
 
Weick K E (1993); “Sensemaking in Organizations: Small Structures with Large 
Consequences” in Murnighan J K (ed), “Social Psychology in Organizations: Advances in 
Theory and Research”, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall 
References 
 
234
Weick K E (1995); “Sensemaking in Organizations”; Sage Publications 
 
Weinberg G M (1985); “The Secrets of Consulting”, Dorset House Publishing 
 
Westenholz A (1993); “Paradoxical Thinking and Change in the Frames of Reference”, 
Organization Studies, 14/1, 37 - 58 
 
Westley F (1990); “Middle Managers and Strategy: Microdynamics of Inclusion”, Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol 11, 337 - 351 
 
Whittington R (1992); “Putting Giddens Into Action: Social Systems And Managerial 
Agency”, Journal of Management Studies, 29:6, 693 - 712 
 
Yin R K (1994); "Case Study Research: Design and Methods", Sage Publications 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Case: The Bristol and West Building Society/ Kepner Tregoe 
 
Case: The Post Office Group/ Kepner Tregoe 
 
Case: Carousel/ Triangle Management Services 
 
Case: McQuillan Young Communications/ Transitions 
 
Bristol and West Case Study 147
THE BRISTOL AND WEST BUILDING SOCIETY 
 
 KEPNER TREGOE’S INTERVENTION 
 
CASE STUDY 
 
Sergio Pellegrinelli 
Cranfield School of Management 
PhD Programme 
 
 
Preface 
 
This case study is part of a PhD research project looking at the contribution of 
management consultants to processes of strategic change within organisations.  The case 
material has come from in-depth interviews of a selection of individuals within the Bristol 
and West  and Kepner Tregoe and documentary information developed at the time of the 
intervention.  The account below is a distillation and partial analysis by the researcher of 
the information available, and therefore is, by definition, incomplete and influenced by the 
research agenda.  The purpose of the account is to set out the context and logic of the 
intervention and to elaborate a “first order” analysis of the key contributions, congruent 
with the experience and understanding of those involved.   The drafting of this case 
provides a springboard for further analysis and theory development, in line with the overall 
research methodology. 
 
The co-operation of all those involved in the research is greatly appreciated.  The 
researcher asks that no part of this case study be reproduced without his prior agreement. 
 
 
Background 
 
In early 1994, the Bristol and West Building Society commissioned Kepner Tregoe, a firm 
of management consultants, to help the Executive Team develop a business strategy for the 
Society. 
 
At the time, the Bristol and West was a mutual organisation whose main business was retail 
deposit taking and mortgage lending, though it offered a wider range of retail financial 
services, such as travellers cheques, and had bought a chain of estate agents, Hamptons.  
While not one of the biggest Building Societies, the Bristol and West was one of the top 10 
and had a strong regional franchise and wide geographic coverage of retail branches. 
 
Kepner Tregoe had worked for the Bristol and West some time prior to their involvement in 
the strategy formulation.  They had been introduced to the Society by Kevin Flanagan, 
Group Services Director, who had some experience of Kepner Tregoe when he worked for 
Littlewoods.  Kepner Tregoe had an analytical process or technique for problem solving 
and decision making (PSDM) and a number of PSDM training modules had been run for 
Bristol and West managers. 
 
 
Initial Contact 
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Kevin Flanagan was reviewing the results of some PSDM modules with a Kepner Tregoe 
consultant, Nick Mobley, when he mentioned that the Society was having difficulties 
developing a strategy. Nick Mobley briefly outlined the Kepner Tregoe process for 
formulating strategy and suggested that Kevin Flanagan should meet Mike Freedman, a 
senior person within Kepner Tregoe's strategy practice.  Kevin Flanagan agreed and a 
meeting was arranged at which Mike Freedman outlined the process.  Kevin Flanagan was 
very comfortable with the Kepner Tregoe approach since it was very systematic and 
structured, a style and approach which he believed suited the Bristol and West.  
Furthermore, Kepner Tregoe were offering a purely process approach, without content; 
Kepner Tregoe would provide the tools and the steps in the analysis and the Bristol and 
West managers would generate the content and shape of the strategy.  Kevin Flanagan 
perceived a pent up desire within the Bristol and West to develop a strategy, but to date he 
and his colleagues had not found a way to do it.  Kevin Flanagan attributed this to different 
conceptions of strategy amongst the Executive Team and the absence of a specific process 
or individual responsible for strategy formulation.  There was no history of formulating 
strategy nor discipline, and so day to day business took precedence. 
 
As soon as the meeting with Mike Freedman was over, Kevin Flanagan went initially to see 
Ian Kennedy, Group Operations Manager, and Jeff Warren, Deputy Chief Executive and 
Finance Director, and then to John Burke, Chief Executive, to secure support for the 
consulting intervention, and received it.  Mike Freedman was then asked to present to the 
Executive Team.  Kevin Flanagan felt that it was important that Mike Freedman should 
establish his personal credibility with his colleagues and convince them of the viability of 
the process.  Kevin Flanagan was conscious that his colleagues were less familiar and less 
comfortable than he was with a process approach.  Kepner Tregoe had to secure 
commitment from the full Executive Team.  Kevin Flanagan was also keen to transfer the 
client responsibility to John Burke so that he could lead and champion the process. This 
transfer of responsibility had the added benefit of allowing Kevin Flanagan to participate 
fully as a team member in any subsequent strategy review.  While Kevin Flanagan felt that 
it might have happened if he had cliented the intervention, he believed that the Chief 
Executive was key to making it work well. 
 
 
The Commissioning of Kepner Tregoe 
 
Kevin Flanagan arranged for Mike Freedman to present to the Executive Team at one of the 
Team’s meetings.  Mike Freedman took the Executive Team through the Kepner Tregoe 
process and what was involved.  He explained that the process was six months long, split 
into a series of two day workshops during which the Executive Team would go through a 
systematic analysis of the environment, the key business drivers and determine the 
appropriate strategy.  The members of the Executive Team were more concerned with the 
personality and credibility of the facilitator that the details of the process itself.  Both Ian 
Kennedy and Jeff Warren felt confident that Mike Freedman, who was to lead the 
intervention on behalf of Kepner Tregoe, could operate at sufficiently high a level and add 
to the process by knowing from experience what had happened elsewhere.  Personal 
chemistry was seen as critical since they were expected to spend significant periods of time 
together in a room and, without good interpersonal relations, the process could have been 
more stressful than it needed to be. 
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Mike Freedman then had a number of discussions with John Burke agreeing the precise 
details of the intervention.  Mike Freedman perceived a certain hesitation on the part of 
John Burke in awarding the assignment, which he later discovered had to do with the fact 
that Bristol and West was using another consultant to facilitate team building among the 
Executive Team.  Mike Freedman discovered after Kepner Tregoe was commissioned that 
John Burke was hoping that this other consultant could facilitate the strategy development 
work, but subsequently decided to commission Kepner Tregoe.  The final decision to use 
Kepner Tregoe was not discussed at length by the Executive Team. 
 
 
The Structure and Logic of the Strategy Formulation Intervention 
 
The intervention was made up of 6 workshops, each lasting two days, with approximately 
one month between each workshop.  In outline, the structure of the Kepner Tregoe process 
was one of identifying the factors in the environment affecting an organisation, 
understanding the organisation's relative strengths, choosing a key driver from a list drawn 
up by Kepner Tregoe, and then developing the exact details of the strategy.  Kepner Tregoe 
provided the analytical framework; in essence the questions that needed to be answered and 
the logical sequence for answering those questions to develop a strategy.  They introduced 
and explained a range of decision making and analytical techniques to support the 
answering of those questions and the consultants acted as facilitators during the 
discussions. 
 
Kepner Tregoe based its approach on a strongly held belief that senior managers should 
carry out the analyses themselves since this generates greater understanding of the issues 
surrounding strategy formulation and greater ownership of the chosen strategy.  If 
managers carry out the analyses they are more likely to implement the strategy and are 
better placed to develop strategy in the future.  An objective of the intervention, from 
Kepner Tregoe's perspective, was to educate senior managers in the processes involved in 
formulating a business strategy. 
 
Kepner Tregoe did not claim to have any particular insight into Building Societies, nor the 
retail financial services market, but focused on facilitating the process through which the 
Bristol and West would determine its strategy.  This neutrality was valued by the Executive 
Team who were keen not to be told what strategy they should follow, but develop it for 
themselves. 
 
Participation in the workshops was restricted to the members of the Executive Team (see 
Attachment) and Mark Abbot who was responsible for Treasury operations, though the 
Team did ask others within the Bristol and West for specific information.  Again, the 
restriction of the deliberations to the most senior managers reflected a firmly held belief 
within Kepner Tregoe that strategy formulation was the prerogative and responsibility of 
senior management.  The process was designed to embed all the information and logic for 
specific decisions within the Executive Team.  On practical grounds too, the number of 
people attending the workshops had to be limited to facilitate open discussion and debate. 
 
Mike Freedman led the intervention, supported by Ann Orton, another experienced Kepner 
Tregoe consultant, and a more junior person, Patrick Harper-Smith.  Mike Freedman and 
Ann Orton led the various workshop sessions and facilitated the debates and analyses by 
the Executive Team, while Patrick Harper-Smith captured the discussions and subsequently 
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produced full reports of the workshop deliberations.  These reports were circulated to 
members of the Executive Team a few days after each of the workshops for their 
comments. 
 
 
The Contribution of the Intervention 
 
Kepner Tregoe’s intervention influenced and contributed to the processes of strategic 
change within the Bristol and West in three distinct, but inter-related, ways. 
 
First, the intervention itself supported the crystallisation of issues that the Bristol and 
West’s management had to deal with, their scope and the resulting deliberations and 
consensus.  Specifically, the intervention provided the catalyst, the focus and the means of 
marshalling the commitment of the Executive Team for developing a formal strategy.  The 
intervention defined and bounded the issues to be discussed and led to the tangible 
expression of a strategy shared by the Executive Team. 
 
Secondly, the intervention enabled the Executive Team to address certain strategic issues in 
a different way and thereby gain a new perspective.  The Kepner Tregoe approach 
addressed strategy in a more systematic and formal fashion and used different conceptual 
frameworks and techniques.  In addition, the presence of Mike Freedman and Ann Orton 
provided a challenge to the way the Executive Team were looking at issues, from outsiders’ 
perspectives. 
 
Thirdly, the setting and external facilitation generated different patterns of interactions 
between the members of the Executive Team.  This allowed the Executive Team members 
to step outside their customary roles and routine dialogues, and to raise and respond to 
concerns and feelings beyond the conventional rational arguments. 
 
 Crystallisation 
 
The process of approaching and subsequent decision to commission Kepner Tregoe 
separated and raised the profile of strategy issues and deliberation from day to day 
business.  The intervention process and presence of the consultants acted as a tangible 
manifestation of a need to address strategy formulation, and in a different way.  
 
Initially, some members of the Executive Team were sceptical that they needed as much 
time to develop a strategy as Kepner Tregoe insisted upon, and that they needed to go 
through each of the steps to the same degree of detail.  Nonetheless the Executive Team 
was committed to the process from the outset, though some members did not believe the 
timescales, nor wanted to do some parts: 
 
“I recognise that, as a group, we need a process to make things work... I find it an 
aggravation and it irritates the hell out of me, and I know we could not short circuit 
it... I am not sure if we can do anything other than follow this process, and we won’t 
get massively side-tracked with other problems.” 
 
There was a belief  that, by following the process, they would end up with a strategy, and, 
from the process, the commitment appeared to grow: 
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“...as results began to emerge and we began to see some real progress, and I repeat, 
committed progress, everyone pretty much saw whilst it might have been tiresome, 
a bit pedantic, a bit pedestrian, they could actually see the value of the process.” 
 
The intervention also disconnected a pre-defined set of questions and issues from the 
myriad current and emergent issues the Executive Team had to deal with.  For instance, the 
Kepner Tregoe process for strategy formulation did not specifically deal with the issue of 
corporate ownership, which was becoming prominent in the Building Society movement at 
the time of the intervention. It was during the strategy formulation process that the 
Cheltenham and Gloucester Building Society announced that it was to become part of 
Lloyds Bank, and that Halifax Building Society indicated its intention to become a public 
limited company.  Specifically, the issue which arose and was being dealt with outside the 
strategy process by the Chairman,  the Chief Executive and the Finance Director was 
should the Bristol and West remain a mutual organisation, or should it become a limited 
company with greater access to funds to expand or acquire other organisations? 
 
When Kepner Tregoe started the process it was not thought necessary nor appropriate to 
discuss ownership.  The argument put forward by Mike Freedman, once the issue was 
raised, was that irrespective of ownership the Bristol and West needed a business strategy: 
 
“... this was a very unusual case of strategy because there were in effect two levels 
of decision being taken... whatever happened... they still needed to sort out the 
range of products... targeted customers, what competencies they needed... I think 
they also recognised that the charge towards discussing the higher level issue was 
one which was not necessarily going to involve them all, so the separation, I 
thought, was well handled by John (Burke).” 
 
The argument was generally accepted.  However, the issue of ownership was included as 
part of the strategy deliberations, but appended towards the end of the main strategy 
formulation process, once the key business strategy decisions had been made.  Mike 
Freedman’s strong position on the subject and the commitment to the intervention helped 
create and sustain this boundary between business and ownership strategy which, from 
within the context of the Kepner Tregoe intervention, excluded extraneous and potentially 
confusing factors and considerations. 
 
The intervention itself generated a tangible expression of the Executive Team’s analyses 
and discussion, giving them a sense of rigour, completeness and robustness.  Kepner 
Tregoe documented the development of the final strategy and the analyses and discussions 
undertaken at each stage of the formulation process, and helped to synthesise the agreed 
strategy in the form of a clearly articulated set of statements: 
 
“The absolutely crucial thing from my perspective was that we got to the end and 
we had a corporate strategy, a document we could say - this is our corporate 
strategy.” 
 
“In retrospect, what was important was that we had something that we could call a 
strategy, and that it could bear some examination by, for example, non-Executive 
Directors, that it would have face validity with the organisation but not perfect... 
something on the ground that we could then go ahead and refine and hone... 
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something on the ground to say - the organisation has a strategy and this is 
credible...” 
 
“... the greatest thing we got out of it was great clarity of thought... It’s very 
valuable to put a circle around our business and to know that we are not going to 
even look at opportunities X, Y and Z because they are outside the circle.” 
 
In essence, the intervention helped the Bristol and West’s Executive Team to solidify what 
otherwise might have been more ethereal, vague and fleeting. The intervention helped them 
to come together with a unity and commitment of purpose, to focus on a bounded set of 
issues and to crystallise the resulting deliberations and consensus in a tangible and credible 
form. 
 
 Different Conceptual Framework and Perspective 
 
The bounding of the issues to be discussed as part of the strategy formulation exercise 
facilitated the application of a well established approach.  The strategy formulation process 
used by Kepner Tregoe was structured, logical and sequential.  Moreover, the Kepner 
Tregoe consultants had great confidence in the process and analytical techniques, having 
used them successfully in other interventions. 
 
The initial sessions revolved around the environment and Bristol and West's strengths and 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats.  Members of the Executive Team had been asked to 
fill in questionnaires which Kepner Tregoe had collated.  The results of the questionnaires 
and subsequent workshop debates: 
 
".... didn't throw up an awful lot that was new.... but what it did establish was a 
consensus view.  I don't think that consensus view was radically different from 
anything that individually we might have had, but we knew that we all shared that 
view, which perhaps is the important thing." 
 
The process itself proposed a number of “Driving Forces” (see Attachment) which Kepner 
Tregoe contended spanned and characterised the different strategy options available.  
Analytical and decision making techniques were used to rank the driving forces against the 
Bristol and West’s relative strengths and the values of the organisation, and then to choose 
one driving force around which to develop the specific details of the strategy.  Neither the 
list of driving forces nor the process design which funnelled the Executive Team towards a 
decision in a pre-determined  way was seen as a constraint, and the choice of driving force 
was found to be relatively easy. 
 
The Bristol and West Executive Team appeared less concerned with the specific merits of 
the process as long as it had some credibility and appeared viable: 
 
“We would have been fairly relaxed about using anybody as long as we felt they did 
have some sort of process formula...” 
 
“I am not sure it matters what the process is.  I am not sure it matters who it is so 
long as they have a decent process... they had a framework and probably one of the 
main things about KT is that they had a view that there are eight key drivers in any 
business and you had to pick the one which is appropriate for you.  It may or may 
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not be rubbish, but I found the process was useful and actually brought out quite a 
bit and therefore they developed a framework around which you can have 
discussions...” 
 
The process itself was seen, by one Executive Team member, as more than a way of 
starting a debate on issues and as a way of drawing out the Executive Team's own 
knowledge rather than a prescribed set of steps: 
 
“The structure forced us not to think of a particular strategy but to get clear our own 
consensus view of a number of important underlying issues and once we had that 
priority then it started to drive out a clear sense of what our strategy should be.” 
 
Even if some members of the Executive Team were not convinced that the Kepner Tregoe 
approach to strategy formulation was not the best in some objective sense, the process did 
create a framework which appeared not to exist within the organisation.  It required thought 
and analyses of issues not routinely addressed within the Bristol and West.  The process 
covered a range of issues in a systematic fashion, which facilitated the creation of a more 
complete, more coherent understanding and appreciation of the “strategic” issues facing the 
organisation.  As one Executive Team member expressed it:  
 
“The process was much more than simply a set of steps; it was actually marshalling  
people’s thoughts, marshalling commitment, tasking people to do things.” 
 
The analytical tools and techniques were only one part of the “process”.  The capability and 
experience of the facilitators, Mike Freedman and Ann Orton, were seen as a major 
contribution to the success of the intervention: 
 
“... the quality of their facilitation was as important as the process...  Mike and Ann 
were personally credible not just in terms of the content and knowledge of the 
process and personally credible in with whom else they had worked, but were self 
evidently good facilitators.” 
 
The intervention philosophy and approach of Kepner Tregoe is to remain completely “in 
process” and not be drawn into the content of the debates; posing questions without giving 
any clues as to what the answer might be.  Mike Freedman was not prepared to short circuit 
the process because of his experience.  Some Executive Team members found this 
annoying.  Nonetheless, the external perspective and experience of similar strategy 
formulation efforts came through indirectly: 
 
“(Mike Freedman) would just keep the discussion going and ask the right questions, 
or what he felt were the right questions, to shift the debate in a different direction... 
he had a number of exercises that he could pull out of his bag to throw a different 
light on it, explore a different aspect.” 
 
The perceived value of the experience within a purely process approach came from 
knowing which analyses and debates are important and need more effort: 
 
“... they actually need to make a qualitative judgement about our input which is - 
look this is not good enough, you actually need more here, I don’t think you are 
addressing these issues with enough weight and seriousness and enough quality.” 
Bristol and West Case Study 154
 
There was a sense, though, that the highly structured approach inclined both consultants 
and Executive Team members towards going through the motions or “ticking boxes” at 
certain stages, particularly as enthusiasm waned.  But, the confidence the Kepner Tregoe 
consultants had in the process helped to maintain momentum and carry the strategy 
formulation exercise to its conclusions, despite any perceived concerns or tedium 
experienced by the Executive Team. 
 
The Kepner Tregoe process and techniques, as applied by Mike Freedman and Ann Orton, 
enabled the Executive Team to look at the Bristol and West, its strategy and the 
competitive environment in a new way. This way of thinking became absorbed within the 
Executive Team: 
 
“We actually have what I genuinely realise are really quite sophisticated 
conversations now about strategic issues, where frankly two years ago we could not 
even spell the words.” 
 
The intervention provided new paradigms and “conceptual gems” (i.e. ways of looking at 
an issue) which became diffused within the Bristol and West, in part through their use by 
Executive Team members in more routine debates and decision making.  These concepts 
and frameworks transcended their initial use in the strategy formulation process. 
 
 Different Pattern of Interactions 
 
The intervention took the Executive Team outside the normal patterns of interaction both 
within the Team and between the Executive Team and other members of the organisation.  
The discussions were non-routine, both in terms of the subject matter and the contributions 
made by individuals, which were increasingly from a corporate-wide perspective rather 
than made as Directors with particular interests to defend and promote. 
 
One of the key attractions in using an external consultant was that: 
 
“... we recognised that we found it difficult to manage each other... we wanted 
someone to manage us through a process, otherwise it was going to take us four 
times as long frankly and it would be more painful...” 
 
“... we are a group of people who are inclined, if we get a chance, to wander off 
along the byways and not stick to the main road...” 
 
The Executive Team found the discipline and strictures imposed by the logic of the process 
uncomfortable at first since they were not used to the systematic approach to addressing 
strategic issues.  They were more inclined towards a more intuitive, unstructured way of 
looking at issues.  Nonetheless, the rigidity and discipline imposed by Kepner Tregoe, 
described by one Executive team member as being “prisoners of the process”, was seen as a 
vital element in achieving the understanding, clarity and consensus in respect of the Bristol 
and West’s strategy: 
 
“Frankly, it occurred to me at the time that it was necessary (to be prisoners of the 
process), but looking back it was absolutely necessary...we were, a slightly 
indelicate term but nevertheless an accurate one, we were strategy virgins... we 
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were like the five year old - golly talking about strategy... if we hadn’t had a tightly 
defined process, we could have gone walk about. ” 
 
The presence of an outsider, with a mandate to facilitate the discussion and the overall 
strategy formulation process, had a significant impact on how the various Executive Team 
members contributed to the strategy debate: 
 
“In the initial stages of the intervention Mike Freedman had to get strident and 
unpleasant from time to time when individuals were being too functional and had to 
remind people fairly publicly that they were there as executives of the whole 
organisation as opposed to head of this or head of that.” 
 
The discussions were perceived as qualitatively different from those had by the Executive 
Team either as a Board or at other routine meetings: 
 
“... given the nature of the subject being discussed, there was nothing routine about 
them... Your financial matters and regulatory matters are pretty much prescribed, 
pretty much standard procedures for following the thing, where decisions can be 
made on previous examples, previous practice.” 
 
“Interactions are inevitably more constructive in corporate strategy work because to 
a fairly large degree you leave behind your functional hat... anyone can contribute 
on any aspect, and you all want the same; the primary driver actually is to have a 
clear corporate strategy... You might have secondary objective which is I want it to 
be a bit more like this...” 
 
The Executive Team approached the subjects under discussion from a different perspective 
and the nature of the interactions evolved during the course of the intervention: 
 
“... you get more emotional arguments in the face of developing a strategy than you 
would in the normal course of business... it is not a political discussion to do with 
my Division getting its way... In business we tend to operate much more with a 
functional hat on, and so your primary concern is for the organisation to meet its 
key performance pieces, but you have your personal objectives... so sometimes you 
will fight for your bits.” 
 
“... initially people came to the table almost exclusively with functional hats on... it 
became obvious that yes when it was appropriate to make, if you like, a point from a 
functional perspective, supporting one’s own function or interest, that sure it was 
legitimate to do that, but the nature of the beast was non-functional... I would say 
the balance shifted.” 
 
The setting and the presence of the consultants, in their role of directing and facilitating the 
debates, also appeared to alter to some extent the interpersonal dynamics of the situation.  
Hierarchical power, while ever present, was reduced in importance, allowing a more open 
debate and sharing of views: 
 
“I think (the Chief Executive) more plays the peer role, and actually largely played 
the peer role, but how can anyone in the room forget that the following day when 
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we walk out of this corporate strategy session, he is my boss and my career depends 
on him... it can never be truly an entirely peer group.” 
 
Not only were the subjects and the processes and techniques for discussing them novel, but 
the intervention focused the thinking on strategic issues, separating them from the on-going 
management issues and operational decisions: 
 
“We tended to leave the discussion of strategy and its stuff to when we were 
meeting with KT (Kepner Tregoe)... it seemed only natural that this stuff was being 
developed out here somewhere, it was being developed in a separate process.  It was 
almost like the only place where you can talk strategy is over in Queens Square, you 
know, that is the strategy room.”  
 
The intervention was designed in such a way that Kepner Tregoe had relatively little 
contact with Bristol and West managers who were not part of the group involved in the 
workshops. Most of the data collection and analyses were undertaken exclusively by the 
Executive Team and other managers were given relatively contained tasks and in a fairly 
circumscribed way: 
 
“... do some research and just find out what the comparative stats looked like over a 
period, to do some projections... really we developed the outline for them to put real 
numbers, to give it real focus... so about 30% of the stuff involved other people but 
it was quite focused...” 
 
The whole intervention was kept low key and revolved around the Executive Team: 
 
“We didn’t set out to make it a secret thing, equally we didn’t go publicising it, 
simply because we actually wanted to have something of substance to say... We 
thought it better to get through something so we had material that we could then 
bounce off some people and then go firm.” 
 
This detachment appeared to facilitate the process of consensus building within the 
Executive Team, sheltered from the pressures and issues arising from the day-to-day 
business. 
 
The ways in which the Kepner Tregoe intervention influenced the thinking and subsequent 
actions of the Executive Team were mutually dependent and supportive.  The initial 
commitment to the process and bounding of the issues to be discussed was supported by a 
tightly defined process and prescribed analytical models.  The facilitation and external 
management of the Team kept the debate within the confines of the analytical steps which 
made up the process.  The messiness, complications, pressures and baggage of the “outside 
world” were suspended temporarily while the Executive Team were “talking about 
strategy”. 
 
 
Post Strategy Formulation 
 
The strategy formulation process created clarity and a shared view in the minds of the 
Executive Team members in respect of the Bristol and West’s strategy.  The final strategy, 
was perceived at the time not to be perfect, but: 
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“... stood the test of time and, I think in that sense, it has turned out, over time, to be 
much better, I think, than I thought it was at the end, because our desire to change it 
has not been great.” 
 
The consensus, ownership and clarity achieved as a result of the intervention was in marked 
contrast to the Executive Team’s experience of other organisations and how they dealt with 
strategic issues: 
 
“... it is clear when we get other people to tell us about their strategy that they 
haven’t gone through the same thought process and, in many cases, they are simply 
very woolly about what their strategy is and although they are doing things they 
don’t really know why and what their objective is and haven’t really thought 
through the underlying reasons for it. 
 
The Executive Team then commissioned Kepner Tregoe to facilitate a group of Bristol and 
West Directors and senior managers to develop an implementation plan.  The Executive 
Team was pleased with the results of the strategy formulation exercise and so the 
commissioning of Kepner Tregoe was an obvious next step: 
 
“They had done such a good job in dragging us through this process and we have 
come up with what looks like a good end result... they must have something useful 
to say about helping us with implementation.” 
 
Nick Mobley, who was Kepner Tregoe’s account manager for the Bristol and West and 
regarded within Kepner Tregoe as technically very competent, was asked by Mike 
Freedman if he would facilitate the implementation.  Nick Mobley agreed and set about the 
implementation planning using Kepner Tregoe’s project management methodology.  
Central  
to the process was the use of a work breakdown technique to decompose the overall 
strategy into discrete tasks or activities and then to sequence them. 
 
The implementation planning did not proceed smoothly.  Most of the Bristol and West 
managers had not been party to the strategy deliberations and were unaware of the 
reasoning underlying, and nuances of, the final strategy.  Some had strongly held views on 
how implementation should be planned and undertaken.  Some of the senior managers 
involved were sceptical that strategy implementation could be looked at as one complex, 
defined project with a beginning and an end.  They were also concerned about sufficient 
resources being available within the Bristol and West to carry forward the strategy and the 
organisation’s readiness to change, both of which were assumed by the methodology. 
 
As the implementation team worked at decomposing the strategy, it became clear to some 
of them that the process was not producing the desired results, specifically that the planning 
process was not going to produce anything that was usable.  They reported their concerns to 
their Directors.  The attitude of Kepner Tregoe was seen as unhelpful as some of these 
concerns were aired: 
 
“KT were totally dogmatic, which did not help. The workload was intense and 
much of it was done at the week-ends... We had a tight schedule with frequent 
meetings and the 20% full time equivalent allowed for the team members was 
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inadequate... Issues were discussed, but there was no movement, no display of 
understanding.” 
 
Part of the problem was attributed by the Bristol and West team to Nick Mobley, who was 
perceived as lacking sensitivity to the situation and lacking facilitation skills.  One 
Executive Team member believed that it was not the methodology itself which was flawed, 
but the way in which the methodology had been explained and applied.  Despite the 
problems, the team completed the planning within the allotted nine weeks in accordance 
with the prescribed methodology and format.  Kepner Tregoe consultants perceived that the 
lack of ownership and appreciation of the overall picture had generated a “not invented 
here” syndrome which combined with strong personalities to hinder the implementation 
planning. 
 
The output from the Kepner Tregoe led implementation planning exercise was received by 
the Executive Team, then discreetly discarded.  Jennie Barton, a senior manager within the 
Bristol and West, and part of the implementation planning team, was then asked to take 
over and begin to put the strategy into action. 
 
Jennie Barton had been responsible for a business process re-engineering (BPR) initiative 
running in parallel with the strategy formulation exercise and she had regular meetings with 
the Executive Team to report on progress and discuss issues which had emerged: 
 
“The Executive had finished the formulation and had the will and the drive to 
launch the strategy.  At the same time I was talking about BPR and saying that there 
was no point in delivering proposals until the implementation details had been 
finalised; BPR was an enabler.  This coincided with a growing unease with KT and 
triggered a request for options at the next BPR workshop.” 
  
Jennie Barton was given a formal role and a small in-house team to institutionalise the 
strategy, and she proceeded to develop and validate a set of plans over the following nine 
months.  In 1996, Jennie had an on-going role and staff group to support the realisation of 
the strategy. 
 
 
As part of the overall strategy formulation process, Kepner Tregoe trained two members of 
the Executive Team, Kevin Flanagan and Ken Scott, in a programme called “Managing 
Strategic Responsibilities” which was designed to help the Bristol and West to 
communicate the strategy throughout the organisation and ensure individuals understood 
their role in implementing it.  In early 1995, 20 two day workshops were held at which the 
process and content of the strategy were presented to members of the organisation.  The 
workshops were given by all the members of the Executive Team and were opened by John 
Burke, the Chief Executive, thereby demonstrating the importance of and commitment to 
the strategy.  This was followed by a two day review of the strategy by the Executive 
Team, facilitated by Kepner Tregoe, in late 1995. 
 
 
In 1996, the Executive Team, without the help of any external consultancy, began to up-
date and refine the strategy, and decided to involve the next tier of management in the 
review process.  The initial results were promising to the extent that the analyses were 
much richer, more focused and more pragmatic than would have been achieved by the 
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Executive Team on its own.  The feeling within the Executive Team was that the output 
was better and it warranted involving more people in the future.  However, about half the 
senior managers involved initially “didn’t do their homework”, which came as a surprise to 
the Executive Team and was something they intended to explore with the senior managers 
concerned. 
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Attachment 
 
 
Bristol and West Strategy Formulation Team 
 
Mark Abbot*, Head of Treasury  
Peter Beeke, Director of Management Services 
John Burke, Chief Executive 
Kevin Flanagan, Group Services Director 
Ian Kennedy, Group Operations Director 
Ken Scott, Managing Director of Hamptons 
Jeff Warren, Deputy Chief Executive and Finance Director 
 
(* not a member of the Executive Team) 
 
Driving Forces 
 
Products Offered 
Low-Cost Production Capability 
Markets Served 
Return/ Profit 
Technology 
Operations Capability 
Method of Distribution/ Sale 
Natural Resources 
 
(Description of the driving forces and guideline for their use are provided in “Vision in 
Action” published by Kepner Tregoe; “Driving Forces” is protected by copyright)  
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Preface 
 
This case study is part of a PhD research project looking at the contribution of 
management consultants to processes of strategic change within organisations.  The case 
material has come from in-depth interviews of a selection of individuals within The Post 
Office and Kepner Tregoe and documentary information developed at the time of the 
intervention.  The account below is a distillation and partial analysis by the researcher of 
the information available, and therefore is, by definition, incomplete and influenced by the 
research agenda.  The purpose of the account is to set out the context and logic of the 
intervention and to elaborate a “first order” analysis of the key contributions, congruent 
with the experience and understanding of those involved.   The drafting of this case 
provides a springboard for further analysis and theory development, in line with the overall 
research methodology. 
 
The co-operation of all those involved in the research is greatly appreciated.  The 
researcher asks that no part of this case study be reproduced without his prior agreement. 
 
 
Background 
 
In early 1994, The Post Office commissioned Kepner Tregoe, a firm of management 
consultants, to help the Post Office Executive Committee (POEC) develop a business 
strategy for The Post Office Group. 
 
About a decade earlier, The Post Office had broken up the overall business into four core 
operating Divisions, Royal Mail, Parcelforce, Post Office Counters and SSL, the smallest 
organisation, which dealt with TV licenses.  The logic for the creation of relatively 
autonomous Divisions was to create a greater understanding of the individual businesses 
and the markets they served, and of the cost economics of serving those markets.  As time 
passed, these Divisions began to assume their own identities and cultures, and a sense of 
internal cohesion. 
 
At the time of the Kepner Tregoe intervention, The Post Office had recently undergone a 
re-organisation in which the roles of Chairman and Chief Executive had been split.  Sir 
Michael Heron had been appointed as part time Chairman, and Bill Cockburn had been 
appointed Chief Executive.  Bill Cockburn had been the Managing Director of Royal Mail, 
by far the largest of the operating Divisions of The Post Office.  Royal Mail had a 
monopoly on the collection and distribution of letters and small packets, where the charge 
was less than a threshold level set by legislation and well above the costs of distribution.  
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Royal Mail had experienced strong financial performance over the previous few years.  
Parcelforce, on the other hand, was in direct competition with some of the national and 
international organisations which specialised in documents distribution, mainly in the 
guaranteed overnight delivery segment of the market.  The Parcelforce experience had been 
one of sustained losses, as the operating costs, once pooled with those of Royal Mail, were 
separated and allocated to Parcelforce.  Post Office Counters too had experienced poor 
performance and was heavily dependent on financial transactions emanating from 
Government Departments, such as the payment of retirement pensions to the public.  Post 
Office Counters was generally seen as being quite distinct, in terms of markets and 
operations, from Royal Mail and Parcelforce, with only about one quarter of its business 
coming from other Divisions within The Post Office. 
 
The challenges faced by The Post Office in respect to its market environment were 
complicated by being part of the public sector and therefore subject to Government policy, 
and particularly the need to reduce the public sector borrowing requirement.  A significant 
proportion of the profits generated by The Post Office went directly to the Treasury.  
Historically, The Post Office had not been allowed, in the view of many insiders, to invest 
as much of its operating profits as it might have done had it been a private sector company.  
Moreover, the prevailing philosophy throughout the late 1980’s and early 1990’s in respect 
of “public sector businesses”, such as The Post Office and British Rail, favoured their 
privatisation, in part or whole.  This created uncertainty within The Post Office and a 
tendency to “second guess” Government policy rather than focusing single-mindedly on 
market and operating demands. 
 
 
The Commissioning of Kepner Tregoe 
 
While Managing Director of Royal Mail, Bill Cockburn had employed Kepner Tregoe to 
help the Royal Mail Board to develop its strategy.  Mike Freedman had been the lead 
consultant for the Royal Mail intervention and had formed a close working relationship 
with Bill Cockburn. 
 
Bill Cockburn was very comfortable with the Kepner Tregoe approach and considered it an 
advantage that Kepner Tregoe were offering a purely process approach, without content.  
Having gone through the Kepner Tregoe process for formulating strategy at Royal Mail, he 
had a feel for how the process would unfold and what it entailed.  Bill Cockburn also 
respected Mike Freedman and thought he was competent and able to provide the assistance 
he was looking for.  Bill Cockburn approached Mike Freedman with a view to Kepner 
Tregoe helping the Group Executive Committee, as he had done for the Royal Mail Board: 
 
“When Bill (Cockburn) was promoted to be Chief Executive at The Post Office, one 
of the first things he did was call me - Mike, we need to do for The Post Office what 
we have done for Royal Mail.  The job is different and bigger and going to be more 
difficult, would you like to do it?” 
 
Bill Cockburn wanted a methodology which enabled the Post Office Executive Committee 
(POEC) to go through a process of self examination.  Kepner Tregoe would provide the 
analytical structure, concepts and tools and would  facilitate the process, while The Post 
Office’s top managers would generate the content and shape of the strategy.   Bill 
Cockburn wanted the POEC, as a team, to create its own vision and set of aspirations. 
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Bill Cockburn was keen to involve external consultants to ensure that the analyses were not 
too inward focused, and to challenge and act as a catalyst in respect of the POEC 
deliberations.  He perceived a real and substantial threat of long term substitution through 
technology, which offered far lower cost methods of data transmission compared to the 
Royal Mail’s high fixed cost infrastructure.  The Royal Mail’s monopoly had enabled 
prices to be increased without significant reductions in volume, leading to sustained profits 
growth.  But Bill Cockburn believed that such a trend could not continue indefinitely since 
customers, offered new possibilities, would no longer tolerate price rises.  He was 
concerned that, in the absence of some external stimulus, the thinking and the resulting 
strategy would be too incremental, and the POEC would not set itself sufficiently high 
aspirations in terms of financial targets and scale of change: 
 
“The customer market is changing, competition is changing, and really the danger 
in a stable, public sector business like The Post Office, which is very successful, 
very resilient, and very profitable, the real danger is complacency.” 
 
Bill Cockburn was determined that The Post Office should carve for itself a dominant role 
in its future markets by instigating the necessary changes early, while it was still successful 
and had the time and the resources on its side.  He felt that it would have been much harder 
to make changes once competition had begun to erode The Post Office’s traditional 
markets. 
 
Bill Cockburn arranged for the POEC to meet Mike Freedman.  Mike Freedman presented  
to the POEC at one of the regular meetings and described how Kepner Tregoe operated and 
what was involved in the strategy formulation process.  Mike Freedman made a point of 
stressing that if The Post Office took on Kepner Tregoe it took on the process in its 
entirety, and the POEC would be taken through the process.  It was clear to the members of 
the POEC that Bill Cockburn wanted to use Kepner Tregoe.  In general, they thought that 
the methodology and chemistry were right.  The POEC members were also reassured by the 
fact that Kepner Tregoe had worked with Royal Mail, and apart from Bill Cockburn, two of 
their number appeared comfortable with and supportive of having Kepner Tregoe carry out 
a similar intervention.   Jerry Cope, Managing Director, Strategy and Personnel, and Kevin 
Williams, Managing Director of Parcelforce, had both been involved in formulating Royal 
Mail’s strategy. 
 
 
The Structure and Logic of the Strategy Formulation Intervention 
 
The intervention was made up of 6 workshops, each lasting two days, with approximately 
one month between each workshop.  In outline, the structure of the Kepner Tregoe process 
was one of identifying the factors in the environment affecting an organisation, 
understanding the organisation's relative strengths, choosing a key driver from a list drawn 
up by Kepner Tregoe, and then developing the exact details of the strategy.  Kepner Tregoe 
provided the analytical framework; in essence the questions that needed to be answered and 
the logical sequence for answering those questions to develop a strategy.  They introduced 
and explained a range of decision making and analytical techniques to support the 
answering of those questions and the consultants acted as facilitators during the 
discussions. 
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Kepner Tregoe based its approach on a strongly held belief within the firm that senior 
managers should carry out the analyses themselves since this generates greater 
understanding of the issues surrounding strategy formulation and greater ownership of the 
chosen strategy.  If managers carry out the analyses they are more likely to implement the 
strategy and are better placed to develop strategy in the future.  An objective of the 
intervention, from Kepner Tregoe's perspective, was to educate senior managers in the 
processes involved in formulating a business strategy. 
 
Kepner Tregoe did not claim to have any particular insight into The Post Office as a 
business, into logistics and distribution, nor into retail financial services.  Their stated core 
expertise was in facilitating the process through which The Post Office would determine its 
own strategy. 
 
Participation in the workshops was restricted (see Attachment) to the members of the 
POEC plus Duncan Hine, who had particular technology expertise, and Richard Adams, 
Group Planning Director.  The process required the POEC members to ask others within 
The Post Office for specific information.  Again, the restriction of the deliberations to the 
most senior managers reflected a firmly held belief within Kepner Tregoe that strategy 
formulation was the prerogative and responsibility of senior management.  The process was 
designed to embed all the information and logic for specific decisions within the POEC.  
On practical grounds too, the number of people attending the workshops had to be limited 
to facilitate open discussion and debate. 
 
Mike Freedman led the intervention, supported by Ann Orton, another experienced Kepner 
Tregoe consultant, and a more junior person, Charlotte Alston.  Mike Freedman and Ann 
Orton led the various workshop sessions and facilitated the debates and analyses by the 
(extended) POEC team, while Charlotte Alston captured the discussions and subsequently 
produced full reports of the workshop deliberations.  These reports were circulated to 
members of  the POEC a few days after each of the workshops for their comments. 
 
 
Processes of Separation and Absorption 
 
The Kepner Tregoe intervention and its effects on the strategic direction of The Post Office 
can be understood in terms of the interplay and tension between the efforts to separate 
strategy formulation from other activities and influences, and the insidious pressures 
drawing or absorbing the intervention into the political and cultural maelstrom of 
organisational life. 
 
Kepner Tregoe’s intervention was intended to and did achieve some degree of separation 
and thereby influence and contribute to the thinking and subsequent actions of the POEC in 
three distinct, but inter-related, ways. 
 
First, the intervention itself supported the crystallisation of issues that The Post Office’s 
management had to deal with, their scope and the resulting deliberations.  Specifically, the 
intervention provided the focus for and the means of marshalling the commitment of POEC 
to develop a formal group strategy.  The intervention sought to define and bound the issues 
to be discussed in developing a strategy for The Post Office, and to capture the logic and a 
synthesis of the resulting strategy. 
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Secondly, the intervention enabled the POEC to address certain strategic issues in a 
different way and thereby gain a new perspective and insight.  The Kepner Tregoe 
approach addressed strategy in a more systematic and formal fashion and used different 
conceptual frameworks and techniques.  In addition, the presence of Mike Freedman and 
Ann Orton provided a challenge to the way the POEC were looking at issues, from the 
perspectives of two outsiders. 
 
Thirdly, the setting and external facilitation generated different patterns of interactions 
between the members of the POEC, allowing members to step outside, at least partially, 
their customary roles and routine dialogues. 
 
However, the intervention was not impervious to the history, politics, culture and business 
environment of The Post Office and its Divisions, which acted like a gravitational force, 
resisting the attempt to address group strategy in isolation and on its own terms.   These 
factors shaped the understanding and influenced the reactions of members of POEC who 
were involved in the strategy formulation process itself, and of senior managers within The 
Post Office, who knew of the intervention but were not party to the discussions. 
 
A political undercurrent, in terms of change agendas and Divisional interest, permeated the 
debates of the POEC.  Individual members of the POEC acknowledged and agreed with the 
stated, objective purpose of the intervention, but could not help also interpreting the aims 
and the stream of activities and outcomes which made up the intervention in terms of the 
politics of the situation.  This interpretation tended to emphasise, rather than play down or 
help set aside, divergence of interests and the existing power structure.  In addition, 
external events, or more specifically the organisational implications attributed to external 
events or potential developments, insinuated themselves into and clouded the business 
strategy deliberations. 
 
The senior managers within the Divisions, who were not directly involved in the strategy 
formulation, talked about and positioned the intervention in relation to their understanding 
of what was happening and why.  The separation of strategy formulation from other 
organisational processes created uncertainty and raised concerns, which in some cases were 
shared with colleagues.  Some of them positioned what was happening as marginal while 
others proactively sought to influence the course of the intervention itself .  The 
intervention was woven into the way senior managers made sense of the organisation and 
their roles. 
 
In essence, the Kepner Tregoe intervention sought to separate certain processes, activities 
and decisions from the complexity and multi-dimensional nature of the organisation, while 
other processes and interpretations of events were re-absorbing it. 
 
Processes of Separation 
 
 Crystallisation 
 
The commissioning of Kepner Tregoe separated and raised the profile of group strategy 
issues and the need to define the business rationale for being a group.  The re-organisation 
had created two roles, Chairman and Chief Executive, which were previously combined,  
and had moved senior and highly influential managers from the individual businesses to the 
group centre. There was a felt need, shared to differing extents by the members of the 
The Post Office Case Study 166
POEC, to review the direction The Post Office was taking and to understand what benefits 
and synergies could be extracted from being a group, as opposed to a number of disparate 
businesses with trading relationships. As one POEC member expressed it: 
 
“I think when we started there were number of us who were probably... well, we 
were committed to the idea that we ought to go through this kind of exercise, we 
were prepared to take it on trust from those who had been through it.... I think if 
anything there was a constructive bit of cynicism.” 
 
The intervention provided the medium to address the issue of a group strategy and, as it 
proceeded, the cynicism in respect to the process and its objective reduced.  The 
discussions surfaced a recognition that the issues of group strategy were important and 
relevant: 
 
“... it really did make you think hard and we felt we were doing something that was 
right, we were trying to create a strategy for The Post Office.  It was important that 
we did it, and that was supposedly what our role was...  As we saw the logic of the 
process unfolding, a lot of that logic helped, and therefore we became slightly less 
cynical about the process.” 
POEC member 
 
“(The intervention) did force us to confront a number of key issues like: Which 
markets do you want to be in?  How are you going to tackles some of these issues? 
How are you going to deal with technology?....” 
POEC member 
 
The intervention also formally disconnected the issue of business strategy from other issues 
within The Post Office, especially the issue of privatisation.  There was a general 
awareness within the Post Office of the need to develop a strategy and Kepner Tregoe 
facilitated and enhanced the process by maintaining a separation between the issue of 
status, specifically whether The Post Office remained in the public sector, from strategy 
issues, specifically the markets served and products offered.   The views of the Government 
in deciding whether or not to grant The Post Office “powers” to undertake new activities 
were seen as critical, if the resulting strategy were to be realistic.  The separation during the 
strategy review helped to clarify the issues that could and needed to be addressed 
independent of ownership: 
 
“And of course during it all we had the privatisation debate.  But my position was 
very strong, and they accepted that, and that was - you need a strategy regardless of 
who owns you, and privatisation will have an impact in terms of affordability and 
how adventurous you can be and the scope of things, but fundamentally you need to 
do this work anyway, and that was accepted.” 
Kepner Tregoe consultant 
 
“We had this issue: Are we going to be privatised? What degree of commercial 
freedom are we going to get?, and a lot of externalising the problem, it’s all 
Government’s fault.  Now actually, KT tried very hard to say no, it’s not 
Government’s fault, everybody has these sort of problems and your job is to manage 
Government, which is absolutely right.” 
POEC member 
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Kepner Tregoe documented the development of the final strategy and the analyses and 
discussions undertaken at each stage of the formulation process, and prompted the POEC 
members to synthesise the agreed strategy in the form of a clearly articulated set of 
statements: 
 
“They did produce a bible of what we had done, so even now I can track, a little bit, 
about how we got from A to B to C to D to E in logic terms...” 
POEC member 
 
“We had to write the strategy in a couple of pages and that is quite an interesting 
and hard technique, because you start to make every word mean something at that 
point in time.  It gets a bit like word-smithing, but it is more than that for the people 
who owned it.” 
POEC member 
 
In essence, the intervention helped the POEC to crystallise and solidify what otherwise 
might have been more vague and fleeting. The intervention helped them to come together, 
outside their routine meetings, and to participate in a process with a clearly defined 
purpose, structure and schedule.   The Kepner Tregoe process focused them on a bounded 
set of issues and captured the resulting deliberations and consensus in a tangible form. 
 
 Different Conceptual Framework and Perspective 
 
The bounding of the issues to be discussed as part of the strategy formulation exercise 
facilitated the application of a well established analytical methodology and style of 
facilitation.  The strategy formulation process used by Kepner Tregoe was structured, 
logical and sequential, and provided the intellectual challenge and rigor which would not 
otherwise have been applied by the POEC to strategy deliberations: 
 
“I think we were perfectly capable of developing a strategy.  I don’t think we were 
necessarily very good at critiquing that strategy.  I don’t think we would have had a 
very good methodology to arrive at that strategy, in a sense it would have been less 
rigorous in its approach...  (Consultants) add a lot of value in terms of rigor of 
approach, facilitation, challenge, models and methodology.” 
POEC member 
 
The demonstrable rigor of the process was seen, by one POEC member, as critical in 
developing a credible and meaningful strategy: 
 
“It’s necessary... to really think deeply about what you do with the business, and 
really the credibility of the analyses and the aspirations, and really the robustness 
and internal consistency of what you are saying.... imagine from the process 
emerged hard targets, unless you can position them within the organisation 
persuasively, then the risk is that they will be seen to be a bit of consultancy 
gimmickry and they won’t command respect, authority and credibility.” 
 
The structure imposed a framework and discipline which was not common practice within 
the POEC and tended, in the view of another POEC member, to: 
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“drive out individual perceptions and individual flair and, if you like, the sort of 
instinctive stuff which is very difficult to fit either into an EFQM model or a KT 
model, or any other bloody model.” 
 
The intervention was helpful in getting the POEC to see the market served by The Post 
Office, and Royal Mail in particular, in new ways.  Historically, the Royal Mail monopoly 
had encouraged managers to focus on the supply side since the demand side was presumed 
given.  The process created a framework or ways of looking at strategy which did not to 
exist before within the organisation, by introducing novel perspectives, thought processes 
and analyses: 
 
“The KT thing did help to show us that there is another side to the coin; 
understanding the markets and how they are changing, understanding the 
competitive pressures, understanding the substitutional pressure, barriers to entry in 
different markets and all Porter’s stuff.” 
POEC member 
 
At the heart of the Kepner Tregoe strategy formulation process were a number of “Driving 
Forces” (see Attachment) which Kepner Tregoe believed spanned and characterised the 
different strategy options available.  Analytical and decision making techniques were used 
to rank the driving forces against The Post Office’s relative strengths and the values of the 
organisation, and then to choose one driving force around which to develop the specific 
details of the strategy.  The process design funnelled the POEC towards the choice of a 
single driving force. 
 
The pressure to develop a strategy around a single driving force was considered by many 
POEC members to be too restrictive, and they formed the impression that everything was 
made to fit the process.  In particular, the choice of  “method of distribution” driving force 
was seen as appropriate for Royal Mail and Parcelforce, but far less appropriate for the Post 
Office Counters business which was essentially involved in performing retail financial 
transactions.  While Post Office Counters branches were a source of business for Royal 
Mail’s distribution infrastructure, this was a relatively small part of the overall Counters’ 
business.  The result was a perceived lack of cohesion in the final strategy statement. 
 
The analytical tools and techniques were only one part of the “process”.  The capability and 
experience of the facilitators, especially Mike Freedman, were seen as a major contribution 
to the success of the intervention, in the eyes of the POEC members, particularly in their 
ability to draw out and synthesise issues: 
 
“... the structure and content came out of the debate, and I think Mike played an  
important part, like a poultice, if you like, drawing out issues and views.” 
 
“In terms of their direct interventions, to come up with the shaft of light, seeing us 
spinning, because inevitably in the team occasionally you sort of hover... I think that 
is the test of a good facilitator and a good bright consultant, who can take all the 
murmurings and mutterings and see and articulate what people are trying to do, I 
think there were occasions from memory when they did do that.” 
 
The intervention philosophy and approach of Kepner Tregoe is to remain completely “in 
process” and not be drawn into the content of the debates; posing questions without giving 
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any clues as to what the answers might be.  The role was seen as one of catalyst for the 
debates and devil’s advocate, ensuring that due consideration had been given to specific 
issues before moving on.  Nonetheless, the external perspective and experience of similar 
strategy formulation efforts came through indirectly in the questions asked and challenges 
made: 
 
“Well, they weren’t meant to, they did of course because any rational, any 
intelligent people, and they were intelligent people, have got opinions on things.  So 
they brought content, certainly in the sense of challenge, and challenge sometimes 
was their own views...”  
POEC member 
 
“In all strategy projects we get to the point where we think the client is heading in a 
direction that is wrong, and that is where our tools and techniques and our 
facilitation skills come in.  So we would test very, very, hard, where we know either 
from an intellectual or intuitive or whatever source that they may be heading for 
something which was not appropriate.” 
Kepner Tregoe consultant 
 
The perceived value of the experience within a purely process approach came from 
knowing which issues needed to be covered and which analyses and debates were 
particularly important and required more thought and effort: 
 
“Doing it on your own, you run the risk of not bringing in the external, we have 
done it in other companies stuff... the other risk is that you could miss something 
important, you could miss something important without knowing it, because at least 
the consultancy are treading a well trodden path for them... they can bring you back 
in a way which maybe internally you will say - OK, we have done that bit we will 
move on.” 
POEC member 
 
The Kepner Tregoe process and techniques, as applied by Mike Freedman and Ann Orton, 
enabled the Executive Team to look at The Post Office, its strategy and the competitive 
environment in a new way. 
  
 Different Patterns of Interactions 
 
The intervention took the POEC outside the normal patterns of interaction both within the 
POEC and between the Executive and other members of the organisation.  The discussions 
were non-routine, both in terms of the subject matter and the contributions made by 
individuals. 
 
Among the key benefits from using external consultants was a view that they facilitated the 
POEC in developing its own strategy while at the same time preventing the POEC from 
being distracted and from losing sight of the strategy issues: 
 
“Whenever the conversation started veering off at some tangent, he (Mike 
Freedman) would try to bring us back to the process.” 
POEC member 
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POEC member:  “Mike did not let us give up, he kept on challenging, livening the 
        process.” 
Researcher:    “He sounds like a drill sergeant.” 
POEC member:  “Maybe that’s what we needed.” 
 
The Kepner Tregoe consultants had great confidence in the process and analytical 
techniques, having used them successfully in other interventions, and carried the process 
through to its conclusion.   Some POEC members found the discipline and strictures 
imposed by the process frustrating: 
 
“It was very rigid, too rigid, if you want a criticism of it.  You know, it was clearly a 
product that they were well versed and very expert at using, and we went in one end 
of the tunnel and we were not allowed to come out other than at the other end of the 
tunnel, and that was frustrating at times.” 
 
The rigidity and discipline imposed by Kepner Tregoe was described by one POEC 
member as vital in achieving the depth and clarity of thought: 
 
“The process stuff, what we got, was actually a great sense like working with 
terrorists; you start off hating them, then after a while you start liking them, in spite 
of all the hating, but it’s necessary to go through this pain to really think deeply...” 
 
The intervention also provided an opportunity for the POEC members to work together, 
which did not happen frequently since the individual Divisions were relatively autonomous 
and had their own operating Boards.  As one POEC member commented, the intervention: 
 
“... got the top Executive together, for quite long periods of time as a team, thinking 
hard about where they wanted to try and take the business.  Now, no matter how 
good or bad all that was, of itself it was a very good issue, very good point.”  
 
The presence of the consultants, in their role of directing and facilitating the debates, also 
appeared to alter to some extent the interpersonal dynamics of the situation.  The 
consultants were perceived, by some POEC members, to be able to say things and make 
certain challenges which they themselves would not have been comfortable in doing.  
Hierarchical power, while ever present, was tempered, allowing a more open debate and a 
sharing of views, and this was seen as a central role played by the facilitators: 
 
“On one occasion I actually said - If you (Bill Cockburn) don’t shut up, I will thump 
you.  I mean I really said that because he was trying to run the process, but that 
would have happened anyway because he is such a forceful personality.” 
Kepner Tregoe consultant 
 
The intervention was designed in such a way that Kepner Tregoe had relatively little 
contact with Post Office managers who were not involved in the workshops. Most of the 
data collection and analyses were undertaken exclusively by the POEC.  Other managers 
were given relatively minor tasks and asked to undertake them in fairly circumscribed 
ways, such as filling in standard questionnaires.  The whole intervention was kept low key, 
with relatively few people formally knowing about it, and the activities revolved around the 
POEC.   The POEC was in a sense detached, for the purposes of formulating the group 
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strategy, from the senior managers within the businesses and the centre who were kept at 
arms length.  In the words of one POEC member and Divisional Managing Director : 
 
“Well I tried to protect them (Divisional Board members) from it mostly... I wanted 
to play my part of the POEC discussions, but in a way that didn’t disrupt them or 
make them too anxious.  And I really kept them apart from it.  I mean I had to ask 
them for information and I kept them broadly in touch with what was happening, 
but without giving them a blow by blow account of how this was all going.” 
 
 
The ways in which the Kepner Tregoe intervention influenced the thinking and subsequent 
actions of the Executive Team were mutually dependent and supportive.  The initial 
commitment to the process and the bounding of the issues to be discussed was supported by 
a tightly defined process and prescribed analytical models.  The facilitation and external 
management of the Team kept the debate within the confines of the analytical steps which 
made up the process.  The detachment and presence of the consultants appeared to facilitate 
the process of dialogue within the POEC.  The messiness, complications, pressures and 
baggage of the “outside world” were suspended, in part and temporarily, while the POEC 
was formulating a group strategy. 
 
 
Processes of Absorption 
 
 Existing Power Structures and Agendas 
 
The intended or potential impact that the intervention could have had on strategic change in 
The Post Office was limited by the strength of the processes which operated to “politicise” 
what was happening.  Specifically, the hierarchy and power structures of The Post Office 
exerted a strong influence on the decision making processes, introducing the tensions and 
issues which the intervention was seeking to set aside in formulating the group strategy. 
 
The stated purpose of the intervention was to develop a group strategy.  The intervention, 
though, was seen as instigated and led by Bill Cockburn as a way of shaking up The Post 
Office, and, by some members of the POEC, as a way of defining his new role.  There was 
a perception, at the outset of the intervention, that there may have been a hidden agenda: 
 
“I think one of the issues for me was: Was this a serious exercise, were we going 
into this with an open mind, was it a genuine attempt to bring the experience and 
expertise and brain power of the Executive Committee to bear on the strategic 
issues facing the Corporation on the one hand, or was it on the other hand a means 
by which Bill intended to have his way?” 
POEC member 
 
“....we have a (separate) Post Office Chief Executive for the first time... this is a 
signal that we are actually going to re-integrate and see the re-emergence of the 
GPO, if you like one great edifice.  I think that was a low level concern....  But I 
think it was made fairly clear that we would follow the process and see where it 
led.” 
POEC member 
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This uncertainty and element of suspicion was one source of the “constructive bit of 
cynicism” and generated, in part, the “creative tension” which permeated the discussions.  
It was also transmitted to senior managers outside the POEC: 
 
“I always got the impression from being on the edge of the KT process that it was 
one the group felt - well, Bill wants to do this, he has brought the consultants in, we 
had better go along with it - and them all hoping that once they came out of the 
meetings they could just go back to business as usual.” 
 
As the intervention proceeded, the strong influence of Bill Cockburn on the process, 
perceived by some of the other members of the POEC, tended to detract from its stated 
aims of neutrality and objectivity: 
 
“Bill seemed to lead the process this time far more strongly, as if he had a view on 
what the outcome would be, and creating a far stronger role for the centre....  So I 
think there was not an air of manipulation, but a sense of - well, of course we have 
to go in that direction.” 
 
It was recognised by those POEC members who had been party to the Royal Mail strategy 
formulation that the process could be steered towards choosing a specific driving force by 
careful selection and weighting of relative strengths attributed to The Post Office and the 
core values of the organisation.  The output from the steps and techniques used in the 
process were no longer regarded as purely the results of objective analyses.  Once this 
perception or even suspicion was formed, personal and Divisional interests became 
legitimate bases for supporting or otherwise the strategic direction emerging from the 
process.  Thus the Kepner Tregoe intervention was, in part, absorbed into the political 
processes at work within the Post Office: 
 
“Bill had his own view about what would happen, and strategy was something for 
him to do.  And he had to deal with us because we were running the businesses... It 
had the effect of bringing me and ..(researcher omitted)..closer together...” 
Divisional Managing Director 
 
Bill Cockburn did have regular discussions with Mike Freedman to take stock of what had 
happened in the workshops and to look at ways of making the process more effective.  
They discussed when certain issues should be introduced in order to make the next step 
more meaningful and relevant.  This dialogue between the client and the lead consultant 
was a common practice for Kepner Tregoe, and provided a way of raising issues which 
neither party wanted to discuss in public.  Bill Cockburn felt that this exchange was 
important, but was also conscious that the neutrality and integrity of the Kepner Tregoe 
consultants should not be compromised: 
 
“Having a sycophantic consultant in charge destroys the challenge, to have 
credibility as it were.  If the team thinks that the consultant is your creature, it won’t 
have the same effect.  And that is the skill of the consultant, to make sure that he 
doesn’t intrude himself and be sensitive to it...  He has got to win their confidence, 
which he did.” 
 
Despite Mike Freedman’s efforts to assert and demonstrate his neutrality and objectivity, 
there was a perception among some of the POEC members that Kepner Tregoe were not 
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immune from the power structures within The Post Office and the political agendas.  There 
was a belief that a degree of collusion existed between Mike Freedman and Bill Cockburn: 
 
“I would say that there was more collusion between Bill and Mike (than during the 
Royal Mail strategy formulation), and it was obvious.... Clearly we didn’t discuss 
those sort of things.” 
POEC member 
 
Some POEC members felt that Bill Cockburn was taking too active a role in running the 
process and tended to close down the debate on some issues, reflecting a pre-determined 
view of what was the appropriate strategy.  For many of the POEC members, the targets set 
as a result of the strategy formulation process were a clear manifestation of Bill Cockburn’s 
influence, and represented a point at which they began to disassociate themselves from the 
process and its outcomes: 
 
“It (the strategy formulation process) began to lose coherence towards the end.  
There was a point at which we had to decide on the strategic ambitions, in terms of 
growth, in terms of cost reduction, and we had this three legged stool idea that Bill 
had.  And he had the numbers in his head which had been cooked up before.” 
POEC member 
 
“I’m sure if you talk to one or two of my colleagues they will say - well, I never felt 
committed to those numbers.” 
POEC member 
 
The influence and strong personality of Bill Cockburn played a part in creating a 
dichotomy between what some of the POEC members said and agreed in public and what 
they thought personally.  One POEC member, on reflection, wished he had been more open 
about his concerns during the process: 
 
“Well, looking back, perhaps I should have been a bit more honest, a bit stronger in 
my view.” 
 
This perceived “politicisation” of the intervention raised questions over the objectivity and 
neutrality of the consultants and their process and led to the emergence of political game 
playing and interactions based on vested interests.   The overt aim of formulating a 
rationally based Group strategy became, for some POEC members, part of a wider debate. 
  
External Context 
 
The POEC members were influenced by factors outside the organisation and their 
immediate control.  These tended to reinforce the existing pattern of thinking and acting, 
making it more difficult to take a step back and address the strategy from a different 
perspective.  The privatisation issue was a major factor which encroached significantly on 
the boundaries or scope set out as part of the strategy discussions: 
 
“We were in the middle of the privatisation debate, or was just heading towards us, 
and that tended to blow us away a bit in terms of management capacity to deal with 
strategic direction whilst we were in this sort of governance issue.... very strong 
element of change which did actually cloud some of the discussions.” 
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POEC member 
 
The issue of privatisation represented, in the eyes of one POEC member, an unspoken “sub-
text” which ran through the deliberations.  It was also divisive to the extent that the 
Divisional Managing Directors appeared to keep an eye on the interests of their businesses 
when considering the group strategy.  The concern was that, as a condition of privatisation, 
The Post Office as a group might have to be split up, with some Divisions remaining in the 
public sector.  Some POEC members perceived Bill Cockburn to be very keen on 
privatisation, almost irrespective of the conditions.  Consequently, there was a desire to 
ensure that at the end of the strategy formulation, the individual businesses had “reasonable 
ground to stand on” should only part of The Post Office have been privatised.  The debate 
over privatisation also raised issues regarding the likelihood that the strategy would be 
implemented, and implicitly the level of commitment to the Kepner Tregoe process: 
 
“It was almost as if there was an acceptance that if privatisation went down, the 
admiral would change, therefore the flotilla would disperse, so just sit tight guys 
and wait for the hurricane to blow itself out.” 
POEC member 
 
“It was not easy to commit oneself to an agenda which I knew and most people 
knew wasn’t a real one and would have changed at the blink of an eye if the politics 
changed.” 
POEC member 
 
Internal Context 
 
Another contextual influence on the intervention came from within the organisation.  The 
senior managers at the centre and in the Divisions were aware of the Kepner Tregoe 
intervention, but were relatively uninformed about the nature of the process and concerned 
over its potential outcomes: 
 
“Whenever a group like this Board gets together it is a bit like being in a goldfish 
bowl.  People know you are doing it and they are all looking - well, what is going to 
come out of it ? What is going to happen ?” 
POEC member 
 
 “... bunch of consultants turn up and talk to the important people in the business, 
who then say your Managing Director disappears for a while.  He is not very clear 
why he is being dragged down, certainly he hasn’t got a big picture... he is probably 
told not to communicate for a bit.  So you get this silence when people start 
speculating as to what is going on.” 
Senior Manager outside the POEC 
 
Despite the attempts to keep the Kepner Tregoe intervention low profile, it was widely 
talked about within The Post Office.  Senior managers outside the POEC tended to be 
indignant at not being involved, and believed that the detachment, and implicit elitism, 
imposed by the Kepner Tregoe process was inappropriate in terms of securing a widespread 
understanding of the thinking behind the strategy: 
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“It was partly the bolshi nature of most of the Post Office Directors - how dare the 
POEC go away and dream up this stuff without involving any of us, after all we are 
the people running the businesses.” 
Senior Manager outside the POEC 
 
“You can’t have a little group of six or seven, even the top team, working in a 
complete vacuum from everybody else’s thinking.” 
Senior Manager outside the POEC 
 
The intervention also generated resentment among some senior managers, who perceived 
that they had been tasked with the development of strategy and were better equipped and 
skilled to do so.  They were not sure how the deliberations of the POEC were going to help 
them meet their targets nor why they should want to duplicate, without admitting it, the 
activities performed within the Divisions.  The intervention triggered a number of defensive 
reactions within The Post Office: 
 
“We had heard that KT were coming in so we did a bit of foraging around to find 
out who these foreign invaders were and what their process was.  And I suppose 
like all consultancy exercises completely poo-pooed it because it didn’t actually fit 
with our view of life.” 
Senior Manager outside the POEC 
 
“We went out of our way to find out a bit more about it, so although this wasn’t 
pressed upon us, and indeed the communication was a bit haphazard, we invited a 
consultant from KT to come and brief our top team.” 
Senior Manager outside the POEC 
 
At one level, the Kepner Tregoe analytical framework and intervention process was 
positioned as “just a technique” and “a strategic planning methodology from the ‘70s”, 
which was being applied in a fairly standard way, and to some extent dismissed as 
irrelevant: 
 
 “We felt that the very structured methodology that Kepner Tregoe were taking 
them  (POEC) through didn’t include enough on scenario planning... wasn’t going 
to come to anything” 
Senior Manager outside the POEC 
 
At another level, proactive initiatives were set in train to get a better understanding of the 
Kepner Tregoe process and so to influence the intervention: 
  
“... get the book and read it, and to force the issue of being communicated to by the 
consultants, because (this was) the only way we were going to understand what the 
bloody hell was going on...  We could work out what the politics of it were clearly... 
but the issue was to try and find out what the likely outcome was going to be, and of 
course to thereby influence the outcome.” 
Senior Manager outside the POEC 
 
The influence was exerted indirectly via questions posed of the POEC members as a way of 
raising issues and implicitly casting doubt over the validity of the framework and process.  
In some cases senior managers provided POEC members with “briefings” designed to 
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“minimise the damage the Group might do” on the grounds that “we know our business 
better than they do.”  In other cases, senior managers tried to introduce frameworks, 
analyses and ideas, emanating from other studies, into the Kepner Tregoe process: 
 
“So there is a bit of competition actually, if you like, between the two studies, and 
that partly was a quite human reaction to these people coming in from outside and 
not bothering to talk to anyone except the POEC... a bit of office politics I suppose 
in that sense...” 
Senior Manager outside the POEC 
 
The intervention generated uncertainty and attempts to reduce it: 
 
“It was quite explicit, sit down and talk about - what the bloody hell was going on? 
What’s likely to come out here?  What sort of nonsense are we going to get from 
Group?” 
Senior Manager outside the POEC 
 
“We were trying to understand what was going on because, by doing it in secret, 
clearly it creates uncertainty and then very many more outcomes are possible, and 
so what you are trying to do is to minimise the number of potential outcomes.... 
faced with a great deal of uncertainty one behaves differently that when faced with 
a known change, so the uncertainty of change is the issue not the change itself.” 
Senior Manager outside the POEC 
 
The strategy formulation process took on a life and meaning of its own within the minds of 
senior managers outside the POEC.  These managers tried to influence it and position it in 
ways which might minimise the potential effects of, in their views, adverse outcomes. 
 
 
Post Strategy Formulation 
 
The strategy derived from the Kepner Tregoe intervention was communicated to senior 
managers within The Post Office.  The strategy was alien to the senior managers who could 
not see how it formed a coherent whole nor how it might be realised: 
 
“(A member of POEC) came along and presented the statement out of KT and the 
audience just couldn’t understand where they were coming from....it was for me the 
worst of all mission statements.... where you can’t really get agreement to what is 
incisive and clear so everyone bundles their bits in.... people just couldn’t see how 
on earth we were going to get there, so there was no sense of strategy.” 
Senior Manager outside the POEC 
 
“ What was interesting is that the two pages (which summarised the strategy), 
which was quite important in our ownership, was completely useless outside the 
room because nobody had been through the process of understanding why you put 
the ‘in’ rather than ‘a’, or ‘global’ rather than ‘world’ or whatever.” 
POEC member 
 
There was a sense among senior managers that the “rigid, behind closed doors approach to 
strategy which then burst forth on an unsuspecting world” was not  “founded in reality”.  
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This was compounded by a perceived “lack of commonality” in the way that various 
members of the POEC talked about the strategy at formal presentations.  Moreover, senior 
managers perceived that  “they (POEC members) weren’t all committed to it”. 
 
The POEC members had not been fully aware of the anxiety and resentment generated by 
the remoteness of the Kepner Tregoe process while they were formulating the strategy, but 
became aware of it when they started to communicate the results to the next tier of 
management: 
 
“It wasn’t very good for the next level of most senior managers, who hadn’t been 
involved.  They felt terribly cut off by this process, and, because it was a fairly 
concentrated process, you know there was something funny going on inside a magic 
box as far as the rest of the organisation was concerned.” 
POEC member 
 
The separation facilitated novel conceptions and understanding of The Post Office and its 
competitive situation, but the frameworks and models were at odds with the models 
embedded in the organisation: 
 
“You got a lot of not invented here, you got a lot of clashes, and this comes back to 
the tunnel point, you got a lot of clashes with existing models and systems, being 
used by very big managers within the organisation, which we weren’t able to 
integrate into the process.” 
POEC member 
 
The central point of the strategy; ambitious targets for operational efficiency and cost 
reduction, organic growth and growth from new products and services, overlaid by a new 
organisational framework, became the subject of ridicule: 
 
“... so the three legged stool emerged from all this.  It was an unfortunate choice of 
word actually.  It is something of a message in communication; you don’t call the 
corporate strategy a turd.  So there was a lot of scope for fun and games about it.” 
Senior Manager outside the POEC 
 
As part of the process of implementation, working groups of senior managers were set up to 
develop the strategy further: “we were told we were going to fashion and shape this thing”.  
However, the senior managers perceived that their feedback was not understood, since it 
was founded on a different framework and conception of strategy, and that no-one was 
acting upon it.  On reflection, one of the POEC members felt that the expectations and the 
understanding of managers within the organisation had not been managed well, and equally 
importantly, that momentum should have been sustained once the strategy had been 
communicated: 
 
 “I think that you have got to do it immediately otherwise the thing just withers and 
dies... you have got to move from doing it to communicating it to actually seeing 
something happen pretty fast otherwise everybody says - Oh, they have lost 
interest.” 
 
“The numbers themselves I think almost gained a notoriety too early, and people 
were almost half expecting - well, how are they going to dispose of those numbers? 
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It is like Government targets, when will it be that the politicians find a reason for 
not doing those?” 
 
The formal process of implementing the strategy was slowed down primarily by the debate 
over privatisation, which was seen by most POEC members as overwhelming any other 
strategic issues, and by other factors: 
 
“The thing got caught up in all the politics of privatisation and I think the 
implementation slowed up a bit.... Another development got in the way; the 
Government launched an Efficiency Review, so that took a lot of time.” 
POEC member 
 
While external factors were influential, the lack of commitment and sense of ownership 
also meant that progress was slow.  In the view of POEC members: 
 
“ I think none of us really on the POEC put our full weight behind it.” 
 
“... and of course these guys (senior managers within The Post Office) are big 
players and they won’t overtly, obviously stop it, frustrate it, but little things happen 
and don’t happen, and you have got other things to do so you don’t get on to it.” 
 
The intervention was seen, by one POEC member, to have lacked the mechanisms to 
embed the outcome within the organisation in that: 
 
“we didn’t really embed it in the business... you have a sort of strategy floating 
around somewhere, not anchored down to the ground.... you have to embed it in the 
activities of the organisation, because if you don’t it won’t be delivered.  So pinning 
it into the five year plan, underpinning it by specific actions that have got to take 
place is the only way you will generate the achievement of the strategy.” 
 
In the view of one POEC member, the work done by the POEC as part of the Kepner 
Tregoe intervention appeared to “go into the sand” and “the words are no longer spoken”.   
As one senior managers in a Division put it: “there has been some chaos and like all 
pebbles the water is closing over them”. 
 
 
Following the resignation of Bill Cockburn in late 1995,  John Roberts was appointed to the 
position of Chief Executive of The Post Office.  He set out with his new team to create and 
implement a new vision for The Post Office.  Even as this process was under way in mid-
1996, some vestiges of the Kepner Tregoe work remained, according to various POEC 
members: 
 
“I think the KT intervention, in a sort of dotted line way... you could probably see 
bits of it that have, sort of, gone through into the organisation.”  
 
“I think that you could say that KT is sort of down here, as a foundation on which 
all this is built, but you can’t.... It’s like a house, once the house is built you know 
there are foundations there, but you can’t see them any more, so it’s hard to say 
what influence they are having.  They are probably supporting it all, but you 
couldn’t be sure... it could have fostered new ideas.” 
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The thinking of individuals within the POEC was influenced by the intervention, and some 
of the concepts, experiences and insights transcended their initial use and meaning within 
the strategy formulation process: 
 
“It has probably influenced us more than perhaps we give it credit for.  We quite 
often go back to (Kepner Tregoe intervention), amongst the Board group somebody 
will remember something that we did in that exercise and will use it as a piece of 
learning, it may be a positive piece, it may be negative... It stimulated the thoughts 
that are now on-going; we no longer think of ourselves as a niche UK player or a 
UK-centric player...” 
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Attachment 
 
 
The Post Office Strategy Formulation Team 
 
Richard Adams*, Group Planning Director 
Bill Cockburn, Chief Executive 
Richard Close, Managing Director Finance 
Jerry Cope, Strategy & Business Development Director 
Richard Dykes, Managing Director, Post Office Counters Ltd 
Duncan Hine*, Engineering Director,  Royal Mail 
Peter Howarth, Managing Director, Royal Mail 
Morag Macdonald, The Secretary 
John Roberts, Managing Director, Group Services 
Kevin Williams, Managing Director, Parcelforce 
 
(* not a member of the POEC) 
 
 
Driving Forces 
 
Products Offered 
Low-Cost Production Capability 
Markets Served 
Return/ Profit 
Technology 
Operations Capability 
Method of Distribution/ Sale 
Natural Resources 
 
(Description of the driving forces and guideline for their use are provided in “Vision in 
Action” published by Kepner Tregoe; “Driving Forces” is protected by copyright)  
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Preface 
 
This case study is part of a PhD research project looking at the contribution of 
management consultants to processes of strategic change within organisations.  The 
case material has come from in-depth interviews of a selection of individuals within 
Carousel and Triangle Management Services and documentary information 
developed at the time of the intervention.  The account below is a distillation and 
partial analysis by the researcher of the information available, and therefore is, by 
definition, incomplete and influenced by the research agenda.  The purpose of the 
account is to set out the context and logic of the intervention and to elaborate a “first 
order” analysis of the key contributions, congruent with the experience and 
understanding of those involved.   The drafting of this case provides a springboard for 
further analysis and theory development, in line with the overall research 
methodology. 
 
The co-operation of all those involved in the research is greatly appreciated.  The 
researcher asks that no part of this case study be reproduced without his prior 
agreement. 
 
 
Background 
 
In July 1997, Carousel commissioned Triangle Management Services Ltd, a firm of 
specialist management consultants, to help the shareholders and Directors of Carousel 
determine a way forward for the company. 
 
At the time of the intervention, Carousel was a family-owned transport broker based 
in Sittingbourne, Kent, which was founded by Maureen Martin in 1985.  Carousel 
offered a full range of domestic and international services including UK parcel and 
courier services, UK road haulage, international document and parcel delivery, 
airfreight, seafreight and European haulage.  Almost all of the international business 
was UK export oriented. 
 
Maureen Martin brought her two sons into the business as it started to grow in the late 
1980s.  Both acquired an equity participation in the company.  Michael Martin 
became Sales and Marketing Director, and Graham Martin became Finance Director.  
Carousel also had a Logistics Director, Andrew Ovenden, who was not a member of 
the Martin family and had no equity participation.  Together, the four Directors 
formed the management team and personally supervised the activities of the 
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company’s staff.  In 1994, when Carousel moved into its current (1998) offices, the 
total number of staff and directors was less than a dozen.  This number had grown to 
around thirty people by mid 1997 as a result of a sustained increase in revenue and 
volume of business. 
 
Despite this growth in revenue, the profit, adjusted for Directors’ remuneration and 
pension contributions, was forecast to be less in 1997 than in the previous year.  This 
financial position was partly attributed by the Directors, to changes in the market, 
especially new entrants offering low rates.  The Directors, and to an extent the staff, 
found themselves working increasingly long hours and at weekends without any 
corresponding growth in profits. 
 
The Directors spent most of their time running the day to day operations and 
troubleshooting, and little time was dedicated to formal management meetings, which 
were squeezed in either before or after their twelve to fourteen hours working days.  
By Summer 1997, customers had started to complain that the service, a cornerstone of 
the Carousel offering, had deteriorated with telephones not being answered and little 
time being dedicated to their enquiries.  At this point the Directors realised that 
something was wrong and decided, given their limited experience and formal 
management training, to get some external help.  They were keen to get some advice 
from someone who knew the industry and could give them some direction.  There was 
a feeling that they were too close to their business and did not have an overview of 
what was happening in the market. 
 
 
The Commissioning of Triangle 
 
Graham Martin was given the task of finding a management consultant.  He was keen 
not to use a London based consultancy, feeling that Carousel would end up paying 
lots of money for a fairly standard approach and output.  He initially approached a 
consultant based in Tunbridge Wells, but found that he did not know the industry: 
 
“Well, from a financial point of view I didn’t want to spend two days money 
in explaining what we did.  I wanted somebody that understood what we did 
and understood the industry.” 
 
After a little searching, Graham Martin found out from the Institute of Freight 
Forwarders that Triangle worked for numerous freight forwarders and approached 
Triangle via the firm’s internet web site.  This was followed by a couple of telephone 
conversations with Paul Jackson, the Managing Director and owner of Triangle 
Management Services. 
 
At the time of the intervention, Triangle Management Services was, and planned to 
remain, an independent specialist services provider to the freight, express, postal and 
logistics industries.  The firm prided itself on the depth of knowledge of the industries 
it served on a global basis, on the calibre and expertise of its professional staff and the 
coverage of its industry networks and market intelligence sources.  Apart from 
management consultancy services, Triangle offered support in undertaking mergers 
and acquisitions, training, project and interim management, marketing and 
recruitment services. 
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Initially, Paul Jackson was not keen to take on the Carousel work.  His experience of 
owner operators was that they rarely used consultants, and he was concerned that the 
size of assignment was too small.  He had reduced the scope of an assignment a short 
while before in response to the client’s cash limits, only to find that the client was 
disappointed by the results.  The client had expected the same results as would have 
come from the original much larger scope of work.  Paul Jackson was concerned that 
such a limited intervention might not generate significant value for Carousel, and that 
having a dissatisfied client might damage Triangle’s reputation in the niche market in 
which it operated. 
 
Despite this initial reluctance, Paul Jackson was impressed by Carousel’s marketing 
literature, which was the best he had seen for the size of company, and by the strong 
financial position of the company.  He was also reassured that Carousel was serious 
about and comfortable with obtaining professional advice.  Paul Jackson agreed to 
work with the Carousel Directors to help them determine a way forward.   He wrote a 
succinct proposal, covering an initial workshop and possible follow-on work, which 
was agreed and formed the contractual basis of the assignment. 
 
 
The Structure and Logic of the Strategy Formulation Intervention 
 
The intervention was made up of a single one-day workshop.  The specific aim of the 
workshop was to undertake a SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and 
Threats) analysis, examining the full range of Carousel’s operations and structures.  
Although simple, Paul Jackson believed it to be an excellent framework for 
identifying and addressing the strategic and other issues facing an organisation. 
 
Prior to the workshop itself, Triangle developed a questionnaire which was sent to 
Carousel for the Directors to complete.  The questionnaire covered a wide range of 
subjects, including the background of the company, the markets served and services 
offered, competitors, the organisation structure, facilities and capabilities, and 
financial performance information.  In addition, the Carousel Directors were asked to 
identify issues they wanted discussed during the workshop.  The questionnaire was 
primarily intended to provide Triangle with information on Carousel, data for some 
preparatory analyses and a source of potential questions and issues around which to 
structure the day.  Paul Jackson also used the questionnaire to sensitise and prepare 
the Directors for the subjects which were to be discussed and to put them into a frame 
of mind to deal with some potentially difficult issues. 
 
Paul Jackson had facilitated a number of such workshops in the past.  His practice was 
to go through the SWOT analysis raising issues and trying to get the workshop 
participants to appreciate the situation and the implications before suggesting or 
imposing his own views.  The desired outcome from such a workshop was for the 
participants to come to four or five major conclusions, and Paul Jackson managed the 
process so that the key issues were discussed in sufficient depth.  He also paced the 
day, seeking consensus and moving on the participants at a rate at which they felt 
comfortable, and where necessary parking unresolved issues for later discussion. 
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Ideally, Paul Jackson wanted to facilitate the process with feeling and sensitivity, yet 
not balk from raising controversial or emotionally charged issues.   Paul Jackson 
planned to use his industry expertise to guide and inform the discussions, but to let the 
Carousel Directors determine their own way forward. 
 
The questionnaire was sent to Carousel in July 1997, and the Directors took a day out 
of their normal routines to complete it.  The completed questionnaire was analysed 
and a list of questions to ask at the workshop was developed. Given the restricted 
budget and size of the company, no additional research nor site visits were undertaken 
by Triangle prior to the workshop in mid-August. 
 
The workshop was led by Paul Jackson, and he was supported by Jason Whiteley, a 
more junior consultant at Triangle.  Jason Whiteley’s primary role was to capture the 
discussions and document the emerging SWOT analysis, and subsequently to produce 
the draft report to be submitted to Carousel. 
 
Although Paul Jackson had suggested that Andrew Ovenden should attend the 
workshop, only the Martin family members participated in the workshop itself: 
 
“… because we needed the day to ourselves to start with.” 
Carousel Director 
  
 
On the evening prior to the workshop Paul Jackson and Jason Whiteley met the three 
Directors for the first time for dinner at the hotel.  The intention was for Maureen, 
Michael and Graham Martin to become comfortable with Paul Jackson and Jason 
Whiteley before the workshop itself.  Paul Jackson was also keen to get an insight into 
the relationship between the Directors, and where they, as individuals, wanted to take 
Carousel and what they wanted to discuss during the following day.  
 
The Carousel Directors had agreed amongst themselves that they were going to be 
very open and honest during the day.  As one Director reflected: 
 
“You’re not going to a conference…you’re going there for a purpose, so 
you’re there to listen to somebody who knows…they’re there for a 
purpose…hopefully maximise the day… and let’s see what comes out.  I 
didn’t know what he was going to pull out of the day.”  
 
 
Processes of Separation and Absorption 
 
The Triangle intervention and its effects on the strategic direction of Carousel can be 
understood in terms of the separation of strategy formulation from other day to day 
activities and influences, which impeded the Directors of Carousel from taking a more 
holistic and detached perspective on the business.  The intervention was marked by a 
lack of political and organisational pressures, which made it easier for the Directors of 
Carousel to consider and subsequently implement some radical actions. 
 
Triangle’s intervention influenced and contributed to the thinking and subsequent 
actions of the Carousel Directors in three distinct, but inter-related, ways. 
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First, the intervention itself supported the crystallisation of issues Carousel had to deal 
with.  Specifically, the intervention provided the focus for and the impetus to address 
formally the future direction of the company.  The intervention defined and identified 
the range of issues to be discussed in developing a way forward for Carousel, and 
captured the logic and a synthesis of the resulting deliberations and conclusions. 
 
Secondly, the intervention enabled the Directors to gain a new perspective and insight 
on their business through more rigorous analysis, challenge and expert input from 
Triangle consultants.  The Triangle approach used a conceptual framework and 
analytical techniques not used routinely by Carousel.  In addition, Paul Jackson, and 
to a lesser extent, Jason Whiteley challenged the way the Directors were looking at 
their business and the issues they faced.   This external perspective was informed and 
supplemented by relevant industry experience, which also contributed insights and 
views to the debate. 
 
Thirdly, the setting and external facilitation generated different patterns of 
interactions between the Directors, allowing members to step, at least partially, 
outside their customary familial and professional roles.  Subjects were raised and 
sentiments expressed that would otherwise have remained tacit.  The discussions and 
ideas were marshalled and channelled towards the specific goal of determining a way 
forward for Carousel. 
 
The intervention was not completely impervious to the history, politics, culture and 
business environment of Carousel.  These factors shaped the understanding and 
influenced the thinking and reactions of the Directors who were involved in the 
workshop itself, and of others within Carousel, who knew of the intervention but were 
not party to the discussions.  These processes of absorption, while not marked 
immediately before or during the workshop, influenced the Directors as they reflected 
on the day and shaped and agreed the specific actions to be implemented.  
 
While the three Directors’ agendas permeated the debates, the interests of individual 
Directors were played down or set aside, facilitated by the high levels of trust and 
respect between all the Directors and commitment to the best interests of the 
company.  Andrew Ovenden, the Director excluded from the workshop, was 
consulted extensively before and immediately after the day, allowing him to 
contribute, albeit indirectly, to the thinking during the workshop, and more directly to 
the resulting changes in Carousel’s strategy and management structure. 
 
The workshop, though a single event and kept low key within Carousel, was talked 
about and positioned by staff in relation to their understanding of what was happening 
and why.  The workshop and subsequent hiatus before the changes were announced 
created uncertainty and raised concerns.  The Carousel Directors actively managed 
this sense making process, reassuring staff that changes would be for the better and, 
implicitly, that they would relieve the operational pressures.  
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Processes of Separation 
 
 Crystallisation 
 
The commissioning of Triangle separated and raised the profile of strategic issues in 
relation to day to day activities, and represented a tangible manifestation of the 
Directors’ commitment to define the way forward for Carousel. 
 
The long hours and declining profitability had made the existing situation intolerable.  
There was a felt need, shared by the Directors, to review the direction Carousel was 
taking and to get outside assistance.  As one Carousel Director expressed it: 
 
“We basically sat down and had a look at what we could do ourselves, and 
given that we have limited management experience, we decided that we 
couldn’t do it, we couldn’t sort ourselves out because we were sort of too 
close to the glass.” 
 
Given the pressure of day to day work, the Carousel Directors rarely spent time on 
strategic issues: “we were constantly fire fighting, and I mean constantly fire fighting” 
(Carousel Director).  Even when the Directors met, the meetings were seen as an add-
on to the normal work, scheduled at the fringes of the working day and time 
constrained: 
 
“We were perhaps then starting our meetings at 8 o’clock in the evening when 
the traffic had all gone, or coming in at 6 o’clock in the mornings…we 
weren’t sharp enough at those two times of the day…meetings then got moved 
around, time-scales didn’t always suit everybody, so you were always clock-
watching.” 
Carousel Director 
 
The Triangle intervention focused attention on the strategic issues, and provided an 
impetus for action: 
 
“And when we got (the questionnaire)…we did actually allocate time to sit 
down and actually answer (the questions).” 
Carousel Director 
 
“We certainly could have had those discussions.  However, what it did achieve 
was that it made us have those discussions, it made us channel our thoughts 
into the various things that we discussed.” 
Carousel Director 
 
“They’ve made us do something…in a way that’s been the best thing for 
us…to have a deadline of a relatively short time that’s been imposed on us by 
somebody else, that has actually been a terrific driving force for us.” 
Carousel Director 
 
The Directors had three key subjects for discussion at the workshop: the fire fighting 
approach to running the business, the possibility of opening an office near Heathrow, 
and thoughts on the future of the market.  However, the scope was opened up during 
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the workshop itself to address the management structure, in particular the roles of the 
three equity Directors: 
  
“We didn’t say to him – ‘have we got our management structure right?’  We 
said – ‘why are we fire fighting?’  And he said – ‘because you haven’t got 
your management structure right.’…I suppose indirectly by saying that we 
were fire fighting we were really sort of saying – ‘have we got this right?’” 
Carousel Director 
 
Such issues were not initially seen as items for consideration and debate, and Paul 
Jackson was not briefed on them nor explicitly asked to incorporate them in the 
workshop agenda.   But the issues did emerge during the day, and Paul Jackson 
recognised their importance.  So they were addressed formally as part of the 
workshop.   The subsequent changes to the management structure became a lynchpin 
of the overall change process. 
 
The workshop deliberations were documented by Jason Whiteley and subsequently 
were turned into a draft report, which was reviewed by Paul Jackson.  The final report 
was sent to Carousel about three weeks after the workshop.  Paul Jackson wanted to 
mull over the conclusions and recommendations from the workshop and articulate 
them in a way that the Directors could use in communicating and explaining possible 
changes to staff within the company.  This process of synthesis and creation of a 
tangible output was valuable: 
 
“For me, the best thing out of it, actually, was to have somebody else to write 
that report at the end…to actually have somebody to create a document which 
makes you think even more, rather than just basically a list of you do this (as 
per normal Directors’ meetings)…we ended up with something a little bit 
more concrete, that we can actually say – ‘well, look this document, albeit a 
very brief document, is something we’ve paid money for’, and therefore it puts 
value on that document…I took it home over the weekend and probably read it 
20 times all in all, and thinking about it, because it gives it some sort of value, 
because it’s not been produced by yourself.” 
Carousel Director 
 
In summary, the Triangle intervention focused attention on the strategic issues and 
helped the Carousel Directors to take a step back from the day to day operations.  
During the workshop itself, a wider range of issues than anticipated was addressed.  
The conclusions were captured and set down as tangible manifestations of the 
discussions and resolutions. 
 
 Different Conceptual Framework and Perspective 
 
The focus on and definition of the core strategic issues were complemented by the use 
of an established analytical methodology, external perspective and expertise.  The 
workshop process used by Triangle was structured, and it provided the framework, 
intellectual challenge and rigor, which would not otherwise have been applied by the 
Carousel Director to strategy deliberations. 
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The pre-workshop questionnaire started to make the Directors look at their business in 
another, more structured, way: 
 
“When we got the questionnaire through it really started to bring to light that 
22% of our business in turnover was with UK parcel work, but in real terms it 
was probably taking up 40% of our time…” 
Carousel Director 
 
The analyses conducted during the workshop also provided a fresh perspective and 
showed certain aspect of the business in stark relief: 
 
“When we did an analysis that showed them that the small amount of work 
they did on the Continent was actually 20 times more profitable than the work 
they did for domestic parcels, it just became very clear, but they’d never done 
that…we did a matrix of what contributed what and how the overheads were 
allocated…they’d never looked at it that way.” 
Triangle Consultant 
 
The analyses and techniques used during the workshop provided a framework for the 
discussions and critiques, and gave the Director tools to promote and defend ideas.  
The results were supplemented and reinforced by the external perspectives brought to 
the business by the Triangle consultants: 
 
 “You have to be humble and you have to realise that consultancy is common 
sense.  I know it’s a combination of experience as well, but it is common 
sense.  And the people you’re dealing with know more about the business than 
you’ll ever know, so what you’re doing is you’re bringing objectivity and 
lateral thinking.” 
Triangle Consultant 
 
“I think we started to uncover things that they hadn’t considered before…You 
know, I think it really opened their eyes during the course of the day…being 
outside the business, we were coming in with fresh ideas and challenging 
things they’d been doing for ten years.” 
Triangle Consultant 
 
The techniques and challenge helped the Carousel Directors to step outside what one 
Director described as the “thought processes” they used, or “slot” as one staff member 
described it, and to gain a new perspective on the business: 
 
“It reaffirmed what we probably already knew, but we needed somebody to 
stand there, because we’re inside the goldfish bowl, if you like, and he was 
outside, and he actually took us outside of that to make us look back in.” 
Carousel Director 
 
“Quite a few things that sort of came out were quite radical for us, which 
totally affects our thinking.” 
Carousel Director 
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“It does make you wonder that the suggestions that were given, you think – 
‘why didn’t we think of that’, you always do.  But it’s such a complete change 
in some ways, getting rid of certain Divisions.  I think it may have been too 
large a step for them to contemplate.” 
Carousel staff 
 
The achievement of this new perspective on and understanding of the business was 
enabled, in part, by a challenging style of facilitation: 
 
“There were a couple of questions that made me, I felt came a little 
close…and I had to think about it…I can understand the reasons for the 
questions…I mean, why am I here, why have we asked him to come in?  It’s 
for a reason, and, yes, who else is going to tell you.” 
Carousel Director 
 
As an external adviser, Paul Jackson was able to say things that the individual 
Directors could not raise directly with one another.  He also tapped into his 
knowledge of the industry to make explicit suggestions and open up new possibilities 
for Carousel: 
 
“We have a lot more to offer than we thought we had.  One thing was air 
freight…Paul got quite excited about it, because obviously every single 
airfreight agent operates out of Heathrow, and nobody actually has the sort of 
client base or location that we do.  And we’ve had discussions with (a major 
airfreight agent)…and it looks like we can do a reciprocal deal with them.  
Now, we never even thought we could do that.” 
Carousel Director 
 
Paul Jackson’s experience in the industry was generally found to be useful during the 
workshop.  Directors felt that he knew what he was talking about, and the fact that he 
had personally worked with major organisations in their industry enhanced his 
credibility and their willingness to listen to him.  In addition, the fact that Paul 
Jackson also ran a family business, and so understood the strains and tensions, helped 
to build a close affiliation between himself and the Carousel Directors. 
 
In summary, both the analytical framework, and the consultants’ external challenge, 
perspective and industry knowledge enabled the Carousel Directors to gain a new 
outlook on and understanding of their situation. 
 
 Different Patterns of Interactions 
 
The workshop took the Carousel Directors outside their normal patterns of interaction, 
between themselves as individuals and with Andrew Ovenden.  The interactions and 
the discussions were non-routine, in terms of the subject matter, the exclusion of 
Andrew Ovenden, the off-site location and the fact that they were facilitated and 
managed by Triangle. 
 
Prior to the workshop, the Directors, including Andrew Ovenden, took time out to 
respond to the questionnaire sent by Triangle and to identify, as a management team, 
the issues they thought needed to be addressed.  This meeting was longer and more 
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structured and focused that the normal management meetings, and stimulated thinking 
and discussion on the various subjects. 
 
The physical separation from the office and the pressures and potential interruptions 
of the day to day activities was important in helping the Directors to take a wider and 
more fundamental look at the business. The workshop was structured and Paul 
Jackson managed the process to probe deeply into the issues and to arrive at a number 
of conclusions by the end of the day: 
 
“There was a lot of psychology there as well within the day, and if we put up 
physical or mental barriers, he was very good at getting rid of them, breaking 
them down and keeping us on track.  So he was quite disciplined with us as 
well, and so it…made us be quite disciplined and quite honest with our 
answers.” 
Carousel Director 
 
“It was psychological or cleverly done, in being able to draw you from one 
area to the other and drop you back to an area where he obviously felt it 
needed more time spent on.” 
Carousel Director 
 
“The structure of the day was very good actually…it’s always good to have 
somebody there to keep you on track.  I mean, our tendency is, because we’re 
all very keen to discuss things ad infinitem, to wander off and discuss 
something else.” 
Carousel Director 
 
The workshop provided the means of disentangling and examining some personal, 
familial and professional relationships and objectives: 
 
“They do have two different objectives and we pulled out what their personal 
objectives were, which they’d never really discussed.  They’d never felt as a 
family they could ask each other – ‘well, how long are you going to be here?’” 
Triangle Consultant 
 
The absence of Andrew Ovenden and the presence of a credible, external expert to 
facilitate the discussions allowed the Directors to discuss subjects and express 
sentiments that would not have been aired otherwise.  Personal and sensitive issues 
were raised and discussed, such as the role of Maureen Martin.  Both Graham and 
Michael wanted her to change her role, and the workshop provided the opportunity to 
discuss the fundamental question of leadership of Maureen Martin’s company: 
 
“At one stage during the day, he (Paul Jackson) made me feel quite insecure 
by talking about – ‘well, let’s get Maureen out of the scenario, because, you 
know, she’s not going to be there forever, she’s coming up to retirement 
age’...Looking back what he actually did was retire me out of the position I 
was in…and said – ‘Maureen, you should be out there networking 
more’…And I must admit, there was one stage where I thought – ‘I haven’t 
got time for all that rubbish’, to be quite blunt.” 
Maureen Martin 
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In summary, the facilitated workshop created a forum and mechanism for 
communicating and dealing with usually tacit concerns. 
  
For the Carousel Directors, the intervention was a profound experience.  They rarely 
addressed strategic issues in any sustained or systematic manner, nor were they versed 
in the analytical tools for strategy development.  The Triangle consultants widened 
their perspectives, challenged their ideas and got them to face some difficult and 
sensitive issues, and to come up with some conclusions.  In the words of one Director: 
 
“He started to paint the picture and the framework went round it last of 
all…one of his final statements was – ‘well, you’ve shown yourselves what 
you should be doing or could be doing…it’s up to you whether you take this 
on board’…We’d painted the whole picture, we’d got the framework round it, 
it was up to us to come back and hang it properly, really.” 
 
 
The ways in which the Triangle intervention influenced the thinking and subsequent 
actions of the Carousel Directors were mutually dependent and supportive.  The initial 
commitment to the review process was translated into participation in a workshop and 
application of an analytical model.  The facilitation, challenge and external 
management kept the debate from getting stuck, wandering off or avoiding sensitive 
issues.  The detachment and presence of the consultants appeared to facilitate the 
process of intimate dialogue amongst the Directors present, at a professional and more 
crucially a family level.  The messiness, complications, pressures and baggage of the 
“outside world” were suspended, in part and temporarily, while the Directors 
addressed how they should move Carousel forward. 
 
 
Processes of Absorption 
 
 Existing Agendas 
 
The intervention was influenced to some extent by the agendas of the three Directors.  
The pressing and perceived overarching issue was the role of Maureen Martin.  
Responsibilities and authorities had transferred in an uncoordinated and tacit fashion 
to Michael and Graham Martin.  However Maureen Martin was not completely 
comfortable about the way she was losing her grip on the company.  This had, to 
some extent, resulted in some frustration and confusion, and in the Directors doing 
each other’s jobs.  The inclusion of this implicit tension in the workshop diffused any 
potential political activity and legitimised the discussion. 
 
The Directors also had personal views regarding the way forward, and were looking 
for support from Triangle for their judgements, be they to exit the UK parcel market 
or to grow the business through marketing.  However, the Directors were open to 
ideas and prepared to accept criticism: 
 
“We’d bring up a point perhaps…and there would be an element of 
defensiveness, which you can expect always…but I think we gradually 
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brought them round to the idea that some things they weren’t doing quite right 
and there were ways they could improve.” 
Triangle Consultant 
 
The Triangle consultants perceived a strong family unity among the Directors and 
mutual respect for one another: 
 
“They’re all secure.  That’s the big plus that they have.  The three shareholders 
didn’t feel redundant.  Most companies…half the management we’re dealing 
with are feeling unsettled because we’re involved.” 
Triangle Consultant 
 
This sense of security helped them to put aside personal interests and to be prepared 
to dismantle personal empires for the sake of the company. 
 
The importance of securing Andrew Ovenden’s commitment to the chosen way 
forward was recognised and dealt with by the Martin family.  Andrew Ovenden was 
included fully in the preparatory work and the deliberations following the workshop, 
allowing him to have a say in the final outcome and changes.  This helped to allay any 
potential concerns he may have had. 
 
 Context 
 
Staff at Carousel knew of the workshop, though the intervention was kept low key. 
Little information was given to the staff either before or immediately after the 
workshop.  The Directors decided to hold off any announcements until they had 
determined the exact changes to be implemented. 
 
The intervention did create a certain amount of anxiety, particularly in the light of 
difficulties experienced by other freight forwarding agents.  In the absence of other 
information, some staff associated the use of consultants with redundancies: 
 
“I think you’re always a little bit wary about any changes…the natural fears 
you automatically have when somebody says radical change.  You think – 
‘who’s going out of the door first?’  But, I mean, it didn’t happen that way, to 
be fair.  But then, because I didn’t have that detail at the time, it was 
worrying.” 
Carousel staff 
 
The uncertainty led to greater speculation and circulation of rumours of possible new 
offices and other initiatives.  The operational pressure, though, was the biggest 
challenge facing the company.  A possible resolution provided an assumed rationale 
for the involvement of consultants: 
 
“People (in Customer Services) were literally tearing their hair out because of 
the fact they were under so much pressure.  And I think that had to be relieved, 
the gasket had to go somewhere, basically.” 
Carousel staff 
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“The management here were all saying the changes are going to be positive, so 
you take them at their word as much as you can.” 
Carousel staff 
 
“They saw it as a problem solving exercise…I think they saw it as being that 
we’d come back and we’d wave a magic wand and all of a sudden everything 
would be 9 to 5 and wonderful…we hadn’t said specifically what we were 
going for, but they assumed it was for their benefit.” 
Carousel Director 
 
The possibility that the intervention might resolve a number of perceived problems 
within the company generated some identification of problem areas and lobbying: 
 
“We had more visits from staff saying – ‘I’ve got a problem with this 
particular thing’…it encouraged people to say – ‘I don’t think we should be 
doing this’.” 
Carousel Director 
 
For some staff, the fact that the Directors were prepared to ask others’ advice was 
positive, and a sign that they might be more receptive to their ideas in future. 
 
The concerns and interests of the staff, though recognised and taken into 
consideration, were not a pressing issue during the workshop and did not affect the 
Directors thinking or willingness to contemplate radical change. 
 
 
Post Workshop 
 
The Directors left the workshop enthused and determined to implement the ideas and 
suggested changes: 
 
“The three of us, I think, all left thinking – this is terrific, you know, if we do 
this it’s going to be absolutely the ‘bees knees’.” 
Carousel Director 
 
“When the report came through, as a reaffirmation of the day really, we 
decided we would go ahead on all of them (recommendations) because they 
made a lot of sense.  There was no point in cherry picking what he had 
suggested.  If we were going to do and give it 100%, we should do it properly” 
Carousel Director 
 
Within a day or two of the workshop, Andrew Ovenden was give a blow by blow 
account of the day’s discussions and was “sold” the conclusions: 
 
“once we knew for a fact it was quite positive stuff, we brought him in, sold 
him the concept of what we were doing” 
Carousel Director 
 
The Directors during the workshop were very enthusiastic and open to suggestions, 
and to a certain extent “talked themselves into” (Triangle Consultant) certain courses 
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of action.  They did not question, explore and internalise fully the concepts and 
proposals during the workshop, but went through that process subsequently: 
 
“He gave us a number of recommendations as a starting point.  We came back, 
we discussed them in depth, we pulled them apart, we put them back together 
again, and it reaffirmed what he had been saying and we actually put that into 
practice.” 
Carousel Director 
 
“We didn’t doubt or question enough what we were being told or proposed 
…it’s not until afterwards perhaps you think – ‘well, actually, it’s not quite as 
they make out’.” 
Carousel Director 
 
As the Directors then thought through the recommendations and their practical 
implications, their ideas began to evolve: 
 
“We went from the initial recommendations saying – ‘yes, going to do all of 
that, no problem, we’re not going to question it’…we started to put it into 
some sort of order of priority, and then we started knocking things off and 
thinking – ‘no, actually, no, we don’t want to do that, and we don’t want to do 
that, or we want to do that slightly differently’.” 
Carousel Director 
 
The Directors were keen not make any announcements until they had received the 
report, which confirmed the discussions of the day, and until they had finalised the 
changes.  This raised the anxiety levels within the company: 
 
“When we came back and we were able to tell them very little, I think it 
worried them a little.” 
Carousel Director 
 
“I think people picked up little snippets here and there along the way, but 
never enough.  I think it’s worse…everybody seems to hear something 
different, and they tend to exaggerate it anyway…that probably makes it 
worse than better.” 
Carousel staff 
 
With the detailed changes agreed, Michael Martin developed a presentation on all the 
changes and their implications for the company and for individual staff members.  
Every member of staff was taken through the presentation individually by two 
Directors and was given the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
The role of Triangle was stressed and the staff were told that the work done by 
Triangle included market research and customer interviews.  The aim was to give the 
recommendations more “kudos” and reduce potential problems in selling the changes 
to the staff.  The involvement of consultants also provided the Directors with a safety 
net and scapegoat for possible staff resentment: 
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“The terrific thing about the staff knowing we’ve had this outside consultant to 
look at it is that we’ve got somebody to blame.” 
Carousel Director 
 
However, the staff recognised that the consultants had provided advice and that the 
ultimate decisions rested with Carousel’s management. 
 
The changes were effected on 1 November 1997.  Maureen Martin became Chief 
Executive Officer and Michael and Graham Martin became Joint Managing Directors.  
Maureen Martin’s role changed from the day to day running of the Customer Services 
Division to developing client relationships, which, in her own words, “energised” and 
gave her “a new lease of life”.  A new tariff structure was introduced for the UK 
parcel business which effectively took Carousel out of that market.  Four of the five 
sales consultants were transferred to Customer Services.  The marketing efforts were 
directed towards cross-selling to existing clients, securing inward traffic from 
Continental Europe and developing alliances with major freight forwarders. 
 
These changes were generally regarded within Carousel as radical but positive.  The 
pressure on the Customer service staff was reduced significantly and people 
understood why Carousel did not want to focus on the unprofitable UK parcels 
business.   One “casualty” of the changes was the Sales Manager who was made 
redundant. 
 
In December 1997, the Directors were in the “honeymoon period” in respect of the 
changes and they and the staff were feeling their way forward: 
 
“They’ve got quite a lot of work to do before we can actually say – ‘we’ve 
done what they’ve (Triangle) have suggested and it’s working.” 
Carousel staff 
 
“(a former salesperson) leaving…has now made everyone else not unhappy 
but uneasy, because for so long we had too few people to cope with the phone 
calls, and then for two or three months we had enough people and now we’re 
back where we started.  It’s like; here we go again.  So that’s a shame…so 
doesn’t help…I think it’s still a little bit too new really to be able to say…we 
all think it’s working, but I think it’s going to take a little bit longer before 
people actually say – ‘I don’t like this, or this doesn’t work’.” 
Carousel staff 
 
Through experiencing for themselves how the changes were working in practice, the 
Directors were acquiring a deeper understanding of how Carousel might operate.  
They were, in certain instances, considering “taking Paul’s suggestion one stage 
further” and expected to “end up with our version of what they want us to do” within 
a few months. 
 
The intervention had not only addressed the strategic issues facing Carousel, but had 
given the Directors an insight into their own styles and into other ways of managing a 
company.  The Directors, on reflection, recognised that their personal management 
styles had changed following the intervention.  In general, they were becoming less 
hands-on and giving their staff more scope to resolve issues for themselves and make 
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decisions.  Their awareness of management structure had increased and they had a 
new perspective on the market in which they operated and their room for manoeuvre 
in that market. 
 
The Directors were considering inviting Triangle back to look at defining precisely 
the roles of the Directors, and to help them put together a five-year plan.  Having been 
through the process and experienced the results, they were comfortable in using Paul 
Jackson again since his advice had proved correct.   However, they expected that they 
would, in future, be more questioning and would direct Paul Jackson towards specific 
issues: 
 
“Now this is the situation and this is what we’ve done, now these are 
specifically the areas that we have problems with, that we want to address, 
rather than this sort of carpet thing.” 
Carousel Director 
 
 
Overall, the intention has led to the transformation of the strategy and management 
structure of Carousel, and has also reshaped the outlooks and thinking processes of its 
Directors.  Four months after the workshop, the ideas, perspectives and suggestions 
which emerged were evolving and being integrated into the thinking of the individuals 
involved, the thinking and interactions of the management team, and the fabric of 
organisational life within Carousel. 
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Preface 
 
This case study is part of a PhD research project looking at the contribution of 
management consultants to processes of strategic change within organisations.  The 
case material has come from in-depth interviews of a selection of individuals within 
McQuillan Young Communications and Transitions.  The account below is a 
distillation and partial analysis by the researcher of the information available, and 
therefore is, by definition, incomplete and influenced by the research agenda.  The 
purpose of the account is to set out the context and logic of the intervention and to 
elaborate a “first order” analysis of the key contributions, congruent with the 
experience and understanding of those involved.  The drafting of this case provides a 
springboard for further analysis and theory development, in line with the overall 
research methodology. 
 
The co-operation of all those involved in the research is greatly appreciated.  The 
researcher asks that no part of this case study be reproduced without his prior 
agreement. 
 
 
Background 
 
In July 1997, Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young of McQuillan Young 
Communications started to use the services of Transitions, a specialist management 
consultancy, on a regular basis to help them to develop their business.  The first six 
months of consulting support, amounting to approximately half a day per month, was 
provided free of charge.  Then the arrangement was formalised into a fee based 
annual contract covering approximately one day per month.  At the time of 
researching and writing up this case study, August to October 1998, Transitions was 
still supporting McQuillan Young Communications as part of this latter annual 
contract. 
 
At the start of the intervention, McQuillan Young was a small communications 
consultancy which provided public relations, writing and editorial services, and which 
published a number of specialist journals.  The clients were primarily large 
organisations in the Oil and Gas Industry, which tended to deal with McQuillan 
Young on a long term basis. 
 
McQuillan Young Communications was formed in February 1995 when Linda 
McQuillan and Tricia Young decided to form a loose partnership.  They had both 
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been freelance writers working for a small number of clients in the Oil and Gas 
Industry.  Tricia Young also had editorial responsibility for a publication.  They knew 
of one another.   Both began to find that operating alone they could not credibly pitch 
for certain assignments, and they agreed to pool their resources should a suitable 
opportunity arise.   An opportunity did present itself, and, although they did not win 
an assignment, the experience demonstrated that they could work effectively together.  
At the outset, they maintained their separate legal and fiscal status, but marketed 
themselves to clients as McQuillan Young Communications, took an office and 
employed Joanne Kuriyan as an editorial and administrative assistant.  It was only 
later, in the Summer of 1997, that McQuillan Young Communications became a 
limited company and employed most of its contract staff on a full time basis. 
 
The gut feeling shared by Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young that by joining forces 
they could create benefits proved correct.  Clients started to see something more than 
a couple of freelance writers and began to take McQuillan Young Communications 
seriously and use it as an agency.  The business grew through the promotional efforts 
of both Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young and the delivery of high quality services.  
By the beginning of 1997 the organisation was made up of its two founding Directors 
and two members of staff.  However, Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young struggled to 
define the identity of the organisation.  They didn’t want to be seen exclusively as 
Public Relations, because they both had writing skills, and some design skills, and 
because they also retained editorial responsibility for publications.  Business came in 
from referrals and personal contacts even though the marketing and presentation of 
McQuillan Young Communications was hazy. 
 
In Spring 1997, Tricia Young attended a seminar on marketing strategies for small 
businesses at the Institute of Directors (IoD), where Simon Pratten and Shai 
Vyakarnam of Transitions were speaking.  Tricia Young found that she could relate to 
some of the things that Simon Pratten in particular said, and made a point of talking to 
him over lunch.  They agreed that Transitions might be able to help. 
  
At the time, Transitions itself was a relatively small management consultancy 
specialising in the growing companies sector.  It had been set up by Shai Vyakarnam 
and Robin Jacobs, both Cranfield PhDs, in the early 1990’s to address the needs of 
small and medium sized enterprises.  Simon Pratten joined Transitions in 1994.  His 
background was in professional services rather than academia, having been a Partner 
and Director of a firm of consulting surveyors, responsible for marketing and client 
management.   As a firm, Transitions offered a number of personal and management 
development services, including executive coaching, career analysis, and team 
building.  One of their core products was a “Supergrowth Programme” which brought 
together diverse organisations with growth ambitions, and through a structured 
programme of half-day seminars, team-based assignments, consultancy support and 
counselling helped the top teams to gain internal commitment and cohesion and to 
develop a robust business plan.  Underpinning the programme was a view, supported 
by empirical research, that for organisations to grow rapidly and significantly 
(supergrowth), a combination of team effectiveness and development, and sound 
business and financial planning was required. 
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Transitions’ positioning, then and at the time of writing this case study, is summarised 
succinctly in one of the firm’s brochures: 
 
“Transitions is a growing consultancy firm focussing on the needs of 
ambitious ‘middle market’ businesses.  Its guiding principle is that, in order to 
achieve their growth, its customers need to develop a clear vision for their 
business shared and developed by a viable top team. We provide an 
interdisciplinary group of leading experts in order to support our clients to 
develop and achieve their vision.  These include:- business strategy, 
marketing, business psychology and so on.” 
 
 
Initial Consulting Interventions 
 
Following the initial contacts, Transitions submitted a proposal to run a team building 
workshop with the Directors and staff of McQuillan Young Communications.  The 
aim was to “start forging this fledgling organisation”, which had formed almost by 
accident.  In part, the proposal was attractive to Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young 
who had experienced some earlier difficulties and disappointments with recruitment:  
two staff members had joined, only to stay for about a month.  Robin Jacobs provided 
the consulting support on behalf of Transitions.  In preparation for the workshop, 
Robin Jacobs administered a number of psychometric tests, including the Myers 
Briggs test, and conducted individual interviews.  He then analysed and structured the 
results of the tests into individual feedback sessions covering a morning, and an 
interactive workshop which he ran in the afternoon.  Despite some initial reservations, 
both Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young found the feedback and workshop useful: 
 
“So, that was all very useful because it helped us recognise why certain of us 
did things we did, and why we behaved the way we did.  And that was quite a 
big turning point actually.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
In particular, Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young recognised that, while they had 
many and complementary strengths, neither was especially strong on control skills.  
Both preferred to be outward and client focused and regarded financial analysis and 
control as a necessary chore, and so spent as little time as possible on it.  They also 
recognised that neither of them was comfortable dealing with conflict situations and 
tended to compromise too readily.   The workshop also highlighted existing tensions 
between the Directors and staff, and suggested some reasons why the relationship was 
not working.  For the two members of staff, the workshop, seen as a way of 
promoting open and honest communications, was not a complete success.  Even with 
Robin Jacob’s facilitation, some issues were left unspoken by staff.  While Linda 
McQuillan and Tricia Young were both friendly and approachable, their close 
professional relationship, their personal delivery and control of the services provided, 
and their deep sense of ownership and identity with McQuillan Young 
Communications formed a barrier between them and the staff. 
 
A little later, Simon Pratten ran a workshop on marketing planning in which he 
focused on processes for thinking about and developing marketing plans.  This 
intervention too was seen as a success. 
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On-Going Consultancy Support 
 
Transitions hoped that the two assignments would lead to more consulting work, and 
Simon Pratten talked about other possible areas of support.  However, Linda 
McQuillan and Tricia Young were rather hesitant, having spent, in their terms, a 
considerable amount of money on Transitions over the previous months.  Simon 
Pratten then suggested to them that he would give them approximately half a day a 
month for six months for no fees.  He cited the need to have case studies as part of 
Transition’s business development process, though the hope of securing further work 
was also on his mind: 
 
“I was interested in what their experience was of growing a new professional 
services business, and felt that there would be useful experience for me, and 
hopefully they would get something out of it as well.  But also, bluntly, I was 
using it as a marketing tool.” 
 
Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young were suspicious of Transitions’ motives, but 
spoke to Simon Pratten and it seemed a good idea: 
 
“So we thought – ‘well, yes, it could be interesting’.  So we embarked on a six 
month programme of monthly meetings, half days, which were free of charge.  
And at that time I guess we were building; there were only four in the 
company, with one of the four about to depart, and it was a question of where 
do we go from here?” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
The process of setting the agendas for the various sessions was “gloriously informal”, 
and the consulting support evolved in line with the needs of the business as perceived 
by Simon Pratten, Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young.  The intervention did not have 
the characteristic hallmarks of conventional consulting assignments, namely a defined 
scope, an approach or methodology, and agreed deliverables or outputs.  At the 
individual meetings, Simon Pratten raised issues he considered relevant, identified 
issues brought forward from previous meetings and added items to the agenda raised 
by either Linda McQuillan or Tricia Young.  These agenda items were then discussed 
in a very fluid, interactive way and action points were identified and summarised at 
the end of the meeting.  In essence, Transitions provided an environment for thinking 
and agreeing the way forward: 
 
“It’s… semi-structured thinking time… One of the key benefits for them, I 
believe, I don’t know how they see it, is that this (the meeting) is a few hours 
away from the office, with me prodding and poking and producing ideas and 
asking questions, giving them the environment to think about the key issues 
that they need to get to grips with and grapple with.   And so, I think it’s 
clarifying thoughts, it’s agreeing ways forward.  I see part of my role as 
making them think about things that perhaps otherwise they wouldn’t have 
done, or make sure they come high on the agenda when otherwise they might 
not… if the process has helped them to clarify what they are going to be 
doing, then they will get on and do it.”  
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The initial meetings were focused on defining and putting into place systems and 
structures to support growth, especially financial control and reporting systems.   
These systems, though simple, proved very effective and gave Linda McQuillan and 
Tricia Young greater insight into and management information on the business and 
key financial trends. 
 
At the end of the six months of free consulting, Simon Pratten suggested that 
Transitions should continue to support the development of McQuillan Young 
Communications.  Simon Pratten successfully proposed an annual contract, covering 
approximately one day per month, along the same lines as the previous six months. 
 
“By this time we had some very real and tangible benefits from our 
involvement with him, so we were more than happy to do that.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
In a little over a year, from Simon Pratten’s first involvement on a regular basis to the 
researching and writing of this case study, McQuillan Young Communications has 
changed significantly as a business, as has the thinking of Linda McQuillan and Tricia 
Young. 
 
 
Processes of Separation and Absorption 
 
Transitions’ intervention and its effects on the strategic development of McQuillan 
Young Communications can be understood in terms of the raising and separation of 
key issues from the pressing client service and day to day operational requirements of 
the business.  The long duration, evolutionary and integrated approach to the 
consulting support facilitated the absorption of ideas and concepts into the action 
routines of the organisation and ways of thinking of the two Directors.  To an extent, 
the consulting support has become part of the fabric of organisational life within 
McQuillan Young Communications. 
 
Transitions’ intervention influenced and contributed to the thinking and subsequent 
actions of Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young in three distinct, but inter-related, ways. 
 
First, the intervention itself helped to crystallise the issues which McQuillan Young 
Communications as an organisation had to deal with to achieve sustained growth.  
Specifically, the intervention provided the focus and impetus to address, in a formal 
and disciplined way, key strategic issues and take action.  The intervention “has been 
a major instrument of change” (McQuillan Young Director).  The monthly meetings 
and input from Simon Pratten defined the range and scope of issues to be discussed, 
crystallised ideas and facilitated subsequent action. 
 
Secondly, the intervention enabled Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young to gain a new 
perspective and vision of their business by being challenged, questioned, informed 
and offered a different perspective by Simon Pratten. 
 
Thirdly, the setting and external facilitation enabled different patterns of interaction 
between Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young, and allowed sensitive and potentially 
emotional subjects to be raised and discussed.  The relationship between Linda 
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McQuillan and Tricia Young was facilitated, and so subjects were discussed that 
otherwise both would have instinctively shied away from.  The discussion was 
channelled and kept on track, maintaining the focus on the key issues, implications  
and consequent actions. 
 
While the intervention shaped the development and direction of McQuillan Young 
Communications, the ideas, suggestions and perspective offered by Simon Pratten 
were not accepted uncritically or unreservedly.  At times the agenda and views of 
Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young ran counter to the proposals of Simon Pratten.  
Differences of opinion and on appropriate action were managed by a process of 
accommodation; an active and subtle managing of the tensions between the external 
view and proposed issues for discussion and attention, and the internal mind set and 
ways of working.  The professionalism of Simon Pratten, and the introduction and 
application of ideas and suggestions, from which Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young 
experienced practical benefits, promoted receptivity, trust and confidence in the 
validity and efficacy of the consulting advice.  Some of Transitions’ beliefs and 
concepts were merged and absorbed into the fabric of organisational life within 
McQuillan Young Communications. 
 
Transitions’ influence on Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young was not accepted 
without a touch of suspicion and resentment on the part of the staff, particularly those 
that had been with McQuillan Young Communications for some time.  Nonetheless, 
the intervention itself became taken for granted and was absorbed into the routines of 
the organisation.  Meetings with Simon Pratten became a regular feature in the diary, 
and the location switched from the IoD to the company’s offices.  Simon Pratten, after 
a little over a year, no longer felt himself an outsider, started to identify with the 
company and began to see the nature of the relationship changing. 
 
 
Processes of Separation 
 
 Crystallisation 
 
Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young were, and remain, the major fee earners for 
McQuillan Young Communications.  Time taken away from providing services to 
clients or gaining new assignments jeopardised the on-going viability of the business.  
They believed it vital to be close to their clients and externally oriented, and to deliver 
highly personalised, quality services for the business to succeed.  In many cases, 
clients insisted on their personal attention and involvement in the service delivery.  
Consequently, Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young were preoccupied and drawn into 
the daily pressures of work and into dealing with immediate issues.  The intervention 
helped to provide a focus for thinking about longer term and more strategic issues: 
 
“…we’re always busy and if we (Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young) agree to 
have an internal meeting, we quite often, say a job comes up, we say  – ‘can 
we put it off till tomorrow because I’ve got to get this report done’.  And then 
something else happens, and then what was going to be a whole morning 
becomes – ‘well, we’d better have a quick half hour’, and we don’t focus in 
the way that you do when you’ve got a meeting with somebody… But we’ve 
been quite good about saying – ‘well, we’ve got a meeting with Simon and 
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however busy we are and however inconvenient it seems on the morning, we 
are going to do it’… He makes us have a morning or a day or an afternoon out 
of the office.” 
 McQuillan Young Director 
 
Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young wanted to grow and believed that they had the 
capabilities to grow.  The presence and influence of Simon Pratten helped to “channel 
that in a much more focused way”.  Simon Pratten “provided that focus and he’s 
given us a much more single minded approach to the business and more discipline”. 
 
Not only did the intervention provide a focus for addressing issues, but it also 
identified otherwise neglected issues and created a pressure for them to be looked at 
and resolved:  “I think Simon makes us face some things that too, that again, you 
might just sweep under the carpet.”  The importance of establishing financial controls 
was raised and discussed at various meetings at the start of the intervention and its 
profile was heightened: “…we knew, but he helped us focus on it as an absolute 
priority, that we had to get that side of the business sorted.” (McQuillan Young 
Director) 
 
Simon Pratten had a significant contribution in setting the boundaries and scope for 
the issues to be addressed and resolved: 
 
“I think only on one occasion have I actually produced a sort of discussion 
document or a formal written agenda.  The rest I have gone armed with what I 
believe are carry forward things, the key things that still need to be looked at, 
and we begin each meeting by agreeing the parameters.” 
 
In some cases, the same or similar issues were raised repeatedly as: “he is very keen 
to build even more structure, give us more solid foundations than we have, and 
constantly tries to drag us back to that.” (McQuillan Young Director). 
 
The “list of things to cover” evolved over time as the direction of the company 
became clearer, with a particular emphasis on the implications and consequences of 
certain decisions.  The decision to split the business into two divisions led to Simon 
Pratten raising the issue of who would take an overview of the business as a whole, in 
essence who would be the Managing Director of the company.   This was not an issue 
that either Linda McQuillan or Tricia Young had considered in any depth: 
 
“So Simon does throw in a thing like that, that he recognises is essential, just 
good business practice, that perhaps we would avoid or think wasn’t 
necessary” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
The tangible output from the meeting was usually a series of items for Linda 
McQuillan or Tricia Young to consider or action.  Only occasionally did Simon 
Pratten produce written summaries or minutes of the meeting, though he retained his 
hand written notes. 
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The meetings nonetheless produced a synthesis, articulation and crystallisation of 
ideas and direction: 
 
“It’s actually working out, talking out the way things are going, talking out the 
solutions, that’s right, flushing out the problems and talking about them, 
around them and developing the solutions, not going in saying – ‘we’ve got to 
find an answer to this’, because the problems aren’t that immediate and 
urgent.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
“It’s an opportunity to articulate probably what you’ve been thinking without 
even realising you’ve been thinking, and also to develop ideas, because you 
don’t get the time to do it.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
“…helpful in getting us to crystallise our ideas, well, again, forcing us to have 
a day to actually start putting some of it together.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
The intervention thus provided the focus and momentum to address issues of a 
strategic nature and to take action.  The monthly meetings were also a primary and 
evolving medium for identifying the nature, scope and implications of options and 
decisions, and for coming to concrete actions to be undertaken. 
 
 Different Concepts and Perspective 
 
The focus on and identification of strategic issues was complemented by the 
introduction of an external perspective and substantive expertise.  While Simon 
Pratten did not use formal analytical models to any extent to address issues, his views 
and comments were, implicitly, informed by values and concepts developed and held 
strongly within Transitions.  This perspective was supplemented by Simon Pratten’s 
personal experience as a Partner and Director of a professional service firm. 
 
This external perspective brought with it challenge and a degree of rigour: 
 
“Simon will challenge us if we don’t challenge each other.  I think it raises a 
lot of things that perhaps individually we are uncomfortable with.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
“He does bring an objective view point to something… we might look at 
things more emotionally than he would.  And he can be much more rational 
and ask a question or say something that just makes us take a step back and 
say – ‘ well, yeah, we ought to think about that’.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
“He doesn’t find us short on ideas but sometimes it’s a question of saying – 
‘right, you’ve got all these ideas, how do we translate them into 
something?’…And I think he’s quite good at… ‘how does that happen in 
reality?’.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
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Simon Pratten also helped Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young to “look at things from 
a bigger perspective rather than a small perspective”, and “demystified the whole idea 
of being a small business and a medium sized business and a big business”. 
Transitions as a firm was focused on helping small and medium sized businesses to 
grow and had developed a number of models.  One was the Transitions Growth 
Model, which suggested that the top teams in businesses had to move from tactical to 
strategic to visionary thinking if they were going to grow their businesses quickly and 
successfully.  In order to do that they had to break through two glass ceilings.  This 
process, according to the model and empirical research, was facilitated by clarity of 
direction and team development.  Structure and systems were seen to provide a 
fundamental underpinning for any sustained growth.  A tenet of the Transitions’ 
approach was that a small firm needs to behave like a larger one to grow: 
 
“That’s what we always say, that in a growing business you need to behave 
and act like a business that is a lot bigger, and then it will work quite 
effectively.” 
 
Simon Pratten also drew on his own practical experience to show “why that is or how 
that could be”, and to draw attention to the aspects of running a business as opposed 
to just delivering services to clients: 
 
“What Simon has brought to it, and what was badly needed, though we 
probably didn’t realise at the time, was the straight business side of it, which is 
the structure of the business, the control of the business, setting the direction, 
actually focusing on McQuillan Young as a business.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young knew how to provide excellent services to their 
clients and so generate business growth.  The external perspective and views created 
for them new insights on and understanding of running and growing a business, 
broadening their horizons yet at the same time linking ideas to achievable actions. 
 
 Different Patterns of Interactions 
 
The process of Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young coming to different views and 
understanding of what was desirable and possible for McQuillan Young 
Communications was assisted by Simon Pratten’s management and facilitation of the 
monthly meetings. 
 
Part of Simon Pratten’s role was to “take the lead” and while “not interfering too 
much” to keep the meetings focused on the strategic issues: 
 
“If I think it’s, we’re, going down a blind avenue or the discussion has 
rambled on too long, I will chop it off and we’ll get back on the rails again.”  
Simon Pratten 
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“We don’t chat about the minutiae of what’s going on.  Well, we do 
sometimes, if something is really bothering us.  But he’s not interested in that 
so he tends to get us round to talking about where we want the business to be 
going and what we want to achieve.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young saw Simon Pratten acting “like the chairman of 
the meeting” to some extent, but more fundamentally as a facilitator, albeit with a 
tenacious streak: 
 
“I think he draws out views.  He doesn’t impose things.  It’s much more of a 
facilitation exercise, or he elicits responses.  And also, I think one of the very 
important functions that he fulfils is that he endorses our views and feelings.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
“But they (role of Managing Director) are things that have to be sorted, and 
Simon won’t let them lie.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
In facilitating Simon Pratten helped to clarify ideas, to arbitrate between views and 
positions and to see and distil the good points.  His presence also made it easier for 
certain subjects to be discussed, and with more challenge: 
 
“There are issues which occur occasionally, and it’s not very often, and 
sometimes they are not even very important, they are not terribly critical, 
which can be very emotional.  And then you do need an external person to get 
some sort of handle on it, to bring some logic to it.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
“He sometimes raises things, which I think is good, that are what people might 
consider more delicate areas.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
“I think in this forum we are much more challenging, we take things on” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
In part, being away from the office and remote from the staff made it easier to discuss 
personal and staff related issues.  Beyond facilitating the discussion about the 
business, Simon Pratten also strengthened, without trying to influence, the 
relationship between Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young: 
 
“(Simon Pratten) also helped facilitate the relationship between us, I think.  
And again, we probably didn’t realise that we needed that, but we do need it.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
“One of the things that struck me is that he hasn’t tried to have an influence on 
our relationship…. I presume that is because he feels he’s got to be absolutely 
neutral all the time.” 
 McQuillan Young Director 
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“I think their (Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young) relationship has developed 
over the last year.  They are talking much more to each other than I can 
remember them doing before.  I think they’ve both grown stronger as bosses, 
in a positive way.” 
McQuillan Young Staff Member 
 
 
In summary, Transitions’ intervention created the focus for addressing strategic 
issues, added a novel perspective and experience, and managed the process of 
deliberation and action planning.  The aspects of the intervention, analytically 
distinguished above, in practice were fused and mutually supportive.  The meetings 
created and confirmed the importance of addressing the direction of the company.  
The management of the meetings and facilitation by Simon Pratten, and his external 
input enabled non-routine discussions and deliberations.  Ideas and action items were 
synthesised and crystallised, prompting action, which in turn highlighted the benefits 
of the process and value of addressing the wider, but less pressing, business issues. 
 
 
Processes of Absorption 
 
 Shaping Agendas 
 
The issues raised, the ideas put forward and the overall perspective offered by Simon 
Pratten were not accepted uncritically nor unreservedly.  They challenged the way 
that Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young looked at and managed their business.  The 
issue of the scale of the business was a central debate at the start of the intervention, 
but which was less so by the time of the research: 
 
“Earlier on in the year, we said – ‘why do we need to be big?’ We can enjoy 
ourselves and neither (of us) are empire builders, nor are we people who want 
to spend all our time managing people… so that limits how big the company 
can ever get… And I think Simon has helped in that process because he kept 
saying – ‘why don’t you want to be bigger?’ and we resisted quite a lot.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
“When I first met them …they didn’t think that they wanted to grow, they 
didn’t know what it really meant.  But, boy oh boy, that changed quickly.” 
Simon Pratten 
 
“As we’ve gone through, we’ve decided we’ve got to stop saying we’re a 
small business and we have to stop thinking we’re a small business… and 
we’ve got to start talking about being a business of whatever size, and if the 
potential exists to grow to a much bigger size, then let’s look at it.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
Other issues have provoked a negative reaction.  For instance, when Simon Pratten 
suggested that equity participation might be offered to attract the right calibre of 
consultant to help Linda McQuillan establish the consultancy side of the business, 
Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young both said no, “sort of instinctively and 
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immediately”.  However, Simon Pratten has continued to raise the issue and attitudes 
were beginning to shift by the time of the research: 
 
“Up until now it has been purely instinctive… and that’s where he keeps 
coming back… And probably six months ago we weren’t even ready to think 
about it, but because he has, now and again, revisited the idea, at least the idea 
is sort of creeping onto the agenda.  I’m not sure it will happen but at least it’s 
on the agenda.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
  
The readiness to accept advice and ideas from Simon Pratten was affected by a 
number of factors.  The “very real and tangible benefits” from applying some of the 
ideas helped to dispel lingering scepticism, and disposed Linda McQuillan and Tricia 
Young to considering seriously any suggestion.  Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young 
had only recently started working together, and had established few precedents and 
working practices which might have created inertia or barriers to change.  They also 
felt that they had limited skills in building up a company: 
 
“When it came to building up a business in terms of staff and support, we 
actually had no experience because we had worked on our own.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
Over time, the relationship developed: 
 
“…any relationship develops over time. You’ve got to develop a respect for 
the person’s professionalism, for their skills and for their integrity, and a lot of 
trust because you are opening up your business to this person, and also you are 
opening up yourself and your internal relationship.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
Personal affinity and empathy also played a part in making the consulting support 
relevant and in tune with the experiences of Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young: 
 
“I think, because he is a working businessman himself in a similar sort of 
company to ours, he does understand some of our problems well.  And maybe 
that’s why his approach is less, what would you call it, structured, academic or 
whatever, because he is living in the real world.  So I think he can relate to us 
quite a lot and that’s why we can relate to him.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
“…as well as giving sound input, we feel that he’s got our best interests at 
heart.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young felt that Simon Pratten accommodated their issues 
and priorities and way of looking at issues: 
 
“OK you want to get there, now how are we going to get there, and so step 
one; do this, step two; do this.  So he’s structured in that sense, but he’s not 
always drawing boxes and trying to put things in boxes, because he’s got a 
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more flexible approach to problems… I think that’s partly why (we) get on 
with Simon, because he’s not too blinkered and rigid and just looks at things 
from one way.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
The implementation of ideas and decisions taken at the monthly meetings was made 
relatively straightforward by the small size of the company, the direct involvement of 
Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young in day to day activities and their management 
style.  As owners and primary revenue earners, Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young 
felt they could discuss, agree and implement decisions without extensive consultation 
with members of staff: 
 
“When we decided we were going to move office we didn’t say to them – 
‘shall we move office?’ (We) decided…then we said to them – ‘we’re going to 
be moving, and this is what we are going to be doing about it’.” 
 McQuillan Young Director 
 
“Over the last couple of years we’ve felt that Linda and Tricia have taken 
major decisions without any warning to us.  They present us with a ‘fait 
accompli’.  I know that myself and one or two others have resented that at 
times.” 
McQuillan Young Staff Member 
 
The monthly meetings marked a continual cycle of review, decisions and actions, 
which transformed McQuillan Young Communications.  
 
 Reactions within the Organisation 
 
The intervention was kept low key.  The role of Simon Pratten and the nature of the 
off-site discussions were not communicated in detail to the staff, even though there 
was a perception that the staff were curious and possibly concerned: 
 
“Simon is sort of the shadowy figure who appears, and Tricia and Linda 
occasionally are out of the office for a day with Simon, doing whatever they 
are doing.” 
McQuillan Young Staff Member 
 
“I don’t think a really clear link has been made between Simon and the 
changes.  Like Simon is just there helping to develop the business and it’s like 
Tricia and Linda developing the business.  And the impression I get is that 
they’re running things past Simon and he’s helping them, rather than he’s 
coming in and changing things.” 
McQuillan Young Staff Member 
 
“I think they were deeply suspicious at first.  I’m not sure they’re completely 
comfortable.  They’ve got used to it…  I think (one member of staff) was 
probably quite resentful, certainly in the beginning, partly because we were 
small and she wasn’t part of the meetings, and partly because there was an 
external influence having an impact on her life without her say so.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
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Simon Pratten met with and advised various members of staff, and ran a workshop on 
marketing services and client management for the whole company in the Summer of 
1998.  The support of an external party in developing the business inspired some 
members of staff with a “degree of confidence about the business” and felt that the 
Directors needed and benefited from the guidance provided.  No effort was made to 
influence what was discussed during the monthly meetings nor other aspects of the 
Transitions intervention: 
 
“We haven’t been invited to share it, except in very specific circumstances… 
so, no, I don’t think we would presume to say before they went off that we 
think this.” 
McQuillan Young Staff Member 
 
Other concerns were allayed by the positive development of McQuillan Young 
Communications, such as the ambitions to grow and the relocation to new offices.  
Simon Pratten’s style, “smooth and charming”, and apparent relationship with the 
Directors also eased tensions: 
 
“It’s very interesting actually that you should call him a management 
consultant because when I think of management consultants I think of 
Andersen Consulting, and I have a much more negative view of them… I sort 
of maybe thought he was somebody Tricia and Linda knew personally, who 
was helping them develop the business.” 
McQuillan Young Staff Member 
 
In part, the acceptance of the intervention and the introduction of the changes were 
facilitated by the growth in staff numbers.  As new people joined, the existence of and 
support provided by Simon Pratten were taken as a routine part of organisational life 
at McQuillan Young Communications. 
 
 Intervention Absorbed 
  
The meetings with Simon Pratten became a regular feature in the diary, and part of the 
fabric of on-going business life, but in a detached way.  The meetings were held away 
from the office at the IoD until October 1998 when the meeting was held in the new 
offices.  This, in itself, changed the atmosphere of the meeting for Simon Pratten: 
 
“I think fundamentally the meeting hadn’t, the way the three of us worked 
together, hadn’t actually changed.  But, boy oh boy, was it different from 
sitting in one of those public rooms or even one of those private rooms at the 
top of the IoD.  It was their place and I felt better there.” 
 
Simon Pratten used the visit to the offices as an opportunity to speak briefly to the 
staff, who already took his involvement in the affairs of the company for granted.  
The visit and the fact that the meeting was held at the offices made Simon Pratten feel 
less remote. 
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Over the course of the intervention Simon Pratten came to feel less and less of an 
outsider: 
 
“I feel less and less an outsider.  I feel quite proud of it actually, not proud 
from my point of view, but proud of the business, that I’m part of what 
they’ve been doing… I thoroughly enjoy it.  I enjoy it hugely, being part of it.  
It’s exciting, it’s stimulating, it’s challenging.”  
 
Simon Pratten also saw subtle changes in his relationship with McQuillan Young 
Communications, shifting from that of an external consultant towards that of a non-
executive Director. 
 
 
Changes at McQuillan Young Communications 
 
“We have grown and I think we have been successful” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
In a little over a year, from Simon Pratten’s first involvement on a regular basis to the 
researching and writing of this case study, McQuillan Young Communications grew 
significantly in terms of revenues and employed additional staff.  Of the many issues 
discussed at the monthly meetings a number of tangible changes have been made. A 
Financial Controller has been appointed and has helped to install financial systems 
and to produce management information.  This financial information has been shared 
with the staff, increasing awareness of the importance of billing time on assignments 
and the importance of securing a stable flow of business.  Regular internal meetings 
for all staff and formal channels of communications have been set up.  A new 
organisation structure was introduced, with two divisions: one focusing broadly on 
publishing and conferences, and the other broadly on consultancy work.  Ambitious 
growth aspirations were announced and the company moved to new, much larger 
offices in September1998, to accommodate better the two Directors and five staff.  
Efforts to recruit a consultant to work alongside Linda McQuillan were under way. 
 
As well as the tangible aspects of McQuillan Young Communications, so has the 
thinking of Linda McQuillan and Tricia Young changed, since their first involvement 
with Transitions: 
 
“At that time we weren’t where we are now in terms of our thinking on where 
we go from here.  So in a year our thinking has changed.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
“…their learning curve over running the business has almost been vertical… 
but they have moved and changed hugely over this period of time in all 
aspects” 
Simon Pratten  
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By the time of the research, McQuillan Young Communications was working as a 
“proper business”, and the Directors had become more confident: 
 
 “I don’t pretend that they wouldn’t have got anywhere without it. But I hope 
it’s probably achieved two things…they’ve got to where they are now 
faster…it’s stopped them re-inventing wheels unnecessarily…they realised 
how good they were and gained confidence through this process…confidence 
in themselves and in what they are doing, and the belief in themselves.” 
Simon Pratten  
 
Overall, the work of Transitions: 
 
“has been a major instrument of change, if you like, which I didn’t expect to 
happen.  It’s happened very subtly, they do it quite subtly.  I think we would 
have had the ideas anyway, but I’m not sure we would have put them into 
practice, because we are just not disciplined enough within the business.” 
McQuillan Young Director 
 
